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Canada
There is, at present, a generally perceived crisis in
the Atlantic Canadian fishery. From one perspective, this
is nothing new as the history of the fishery can be
portrayed as a long series of crises. What is new is that--
with Canada's extension of its territorial limits to 200
miles in 1977--a strcmg, institutiona112;ed role for science
was created in the fisheries management process expressly to
help avoid the "boom and bust" cycles that had plagued the
fishery in the past.
This work takes the position that the descriptions and
interpretations of reality offered by fisheries stock
assessment science during the period from 1977 to the
present can be understood as an artifact of multi-levelled,
interactive social processes--that in many respects this
perspective yields a more plausible explanation of
scientific knowledge production than do the scientists'
reconstructions.
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FORWARD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A Reflexive Moment
Within sociology, the concept of reflexivity has gained
considerable currency in recent years. On the most general
level, reflexivity means that we should treat as significant
the social conditions of our own constructions as well as
those of the subjects of our work. If, as most of us
believe, society, cUlture, personality, and meaning are
social constructs, then it inescapably follows that our work
is likewise socially constructed. Further, if we maintain
that individuals, events, institutions, and so on can I)nly
be fUlly understood (via empirically-engaged field work) in
terms of their immediate relationship to other social.
subsets and their more nebulous relationship to a larger
social context (via empirically-grounded theory), then it
would seem logical to argue that our work as sociologists
can only be fully understood in a similar way. This, in
essence, 1s the underlying rationale of the call for
reflexivity.
From this perspective it is easy to see that a
sociologist makes decisions (mostly unconsciously) that
affect the nature and outcome of his or her work. In the
following few paragraphs I attempt to make overt the most
salient featurbs of the social context wi thin which this
study has been produced.
This work was written as a Milsters thesis, I began my
rosoarch as a straight-forward eJO:ercise in applied theory;
in th.1.s case, the social-constructivist perspective of the
sociology of scientific knowledge. I selected fisheries
stock assessment science as the empirical ground for purely
pragmatic reasons. The fishery was in a self-proclaimed
3tate of crisis and the question of whether or to what
degree scientific error had contributed to the creation of
the crisis \'laa the subject of widespread controversy. The
research station that was the base of operations for these
scientists was a ten-minute drive from my office at Memorial
University making the log:l.stics and cost of the research
qui te reasonable.
Shortly after beginn:ing to make the acquaintance of the
scientists, I began to de"elop an appreciation for the human
reality of the problem. :en short, my research quickly
ceased to be a th90retical exercise. These scientists were
no longer "subjects" or "actors" but real people, many of
whom I came to respect for their intelligence and obvious
deep concern about the health of the resource, the well-
being of those people whose livelihoods depended to some
degree on that resource, as well as the crisis in their own
profession.
It was the cooperation, patience and trust of the
scientists who made this work possible and to whom, above
all, lowe a tremendous debt of gratitude. I fear that they
may feel poorly repaid. I have tried to present the people,
institutions and events as objectively as possible. Thero
are no villains in this piece. Neither are there heros.
These people are all intelligent; many of them strikingly
so. They are sincere; sometimes painfully so. They are
surprisingly honest in their reconstruction of a personally
and professionally traumatic, confusing period in their
lives.
Being human, I have developed feelings for and opinions
about the people who are the subjects of 11I'1 study and the
institution within which they work. ,Although some parts of
my analysis are bound to irritate or even anger most of my
sUbjects, I liked them all. Ir,evitably, I found the company
of some to be more personally congenial than that of others.
This will be most obvious in the fUll transcripts of the
interviews presented in the Appendices. I have tried to
correct for it in the body of Illy work.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This is a highly critical work. It is critical of
institutions, not individuals. More particularly, it is
cr.iticel of an inst.:l..tution' s tendency to develop conceptual
and operational inertias that have the power to pre-
determine the collective reality of ite ind.ividual members-~
to frustrate, nUllify and, occasionally, subvert an
individual's efforts to correct perceived errors or
misdirections. The work explores the generation of
consequential social forces at many levels of organization
and degrees of complexity. To the extent that it offers a
plausible explanation for a controversial and critically
important period in the Atlantic Canadian fishery, it is I)
work of forensic sociology. To the extent 1. t is an
empirically-grounded discussion of theoretical issues of
knowledge production, it .is an attempt to construct a more
broadly-applicable link between theory and praxis.
The focus of this study is the institution of the
Science Branch of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Centre of
the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceana. As n
relatively email institution, it interacts with other,
larger. sometimes competi. tive and/or cogoiti.vely
i.ncompa"tible institutions and enterprises. Among these are
the professional bureaucratic structure of the Department of
Fi.sheries and Oceans (OFO) aod the politica~ structure of
the federal governme'lt of Canada in which it is embedded and
to which it is rasponsib~e.
The Science Branch's primary institutional function is
the provision of obj active scientific advice as the basi.s
for the rational management of the commercial oxp~oitati.on
of biol.ogical marine resources. Very few people in the
Provlnce of Newfoundland and Labrador would seriously
suggest that it has been entirely successfu~ in this
respect. 1 In making this claim, I include many of the
individual members of the Science Branch.
In the work that fo1.1ows, :I take the position that the
descriptions and interpretations of reality offered by
fisheries stock assessment science during the period from
1977 to the present (1990) can be understoOd as an artifact
of mUlti-levelled, interactive social processes--that in
many respects this perspective yields a more p1ousi.ble
explanation of scientific knowl.edge production than do the
scientists' own reconstructions.
Obviously. my work is also a social construction of
reality. I must leave it to the reader to jUdge its
explicative merits.
His1:orical and Cultural Con1:ext
state-sponsored fisheries science: a history of
conflict
The Canadian state's sponsorship of fisheries science
dates from the creation by Act of Parliament 1n 1895 of the
Fisheries Research Board (FRB) (chaired by the Min.ister of
Mar.ine end Fisheries but staffed on a voluntary basis by
sc.ientists from the nation' sun!versities) and the
establishment of a summer research station in st. Andrews,
New Brunswick. The history of this relationship between
sc.ience and the state documents, from the very first year to
the present, an endemic structural stru9gle to def.ine their
respective rights and duties and to control the direcl:ion of
scientifi.c activities. This history is also ona of tho
cognitive conflicts and contradictions inherent in the
techno-utopian marriage of scientific rationality to
bureaucratic rationality. Tha dual dynamics of this
re~ationship. running in parallel, fon the backbone of the
follow1.ng work.
At tha interface between the political institution that
is Dro and the professional institution of science there are
conflicting and competing forces. The political J..nstJ..tution
of federal government operatJ..ng through the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans is the sale source of the Science
Branch's funding and functional authority. However, the
Sc1.ence Branch's sole raison d'etre within that POlitical
institution is the epistemological authori.ty derived from
the putative independence ..:Jf its knowledge constructions
from the political concerns of the state and its allegiance
to the classical norms and values of science.
In our quest to explain the Science Branch's consistent
construction and persietent defense of what is now generelly
acknOWledge to have been an erroneous description of the
northern cod population dynamics, it is essential to
understand someth1.ng of the history of the relationship
between Canadian fisheries science and the federal
government. Readers interested in a more detailed
description and discussion of that history than X offer
below are referred to Jlppendix A.
The essential point to note is that, for over 100
years, the relationship between federally-funded fisheries
science and the sponsoring government has been characterized
by a struggle for control of the cont~nt of scientific
knowledge production through control of the structural
environment within which £ederal fisheries science is
located. From the very beginnings to tha present, we see
the state's desire to assert fUll control and science's
maneuvoring to preserve some relative measure of
independence. This struggle has been variously sharv and
overt, and diffused and subtle. The final resolution came
when the Canadian government, anticipating the linkage of
foreign policy considerations to its greatly expanded
management responsibilities with a 200 mile limit. simply
eliminated the last vestiges of the FRB'e independence by an
Act of Parliament.
Yet, functional (or dysfunctional, depending on the
perspective) vestiges of science's traditional and assumed
independence remain. Foremost of these is the tendency for
the individual and collective self-identif.1cation of -DFO
scientists to be primari1y in terms of their status as
scientists and only very secondarily as employees of th-3
Canadian government. Another survival from the years of
independence is the procee:a of peer review that governs
reward and promotion. Both of theao factors (discussed more
fully in Chapter 5) are of considerable significance and
must be remembered as we work our way toward an
understonding of the general problem.
In this ambivalent relationship between science and the
state, we find a dynamic capable of generating the kind of
powerfully determining social forces necessary to explain
the central problem.
The fish and the fishery: caUlie and effect
In tho northwest region of the Atlant1c Ocean the most
important of 'the marine biological resources--both in terms
of numbers and commercial value--is the northern cod. [Anon.
DFO F8ctbook, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, DFO/4155,
Ottawa 1989J This stock inhabits a vast area of the
con'tinentel shelf encompassed by the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organization (NAFO) management areas known as 2,),
31<, and 3L or, collectively, as 2,)3I<L. [see Fig. 1.1J
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The unequalled richness of th6 cod stocks was the
primary reason for repeated military conflicts between
nations for the control of access to these fishing grounds
and the principal motive for the European colonization of
the otherwise barren and inhospitable land known today as
the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador. It is difficult
to over-emphasize the i~portaoce of the fishery to the
people of the province. While the fishery's contribution to
the provincial economy, although still significant, 2 has
considerably less~~r.ed in the years since 1949, when the
region became the tenth province of Canada, it remains the
single most powerful source of collective cultural identity
for the people who were born and raised there. Most native
Newfoundlanders are no more than two generations removed
from direct family participation in one or more aspects of
the fishery.
It is important to understand that when Newfoundlanders
speak of the fishery, they mean the traditional inshore
fishery; not the highly mechanised, capital-intensive
offshore trawler fishery. With the exception of the
addition of engines and, in some cases, depth sounders, the
inshore fishermen of today ply their trade in boats and with
gear not much changed for over 100 years. In the case of
handlines and jiggers and mUlti-hook, baited 10ngline5 or
trawls, the technology is pre-Elizabethan.
Thus it is that when something appears to threaten the
inshore fishery--falling prices, rising costs, government
regulations, or steadily declining catches--the sense of
danger is shared much more widely among the population than
any purely rational, economic analysis of the inshore
fishery would suggest.
The depth and breadth of concern surrounding the
crisis--the pol!tical, professional, and cultural stakes
riding on its outcorne--is difficult to imagine anywhere else
in North America. Only in Iceland and, perhaps, Norway
could the significance of this problem be understood in its
own terms.
Background to a Crisis
There is, at present, a generally perceived crisis in
the Atlantic Canadian fishery. From one perspective, this
is nothing new as the history Of the fishery can be
portrayed as a long series of crises. What is new is that--
wi th Canada's extension of its torritorial limits to 200
miles in 1977--a strong, institutionalized role for science
was create ~ the fisheries management process expressly to
help avoid the "boom and bust" cycles that had plagued the
fishery in the past.
Recent institutional history
Some key events in this process of institutionalization
were: (1) In 1977, the formation of the Canadian Atlantic
Fisheries Scientific Advisory Council (CAFSAC) as a
transmitter and translator of scientific information between
the producers (stock assessment scientists) and the
sponsoring consumers (the political management structure of
the Minister's Office). (2) The transmutation in 1977 of
the largely powerless International Convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) into the Northwest
Atlantic Fi3heries Organization (NAFO); (equally powerless
[Harris 1990]) for the joint international management of
extra- and trans-boundary stocks. (3) The creation in 1979
by an Act of Government of the Department of Fisheries and
Oceans (OFO) from elements of the former Department of
Fisher1es and the Environment.
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1I.nd yet, in spite of substantial institutional and
financial commitments to the goal of creating robust stocks
and a profitable domestic fishery, subsequent events have
given dramatic and costly evidence that the federal
government is still widely considered to be incapable of
effectively managing the resource and its exploitation. 3
The "Kirby Report" [1963], the "Keats Report" [1966], the
"Alverson Report" [1967], the "Harris Report" [1990], and
the "Dunne Report" [1990] all responded to perceived crises
or aspects of a perceived crisis.
In the current atmosphere of social, economic, and
environmental crisis, everyone with an interest in the
fishery is searching for ths reason for this latest failure.
Many fingers are being pointed at the traditional targets
from previous crises. Among these are: overfishing (both
domestic and foreign), federal mismanagement for reasons of
pOli tical expediency, and over-capacity in the harvesting
and processing sectors. But in the latest crisis, voices in
all sectors of the fishing industry, the federal management
structure, the media, and the general public are suggesting
that it is science, the erstwhile saviour, that is to blame.
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Recen't history of crises
In 1982, and again in 1987, and 1989 a generally
perceived crisis in the Atlantic Canadian northern cod
fishery occasioned the formation of a federally-sponsored
task forcA to investigate causes and condi tiona of the
crisis and to generate recommendations for the alleviation
of the crisis. The 1982 group was known formally as the
"Task Force on the Atlantic Fisheries" and informally as the
"Kirby Commission" in reference to its chair, Michael J, L.
Kirby. The 1987 group was the "Task Group on Newfoundland
Inshore Fisheries" (TGNIF) or the "Alverson CommissiOn"
chaired by Dr, Dayton L. A.lverson. The 1989 group was
formally the "Independent Review of the State of the
Northern Cod stock" and informally, the "Harris commission",
i t8 chair being Dr. Leslie Harris.
Each commission issued its findings In a report to
government. These documents are widely referred to as "The
Kirby Report," the "Alverson (or TGNIFJ Report," and "The
Harris Report." respectively, and shall be so called in the
balance of this work.
The three reports are strikingly different in almost
every respect, sharing only a general sense of crisis in the
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fisheries and a federal mandate. And yet they are
intimately linked in that the findings of the Kirby Report
are commonly judged to have precipitated the current crisis
addressed by both the Alverson Report and the Harris Report.
At the heart of the matter is the deceptively simple
question: "How many fish are in the sea?"
The Kirby Report: a crisis in the making
Broadly stated, the Kirby Report responded t::J a sharp
decline in the overall profitability of the Atlantic
Canadian fisheries due to a persistent "cost/price squeeze."
The fishermen's and processors' operating costs wt>:;;:·e rising
in the face of a steady decline in the price received for
their products. The report's findings and recommendations
were based upon the explicit and reiterated assumption that
the resource base was strong and would continue to grow
stronger under the capable management of Canadian fisheries
scientists. And by far, the greatest growth in the resource
base would occur in the northern cod stacks.
"The rebuilding of the northern cod stock is
expected to continue through 1987 when a Total
Allowable Catch (TAe) in the vicinity of 400,000 t
[metric tonnes] or more is forecast. This level is
almost certainly below the maximum sustainable yield
from the stock.... By fOllowing a conservative rate of
harvest ... the eventual long-term production of the
stock is thought to be about 550,000 t annually."
[Kirby 1983 p. 242]
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The text goes on to acknowledge a degree of uncertainty
in fisheries forecasting and that these estimates,
therefore, are deliberately conservative.
Based upon the belief that the Kirby Report's forecasts
had some reasonable and valid correspondence to reality, and
with the active support of the provincial and federal
governments through various incentives, individuals and
corporations involved in the fishery, and particularly the
northern cod fishery in the NAFO management area 2J3KL, made
heavy capital investments to update and expand their
harvesting and processing capacities. Landings from the
northern cod stocks continued to increase through 1985.
However, at present, it is not at all clear whether this
increase was due to a real increase in resource abundance,
increased fishing effort, more efficient and effective
technOlogy and techniques, increased familiarity of the
skippers and fleet managers with seasonal movements of the
resource, or (most likely) some complex combination of these
factors.
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The Alverson and Harris reports
Contrary to DFO estimates of a 15 per cent annual rate
of growth in the stock, and in spite of increased fishing
effort, the total northern cod catch remained essentially
static through 1987--the inshore catch declining while the
offshore catch increased. [Harris 1990] People with a
strong interest in a sustainable, profitable fishery began
to suspect that the OFO numbers might be considerably less
than accurate. Growing criticism of OFO from the inshore
fishery became wide-spread public criticism and was given
sympathetic coverage by the media. 4
This generated political pressure on the federal
government which responded with the formation of the
Alverson Commission to investigate thQ causos of the decline
in inshore catches. It's conclusions, as presented to the
public by OFO, supported the scientific claims of an
increasing resource base and concluded that the decline in
c ..tches must be due to some combination of enVironmental
influences on the annual inshore migrations of the stock.
This explanation was rejected by the inshore fishery and the
pUblic criticism and political pressure continued unabated
but focused specifically on the scientific claims as to the
stock's status.
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In 1989 OFO issued its annual assessment based upon a
revised (and ostensibly more accurate) mathematical model to
generate stock estimates from research and catch data. The
results--indicating that abundance had been over-estimated
by as much as a factor of two--were SUfficiently alarming to
precipitate the latest crisis and the formation of the
Harris Commission to investigate the causes of this
perceived scientific error and report its findings.
A close reading of the Harris Report suggests that the
OFO estimates of stock strength were based upon data,
methodologies, and models of such poor or uncertain quality
as to be essentially useless as a rational basis for
management or commercial planning. And yet the pressure is
enormous from all concerned sectors to generate legitimating
ground for the strategic and tactical decisions that must be
made. As a fisheries scientist said during a conversation
at e recent international conferenceS in st. John's, Nfld.
"'z don't knoW',' si.mply isn't an acceptable answer."
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The Task A't: Hand
It is at this point that the issues anc! practices of
fi.sheries stock assessment begin to get inhn. esting from a
soc10logical point of view.
Based upon recent research--primarily extensive
unstructured interviews with the key actors in the federal
scientific stock assessment and management process--I will
argue that this latest crisis can be most usefully
understood as a product of multi-levelled and interactive
social forces and processes. This perspective diverges
quite sharply from the more traditional view which holds
that the "success" and/or "failure" of stack assessment
science is attributable solely to the ability or inability
of scientists to objectivelY lind accurately understand,
describe lind predict th.e dynamics of external natural
reality.
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1. The following responses were obtained in a poll conducted on
Feb. 20, 1990 for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CSC) by
Corporate Research Associates of Halifax, Nova Scotia. The
sample was 400 indiv.1duala and the results were sa.1d to be
accurate within five per cent 19 times out of 20.
In response to the question "HOW would you rate the Federal
Government's handling of this crisis?", 72 per cent rated it as
"poor." None rated it as "excellent," only 3 percent as IOgood,"
23 per cent as "fair" and 2 per cent had nr, opinion.
2. As of 1988. the fishery provided employment for 25 par cent of
the workforce of Newfoundland but contributed only 15 per cent of
the province's total goods production. (MandaIe 1990)
3. See also Endnote 1.
4. The fOllowing excerpt from an editorial is typical of the
media' 8 treatment of the sUbject.
"On the east coast. Ottawa's flawed policies had plunged
hundreds of fishing towns into crisis.
"Cabinet mi.nisters. acti.ng on advice from federal
scientists. had permitted Canadian [o:ffshore trawler]
skippers to steadily increase their cod harvests off
Newfoundland' 5 coast until the bottom fell out of
established logic and Ottawa awakened to a resource crisis."
(The Sunday Express Feb. 25, 1990 p.6)
5. The International Symposium on Operational Fisheries
Oceanography, st. John's, Newfoundland, OCtober 23-27, 1989.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETI:CAL PERSPECTI:VE AND METHODOLOGY
I: began my research from the theoretical perspective of
the "social constructivist" school of the sociology of
scientific knowledge. My intention was to document. discuss
and analyze the activities and knowledge production of DFO' s
fisheries stock assessment scientists entirely from within
this relatively new analytical framework. However, it soon
bocame clear that this essentially micro-social approach to
the problem was insufficient to explain the data; the
empirical real!ty of fisheries science as I came to
understand it during the course of my research.
The Dynamic Complexity of Knowledge Construction
It was clear that knowledge was being constructed as a
product of dynamic, interactive, and mUlti-dimensional
social forces. Macro-level social forces were generated
within and between several national and supra-national
iosti tutions and functional structures. Primarily these
were: (1) the federal governments of Canada. the Un! ted
states and the European fishing nations, (2) international
fisheries organizations such as NAFQ and ICES, (3) the
commercial fishery as a unitary national structure, (4) the
public media, and (5) science as supra-disciplinary
cognitive structure and process. The forces originating on
this level were interactive with the demands of provincial
governments, individual multi-national fishing corporations
and coltpeting sectors of the fishery--characterized by their
geographic areas of operation, such as inshore and offshore,
or target species such as cod, caplin, or shrimp. Micro-
level knowledge construction wi thin the DFO Science Branch
in St. John's and the activities of individual scientists
could be seen to be occurring interactively with all the
higher levels of social organization.
Because my primary research s1te was located on the
micro-social level within the Science Branch of the DFO
station in St. JOhn's, Newfoundland, I rely most centrally
upon the insights into the production of scientific
knowledge afforded by social constructivism. Rowevar, to
adequately account for knowledge construction on this level,
I was compelled to empirically and theoretically encompass
the full range of dynamic relationships. Therefore, I
occasionally borrow from other theoretical perspectives
(discussed beloW) not normally associated with social
constructivism.
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Social Constructivism and Scientific Knowledge
The classical perspective
Scientific knowledge is conventionally poi'trayed as and
believed to be an obj~ctive, dispassionate, description of
external natural reality--a reality explicitly external to
human sccial reality. In this view, the content and, by
extension, the production of scientific knowledge lies
beyond--and is exempt from--critical examination by non-
scientists. However, relatively recent theoretical
developments in the sociology of scientific knowledge allow
us to approach science from a new, some would say radical,
perspective.
Constructivism: the legacy of Plato, Locke, and Kuhn
In many respects the sociology of scientific knowledge
is an evolutionary synthesis of aspects of history,
philosophy, anthropology, and sociology. However, certain
implications in Thomas Kuhn's seminal work The structure of
Scientific Revolutions [Kuhn 1962) have been widely cited as
the conceptual catalyst for the inclusion of the actual
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creation and content of 'scientific knowledge as a legitimate
site for social research.
Although for practical purposes Kuhn is well-deserving
of his founder's status, from a philosophical perspective,
the idea that our descriptions of natural reality are
fundamentally and i.nevitabl.y social constructions has been
around for a very long time. Plato made thi.s point with the
parable of the cave. John Locke pronounced on the theory-
ladenness of observation, albeit for hie own philosophical
purposes.
"In his 'Essay concerning Human understanding', John
Locke argues that the only objects of human knowledge
which exist are qualities, which are perceived
(experienced) as ideas of sensation and reElection.
According to Locke, qualities are passive effects which
'cannot be imagined to [i.e. it is inconceivable that
they} substst by themselves.' As qualities are not
selE-sustaining, Locke argues that 'we accustom
ourselves to suppose some [unperceived} substratum
wherein they do subsist and from wh1.ch they do result.
which .•. we call substance.'· [John Locke in David
Burton, The Knowledge oE SUbstance in the Thought of
Locke and Berkeley, Codgito (sic--it's a pun), Vol. 1,
#1, Dept. of Philosophy, Memorial Univarsity of
Newfoundland, St. John's 1990]
From the social constructivist view we ses scientific
knowledge primarily as a social artifact and a social
accomplishment rather than an objective description of
external natural reality. [Pinch 1986, MUlkay 1979, 1983,
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Knorr-Cetina 1981, 1983] The most radical treatments
portray modern science as the enabling and legitimating
belief system of the industrial revolution and the l:l..beral-
capitelist state.
Michael MUlkay summarized the perapective quite
succinctly in Sc1.ence and the socio~ogy of Knowledge.
"1 have tried to show... that there are good grounds
tor rejecting this [conventional] portrayal ot science.
In particular. the central assumption that science is
based on a direct representation of the phys1.cal world
has been criticised Lrom several direct1.ons. For
instance. factual statements have been shown to depend
on specu~ative assumptions. Observation has been shown
to be gu.1.ded by linguistic categories. And the
acceptance at knowledge-claims has been shown to
lnvolve indeterminate and variab~e criteria.
Sc1.entit1.c knowledge. then. necessarily offers an
account ot the phys1.cal world W'h1.ch is mediated through
avallable cultural resources: and these resources are
in no way defin1.tive. The indeterminacy of scientific
criteria. the inconclusive character of the genera~
knowledge-claims of science. the dependence of such
claims on the available symbolic resources a~l indicate
that the physical world could be analyzed perfectly
adequate~y by means of language and presuppositions
quite dlfferent from those employed in the modern
scientific community_ There is. therefore. nothing in
the physical world which uniquely determines the
conclusions of that community. [Mu1kay 1980 pp. 60-611
"The conclusions established through scientific
negotiation are not. then. definitive accounts of the
physical world _ They are rather claims which have been
deemed to be adequate by a specific group of actors in
a particular cultural and social context. ~ [i.bid p. 95]
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In the course of the fallowing work I will show that
this cultural. and social. context can include, must incl.ude.
the totality of the institutional and poU.tical environment
in which scientists produce their knowledge. In fact, the
production and content of DFO' s scientific descriptions of
the northern cod stock caMot be adequately expl.ained
without a fairly comprehensive understanding of the social
dynamics of the Science Branch's relationship with the
larger-ardQr institutional and politi.cal environment.
"The revisions in the customary view of science
which have been presented above enable us to reconsider
the posSibility of there being direct external
influences on the content of what scientists consider
to be genuine knowledge.~ [Mulkay 1980 p.97]
"There is in practice a continual cuI tural exchange
between science and the wider society. Interpretive
resources enter science Ilainly through informal
thinking. usually with only a very Haited awareness of
their external orig!rts on the part of participants.
They are relined and modified in the course of informal
negotiation: and they are allowed .into the public
annals of science only after appropriate
reforlllUlat.ion." [ibid p.99]
Later we will see that this describes very well how
both individual scientists and the institution of the
Science Branch cou~d develop cOl1lllitments to a descript.ion of
reaHty that. in soma respects, actua1ly came to invert the
classical portrayal. of the relationsh.ip between science and
natural reality. In this case, the commitment to the idea
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of a strongly rebuild~ng northern cod stock was so powerful
that it can be shown to have been determinate of data
se~ection and processing as well as analytical
methodologies. The reality of a rebuilding stock was
constructed through subtle, amorphous but persistent
influences on scientists and the Science Branch of the
social, cultural, economic, end political concerns of the
wider society to which they alSO belonged.
Pinch, in Confronting Nature: The Sociology of Solar-
Neutrino Detection, identifies the concept of "symmetry~ or
"equivalence" as the f1.rst guiding principal of the social
constructivist approach.
"In providing an explanation of the development of
scientific knowledge, the sociologist should attempt to
explain adherence to all beliefs about the natural
world, whether perceived to be true or false, in a
similar way." [Pinch 1986 p.3]
Therefore, 1.0 the case at hand, we are not ultimately
interested in assessing the relative accuracy of the work of
OPO stock assessment scientists but rather in understanding
the social forces that impinge upon the production of their
knowledge and the social conditions that create jUdgements
of "right" and "wrong" by outside groups and individuals
with interests in the fishery.
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Controversies and crises are the most productive sites
for social-constructivist research as it is during these
episodes that the actual content of knowledge and the rules
under which it is created and accepted or rejected are in
open, conscious debate. The key actors in the controversy
are readily identifiable, accessible for interviewing, and
are usually quite few in number. [Kuhn 1962, Pinch 1986]
The task of a sociologist is to be able to show that
such apparently immutable, monolithic concepts used by
scientists to evaluate the validity of their work such as
"repeatability", "refutation," "calibration," etc.. are in
fact extraordinarily flexible and that their actual
deftni tions and applications are regularly negotiated among
scientists. Thus, scientific knowledge can be seen as a
flexible, relativistic creation of scientists rather than an
unquestionably "true" description of natural reality. [Pinch
1986]
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Other Supplementary Theoretical perspectives
The limits of constructivism
A critique of social constructivism is offered by Rob
Hagendijk in his article "structuration Theory,
Constructivism, and Scientific Change." Hagend1jk presents
what he sees as the weaknesses of constructivism in order to
argue the superiority of structuration theory as an
analytical tool for revealing the social forces and process
by which one of several competing theories are established
as "true." I, however, have chosen to use his critique, not
to reject constructivism, but to locate the boundaries of
its utility as applied to my research.
"TwO ideas distinguish the constructivist approach.
First. constructivism holds that scientific knowledge
is constructive rather than descriptive .•..
Scientific 'facts' are created by scientists and should
be analyzed accordingly. Second, constructivism argues
that (sacial) structure is at best a consequence but
never the cause of what people do. structural social
factors or conditions are therefore dismissed as
inadequate analytical categories for the understanding
of scientific work." (Hagendijk 1n Cozzens and Gieryn
1990 p. 44]
While I agree with the constructivists that "structural
social factors" per se are indeed insufficient for a deep
understanding of the construction of scientific knowledge, 1
also agree with Hagendijk that, with respect to the present
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problem--and very likel.y others--these factors must also be
adequately accounted for in order to produce a complete
description and satisfactory explanation of the fisheries
stock assessment knowledge construction of DFO science and
scientists. 1"0 this end, Hagendijk makes my point as well
as his.
. • . . So much emphasis is placed an the
'negotiability' of scientific knowledge and research
that is becomes impossible to analyze what is beyond
negotiation or manipulation for certain people at
certain particular times and places, and why this 1.s
so. If everything is constructed. what makes some
constructions more tenable than others? 1'0 deal w.fth
this question it seems unavoidable that: structures must
be invoked that go beyond the situation in wh.ich
knowledge claims are being negotiated • • . ."
.. . . • . Constructivism allows us to understand
*how* these scientists reached a given agreement. but
it does not allow us to understand *why* they reached
this particular agreement and not some other one •
. " [ibid pp. 49-50}
Boundaries as an analytical tool
As mentioned above, in the course of my research and
analysis I found it necr.Jssary to accoun"t for the
relationships between institutions and structures located at:
differing lavele of social organization. However, these
enti ties appeared as distinct and stable only wi thin the
context of a given issue or at a particUlar moment in time.
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As time flawed and issues changed these entities could
become frustratingly chimerical.
Consequently, I found it necessary to confront the
concept of boundaries and the questions of how to cope with
their elusive plasticity and how they could be usefully
incorporated 1n a sociological study of science. In this
case :r was concerned less with the nOrDIlltive/cognitivQ
boundaries within science itself such as pure/applied,
biology/medicine etc. than boundaries between science and
other social structures and institutionS such as
science/technology, science/politics, science/economics, or
at the highest level, science/society. In pursuing this
matter I found several of the articles in Theories of
Science in Society to be of considerable value. [Cozzens and
Gieryn eds. 1990J
The concept of boundari9s is of critical importance in
the sociology of science :for purposes of both description
and analysis. They parmi t us to describe relationships
between actors and/or groups in terms of transactions
involving knowledge, power, and material resources--to
10cate these transactions in time and spece, to see
directionality in these transactions and, therefore, to
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detect and describe hierarchies of relationships. In turn,
these constructions perm!. t us to analyze and explain these
relationships and. thereby, construct and assign meaning.
Boundaries and other, similar distinctions originally
arise because of sOllie instrumental functionality ;1ntrinsic
in the dist;1nction. From the perspective at: the originating
person or group it is useful that such a boundary be
constructed. From any given perspective i1: is common for
boundaries/distinctions to vary in relation to the
particular interests at stake. However, boundaries lIIay well
persist. outliving their original function and become
somewhat JIIisleading--in some instances, deliberately so--in
which case they take on a new, disingenuous functionality.
In the present c8se. the boundary between science and
the political/bureaucratic structure of the state is of
cr1tical importance. Throughout the work that follows we
will repeatedly see that the location of this boundary is
not fixed but can vary greatly and be the subject of heated
disputes. In general, it can be said that is in the state's
interest to enlarge end weaken the boundary while it is the
interests of science to c10sely circumscribe and strengthen
it.
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Patronage and power
Another theoret.ical perspective which I have found to
be of value in understanding the diversity of social forces
that can impinge upon scientific knowledge construction--
that of resource and power relat.ionships between sc.1ence and
other social institutions and structures--is offered by
Cozzens and Gleryn in their intrOductory text.
~An understanding of the complex associations that
make up scientific patronage is surely near the core of
a theory Of science in society ••••
"The relationship between patronage and the autonomy
of science is center stage in several of these
essays ••.. These thoughts demand revision of. the idea
that scientists enjoy autonomy from politicdl and
economic forces swirling outside their laboratories.
because such cloistering is essential for objectivity
and truth. Laboratories are political and economic
forces, as Westrum forcefully reminds us, and
scientists' autonomy is an illusion perpetuated by the
misbelief that neither money or power 1s a prerequisite
for 'big' science. Both power and money come wi tll
strings attached." (emphasis in the original, Cozzens
and Gieryn 1990 p. 5]
Modern scientific know~edge production, on aoy
significant scale, cannot exist independently of a market
for that production. The time when a self-funded scientist
such as the 16th century astronomer and Danish nobl.eman
Tycho Brahe could produce substantial work is long gone. In
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the present atmosphere of increasing political vol.atility in
Canada--characterized by parties' and politicians' apparent
Willingness to respond to short-term interests of
momentarily powerful. social. entities, end reactions by
politicians (individually and collectively) to the changing
pol.itical environment~-moneyfor science must become ever-
more directly linked with political/pragmatic objectives.
Politically motivated interests may well notice and seek to
exploit "legitimate" scientific debate on a given issue for
se1f-interested pol:l..tical/economic ends. The bind that this
can create for science is succinctly stated by Hagendijk.
" • . . . Boundary maintenance and col~aborat.1onare
important in maintaining the distinct identity oE
science. On one hand scientists have to maintain their
scientific i.ntegri.ty and trustworthiness: on the other
hand. t.hey depend on thei.r nonscientific environment
Eor support and legitimation • . . ." [Cozzens and
Gieryn 1990 p.se]
Author!ty and investments
This leads us to a related but distinct theoretical
concern; that of sci.entifi.c authority and its construction,
negotiat:l.on, maintenance, and defence. In the present case,
the outcome of the debate between OFO science and other
outside lnterests (and, later, within the Sc1.ence Branch
we11) es to the "true" status of the northern cod stocks
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by no means inevitable. The current 18b'9l1ling of the
earlier perception of a still-growing stock as "wrong"
the result of a complex set of negotiations between
competing interests with differing kinds and amounts of
authority at their disposal and with differing objectives.
It is perfectly conceivable that under different
circumstances, the scientists· original perception wou~d
have been author:ltetively vindicated and the debate about
the state of the stocks settled by a definitive closure.
It is pos9ib~e to postulate another reason for the
persistence of "erroneous" know~edge in stock assessment
science. This has to do with the costs and comp~exity of
the production of that knowledge. Unlike knowledge produced
by the humanities or the socia~ sciences, knowledge
production in the Hfe sciences, and especially in large-
scale marine bio~ogy, requires the establishment and support
of a complex human and technical apparatus--research
so1entists, technicians, administrative support personnel,
laboratories crammed with sophisticated, expensive
equipment, computers, telecommunications equipment,
specialized research vessels and alrcraft--all coordinated
and supervised by a hierarchy of managers.
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The knowledge produced by this system is. to a great
extent. validated simply by virtue of its production. The
results of an :lmpressive deployment of resources are imbued
with the power and authority of the institution capable of
mobilizing such resources. This effect is perhans even more
pronounced wi thin the sponsoring institution than without
it. Secondly, having made large investments in the
production of knowledge. and having originally certified it
as valid, the institution will not lightly decertify its
validity. Such knowledge is energized with an inertia in
rough proportion to the institutional investment in its
production.
From this perspectiva, DFO's resistance to the initial,
external criticism of its construction of reality in 1984-85
is not probl.ematic but, rather, perfectly normal. What is
remarkable is the fact that such a relatively brief period
of time--five years--was required to attenuate the
prevailing epistemol.ogieal inertia and begin the process of
reconciliation of conflicting cognitive models and the
reconstruction of a more broadly-shared reality.
Another dimension of authority is the competiticn
between scientific organizations engaged in similar work.
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In the following passage the author is referring to
scientific work conducted wi thin academic iost!tutions but
hi ~ claim can be usefully extended to include state-
sponsored scientific activity as well.
"Most of the time such institutionally supported
scientific work is conducted in direct competitior. with
that of other teams of scientists in parallel
institutions engaged on the same or similar work: this
competition constitutes a struggle for authority or
mastery of the scientific field in question in every
sense of that term." [Redner 1987 p.97]
Applied to the current problem, we can hypothesize that
DFO scientists may have conceptualized their work as being
in competition with that of other fishing nations'
scientists (most prominently Norway and Iceland) with
respect to providing the scientifio knowledge and advice
neoessary for the masterly rebuilding of a depleted resource
and the sustainable rational exploitation of that resource.
This is the guiding vision of techno-utopianism, a vision
which had not previously been realized on any significant
scale. This perspective yields yet another possible
explanation of the persistent optimistic interpretation of
ambiguous results and the strong reluctance to consider
al ternative interpretations.
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My work relies primarily on the transcripts of
extensive interviews with fisheries scientists and their
managers in the political/bureaucratic hierarchy of DFO and,
additionally, on related government and academic
publications and media accounts.
A.ll interviews (except where explicitly noted) were
conducted under a self-imposed set of rUles and procedures.
Each interview (including fOllOW-Ups) began by asking
permission to tape record the session. All tapes were
labelled, dated, and safely stored to serve, if needed,
the reference for any questions of context or accuracy. At
any point during 'the interview the subject could request
that specified information be placed off-the-record or the
tape recorder turned off.
Subsequently, the subject would receive a verbatim
transcript of the interview and be requested to make any
corrections, clarifications, amplifications, additions, or
deletions that he or she felt were appropriate. Any
published quotations or references to information acquired
during the interview would be from the subject-edited
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transcript. Further. prior to the publication of the
present work, no other person would be permitted to quote
from or refer to material contained in the interview without
written permission from both the sUbject and myself.
I felt that these precautions and guarantees were
appropriate given the highly controversial nature of the
subject, the sensitivity of some of the information and
opinions offered during the interviews, and the
vulnerability of some of the subjects to--possibly quite
severe--repercussions.
It is worth noting that after a general description of
my research, the reasons for my interest 1n this issue, end
an explanation of my interview protocol, no one refused to
be interviewed or my request to tape the interview. All
sUbjects agreed to speak on-the-record and for personal
attribution. In only one case was I asked to turn the tape
off for a brief period. Nor do any of the subjects' self-
edited transcripts contain any substantial revisions or
deletions.
There are two possible reasons for their openness.
One, is that I had seriously overestimated the controversial
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nature of the research area. I think that this is quite
unlikely. The second is that the people whom I interviewed
were and are deeply concerned about the fisheries--the
relative health of the biological resource and the welfare
of the men snd women, the communities and corporations,
whose wellbeing is intimately entwined with that of the fish
stocks. Many of my subjects are dismayed that this latest
crisis happened in spite of their best efforts and are
actively searching for the reasons. A few have suffered
both professionally and personally because of their
perceived role in the apparent over-estimation and
mismanagement of the stock. For a variety of reasons, these
people took a genuine interest in my research and were
willing to contribute their version of events and
perceptions of the issues, often quite emphatically.
Several reviewers of earlier drafts of this work have
suggested that I reduce the length of my quotations from the
interview transcripts. I have chosen to ignore their advice
for the following reasons: First, the most common criticism
levelled against an author by a quoted subject is that their
words were "taken out of context." By "bookending" a
crucial passage with some of the preceding and SUbsequent
conversation I attempt to make clear the context of a
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particular question and answer. Although I have included
the fUll transcripts in the Appendices, I felt that it was
unrealistic to expect the reader to flip back and forth.
Second, it was important to me that I share these pages as
fully as possible with the people who are, in a very real--
if unusual--sense, co-authors of this work. I am frankly
uncomfortable with my power as an author to decide what
these people can and cannot say. The lengthy quotations are
my way of abdicating this power so that my co-authors may
speak directly to the reader.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE
At the heart of this controversy is the generation by
fisheries scientists of current stock population estimates,
predictions of the effects on stock populations of
exploitation and management variables, and the consequent
issuance (through the Canadian Atlantic Fisheries Advisory
Council (CAFSAC) of their findings in the form of yearly
catch quota recommendations and long-range forecasts. Based
upon these recommendations and with consideration given to
various social, economic, and political factors, the federal
Minister of Fisheries sets yearly Total Allowable Catch
(TAC) quotas for commercially exploited opecies/stocks and
develops longer-range management strategies. Based upon the
yearly TACs and official predictions, individuals and
corporate interests 1n tho harvest1ng and process1ng sectors
make tactical operat1onal and strateg1c investment
dec1sions.
The ab0ve process is predicated on the obvious
assumpt10n that fisheries science is capable of producing
quite precise assessments and projections that are and will
be of practical value to, and consistent w1th, the
subjective experience of its two principle clients--the
pOlicy and planning sector of the DFO Ministry and the
commercial fishing industry.
In fact, the entire institutional structure of DFO and
the process of scj entific stock assessment and advice/input
to the formulation of fisheries policy and the planning of
resource exploitation is based upon the widely-shared
paradigm that the natural universe and perceived sub-systems
are a product and process of linear dynamical interactions
that are governed by "natural laws" and, as such,
ultimately knowable and, therefore, manageable. 1
Assumptions and Expectations at the Third Law of the Sea
Convention
The foregoing paradigm informed Canada's position at
the Third Law of the Sea Convention when it argued in favour
of the extension of the boundary of its control over marine
resources from 12 to 200 miles.
" .. . from the Canadian point of view, the 2J3KL cod
stock had been seriously overexploited •.• • Thus the
reqUired management policy seemed obvious--rebuild the
stock. In fact, of course. Canada had insisted on
implementing this policy before invoking the F:FJ
(F:xtended Fisheries Jurisdiction], as shown by its
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actions in 1975." (At the Third Law of the Sea
Conference and at the ,June, 1975 ICNAF meeting to set
the 2J3KL quota) (Munro 1980J
Canada's arguments in favour of the 200 mile limit were
presented in the powerfully persuasive language of science
and, as such, were accepted as rational. They were "true"
becausE. they were believed to be grounded 1n scientifically
mediated empirical reality. Further, the Canadian
negotiators were emphatic, explicit, and--ultimately--
convincing in their insistence that their motives were
essentif':lly altruistic and not expansionist.
"Canada's argument was stated to be a functionalist
one: that is, Jurisdiction would be extended for
certain specific purposes where it was necessary to
manage resources or protect the environment, and the
extent of that jurisdiction would be coterminous with
management or protection needs. Moreover, it was
argued, the coastal state would be carrying out these
functions as a ' trustee' or as a 'custodian' for the
international community." (McRae in Canada and the Sea,
1980]
Canada's position was as follows:
1.) Joint international management of commercially important
stocks through the agency of ICNAF had been and would
inevitably continue to be a failure. This was theoretically
informed by Hardin's thesis of "the tragedy of the commons"
and empirically supported by the fact that, in spite of
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falling catches since 1968 (see Table 3.1). the northern cod
quotas set by ZCNAF had been hugely in excess of what was
capable of being caught by a large and powerfUl fleet (see
Table 3.2). [Regier 1978, Munro 1980)
"In terms of the promise of additional harvests. the
2J3KL stock complex overwhelms all else by virtue of
its size and its over-exploitation between 1956 and
1976." [Munro 1980 p. 27)
'l"able 3.1
Harvests of COd in ICNAF Sub-Areas lJ3KL,
Selected Yea.rs 1956-75
(All catch figures given in thousands of metric tonnes)
Distant Water Nations Canada
Total Harvest t Share NF Iosh. NF Ofsh. Other
1956 300.5 117.1 39.0 172.1 2.3 8.7
1960 393.6 229.9 59.2 157.3 2.S 4.'
1964 562.0 420.5 74.8 131.5 6.7 3.3
1969 793.2 659.9 94.2 101.0 20.2 2.2
1972 454.6 388.1 85.4 62.3 3.8 0.4
1973 354.5 310.0 87.4 42.7 1.4
1974 372.6 336.5 90.3 35.2 0.'
1975 287.5 245.0 85.2 41.1 0.9 0.4
Source: ICNAF, Statistical Bulletin 1975 [in Munro 1980)
~
Total Allowable Catches and Actual Harvests of 2J3KL Cod,
1973-75
1973 1974 1975
(thousanCfSOf tonnes)
ICNAF TAC 665.5 656.7 554.0
Harvest 354.5 372.6 287.5
Source: ICNAF, Redbook 1978 [in Munro 1980]
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2.) Canada was the most proximate sovereign state to the
resource and had a dominant. historically-grounded interest
in the long-term viability of the resource. The northern
cod fishery was one of thQ basic engines of socio-economic
activity in Atlantic Canada and the fundamental raison
d'etre of the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador. [Munro
1980. Atlantic Report July. 1990] "Canada's posJ.tion on the
fisheries was tha.t the coastal state ought to have the
responsibility for managing species harvested near its
coasts ... " {McRae. Donald M. in Canada and the Sea 1980]
3.) Canadian fisheries scientists had earned an
international reputation for excellence, {Regier 1978]
4.) Therefore. Canada had the right, the incentive. and the
capability to responsibly. rationally. and effectively
manage its adjacent llIarine resources. [Kirby 1983]
5.) Further, under exclusive Canadian management depleted
and, perhaps, endangered stocks would be rebuilt to and
maintained at historical levels (see Table 3.3). supporting
sustained catches higher than historical levels was
considered to be a strong possibility. [Kirby 1983]
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Table 3.3
Projected 1985 TACs for 2J3KL Cod at Different Rates of F.
Fishing Mortality Rates (F)
F..O.lO
F=O.16
F;;.FO.laO.20
FMSY.O.35
Projected TAC
(thousands of tonnes)
307
402
442
523
Source: ICNAF Redbook 1978 and A.T. Pinhorn, DFO St. John's
{in Munro 1980]
(NOTE: Pinhorn was and remains one of the most respected and
influential scientists working on matters pertaining to the
Northwest Atlantic fisheries. As such, his predictions
would ha....e been accepted as highly credible.)
"To put these TAe levels into perspective, it can be
noted that a difference of 57,000 tonnes of I7roundfish
landed and processed per year in Newfoundland is a
difference of 1,000 man-years of employment in the
processing sector." [Munro 1980 p. 26]
6.) Finally, exclusive Canadian management would not only
bring long-sought stabil1ty and sustained prosperity to the
Canadian fishing industry but would also (in accordance with
the provision of the Third Law of the Sea convention that
required a state to make available to other nations
resources surplus to that state's needs) bring these Bame,
if somewhat lesser, benefits to the industries of other
nations that had traditionallY fished on Canada's
continental shelf. [Regier 1978]
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In reviewing this argument, we can discover the seeds
of the current fisheries crisis and the foundations of the
institutional structure snd process that would later result
in the penetration of powerful social forces deep into the
heart of fisheries stock assessment science. The first
point was grounded in a broadly-shared, quantified reality.
The second appealed to generally accepted principles of the
rights and legitimate interests of sovereign states. The
third established Canada's unsurpassed expertise in
fisheries science end, therefore, its eminent qualifications
to rationally exercise its sovereign rights end interests.
The fourth is a logically persuasive recapitulation and
integration the first three points. The fifth and sixth
points, while seeming to flow smoothly from the foregoing,
are in retrospect, the "bridge too far."
Techno-Utopianism and Fisheries Management
The fact that no state had ever attempted (much less
succeeded) to establish a long-term sustainable fisheries
management regime on such a large scale did not, at the time
seem to be a significant problem. It was, after all, merely
a matter of scale. Canadian scientists believed that the
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theory of fish population dynamics was reasonably well-
understood. what had prevented rational, sustainable
management in the past had been lack of authority. control.
and resources. And now they were to be given all three. So
it was not considered to be unrealistic, or even overly-
optimistic, to project and promise such specific and
substantial results, both to the Canadian fishing industry
and to foreign nations such as Spain and Portugal which had
relied heavilY on the fisheries of the North West Atlantic
for more than 400 years.
'l'he fundamental assumptions are clear:
1.) The dynamics of the marine ecosystem are those of the
classical post-Newtonian scientific paradigm: the universe
is mechanistic and deterministic and its workings are
governed by a few fundamental and unvarying Laws.
2.) The marine ecosystem and its perceived sub-systems (in
this case commercially valuable fish stocks) are
fundamentally robust. That is, they are relatively
insensitive to small perturbations and tend to seek natural
equilibrium states.
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3.) These natural equilibrium states are determined by
relatively few significant variables. In this case,
fecundi ty, recruitment, natural mortality, and fishing
mortality.
4.) These variables are knowable and their effects on the
stocks are linear and predictable ... i. e. that a 50 per cent
increase in the spawning biomass will produce a 50 percent
increase in fecundity.
5.) Science-based management can manipulate some of these
variables (primarily fishing mortality) and monitor the
others to effectively control the system and produce (within
certain broad limits) equilibrium shtes in gen9ral harmony
wi th human needs and desires.
6.) Having rebuilt the stocks to the desired level, they
could then be maintained at that level by relatively minor
adjustments in the TACs, thereby bringing long-sought-for
stability to the fishery and its dependent socia-economic
structures and institutions.
The reasons for this ';aith 1n the ability of Canadian
fisheries science and management to deliver the promised
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abundance and stab;!.li ty are best expressed in the words of
some of the principals involved.
In 1988, at the request of the then Minister of
Fisheri.es and Oceans, Thomas E. Siddon, Or. Leslie Harris
(then president of Memorial university) formed and chaired
the panel that produced the Independent Review oE the State
of the Northern Cod Stock (Harris 1990]. The "Harris
Report" as it is commonly called was highly critical of DFO
policy and practice and focused particular attention on what
it deemed to be the inadequacies of the process and product
of stock assessment science. The fallowing is excerpted
from the transcript of a taped interview conducted with Dr.
Harris.
"xhey [DFOj had set out in 1977 with a very
optimistic world view. That if you do thus and so, the
stock will grow at this particular rate. . .• The
great excitement that came with the 200 mile economic
zone and the possibilities that that opened up: finally
we've got it under our control. finally we can manage
~~~ ~~~~:'l~oW~ok~~~tw~:\~:~r~/~~~~ifinally we have
Jim Roache is Director of Communications for the
Newfoundland Region of DFO. He was recently assigned to
this position by the Minister's office in ottawa
specifically to manage the regional response to the Harris
report. This took the form of rapidly -9scalating criticism
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of DFO from all interested parties and nearly universally
negative media coverage of DFO's role in the fisheries.
"When we went to a 200 mile limit, people in
general, and I think industry as well, felt that our
ship had come in, that the time was at hand when we
could catch as many fish in as illany different ways as
we wanted. throw in as much technology and as much
capital as we liked, making it as labour-intensive and
as capital-intensive as we wanted. pul.ling out all the
stops in marketing the product. It was a gold rush
~~~~s~~ ~~n~~;i~i~to;~cw~~s~~~9g to be a boom as
Bernard Brown, for many years the only public relations
person in the DFO Newfoundland Region and now an assistant
to Roache, concurs.
"The 200 mile limit. That's what started the
bonanza attitude. It was EI Dorado again. The
Canadian offshore boys got into the fishery and started
landing all the fish here. The processing industry
~~n~h~;~h~e;~~~~gh the roof. It was fabulous. For two
The critical point is that Canadian scientists
genuinely believed that, given the opportunity, they could
provide the necessary advice to rather rapidly rebuild the
northern cod stock and then maintain it in approximate
equilibrium. Based upon this confidence, the Canadian
state, in return for international recogniticn of the
extension of its fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles,
assumed stewardship of the resource on behalf of all
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interested nations.
Very specific benefits were promised which, in turn,
created specific expectations. To fulfil its domestic and
international commitments, the state created DFQ in its
present form and undertook to provide it with the necessary
human and material resources. In short, the state, DFO, and
many indivi.duals in these institutional structures had a
substantial investment in the idea that the stocks would
respond in predictable (and predicted) ways to science-based
management strategies and practices.
The Bursting of 'the Bubble
ThiS widely shared and deeply felt belief, that the job
do-able and the expected results attainable, was to
inform both the federal and provincial governments'
fisheries policies until profoundly shaken by the 1989
northern cod assessment. More properly called a
"reassessment", i.t concluded that the exploitable biomass
(fish aged four years and older) had not grown five-fold
since 1978 as previOUSly believed but only about three-fold
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and was now stat1.c (OFO/4396 1990] or, possibly, in decline.
(Harris 1990]
Further, if 'the stock s1.ze had been seriously over-
estimated, then the dependent quotas, set to aChieve a
target fish1.ng mortality (expressed nUller::t.cally as some
value of "F" such as FO.lllf roughly twenty per cent of the
exploitable biomass had, in fact, resulted in annual
removals by fishing of one third or more of the 8vai~able
population. [Alveraon 1987] If this was true, 'then--not
only was the stock much srlalier than had been thought--its
ability to reproduce itself had been weakened, perhaps
dangerously so. [Harris 1990]
What is FOJ7
OFO adopted the FO. pIe as the guiding pr1nciple for
its management regimo of fishery resources inside the new
200 mile limit. 1:1: is used to express both target fishing
mortality and SUbsequent: estJ.mated actual fishing mortality
where "r" simply means fish caught by commercial activity
and the following numbers are meant to indicate the
relationship of the weight of the f1sh caught to what Is
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thought to be the weight of the total catch-able population
also known as ~exploitab1.e biomass. ~ When the number
following F is in subscript, as in FO.l ,the number is a
function of the returns of some unit of fishing effort in
relation to stock size (discussed more fUlly below). When
the number is in normal script, such as F"'_20 or F.20, it is
a straight percentage of what has been estimated as the
weight of the exploitable biomass.
This rule had been developed 1n :ICNAF as a more
conservative replacement for the concept of Maximum
Sustainable Yield (MSY) as a management goal. MSY is a
strictly biological concept and refers to the amount of fish
that can be removed from a fish population without driving
it into decline. :It has generally been superseded by such
multi-variate concepts as optimum Sustainable Yield (OSY)
and Economic Sustainable Yield (ESY) which claim to include
various social and economic factors. [Munro 1980]
AS defined in a recent DFQ publication:
~ ... FO 1is the level of fishing effort at which addingone more boat would result 1.n increasing the total
catch by only 10% as much as the very first boat to
~~~Zg;~:~ts~~~~~~~.~~.a~:sat~~e[~tn::e~h;noi~s~;~;::um
sustainable yield' did not. It takes some account of
the econom1.cs of fishing and it leaves a wide margin of
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biologica~ safety.~ [Fo'c'sle, The Science of Cod, p.
22, OFO 1988)
In practice, fishing at the FO. J1.evel will remove a
larger percentage of the fishable stock from short-lived
species than frOlI ~ong-lived species. For northern cod,
fishing at the FO. p.evel means annual catches of about 20
per cent (also expressed as P-.20 or simply P.20 ) of the
exploitable biomllss defined as fish aged four and older. It
should be noted that the ~sxploitable" biomass is different
from, and can be considerably larger than, the "spawning"
biomass. This is due to the fact that, whila young cod
begin to aggregate with the adult stock at about age four,
they do not reach sexual maturity until age six to eight
depending upon II number of environmental variables.
SOll1a idea of the strength of the belief in the benefits
of Canadian control. and management and the magnitude of the
expectations thereby created can be seen in the fOllowing
excerpt from a report prepared by Gordon R. Munro for the
Economic Council of Canada in 1980. .Its title alone, A
Promise of Abundance: F"tended Fisheries Jurisdiction and
the Newfound~and Economy. bears eloquent testimony to the
point.
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"There were exceptions [to the FO Imanagement goal}
one of these being the 2J3KL [nortliern} cod. The level
of fishing pertaining to this stock complex was
deliberately set below that corresponding to the FO 1
rule in order to quicken the pace of resource .
investment .... To be more precise. in the case of 2J3KL
cod. FO 1",0.20[1.e. 20 per cent of the catch-able
stock].' Present management [1980 quota] calls for
F.,0.165 •••• [or 16 1/2 per cent. The implied
precision is significant.] If. in fact. this
management strategy were to remain unchanged. the
resource would be roughly within 5 per cent of
equilibrium by 1985. thus implying an equilibrium TAe
of roughly 385.000 tonnes. . • . Fisheries and Oceans
has. at the time of writing, now published three sets
of projections. the first appearing at the end of 1977,
the other two appearing at the end of 1978 and in the
spring of 1980. Consider the 1985 Tiles tor 2J3kl cod
as projected in these three publications: 294.000
tonnes (1977) 402.000 tonnes (1978) and 365.000 tonnes
(1980). [NOTE; The actual TAC in 1985 was 266,000
tonnes although the fleet was able to land only 232,000
tonnes]
n •••• It can be said further that. even if the
biologists' estimates were perfect. it: is certainly
possible that the actual TAC will prove to be higher
than pro1ected. [emphasis added] The present
management policy is designed for rapid investment in
the stock. This implies . •• a very conservative
program during the adjustment phase. There is no
necessary reason, however, Why such a highly
conservationist policy should be maintained into the
mid to late 1980s when the adjustment phase should be
draWing to a close." [Munro 1980 pp. 25. 26]
What Happened?
In the following pages I will show that, when faced
wi th ambiguous or inadequate data. many of the DFO
scientists charged with the responsibility for assessing the
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size of t:he northern cod otocks (the inc1usion of numerous
caveats in their published results notwithstanding)
ragularly interpreted the data in the most optimistic
possible way. Thus, the quotas recommended through CAFSAC
to the Minister--while thought, at the time, to be very
conservative--are, in retrospect, seen as having been
dangerously high.
Another way to state this is that. in the absence of
any hard evidence to the contrary, there was no reason to
disbelieve that they had. been, and continued to be,
successful in dOing what they and the Canadian government
had set out to do in 1977--rebuild the stocks and maintain
them at a heal thy, stab~e level that woul.d produce
substantial and sustainable economic yiel.ds for the Canadian
fishing industry and its dependent social. structures.
This interpretation of events is strongly supported 1n
the Executive Summary of the Harris Repori::
"Dur.1.ng the next seven years [1918-' 85) the euphoria
that had been engendered by the declaration of the
exclusive economic zone was reinforced by the steady
growth of the stOCk, by continually improving catches,
~~~~!Im=~~ b~~i~~o;za~i;~~m~~aA~~~~C;:r:n~t:~s;nf::1f:w
by false data signals and, to Some extent,
overcon.f":',dent of the validity oE their pred1.ctions,
fa1.1ed to n~cogn~!lo t:he stat.f.stical inadequacies in
"
their bulk biomass model and failed to properl.y
acknowledge and recognize the high risk .involved with
state-of-stock advice based on reJ.atively short and
unreliable data series.
that if there had not been
such n1:ellec1:ua1 co...i.tment 1:0
the not on l,tra1:egv was working, the open
and increasing scept ID of inshore fisherJllen might
have been recognized as a warning .flag • . . ." {Harris
1990, Executive Summary pp. 2,3 emphasis added]
Further, in addition to the inertia of expectations,
other powerful socJ.al forces combined and conflicted to the
extent that--for the period under discussion, 1977 to the
present--the content of fisher.i.es stock assessment science
can be better understood as a product of complex and
J.nteractive social forces rather than an objective
description of natural reality.
1. This fundamental assumption may well be seriously flawed. A
number of recent works--both theoretical and applied--following
from the provocative implications of chaos theory (also known
somewhat less dramatically as nonlinear dynamical aystems theory)
claim that this is, in fact, the case. The interested reader is
referred to the fOllowing selection of these works.
Alden, Robin: The voice of the responsible gcoundfisherman:
Listen: [editorial] in Commercial Fisheries News,
February, 1991
sak, Per and chen, Kan: SelE-Organized Criticality. in Scientific
American, January 1991
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Briggs, John and Peat. F. David: Turbulent Mirror. Harper & Row.
New York 1989
Finlayson, Alan C.: (forthcoming) in Maritime Anthropology
Studies (MAST}
Gaskill, Herbert S.: Jl Model of the Northern Cod Stock, [draft]
£orthcoming
Gleick, James: Chaos: Making a New Science, Viking Penguin. New
York 19B7
Mandelbrot. Beno.:Lt: The Fract:al Geometry of Nature, W.H. Freeman,
San Francisco 1982
Smith. Estellie: C1I80S in Fisheries Management. in Maritime
Anthropology Studies, Vol. 3 No.2 1990
Wilson, James A., et al.: Managing unpredictable Resources:
Traditional pol1cies llpplied to Chaotic Populations. in
Ocean & Shoreline Management, #13, 1990
Wilson, James A•• at al.: Chaotic Dynamics in a Multiple Species
Fisheries [sic]: A Model of COmlllunity Predation. in
Ecological Modelling [forthcom.:Lng]
Wilson, James A•• at.al.: Management of Chaotic Fisheries: A Bio-
economic Model, Proceedings from the Symposium on
Multispecies Fisheries, Sissenwine, M. and Dann. N. ads.,
International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES)
forthcoming
Wilson, James A. end Roy, Noel: Constraint-Induced Chaos in a
Mul tispecies Fisheries Model, notes (unpublished) for a
presentation to the JourneEls du Groupe de recherche en
econom.1e de 1 'energie at des ressources naturalles (GREEN)
at the Universite Laval; October 27. 1989
2. From an interview wi.th Leslie Harris conducted on August 29,
1990 in St. John's. The fUll transcript is Appendix G.
3. From an interview with Jim Roache conducted on JUly 24, 1990
in St. John' s. The fUll transcript is Appendix N.
4. From an interview with Bernard Brown conducted on August 3,
1990 in st. John's. The full transcript is Appendix B.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ERROR. UNCERTAINTY AND INTERPRETIVE FLEXIBILITY:
THE CRITICAL NODES OF SOCIAL CONSTRUe-tION
There was--and to a somewhat lesser extent still is--an
unusually high degree of interpretive flexibility in the
scientific assessment of the northern cod stocks. This was
permitted by uncontrolled sources of error of unknown
magnitUde (snd errors from unknown or unexamined sources) in
the raw data combined with substantial uncert.ainties as to
the relative robustness of the statistical procedures used
to process this data and ambiguities and biases
characteristic of the assessment methodOlogies employed.
Given the strong individual and institutional commitments to
a rapidly rebuilt stock sUj]porting high levels of sustained
yield, as discussed earlier, it is not at all surprising
that, until confronted with significant substantive
cr;!ticism from highly respected and credentialed peers, the
most optimistic possible interpretation prevailed. Further,
there certain1.y were incentives for those committed to the
"promise of abundance" to preserve this interpretive
flexibility by discounting or dismissing potentially
contrary data sources and resisting the implementation of
more rigorous analytical procedures.
It is quite telling that the eventual reassessment of
OFO's data and methods (which led to the radically reduced
1989 assessment of the stock size) WIIS not initiated by
people or processes interna1 to DFO sci.ence but by politi.cal
pressure brought by outside i.nterests--primarily the inshore
sector of the fishery. Through the 19808, their sceptici.sm
of DFO'S knowledge claims grew to become direct charges of
scientific incompetence and mismanagement of the resource.
The relationship between fisheries science and the inshore
and offshore sectors of the fishery is discussed more fUlly
in Chapter Six.
Independent Review: A Chrono1ogical Account of Criticism and
Rebuttal
The Keats Report
In 1986 the Nswfoundland Inshore Fisheries Associetion
(NIFA)lresponded to the growing discrepancy between its
membership's perception of the stock's condition and that of
DFO by commissioning thrse biologists from the Memorial
University of Newfoundland to conduct the first independent
review of DFD stock asssssments. Thsir report, 11 Review of
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the Recent Status of the Northern Cod Stock (NAFO Div.is.ions
2J, 3K, and 3L) and the Declining Inshore Fishery (also
known as the ~Keat:s Report" after its principal author) was
highly critical of OFO's data sources, statistical
procedures and conclusions. One simple, but powerful~y
suggestive example (Tab1e 4.1) will suffice.
Orig.ina1 Current-Year Biomass Estimates for the years 1977,
1979 1981 and 1983 and the SUbsequent Revisions of Thoco
Estimate.s in FOllow.inq Years
1977 1979 1981 1963
YEAR B.iomass Biomass Biomass ~1980 ~ 12070
1981 5639 10880
1982 5482 10466 13684
1983 5211 9320 11863
1984 4968 8211 10238 15531
1965 4616 7371 8589 11413
1986 3857 7353 8243 10970
[from Keats 1986]
The table shows the. original bi.omass estimates (in
metric tonnes x 10-2; add two zeros on the right) for the
years 1977, 1979. 1981 and 1983 and the regular downward
revis.ion of these initial eatimates through the years 1980
to 1986.
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Hindsight: the retrospective convergence of sta1:istical
variation
This revision happens via 8. process known as
retrospective population analysis, cohort analysis or
hindcasting. The problelll is that, in 8 given assessment
year, the total fishable biomass is comprised of fish from
<:ge four up to age twenty or so. All fish from a given
year's spawning season are presumed to have the same
birthday and are referred to as a "year-class." It is not
until all the fish of all year-classes present in that
assessment year have either been caught and accounted for in
commercial catch surveys or died from natural causes that
the final, most accurate, estimate of the total biomass of
that assesslPent year can be made. Because cod are
relatively long-lived fish. this means that quite a lony
time-series of data is required before statistical variance
begins to converge to an operationally meaningful level. In
practical terms, it will be at least five years from now
b9fore we can know with any useful degroe of probability how
many fish are in the stock today.
DFO's own original estimates and subsequent revisions,
as presented by Keats, clearly illuatrate this problem and
show that the OFO assessment has systematiCally and
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consistently exploited the interpretive flexibility of
unknown (or known but unpublished) confidence intervals to
make optimistic assessments.
Notice how the numbers increase frOl1 left to right but
decrease from top to bottom. The original yea.rly estimates
show a steady increase in keeping with DFO'9 position that
the stock was rebuilding as desired and predicted. The
subsequent downward revision"'. driven by statistical
variance converging with reality, do not support the claim
of a rebuilding stock. They do. however, support my claim
that sparse and indeterminate data sUbjected to analytical
methodologies of dubious rigor permitted an unusual degree
of interpretive flexibility Bnd that this opportunity was
invariably exploited to produce scientific and, therefore,
supposedly irrefutable, evidcmce as to tho effoctiveness of
DFO I S management strategy. It would be interesting to
continue this time series for more recent years. But in the
course of the extensive research for the present work, I
have not encountered one single example of a northern cod
assessment being subsequently revised upward. Keats reached
a similar conclusion.
"While the lack of confidence limits do not permit an
estimate of the precision with which biomass has been
estimated. there is a much more serious problem with
.3
uncertainty related to assessment methodology. Biomass
estimates for any given year in the past are
continuously and consistently revised downward each
year as the F values upon which they are based are
revised upward. For example. the 1977 biomass estimate
has been revised down to about 45% of what it was
estimated at in 1980 (I only have data going back to
1980 at this time'. The same trend applies to 1979.
1981. 1983. and presumably the years which I have not
examined in detail. t the biomass is
consistent! assessment ear b
as much as in a considerable
and consisten the Fa 1 catch
should be wi have taxen
consistentl times the revised Fa .' catch
since 1977." emphas added Keats 1986) -
What this means 1n plain English is that since 1977,
instead of realising the FO. 1management goal--catching
about 20 per cent of the fishable stock; a level, it was
generally agreed, that would allow the stock to rebuild--the
catch had been somewhere between 30 per cent and 50 per cent
of the stock. This rate of exploitatioo did not support
OFO's contention that the stock was growing but tended to
confirm the inshore sector's perception of the state of the
stock as, at best, static or, possibly. in ·:1ec110e.
Thrust and parry: science defends i1;s claims
The response from OFO was to dismiss the Keats Report
as superficial--it was researched and written in only four
weeks--and axiomatically biased; pseudo-science written to
support the political actions of the Newfoundland Inshore
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Fisheries Association (NIFA). However, NIFA and a growing
number of other grassroots organizations and individuals
representing the interests of the inshore fishery refused to
be moved from their position and, in fact, actually
increased the volume and severity of their criticism of
OFO's claims. Their persistence in attacking OFO science
(widely regarded as among the best in the world) and their
growing public support in the popular media compelled the
federal Minister of Fisheries--then Tom Sidf.:..n--to direct
the formation of the Task Group on Newfoundland Inshore
Fisheries (TGNIF) in August of 1987.
Bernard Brown, a fo::-mer journalist and a member of the
DFO Newfoundland Region Communications Division for nine
years, recreated his actions and perceptions during the
early and mid-19aOs.
"I tried to talk to our people when the massive
criticism first hit, before the Alverson Commission was
appointed. It went right over their heads. [They felt
that ... J It had nothing to do with science, so who
cared? I tried to tell them that it isn't really DFO
science that's being criticised. It's the fishermen
realizing now that all that stands between them and
disaster are political decision-makers so they, i.e.
fishermen, decided that they have got to get into the
political process and start hammering the government.
And either through a lucky shot or some very shrewd
thinking, the pressure point they picked to hit was the
science.
"DFO is so prOUd of its science. And we have done a
lot of good science. So to come and hammer our
65
strongest point. our little area of purity. it was
devastating to our scientific people.
"It was puzzling to the senior managers and
politicians. Why are they attacking our science?
That· s the one thing we do rightl We could take
criticism of our management decisions because we were
used to tha t bu t to come and condemn our science!
"It's hard to exaggerate the first reactions of our
scientific people. They were puzzled. upset. angry.
For a while they were just like children. The shock
was horrible. Here we were being attacked in the one
area in which we thought we were unquestionable. We
were used to criticism from allover on "tlr management
decisions because you can never please all the
competing interests. But we always thought that the
~~~~~~~r:~~e~~2 one pure area. free from political
The Alverson Report
Although the Task Group (TGNIF) was convened by the
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. the political director of
DFO. its membership was comprised of fisheries scientists
from the United statss, the United Kingdom, and Canada--
people with no direct connection to the Canadian government
and possessed of the highest possible credentials and
reputations. This was essential if the Group's findings
were to have any credibility with the growing number of
increasingly vocal critics of DFO science and management.
On the other hand--unlike the Keats Report--because of their
eminence in the international community of fisheries
scientists, any criticism in their findings could not be
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lightly dismissed.
The wording of the final report was cautious and, in
places, equivocal. Nevertheless, a careful, informed
r£lading shows that. the Task Group's conclusions were not
substantially different from those of Keats: chronic, overly
optimistic interpretations of data of questionable validity
had resulted in a persistent underestimation of fishing
mort.alit.y and a concomitant over-estimation of the rate of
growth of t.he biomass since 1977. Further, it was a matter
of interpretation whether the stock had experienced any
significant growth since 1982.
"Selection of the dolo and anal sis is to
some extent a value takin into account the
data available and t in assum tions, and rna
var between scientis , a plausible range of
possible F values for 986 can exist." [Alverson 19B7,
emphasis in the original]
Bernard Brown reconstructed his interpretation of the
Alverson Report from the perspective of a public relations
professional.
"Now to anyone who read the report closely and read
it with an open mind, from the point of view of, 'maybe
our critics have got a point, '--if you read the
Alverson report carefully from that point of view. I
think the signs were in there that the problems were
worse than stated in the report.
"First of all the report was a horror as a piece of
writing. It's interesting to read the Keats Report by
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some people at MUN which was done at the request of
Cabot Martin and his people {NIFll]. You {referring to
the interviewer] read that. And that was part and
parcel of the whole effort that went on for a year or
so of criticising DFO science that eventually led up to
the appointment of the Alverson group to review our
scientific effort.
"That thing done by Keats really set off a little
firestorm of criticism. Our scientists ridiculed it--
Who are these people? They aren' t fisheries
scientists. They don' t know fuck all. They [the Keats
Report authors] were absolutely ridiculed. My own
feeling is that they did a neat little piece of work.
Real neat.
"Then you read the Alverson report. As I said, a
real horror. God what a struggle trying to read it.
And I got the sense, that, while Alverson was asked to
go and do an objective evaluation of DFO fisheries
science, he was most reluctant to come out and be
critical. So I have a feel1ng--and this is purely a
feeling based on the tone of the thing and so on--that
~~i~~~~~ ~~ ~~:n~c~:~t~~i~e:~f~;i~gng,a good deal more
Following my interview with Brown, I took a second,
much closer look at the Alverson Report and related
documents. I was intrigued by Brown's suggestion that TGNIF
may have privately reached more critical conclusions than
were obvious from a cursory reading of their publicly
published report. Credible, although inconcLusive,
inferential and circumstantial evidence in support of this
hypothesis can be found within the Report itself. A
comparison of the public interpretations of the Alverson
Report--presented by OFQ in a publication antitled "The
Science of Cod" (recently r&moved from circuLation)--with
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the actual contents of the Report. Finally, there is the
fact that the internal release of the report was closely
followed by a switch to a much more conservative assessment
mothodology.
Text and data: a case study of intel:'pretive flexibility
The greatest insight into the actual opinions of the
Task Group is to be found in the substantial appendices
which contain the raw data from which they worked. It is
characteristic of scientific CUlture that assessments of
professional values such as "objectivity, integrity, and
honesty" are applied much more rigorously to data than to
the textual interpretation of that data. While the Task
Group fully exploited th.e interpretive flexibility of the
data in the text of their report, the data remained
inviolate from conscious manipUlation.
As with the Keats Report, one simple table of figures
(extracted from the Report's appendices) speaks more clearly
than the text. Table 4.2 contains data supplied to the Task
Group by DFO but also includes the reSUlts of an independent
reanalysis by the Task Group of the earlier generations of
data from which these figures are derived. Table 4.2
reveals a pattern of consistently optimistic explot tatton of
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the interpretive flexibility of indeterminate data and
methodology. In this instance the numbers are estimates of
fishing mortal! ty.
Table 4.2
OFO Current-Year Estimates of Fishing Mortaltiv (F) for the
Years 1975-1986 and sUbsequent Revsions of Those Estimates
Estimate
of F the OFO Revisions Task Group
Fishing Following of F in Estimates
~ ~ SUbsequent Years of F ( )
1984 1985 1986 1987 ( 1987)
1975 0.50 1.03 1.04 1.08 1.09 ( 1.08)
1976 NfA 1.14 1.12 1.23 1.17 (1. 25)
1977 0.40 0.63 0.64 0.53 0.54 (0.55)
1978 0.27 0.45 0.50 0.51 0.53 (0.54)
1979 0.20 0.45 0.49 0.48 0.50 (0.52)
1980 0.17 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.32 (0.34)
1981 NfA 0.24 0.28 0.32 0.35 (0.38)
1982 0.225 0.27 0.34 0.35 0.39 (0.44)
1983 0.225 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.37 (0.45)
1984 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.32 (0.43)
1985 0.25 0.25 0.28 (O.45)
1986 0.21 0.21 (0.40)
[from Alverson 1987 p. 81]
Notice that for the years 1975-76--when Canada was
arguing its case for a 200 mile zone of eXclusive
juriSdiction--the first-year-after estimates are quite high;
in the region that indicates an over-exploited, declining
stock. Even so, later revisions have concluded that the
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actual value of F was 100 per cent highor. The first year
of Canadian management: was 1978 with the TAC set at 135,000
mt to limit the fishing mortality to no more than 20 per
cent of the fishable stock or, as expressed in the above
table, FsO.20. The fact that, in subsequent years, the
fishing mortality for that year was revised upward by 100
per cent means that the size of the stock had been seriously
over-estimated--that the actual catch for 1978 of 138.500 mt
was approximately 40 per cent of the biomass; a level
generally accepted to be inconsistent with the goal of
rebuilding the stock.
Also notice that the Task Group's estimates of Fare
consistently higher than those of DFO, particularly for the
more recent years 1982-1986 where DFO's seemingly inevitable
upward revision--through hindcasting of F in light of longer
time series of data--has not yet fully developed. What this
chart is saying is that the Task Group found no reason to
believe that DFO' s then-current estimates of fishing
mortal! ty and biomass would prove to be any less optimistic
(or, in other words, any more accurate) than in previous
years.
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In discussing this problem the Alverson Report stated,
This is understatement verging on disingenuousness as
one can see from the following chart, Figure 4.1, included
as Figure 7 in the Appendices of the Alverson Report.
(Alverson 1987 p. 94]
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First, one can see that even at a fishing mortality of
F-a.30--a figure lower than DFO' s own revised figures and
considerably lower than the Task Group's estimates--the
stock biomass is shown as having doubled from the 1977 low
of about 500,000 JIlt to roughly 1,000,000 mt by 1984 but had
since remained static. Using the Task Group's estimates of
F..0.40+, the picture is of stock biomass peaking at about
800,000 mt in 1984 with a slow decline thereafter. Simply
stated, the claims in the text are not supported by the data
in the appendices. The Report's executive summary, which is
the only section likely to be read by someone unfamiliar
with the specialized language of stock assessment, is even
more misleading and milder in its cri'ticism.
"Estimates of tho growth of the total stock may have
been overly optimistic. and although we conclude that
the tota~ stock has increased since 1977, it has not
reached the expected levels. Nevertheless. it
currently appears to be increasing, but at a slaw
rate." (ibid pp. 1-2]
"The assessment methodologies employed by the
fishery centre at St. John's should lead to reasonably
accurate estimates of stock abundanc,;;. The CAPSAC
est1.lllates of fishing mortality in 1986 fall within the
(0.2-0.4) range of estimates supported by the data, but
at the lower end oE the range accepted by the :rask
Group ... " [ibid p. 3J
Claiming in 1987 that the 1986 CAFSAC estimates are
"within the range of estimates supported by the da'ta" albeit
at "the lower end," is another clear misrepresenta'tion of
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the Task Group's true opinions on the matter. First," the
range of estimates [0.2-0.4] supported by the data" is, in
terms of practical consequences, huge. The terminal-year
difference in total biomass estimates is as much as 800,000
mt or nearly four times the total northern cod TAC for that
year. Figure 4.1 (above) shows this in graphic form.
Second, it is obvious that the Task Group found no reeson to
assume that the recent DFO!CAFSAC estimates of F would prove
to be any less optimistic than those in the past. If the
pattern held true, after a period of reanalysis in light of
a lengthening time-series of data, the "lstlmate of terminal
F for 1986 would stabilize somewhere between F=0.3 and
F-O. 4. In the main body of the Report the discussJ on turns
to the technique called Virtual PopUlation Analysis (VPA),
the method of hindcasting used by DFO and CAFSAC to estimate
fishing mortality.
"The estimates they [sic) provide, however, only
really have these virtues [relative objectiVity) for
years sufficiently far in the past for the method to
have effectively converged to the correct answer.
"In the case of 2J3KL cod, this convergence process
takes about five years and the estimates of fishing
mortality rate, populatioTJ size and b10mass in the most
recent fishing years depends to an ever increasdng
extent on the value of fishing mortality used Ear the
last year (1986) of the analysis. Figure 7 [Figure 4.1
above) illustrates for a range of values of assumed
fishing mortality from 0.10 to 0.80. the nature of the
dependence of biomass on these inputs." [ibid p. 33J
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In other words, in the Task Group's judgement, claims
made about the value of F for a given fishing year derived
from the VPlI. method have 11ttle statistical ~'a11dity or
operational legitimacy until five further years worth of
data have been collected. By the Group's own admission, its
carefully worded, marginal endorsement of the CAFSAC/DFO
claims in the executive summary is i)ractically moaningless.
Dr. Jean Jacques Maguire, a fisheries biologists and
stock assessment :;cientist with OFO since 1977 and the chair
of the Canadian Atlantic Fisheries Advisory Council (CAFSAC)
since 1989, reflected on OFO' s history of over-estimation of
fishing mortality.
"One of the characteristics of the technique which
we use, which is sequential population analysi..
[another name for VPA analysis] on which you've
probably read, is the further back you go, the more
confidence you have in your assessment. It' 5 called a
'convergence' .
"When we extended jurisdiction in 1977, we said,
there were all those big foreign trawlers out there.
Fishing mortality must have been very high. We've
kicked them out and replaced them with large trawlers
but much smaller and many fewer of them. Fishing
mortality must have gone down. If fishing moralii.y is
down, stock size is high~r.
"We held that belief for five, six, seven years.
But as time passes, you do the assessment and you
estimate the fishing mortality is 0.2. So that was in
1980. You do the same assessment in 1981 and you
estimate that the fishing mortality was again 0.2 but
when you look back. you see that it was 0.25 for 19BO.
Whoops/ What happened there? After a few years, you
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look back and you do the assessment in 1985 and you S<"1e
that for the first part of the 19805 the fishing
mortality was about 0.4. So you say. why would it be
0.2 today? There's no reason Eor it to be 0.2. The
boats are fishing as hard. They're out there as long.
Their efficiency has probably increased. Which we
didn't take into account. Jlnd there's no reason for
fishing mortality to have decreased. So it must be
~~~~ll~n~C~;p~~~l:~~ernativeexplanations, 0.4 was
The abcve analysis of the actual content of the
A.I verson Report (and reconstructed perceptions of primary
sources l, while by no means conclusive, does tend to lend
support to the hypothesis that the Task Group's actual
assessment of the Science Branch's performance was
considerably mora critical than the impression conveyed by
their final report. Further, their data--particularly that
contained in the appendices--does not support DFO' s
subsequent public claims "that the "credibility of DFO
scientific advice was not questioned." (Fo'c'sle 1988] This
will be more fully discussed in the following section, "The
Science of Cod. "
An alternative explanation
In the above discussion, I have argued that the textual
construction of reality presented by TGNIF was dr1ven by the
inertia of macro-level institutional commitments to a
strongly rebuilding stock resulting from rational,
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scientific management. However, as i& often the cese when
dealing with less than fully determinate evidence, there is
at least one other quite plausible micro-social explanation
of the TGNIF's ambiguity and reluctance to clearly !'Jtate
what they--as eminent fi.lheries scientists--fel t to be
serious weaknesses in DFO's data bases and stack assessment
methodologies. This is precisely derivative from their
status as eminent colleagues of the people whose work they
had been called upon to review.
While it is true that the TGNIF membership was not
institutionally affiliated with DFO or the Canadian
government, by virtue of their specific expertise they were
members of the same, relatively small, .international
community of fisheries scientiets as their DFO peers. In a
Chapter Five, I establish the fact that most fisheries
scientists' professional identity and advancement derives
pr.imarily from their membership in and standing within the
national and international community of their peers and only
secondarily as employees of a particular institution. This
being the case, the Task Group's reluctance to publicly
criticise their peers, and possibly, in some cases, close
friends, would have been entirely understandable.
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Which of these possible explanations (or some other) is
Mtrue- is not of critical 1.mporlance to this work. What 1.s
important is that I havo shown that the construction of
reality presented by TGNlf in the text of the':'r report was
by no means determined by the underlying data. I have
established that, in fact, the data were quite indeterminate
and interpretively flexible. Therefore, the explanation for
the construction presented 1.n the TGNIF report cannot be
found in the data itself but must be located in the
surrounding social order. I have identified two plausible
sources (one macro-level, the other micro-level) of
sufficiently powerful social forces to account for the
textual content of the Repor·t. In this cose the interests
a l both social si tea were very s1.m1.lar although for very
different reasons. The state would have been interested in
defending the cred1.b1.lity of science as 8 source of both
domestic and international legitimation for its exercise of
the fiduciary responsibilities inherent 1.n a public
resource. The interests of DFO would have been served by
defending its fnsti tutional author1. ty and prestige--both in
relation to its institutional competitors for state
resources and in relation to the fisheries management
structures of othor f1.shing nations. The individual msmbers
of TGNIF and the Science Branch would have been interested
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in preserving their professional relations as members of the
international community of fisheries scientists and in
avoiding public scrutiny of what they faIt to be a puroly
internal matter. It quite likely that all of these
considerations (and, perhaps, others) contributed
~.nteractively to the construction of reality defended--
albeit somewhat ambiguously--by the TGNIF Report.
"The Science of Cod"
Turning now to an inspection of "The Science of Cod"--
DFO's direct public response to the Alverson Report--I will
show that it contains mislear\ing simplifications end
misrepresentation of the Task Groups' B findings.
Additionally, it is now known that the work of TGNIF did, In
fact, catalyze vigourous and. in some instances, hostile
debate within DFO and within the Science Branch in
particular. This debate was to result--Iess than one year
later--in the radically reduced {by 6bcut. one-third) 1989
estimate of the northern cod biomass by CAFSAC. It is
inlportant to note that this was the first reduction in
current-year estimate since the advent of the 200 mile limit
in 1977. And yet, in "The Science of Cod," there is only
the most perfunctory sort of acknowledgement of the
uncertain and highly debateable nature of DFO's stock
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assessments. The dominant tone h .. one of objective,
scientific authority.
The publication is introduced by a letter from Eric
Dunne, the Director General, Department of Fisheries and
Oceans .. Newfo.mdland Region. It says, in part:
"Fisheries science is vital to the well-being of the
industry. The scientists and technicians :involved have
dedicated many years to the pursuit of information on
fish and their environment and are world experts in
their field.. They have made a substantial contribution
to the rebuilding of overfished stocks as evidenced by
the five-fold increase in northern cod since 1976 ••..
"As part of the work of TGt/IF, the size of the stock
in 1986 was estimated. Dr. Alverson noted in a CBC
interview on November 20 that 'it's rather ama?-ing that
we (TOt/IF and DFO) are as close to each other as we
are.' The Task Group estimated rather fewer older cod
(aged 7 years and older J and rather more cod aged 4-6
years. The difference in numbers overall was about 4
t:o S'r. The Task Group estimate of the weight or
overall biomass of the stock in 1986 was about 11%
lower that the Canadian Atlantic fisheries Scientific
Advisvry Committee (CAFSAC) estimate.
"It is reassuring that tlle conclusions of the Task
Group and CAFSAC about northern cod are quite similar
with respect to the present stock size and the causes
for the decline in the inshore fishery since 1982. The
credibilit:y of DFO scientific advice was not:
questioned" [emphasis added Fo'c'sle Vol 8, No.2, "A
Special Science Edition" DFO Feb. 1988]
If one were to read this without having also closely
examined the Alverson Report, one would quite naturally
conclude that the Task Group supported the claim of a five-
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fold increase. But that was not the case at all. Notice
that the claim is made prior to any mention of the Task
Group anc] itb' findings. The confusion was purely
intentional as the fallowing dis,:::ussion with Dr. J. J.
Maguire will show. Maguire is chair of CAFSAC, the
structure that mediates between the sites of scientific
knowledge production and the political leadership of DFO.
[all emphasis added]
Q: Are you familiar with the history of the Alverson
Commission and the Alverson Report?
A: Yes.
Q: Until some recent discussions. I was under the
impression. as perhaps most outside observers were.
that the first critique of the way science was doing
its Job came with the [1990] Harris Report. Because
the version of the Alverson report that lias made
public. to the extent that it was critical. it was very
mild and. in public, it was called a vindicat:ion by t:hg
scientists.
A:~
0: I've been told by several sources that the original.
the first draft of the Alverson Report was considerably
more critical and the lessons made public in the liarris
report were originally....
A: That I don't know. That I don't know. But the
Keats Report was the first one. That was commissioned
by NIFA. Jlnd that was not taken very seriously at the
time.
0: By science?
A: By DFO science. Yes. BecaUfot the analysis was
somewhat naive. I think. and because it was easy for us
to discount: it. The TGNIF report. in my eye, the way I
read it .•• I don't know if I've seen t:he same version.
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but most likely•.. was critical. It was critical.
Maybe it's the broadcasting of it that was more
~ive. But I think it was critical.
It must be remembered. as well. that there were not
that many conclusions that could be reached. The TGNIF
report suggested. when you look at it, that the
difference between the TGNIF report and the CAF5AC
aGsessment to/as much greater than between the Harris
report and the [1990) CllFSllC assessment. The Harris
report and the ClIFSlIC assessment are essentially the
same. They're bang on. They're saying exactly the
same thing. While the TGNIF report was saying that
CAFSAC [through 1987) has over-estimated s~ock size.
0: But. as I recall reading. the differenca was
something like five percent.
11: It was more than five percent because our
assessment at that time was for a fishing mortality of
about 0.2. And theirs. their range, was from 0.2 to
0.4. llnd they picked in the middle. 0.3. So there's a
much broader range. And the difference was quite
large.
0: What I'm thinking of is not the original [Alverson
Report) but the DFO report called "The Science of Cod"
and the first page was about how DFO had estimated that
the stock had grown 5. 5-fo1d and this independent
review had concluded that it had only grown five-fold
but really. that's pretty close and really we're doing
a terrific job.
A: 'l'hat was the in
it. If ou look a
the assessment tha
about 8; third less
report says eKactl
that's the interpretation, For broadcasting, for
publicity, the way we decided to use it.
Q: Where was that decision made? That certainly would
have been made at a level higher than the Science
Branch.
A: Probably. :r don't: know. :r don't know.
Q: And yet Science is taking the pUblic heat for that.
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A: I wouldn't say that it was higher than Science
Branch.
0: Perhaps the trigger was that the Alverson Report: did
not result in a direct reduction in quotas whereas the
Harris Report did.
A: From the handlin of
sli ht difference. Whi
was resented more or
Re ort was resented b
there's another
e Alverson P.e art
3nd the Harris
A: I think so. [All emphasis added] 5
The fallowing excerpts from "T)Je Science of Cod" are
illustrative of the specific ways In which OFO chose to
interpret the TGNIF findings. The voice is one of unitary
scientific authority when we now know that within the
Science Branch, individual scientists and factions of
scientists were--by that time--fiercely disputing the
quali ty of the data bases, the reliability of the analytical
methodOlogy and the validity of the interpretations.
Additionally, in this pUblication, OFO made claims--
.,
particularly about the competence of its science and
effectiveness of its management--that the reader was clearly
intended to take as having some basis in the Report's
content when this was not. in fact, the case.
"The most obvious reason for low i.nsh'Jre catches would
be a shortage of fish. Yet. every calculat:ion of the
abundance of northern cod shows tha1: the stock is l'11:il1
growing." [emphasis added Fo'c'sle 1988 p. 1]
This was not true. Several of values of F that 'l'(JNIF
concluded ~ere within the range of possibility supported bl
the data described a static (F_Q. 30) or slowly declining
stock (F=O.40). (See Fig. 4.1)
The following description (also from "The Science of
Cod") of the scientific stock assessment process assumes and
exploits the long-standing popular construction of
scientists as humble. altruistic seekers of truth and the
doing of science as the rigorously dispassionate process by
which the truth is revealed.
"HOw can we be suz."e that the people who set fishing
quotas know what they are doing? Sure. management
deci.sions are based on scienti.fic advice. but how do we
know the advice is sound?
"The answer lies in the nature of science itself .
. . [ibid p. 20j
"Scientists are methodical. They value only what
they can measure. Guesses. hunches. impressions.
rumours. pet theories. likes and dislikes--all these
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things the rest of us find so absorbing must be avoided
by a scientist. He puts them aside and looks for
facts.
"To be any good as a scientist or advisor, the DFO
biologist must be neutral, objective. and
professional. H [ibid p. 261
"Science is a curious trade. because scientists
thrive by giving awa!l the results of their work. A
fisherman who did that would be bankrupt in a season.
"Scientific knowledge is like a huge pool which
belongs to ever!lbod!l and which grows as new knowledge
is added. But not just an!l new information is dumped
in. Scientists are cautious, sceptical folk, and each
new contribution to the pool of knowledge is closely
examined b!l other experts in the same field.
"It's a process of quality control like fish
inspection." [ibid p.201
"In this process. sloPP!I work soon gets discarded.
And the same strict standards appl!l whether the
information is some new discovery or just raw data .
"In the case of stock assessment. the peer review
process is complex. Each of the steps involved is a
safeguard against poor research or hasty conclusions."
[ibid pp. 20, 21]
Social constructivist studies of the actual production
and content of scientific knowledge have amply demonstrated
this to be a very effective mythology by which science has
created and preserved its position of epistemological
privilege and by which scientists have created and preserved
a special social and institutional status. However, from
the constructivist perspective, the reality is considerably
different. In recent years, a few scientists have come to
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share some aspects of this perception of their activities
and knowledge claims. Others still adhere firmly to the
orthodoxy. As one scientist said in reply to my questions
on this subject "2'he truth is discovered. not negotiated."
As the atmosphere of growing scepticism--in some cases
outright rejection--of DFO's knowledge claims spread from
its origins in the inshore sector of the fishery to include
influential members of the public and the media, DFO can be
seen as having had excellent reasons for appealing the
legi timacy of its claims to the established mythology of
science. By this point many of the individuals felt, quite
correctly, that the institutional credibility of DFO was at
stake and that belated public acknOWledgement of the
substantial uncertainties inherent in stock assessment--and
the sharp internal debates engendered by these
uncertainties--would be lnterpreted by the political sector.
the fishing industry, the media and the general public as an
admission of incompetence and failure. Their fears were not
wholly unfounded as this was precisely the reaction that
followed the publication of the Harris Report exactly one
year later.
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Bernard Brown's reconstruction of thoso events is quito
similar to Maguire's in substance though considerably less
circumspect.
A: I look at this from the point of view of lDy job.
which 1..s a PR hack. And when the whole racket started,
when the Alverson Commission was appointed. everybod!:J
was in a quandary. How are we going to stop all this
cr1..ticism? My adv1..ce was. and I exaggerate to make a
point. go out on our har.ds and knees and say {to the
fishermen." please forgive us. We'vB done the best we
call but we real1..ze we have to do a lot better. Work
with us and help us. Instead we took the Alverson
Report--which quibbled with our science but didn't
condemn it--we took that and ran allover saying "look,
aren't we great!"
Our sc1..entists were say1..ng that since . 77 the
northern cod stock had increased five-and-a-half fold.
And they were sa!:Jing all sorts of other things around
that basic central fact. So our scientist were say1..ng
that our fisheries science effort and ouc fisheries
management effort. based' on our science effort, has
been a r1..p-roaring success. Where else on the face of
the earth have we gone from a situation like we had in
the late sixties and early seventies where we bloody
near w1..ped out the stock, to a point where we now have
this huge stock of fish out there?
And essentially they were telling the inshoce
fishermen who were creating all the uproar about the
destruction of the stocks. that you don't know what
!:Iou're tal.king about.
0: So you counselled humility and they responded with
arrogance.
A: Precisely so. And from a public relations point of
view that was a fundamental mistake and we're still
making it.
The fishermen were basically understand1..ng of the
fact that we ware doing our best. All they were
telling us \-Jas that OLlr. best. because of the difficult
nature of the sc1..ence. was not gOOd enough. And they
didn't expect us to become good enough overnight. They
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wanted us to admit that our science wasn't good enough
and to make fisheries management decisions with that
understanding in mind. Not to keep gambling on the
optimistic side--that we were right in our science.
That's what they were telling us. "Quit gambling.
Quit pretending that you know more than you know. "
They basically had the same understanding, that it
was an extremely complex business and that all of our
calculations had huge levels of uncertainty,
Well tll1.s {DFO' s public interpretation of the
Alverson aepert] was a complete put-down of all the
criticism that our scientists had been getting.
Trouble was. over the next couple of years, the inshore
fishery got even worse, So we end up a year and a half
later with another independent review {Harris]. It
would never have happened of course if the scientists,
a year or so after Alverson, hadn't started to realize
that their own numbers were wrong. And a good deal
more wrong than Alverson was saying. In other words,
they started to get a handle on the numbers for the
first time since '77.
That's what's happened in the last couple of years.
Cod being a seven to ten year-old fish, it takes a
decade to get 8 handle on a stock in terms of assessing
it. Granted, we 've had fisheries science going on in
this province for a long, long time but full-blown
stock assessment has only been going on on the northern
cod since about . 77. So they're just starting to get a
handle on it, particularly with a little kick in the
ass with all the criticism that forced them to be a
little more careful in their research.
They came to realize a year or so ago that they were
very seriously out. And as soon as that dawn started
to break, the people in Ottawa reacted with another
full-blown review of fisheries science.
It's not funny for the poor bloody scientists.
They've been crucified through all of this. Really
quite unfairly when all is said and done. You can go
and quibble at some of their behaviour, their arrogance
in their belief in the correctness of their own
knowledge. But they were really trying and, god damn
~~t ~~e~~~~60nlY people and they have been left to hang
B9
The final paragraph of "'1:he Science of Cod"
rec£'pitulates DFO's claims and dismisses those of its
critics in an une~uivocal statement.
"The Department of Fisheries and Oceans prides
itself on world-class scientific capability. The
unprecedented rebui.lding of the northern cod resource
since 1977 is ample testimony to sound management
practices based on good scientific advice. 1Iav1ng
nurtured the resource to a good stage of health
overall, the department is now setting out to enhance
that all-important achievement by addressinq more
intensively and more comprehensively other problems in
the fishery." (Fo'c'sle 1988 p. 29]
Less than one year later it was a matter of general
consensus both wi thin and without DFO that none of this was
true. Further, my research has shown that at the time it
was written, few people within the DFO Science Branch would
have been willing to individually make such unqualified
claims. From my present perspective, I sU9gest that the
content of this publication is best understood as an
argument in defense of DFO's institutional legitimacy rather
than a statement of scientific knowledge claims.
The Harris Report
In spite of DFO's self-serving management of the
presentation of the A.l verson Report, the rising tide of
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criticism abated not at all. Irrespective of whether or not
the northern cod stocks were, as the lllOst radical critics
claimed. in a state of critical decline. it was
unquestionably true that the institutiona1 authority of DFO
was in such a state.
The political dimensions of a scientific: crisis
The allocation of scarce resources--quotas for specific
species--among competing sectors of the domest:lc industry
and the issuance of specific allocations to the fleets of
other nations in sup!IOrt of foreign policy objectives is
done by the Minster of Fisheries, 8 pol1tical (and often
9Ol1tici;.o;ed) entity. It has been saId of just1Ctl that, not
only must it be done, it Dust be seen to be done.
Si1ll11arly. not only must the Minister's allocations be fair
and reasonable, they must be se"n to be 80. Failure "=Ollleet
this requirement subjects the Department. the Minister and
the Prime Minister of the goverl'llllent in office, to
unacceptable and unrelenting ptllitical pressures and public
criticism. To avoid this and to promote genera1 acceptance
by the competing interests of the allocation decisions, the
Minister enl1sts the power and prestige of science as the
objective legitimating authority for the year's quotas and
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other management measures. However, if the credibility of
the scientific description of the resource base is seriously
damaged, then the Minister's claims to have made the
decisions on the basis of principles of fairness and equity.
even if true, will not be accepted. The result can be a
pol! tical crisis.
The foregoing summarizes the position of the then-
Minster of Fisheries, Tom Siddon, in the spring of 1989 when
it became a.bundantly clear that his department's official
construction of reality was passing beyond criticism and
becoming the object of ridiCule and contempt. The last
straw, albeit a very heavy straw, was the release of the
1989 CAFSAC assessment of the northern cod stock. This was
based upon a revised data-weighting methodology and
modelling technique and concluded that previous assessments
had over-estimated the size of the biomass by approximetely
c.ne-third--essentially the same conclusion drawn by both
Keats and Alverson.
The Harri. cOllVDission: mandate and membership
Once more a speciel comnli.~>sion wes established but this
time, with a significant difference. The Alverson
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Commission's mandate was primarily to investigate the
reasons for recent declines in the inshore sector's catches
with the object of negating the public criticism and
political pressure emanating from that source. The Northern
Cod Review Panel was given considerabl.y more scope. It's
terms of reference were straightforward.
"X'he panel wil~ consider the scientific advice
provided by the Department oE Fisheries and Oceans
since 1977 on the Northern cod stock and the current
state and size of the stock, and make recommendations
regarding stock assessment methods and means wi th a
view to better forecasting the size, growth potentia.!
and behaviour of the stock in the future." (Harris 1990
p. 11)
The minister appointed Or. Leslie Harris, then
President of Memorial University of Newfoundland and a
historian, as chair of the Northern Cod Review Panel.
Former members of the TGNIF recruited by Harris included
Alverson and John Pope, a highly respected stock assessment
specialist from the United Kingdom.
The Harris Report was explicitly and extens:l.vely
critical of DFO's pre-1989 stock assessment science snd
expressed continuing rese:o:'vations about its current data
bases and methods. The fact that the only members of the
Harris panel with any real depth of experience in stock
assessment science were veterans of the TGNIF is highly
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suggestive. It lends considerable support to the theory
that the Task Group's findings were, in fact, considerably
more critj.cal than ttley were either inclined or permitted to
reveal in their public report.
An i.ntroductory sWIIlIIary
In the fallowing section I will review the Harr.i.s
Report wj.th reference to its identification of critical
inconsistencies. confJ.ict£>, uncontrolled variables, and
lacunae in the data collectj.on, mathematical manipUlation,
snd analysis of the fisheries stock assessment process.
These points are of interest in that they represent what I
call ·critical nodes" of opportuni.ty for Bocial input to
what has been portrayed as, and believed to be, an objective
produot of rational science.
The discussion of the Harris Report can begin with a
synopsis of its findings. Tho goal of the DFO management
plan during the period of 1977-1989 was to set Quotas that
wouJ.d reaul t in the harvest of no more than 20 per cent of
the stock in a given year. As discussed earlier, this 1s
usually expressed as FO.lor F 0.20 and .is called the
·f.ishing mortalj.ty rate.· It was assumed, and is still
assumed, that the stock could sustain this level of fishing
pressure and continue to grow. The calculation of the rate
of fishing mortality is of critical importance in that it is
derived from total commercial landings from a stock and used
as an "indicator of abundance." Very roughly speaking (and
discounting natural mortality which is assumed to be a
constant), if during a given year X tonnes of fish have been
removed from a stock at a rate of Fa. 1 (or 20 per cent of
the fishable stock), then the total biomass of that stock
must have been 5 times X.
Clearly, a reasonable degree of accuracy in the
estimation of total biomass is essential to the effective
management of a stock. But the mortality rate indicated by
the revised 1989 modelling methodology (F 0.45 ) implied
that the stock biomass was little more than half as large as
had been previously thought. ~f the newly minted assessment
was a better approximation of resHty--and the Harris Report
cautiously concluded that it was--then, for fishery
managers, independent fishermen, corporate entities, their
employees and stockholders alike, the real effect was as if
millions of fish weighing hundreds of thousands of metric
tonnes had really disappeared. And rather than being fished
at lovels of sustainable growth, the stock had been fished
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at levels that pointed toward commercial extinction. This,
in a nutshell, was basis for the perception of a crisis in
the northern cod fishery.
Critical nodes: the sites of social construction of
scientific knowledge
In its introduction, the Harris Report enumerates the
significant sources of uncertainty and error in the stock
assessment process .
..... a wide variety of factors come into play. all of
which have the potentia~ of altering the hoped for
resu~ts. These factors can include an unpredictable
and highly variable physical environment, wide swings
in the numbers of young fish annually recruited to the
stock. extensive and incompletely known interactions
among different species occupying similar terri tortes.
the proper reporting of fish catches and the subsequent
utilization of available information in sufficiently
sensitive and rigorous statistical models." (Harris
Report pg. 1 1989)
What, exactly is to be assessed?: defining the
boundarie~ of a stock
The Harris Report begins by examining the va1idity of
the conception, measurement, and management of the 2J3KL
northern cod as a single stock. 1t concludes that this is a
highly dubious assumption that arises primarily from the
convenience of ignoring evidence to thCl contrary. For
"
instance. the stock in 2J3KL
" _ .. is comprised of a complex oE rather discrete
sub-groups . . • • Whether or not the spawning
SUb-groups constitute genetically separable stocks is
unknown. . . . there is no evidence that the 2J3KL cod
popUlation necessarily recruit young exc.lusive.ly from
the spawning stocks in 2J3KL management divisions. • •
. [and there is some evidence of} inshore stock(s)
which is/are separate in a genetic and/or behaviou1"ial
sense from the offshore stocks." [Harris 1969 pp. 6-7]
In the face of such uncertainties--uncertaintlelil which
would be difficult, tilll6-consuming. and very expensive to
resolve-~it is statistica11y and bUreaucrati.cally convenient
to Silllp1y ignore these complex. elusive, and confusing
var1ab1es and proceed u .1f the stock were a closed systell
un.1ty. The problem with this .1s that from the very first
step of the assessment process it can be seen that there is
no clear understanci.1ng of just what 1s being r'!lsessed. Any
final figures derived from a procese with 8\.0._,. a shsky
foundati.on arB likel.y to be 1I0re representative of wishfuL
thinking than operational reality.
Models
The first. end most obvious. opportun1ty for socia1
forces to impinge upon the creation of scientific know1edge
1s tho selection and operation of methematical stock
assessment models. Questions must be aaked as to how and
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for what reasons the constructor of a model selects from tho
range of possible input data, how the "quality" and relative
statistical weighting of that data is determined, how and
why the data is sUbjected to certain mathematical proceduroa
and not others, how correction factors are determined and
applied, how the model constructor's work may be subject to
influence from the prevailing norms, values, and theories of
scientific peers, etc. Other questions must be ssked as to
who exactly chooses among possible methOdologies based upon
what legitimating authority and under pressure from what
competing social groups. My research enables only a very
general discussion of this aspect of the problelll. The abovo
noted questions regarding model construction and
implementation should be addressed by further, more narrOwly
focused research.
In the course of our interview, Harris reflected on the
dual nature of cognitive models_ On one hand, they csn be
seen as concrete abstractions of the Current prevai~ing
cognitive paradigm of the fundamental dynamics of a given
system. They are useful tools in thsorizing those dynamics
and organizing and evaluating the interactive effects of
human social activity with a natural system. In this way
models are thought to be useful in extending our
9B
understanding of natural reality and provide a basis for the
rational Illanage.ent of social .interactions with the natural
world.
On the other hand, because they incorporate basic
aS9umpt.ions about the nature of reali ty--end because they
are, of necessity sir. Hfied abstractions--modols tend also
be determinant of cognit1.v9 reality. This occurs through
models I origin in, and support of, prevailing paradigms at
the expense of alternative construct1ons of rea11ty. Th.1s
.1s ach1.eveCl by a model's power to framo the questions that
can and cannot be asked, its intrins.1c def.1nition of date as
"relevantW or -it"relevant," end its strong tendency to
detendne the interpretat1.on of ambiguous data. Harris
noted these problems and d1.scussed thelll in terms of
h1.stor1.cal exallples.
A: The danger in all modelling, in my view. 1s that you
become trapped by 11: to sOlIe extent. It's self-
fulfilling. You 're dea~ing with data which are
manipulable and var1ab~e and uncertain. You have a
var.ietyof ways that you can interpret the data. If
you've got a lIOd'el that you beHeve in you will
interpret the data in a way that makes the lIlOde~ work.
I don't think there's any dishonesty in this, as such.
When I was talking to fishermen and f1.shing groups,
I used two or three ana~ogies to try and expla1.n this
phenomenon. which I think is universal and has occurred
throughout the whole of the history of science and
technology.
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A simple example is, perhaps, the Copernican
revolution. You have a couple of thousand years of
people looking at the earth as the centre of the
universe. The mind Slilt is there, firmly fixed.
There's no question about that whatsoever. So you see
all this other data, the orbits of planets, and it
doesn't fit. But what you do instead of saying "our
premise must be wrong because these orbits are
impossible," you say "we have to find a fancy way of
mOdelling to prove or to show that these sorts of
orbits can be created with the earth still at the
centre of the universe."
So you have brilliant minds devising weird
mathematics to show Why planetary orbits are the way
they are [Ptolemaic cosmology]. Defying all logic but
very seriously presented until copernicus comes around
and says "Look. You've got it all wrong. Let's
suppose that the sun is the centre of the universe.
All these orbits suddenly work." Well it's the same
with this fish model or any other any other model.
Take William Harvey and the circulation of the
blood. People had been cutting open cadavers for years
and years and years and looking at the circulation
system. Looking at the veins and the arteries.
Looking at the whole system. But they couldn't admit
what their eyes saw becatlse they had a conception of
the heart which indicated that it was more than a pump.
0: So theory and expectations can overpower data?
11: Exactly. And I think that's the danger of all
modelling and it's a danger when you have a
particularly unsophisticated model. And I think the
:~~:~t~=~iyw:~ e~;~~h~;~~~a~~~.b~;~~~~~~:s~o~;i~9d. is
Terms of reference: the reification of language
Another critical issue is the decision to express stock
strength and make management decisions primarily 1n terms of
biomass rather than population. This is probably related to
the fact that the largest source of data used by DFO is from
100
the commercial, offshore sector of the fishery and--since
all transactions invoLving the catch are .in terms of weight-
-that it is far easier methodologically to conceptual.1:z:;e the
stock as a biomass rather than a population.
Besides the sheer volume of data ava.ilable from
commercial landings, this source has other attractive
aspects. It is free of cost at the source and it tends to
exhib.1 t less var.1abil1 ty than other data sources. But the
choice to treat the stock as a biomass can result in a high
degree of uncertainty as to the actual numbers and
reproductive potential of the stock. '!'wo hundred thousand
10 kilogram fish have the samf;IJ biomass as one mi 1110n two
kUogram fish but the two populations have very different
.implications for resource management.
Further complicating the p.icture is the fact that the
fishable stock is comprised of fish ranging from age four up
to a few venexable twenty-year old fish. Each age group is
referred to as a "year-class" and is identified by the
spawning season from which it arose .i.e. the 1986 year class
will be four years old in 1990.
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Data as a source of interpretive flexibility
The Harris Report identifies £ivQ prillary sources of
raw data £or stock assessment: 1) catch data frc. both the
inshore and offshore sectors. 2) catch per unit effort
(CPUE) data from the offshore sector, 3) research vessel
(RV) data. 4) age-length and age-weight samples of the
catch, and 5) on-board DFO observer data on by-catch,
discards. and operational methods of the offshore sector.
Each of these sources can al.so be seen as a critical. node
for potential social inputs to the data.
1.) catch data
Catch data is supplied voluntarily by the commercial
sector to the scientific sector. :In addition to the
possibility of a large discrepancy between the two sector's
concepts of this data' 8 value and the importance of its
accuracy. it is further coneeivabl e that the cOIlIIereial
sector cay have incentives to under-report or otherwise
llanipulate the data before transmi. tting it to the scientific
sector. This would have been a lIIore signHieant source of
error and uncertainty when DFO's independent observers were
only occasiOnl!llly present aboard the offshore trawlers.
Since 1990. nearly all boats over 100 feet in length--
whether domestic or foreign--fishing inside Canada's 200
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mile zone, have had a DFO observer aboard.
2.) CPUE da:ta
catch-per-unit of effort, (CPUE) data is used as an
"index of abundance" under the assumption that a given unit
of fishing effort, expressed as some unit of purposeful
fishing activity (time that the net is in the water and
fishing or days at sea for instance), will produce more or
less fish in relation to the stock's relative abundance.
This does not take into account the influence of such
variables as changes in technology and technique that
improve efficiency, general changes in the relative skill of
the skippers, changes in fleet management strategies in
response to market conditions and/or DFO management
decisions, adaptations to a changed regulatory environment,
unusually good or bad weather, and possible changes in the
stock's patterns of behaviour due to fishing pressure and/or
significant environmental influences.
Most critically, it does not take into account the fact
that northern cod are not randomly distributed but are a
densely schooling species, especially during the spawning
season when the stock concentrates on a few, well-known and
relatively shalloW banks. Concomitantly, northern cod are
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not randomly hunted. Using very powerful fish-finding
sonar, the skipper of an offshore dragger will not shoot his
net until he has located a sufficiently large school of
fish. If it is a very large concentration of fish and--as
is usually the case--the skipper is an employee of a multi-
ship corporation, he will contact headquarters by radio
giving the estimated size and exact location of the school
to the director of fleet operations who will then vector in
one or more additional ships. In this respect, modern
corporate fishing of northern cod is more like mining a vein
of are than hunting wild game.
Irrespective of these serious deficiencies, until the
1989 CAFSAC assessment, considorably more weight was given
to the CPUE data as an indicator of abundance than to the
scientific survey data collected by DFO' s research vessels
(see below). The reasons for this appear to be quite
simple, very hU11lan and very unscientific. Massive amounts
of data were available from the offshore trawler fleet at no
cost. The data showed little internal variability. Most
importantly, the CPUE data could be interpreted to confirm
the previous descriptions, predictions alld expectations of a
healthy, growing stock and the fundamontal soundness of
DFO's management strategy.
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3.) RV data
Research Vessel (RV) data attempts, through random or
stratified sampling, to construct a statistically projected
portrait of the stock. Sampling sites are selected in the
management area and a net is towed for a given length of
time (usually one-half hour) at selected depths on specific
courses called transects. The fish caught are counted,
measured and weighed. The total swept area of the sample is
known, as is the percentage swept of the total management
area. A simple mUltiplier factor will then yield a portrait
of the entire population.
One might assume that data from this source would be
the most rigorous and least ambiguous. The data is
collected directly by scientists through research designed
expressly for that purpose. In fact, scientific popUlation
research surveys do not appear to be any less susceptible to
social inputs than other data sources. There are
significant sources of error--and, therefore--interpretive
flexibility, in RV sampling.
The first is that, by normal standerds of statistical
validity, the population is hugely under-sampled. Research
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vessel operations are very e)[pensive and time-consuming and
must be negotiated in competition with. other demands for
available financial and human 't"esources and ship time.
Thus, while continuous, year-'round 5ampling could
conceivably proVide realistic data, the operation--through
1990--was limited to a one month-cruise in the fall of each
year. The timing of the cruise and the ability to adhere to
the sampU.ng plan are influenced by the prevailing weather.
The consistency of the quality and quantity of the human
resources and sampling gear is unknown. And the validity of
a projected population portrait derived from such a small
slice of space/time is the subject of considerable debate.
"It's like trying to tell the population of st. John's by
counting the people in one house," said a fisherman on a
recent episode of "On Camera" on CBC-TV. "It is highly
unlikely that we would miss any large concentrations of
fish," said a DFO biologist on the same program. "It's like
trying to count moose at night from a helicopter," said Mac
Mercer, then Director of the Science Branch.
Some practical examples of the sources of error and
indeterminacy in RV date were given by Chris Lang, an
electronics enginoer with DFO working to develop hydro-
acoustic technOlogy for incorporation in the reeearch
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surve~s. He began b~ describing 8 purely social dimension
of data collection resulting from the
professional/bureaucratic differentiation between the
technicians whr design the equipment and collect the data
and the research scien'tists who analyze the data and
incorporate it in the assessment models. It should be noted
that hydro-acoustic sampling is still in development and the
data is not yet used in northern cod assessment. However,
many of the issues raised by Lang are more broadly
applicable to current assessment methodologies.
0: Do you go out on the cruises?
,II: Once or twice a year. Somebody has to go. Our job
1s to get this data on computer tapes of higher quality
than the scientists can deal with so we can stay ahead
of them. So that their problem isn't us.
0: Is this kind of like a game?
A: Not really. It's CYA .. . cover your ass. That's
really our job. If the limitation becomes the quality
of the data or the quantity of the data. then it's
obviously our problem. There's a lot of analysis
techniques that have to be developed to interpret the
data. It· s still too raw.
0: Who does that?
A: Someone else. I calibrate the equipment so in that
sense I can bump things up by 20.000 tonnes here and
20.000 tonnes there or bump them down by 20.000 tonnes.
0: How?
A: I could just cheat on calibration if I wanted to. I
could say that this many blips means that many fish
when in fact it only means half that many fish.
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0: How do you do your calibrations?
A: Honestly. 8
We turned to the subject of social inputs to, and
theory-ladenness of, research design and data analysis.
A: And that problem [theory-ladenness] represents
itselE in perhaps 25 layers before some number comes
out of a survey. For instance. you're trying to
measure the spatial distribution and concentration of
fish but you only have one boat and one transducer.
And there are survey designers who say you' re going to
drag it across this path and then you'll go up there
and drag it and then go down there and drag it here so
that we can look at it all and get something out of the
whole thing.
If you had the luxury of 25 ships you cC'uld go
through the one area at the one time and gather thE"
stuff in parallel and then you could structure your
analysis a whole different way. But ...The fish could
be chasing your boat around. Ear example. They might
like the sound of it.
They're tracking some stock and all of a sudden you
get a blip in 11Ee. something might be wrong. right?
So you go back and do it again. I don't know if I
believe this or not. Well maybe I screwed this up.
:chere's some amount of evidence to suggest that I did
and some to suggest that I didn't. Or. maybe I screwed
that up or .• . there 's always SUbjective inputs all along
the process.
I guess that there are social inputs in that
scientists read the newspapers and they know that they
need to have more fish than they are saying that they
have. If he's stuck with a question with a fifty-fifty
answer. he's going to take the one that gives him the
answer he's looking for. If you woanted to insure that
a truly objective job be done, you should lock the
~~~:~=~:;~,u~o~~~e~~~r~he~o~~fkl~; ;~~~~=~~ any
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In the following passage, Lang and I discussed his
initial experiences with a new, much more technically
sophisticated and sensitive hydro-acoustic system. It shows
that increased sophistication and sensistiviy per se do not
guarantee a reduction in the indeterminacy of data. In
fact, it can have quite the opposite effect by revealing
sources of variability and error hidden by the relative
crudeness of the previous equipment.
A: There are some things that are not clear about the
data that we get with an acoustic surve!! now... that we
have to pin down by catching fish with a trawl whereas
you could measure them directly with a multiple beam
system.
(): So you'd be able to see individual fish?
A: Yes. Then you could scale the cloud on the basis of
the measurements that you make on individual fish. But
there are some things that are unknown. Not 50 much on
tIle implementation of the technology but in how to
interpret the data and how to remove some of the biases
that show up.
(): What sort of biases?
A: Well it's easier to get good quality measurements on
fish that a.....,. bigger and to reject smaller fish hecause
the quality of the measurement is not good so you tend
to bias the population that you are characterising on
the high end of the size of the fish that are in the
cloud.
(): So do you drag a trawl through a population at the
same time that you are scanning it to calibrate the
equipment?
A: No you sample a population alternately. Within the
parameters of the survey design, you periodically stop
surveying and pull the survey equipment in and let the
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trawl out, tow it for half and hour, pUll it in and let
the survey equipment back out,
Q: So you're not fishing the same fish that you are
surveying?
A: In a global sense only,
0: Wouldn't it be better for calibration to be beaming
down onto a population just before you dragged a trawl
through it?
A: A trawl isn't a real good sampling tool for fish in
that respect because you're looking down from a survey
transducer at a depth of five to ten meters clear to
the bottom whereas a trawl can only sample some subset
of what's right in front of the net. There's something
to be said for what you suggest but there's a long way
to go yet before that's necessary. The calibration is
not that precise yet anyway.
Fish look very different with behaviour, The aspect
of 8 fish changes its acoustic signal. its
reflectivity, tremendously, So if you are sampl.tng a
population that for some reason is more vertical in the
water or making vertical depth changes as you are
measuring them, or if you are measuring a population
that's turned broadside to you and swimming on the
level •• • even though it's the same population of fish,
tJ;·)!J will look very different acoustically. So it's
not an exact science by any means. There's a lot of
work to be done,
0: Last time we were talking you mentioned error bars
and it wasn't clear to me whether yOll were talking
about errors in the TAe or in the whole population.
A: Well just from an acoustic point of view, you can
have as much as one quarter as much peak response from
one population. So you could survey one population and
have a certain beam response and another time you could
get as low a one quarter of the same population if they
were all hanging around with their noses up. So
there's that level of uncertainty.
0: So you're saying that with the technology and the
techniques that you are using now you could be dealing
with levels of uncertainty as much as 75 per cent onB
110
way or the other simply due to variabilities of fish
behaviour?
A: Yes. Just on that one alone. Just on behaviour.
Q: So in your opinion the behaviourial unknowns are the
biggest source Of uncertainty in the data?
A: With the possible exception Of survey aesign. lO
Later I discussed the problems of data acquisition and
analysis with Dr. Jake Rice, then head of the Science
Branch's Groundfish Division. He suggested a higher-order
concern with the increasing sophistication and sensitivity
of data acquisition technologies having to do with the sheer
volume of data generated by these systems. Rice said that
the only choice they have is to increasingly automate data
manipUlation and analysis but that this inevitably means
that the technology begins to dictate the questions that
they ask.
Until recently, the aSsessment modellers themselves
apparently harboured reservations about the relative
accuracy of RV data in that it was often discounted in
relation to CPlJE data as an independent indicator of
abundance--that is until the 1986 RV survoy which showed a
150 per cent increase in the biomass from the previous year.
[Harris 1990] This astonishing increase was apparently
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accepted as reality and unproblematically incorporatGd in
the assessment. Perhaps no other piece of evidence so
convincingly illustrates the abiHty of established belief
to overpower the supposed objectlvi ty of the scientific
method, not to mention common sense. It is probably fair to
suggest that if the 1986 survey had indicated a proportional
decrease in the biomass, the results would have been
immediately identified as anomalous: and rejected.
Of this event, Harrie says,
" ••. the 1986 values which were incor orated
into e calibration have now been
shown 0 resource ava labilit [a
dispr number of fish just happened to
be in the survey areas}, probablY brought about by a
change in the timing of the 1986 RV survey. . . .
Whether or not the 1986 survey data should have been
suspect and ignored ... is a value judgement which is
easier to make in retrospect than it might have been in
earlier years." [Harris 1990, pp. 73, 74 emphasis in
the original]
4.) Age-length and age-weight data
Age-length a.nd age-weight sa.mples woull'l. seem to be a
more straight-forward proposition. It is presumed that
growth-rate of age classes is an index of environmental
pressures on the stock. More is better, less is worse. And
yet the bulk of this data 1s collected ashore on
cOll'.rnercially landed fish and it is possible that some of the
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same variables that can influence CPUE and catch data are
present in these samples.
Further, the growth rates can vAry dramatically within
the 2J'3KL :tone by factors as high as 300 percent. Figure
4.2 (Figure 20 in Harris) taken from "The Science of Cod"
shows the observed length-and-weight~at-agedifferentials
for fish from various regions. At the extremes of the
northern cod rsnge, Labrador and the South Grand Bank, the
average eight-year-old fish will vary from 17 inches and 2.4
pounds to 30 inches and 7.9 pounda. This diaparity
increases with age. A 12 year old fish will average 22
inches and 3.0 pounds in the north and 36 inches and 13.1
pounds in the south. It is not clear from my research how
and to what extent this regional differential is
incorporated into the assessment of the northern cod
biomass. As a possible critical node for social input, this
data source must be much more thoroughly evaluated.
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5.) conunercial observer da1:a
The Harris Report is not clear whether by "commercial
observers" it is referring to scientists placed aboard the
vessels or independent technicians working under contract to
DFO. It is also not clear whether participation by any
given vessel was voluntary or mandatory nor is it stated
what the frequency and distribution of commercial
observations might be and what, if any, controls are placed
on the possible variables in their observations. A skipper
may well alter his methods and practices i~.. the presence of
an outside observer. In any case, the Harris Report is
inclined to discQunt the value of this data source because,
"There is some question as to how effective these
data have been in augmenting the scientific di::ltabase
because of the quality of the observers and the lack of
data processors and computer time for its analysis."
{Harris 1989 p. 10]
Due to a recent expansion in the program, data from
observers on the offshore trawlers may be somewhat more
robust than was previously the case. Every foreign ship
fishing inside Canada's 200 mile liml.t is now required to
carry a DFO observer aboard and most of the Canadian
offshoro trawler fleet is monitored by observers. While
this may encourage more accurate reporting of fishing
results, it can only exacerbate the above-noted problem of
growing backlogs of data awaiting manipulation and analysis.
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A concrete example of this problem was the recent
announcelrl\nt that the Science Branch had finally been
allocated l. i1e necessary human and financial resources to
begin an ana: ysis of the contents of a three-year backlog of
cod stomachs. While it is known that an understanding of
the food and feeding relationships of cod with other species
in the eco-system is an absolutely fundamental requirement
for an understanding of cod population dynamics, tens of
thousands of cod stomachs had--for years--been carefully
collected, labelled and filed away in freezers for lack of
analytical resources.
6.) other factors
The Harris Report concludes its discussion of the data
sourceo by noting that data on environmental influences--
relative abundance of both food and predators, changes in
ocean currents, water temperature, salinity, oxygen content,
and other oceanographiu and meteorological factors--al though
available, "have not as yet been used to adjust population
estimates in providing advice to the government ... " (HaJ:"ris
1990 p. 11]
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There are several. plausible explanations for the
omission of the3e data sources from stock assessments. One,
as in the case of cod stOlllach contents, is 8 simple lack of
the requisite resources for thoir systematic incorporation.
Being simple, this explanation is also simplistic. It begs
the general question of the criteria determining the federal
government's allocation of resources to DFO, DFO's
al.location of resources to the Science Branch and the
Science Branch's final deployment of those resources. 'I'his
too 1s a problem deserving of more thorough research.
Methodology of .'tack assesslllent:
The methodology used by oro to generate its stock
assessments is known variously as sequential popUlation
analysis, cohort analysis or Virtual Population Analysis
(VPA) "tuned" by RV- and CPUE-derived "indicators of
abundance." VPA involves tracking and estimating the annual
mortal!ty of each year-class of fish. By counting the
number of 1982 year-class fish caught in each of the
successive years until no more 1982 fish are caught and
adding to this the estimated number of 1982 fish that died
of natural causes, one can--by 1995 or so--know about how
many fish were in the 1982 year-class.
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The initisl weaknesses in this method are "the
uncertainty of the rate of natural mortality and its
assumption that a11 year-classes of fish are proportionally
represented in commercial concentrations. Natural mortality
lilly be affected by oceanographic changes. variations in the
food supply, increases or decreases in the predation by
other species, and disease. And yet, in the assesBJIl(Int
model, natural mortality is not a variable but a constant--
assumed to occur at an annual rate of 20 per cent fqr all
year-classes. This Is, of course, a practicel necessity as
there is no known technique for monitoring natural
mortality. Another problem is that boats operating under an
enforced quota have Il strong incentive to discard the
Slllaller, less valuable fish--landing and report1ng larger
and Older fish--introducing an unknown, uncontrollable bias
to landings survoys. With nearly 100 per cent coverage of
the offshore fleets by DFO observers, this lilly now be les9
of a problem than in the past. Howe...~et w1th today's very
powerful and sophisticated fish-finding sonars, a skipper
may be able to pre-sort his catch to some extent by bi-
passing concentrations that seem to contain a high
proportion of small fish. None of these factors, or other
possible variables, were controlled for in the VPA--or even
very well-understood. Again, the reliance on the commercial
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catch as a data source was questionable.
To convert this Mhindcasting" to a current stock
assessment DFO applies a calculated value of fishing
mortality (i.e. F=0.20). If, for example, in the 1987
fishing year. 50,000 mt of 1982 year-class fish are caught
weighing an average of 1 kilogram each and--l£ the value
F"O.20 is correct--then the total biomass of 1982 fish at
the beginning of 1987 (and accounting for a natural
mortality of 20 per cent) was 250,000 mt with a total
population of 250,000,000 fish. Performing these
calculations for each year-class present in the commercial
catch will yield figures for the total fishable biomass tmd
total fishable population.
The VPA-based. F-derived figures for total biomass Bnd
populations of all year-classes are then "tuned" by the
introduction to the model of RV- and CPUE-derived indicators
of abundance, both of which are subject to the sources of
error and uncertainty noted earlier. To add to the
confusion, the RV and CPUE data often show confU.cting
trends.
"The picture painted by RV data shows a noticeable
decline in the number of fish in the population since
1985. wh!l& the commercial f1.shing database suggests a
cons.iderable increase .in the number of animals in the
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population. Which to pick?" {Harris Report 1989 p. 27]
Which indeed! The current OFO solution to this
probl.em, to simpl.y average the two, shows no real confidence
in either source but rather the hope that the errors and
anomalies of each indicator will somehow negate each other.
At present, this technique does have the happy result of
showing an essentially stable stock. The end result is the
official OFO estimate of total biomass and population and
forms the basis for the setting and allocation of quotas.
Summary and Analysis
The findings of the Northern Cod Review Panel were
presented to the public by Harris and copies of the report
were widely circul.ated. Prior to its release, its contents
were the focus of intense speculation in the public media
and, after it became available, subjected to months of
public analysis and debate.
TwO things seemed to be abundantly clear. The first
was that OFO's claims--prior to 1989--0£ steady stock growth
were, in fact, not true and that since sometime around 1984,
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the stock had remained at best, static or, very likely,
experienced some degree of decline. Th1.s erroneous
perception of the stock was the result of consistent and
persistent under-esti.mations of fishing morta1ity and
consequent over-estimations of abundance. Severe and socio-
economically punishing reductions in the TAC were necessary
to correct the si tust1.on.
With this in mind, the Harris Report conCluded that the
most recent (1989) CAFSAC estimate of fi-shing mortality of
F-O.44 wi.th a TAC of 235,000 mt was "most probably 1.n the
right domain," but that an immediate reduction of the quota
to achieve 8 real fishing morta1i.ty of F=O.20 (8 TAC in the
vicinit~ of 125, 000 mt) "would precipitate social and
economic repercussions of a part1.cularly drast::.ic nature."
As an interim measure it suggested a 1990 TAC of 190,000 rot
(F"0.30) but cautioned that this "may not serve to reverse
the trend of a declining spawning stock but may rather
contribute to further decline." Accordi-ng to figures
gleaned from s recent DFO publication, this reduction of
45,000 mt would mean a loss of about $26.6 mi11ion to the
industry in direct landed value, $66.6 million in processed
product value and 1,035 Person Yeare of employment. [Dunne
1990]
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Reviewing the Keats, Alverson and Harris. Reports, it is
imlllediately apparent that all three investigations reached
rellarkably silllllar conclusions. Thi.s, in spi.te of the fact
that they had differi.ng institutional. sponsors, differing
mandates and differing human, financial and temporal
resources with which to work. This congruency of findings
strongly suggests that their constructions bore a closer
correspondence to natural reality than did that the claims
of DFO.
Having established the general context, I am now
prepared to state and examine in the following chapters the
central sociological problem: why did Dro science--workiog
frOll the same data bases as Keats, Alverson, and Harris and
with vastly superior resources of every kind--persist in the
construction what is now accepted as an erroneous real.1ty
and why did .it defend that construction against competing
alternatives to the point where its epistemological
authority and operational effectiveness in the management
process were severely compromised?
In the preceding chapters I have outlined the multi-
levelled historical, instituU.onal, and cognitive dimensions
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of the problem--both identif.ied and hypothesized the social
dynam.ics that animate this structure--and located important
aspects of the problem in time and space. The essenti.al
features are aa follows:
Science and the state have struggled to define the
terms and conditions of their relationship from the fi.rst
year of the creation of a formal institutional association.
This relationship temporarily stabilized and harmonized
around the issue of extending Canada's exclusive
jurisdiction for the management of marine resources to 200
miles. That essential harmony was preserved (at least with
respect to stock assessment) as long as all the consumers of
scientific knowledge found its construction of reality
unprob1emat1c. 1 have shown that th1s construct10n fully
exploi.ted the interpretive flexibility inherent 1n a very
.inexact branch of science and t:hat the direction of the
interpretations was driven by strong institutional
commit:ments to a very specific reality end a techno~utopian
vi.sion on the part of individual sc1entists as to the
possib.ilities for effective, rational management presented
by the 200 mUe limit.
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The Inl t1.al challenge to this construct1.on arose froID a
previously unrelated source--the trad,itional inshore
fishery. Their challenge was fonal1zed in the Keats Report
but was initially ra'ther easily discredited and dismissed by
both science and the state. However. the inshore sector
refused to accept their lllarginal.1zat1on and began 'to
actively and effectively exploit their cultural and grass-
roots political power. It was a't this point that the
relationship between science and the s'tate became
increaS.1ngly problematic.
In its public presentation of the Alverson Report, DFO
showed an apparently united front in defense of their clab
of a robust, rebuild.1ng stock. However, in the process of
conduct.ing their enquiry, the Alvenon group seelll$ to have
triggered a criBls wi.thin the Science Branch .itsslf as to
the vali.dity of their assessment data and .ethodologies and,
therafore, their clai.ms. The result was the crucial
reassessment 1.n 1989--which is thought to have ellp10yed mora
realistic data fed .into a more rigorous model. Th1.s
reassessment concluded that the stock was not grow1.ng but
was stable at 8 biomass somewhere between two-thirds and
one-half of DFO'e previous claim.
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To the consumers of scientific knowledge and related
interests this appeared to be clear ev.1dence of scientific
incompetence. The inshore sector widened the scope of its
attack to include not only the Science Branch but DFO as a
who~e, the federal government, and the offshore trawler
industry. They charged the scientists with incompetence,
the pol! tical/bureaucratic elements of OFO with
mismanagement of the resource, the federal government with
irresponsibility in permitting this situation to develop,
and the offshore trawler industry with rape of the fishery
through overfishing and eCOlogically destructive methods and
technologies.
While the public focus of the crisis was on the status
of the northern cod stocks, the real crisis was one of
authority and legitimation--the institutional and po1.itical
authority of the federal government, the epistemological and
professional authority of science and scientists, the
cUltural authority of the inshore fiehery--and the struggl.e
for legitimation of each of their res!?ective, conflicting,
cognitive orders and conatructions of reality. From the
perspect.1ve of the state, DFO and science had failed in
their pr.1mary function; the provision of authoritative,
unproblematic legitimation for the politicsl management of a
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public resource. FrOlR tho perspective of science, the state
had fa1.led to accept the experimental, probabilistic nature
of sc1.entif1.c knowledge construction. Instead, the state
had attetlpted to exploit the epistemological authority of
science to legitimate a politicized socia-economic fisheries
policy. From the perspective of the inshore f1shery--and
much of the general public--both science and the state were
committed to a construction of reality that favoured the
interests of the offshore trawler industry at the ruinous
expense of the traditional fishery.
This was the situation faced by the Harris Commission
when 1. t was formed by the of Minister of Fisheries in 1989
and accounts for the broadly-J.nclusive terms of reference
which established the scope of Harr1.s'e enquiry and directed
its activities. In its findings, the Harris Report
general.ly confirmed the Science Branch's revised assessment
of the stocx's status. It's criticisllls largely applied to
pre-l989 assesslIlents and it made a set of specific
recommendations for future improvements. It passed the
notice of the crttics that 1l'IOst of these recommendations
were for programs and lines of enquiry that the Science
Branch was on record as having identified aa things that it
would have already done or been doing given sufficient
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budgetary commitments from the state.
From the perspective of this work, the primary value of
the Harris Report is as a guide to the nodes of opportunity
resident in scientific data and assessment methodologies for
the intrusion of social forces into the construction of
scientific knowledge claims.
In the following chapters I will turn almost
exclusively to my interviews with the key actors in this
debate. The points of contention and the theoretical issues
will be examined from empirically-grounded points of view at
various levels of social organization. We will begin at the
micro-social level in a reconstruction of a fundamental
conflict between two small groups of scientists within the
Science Branch--a conflict that had enormous macro-social
consequences. To adequately explain and understand the
origins and nature of this conflict, we will move to a
larger level of social organization and examine issues of
professionalism, reward, and promotion as they apply to
scientists embedded in a polio tical bureaucracy. The next
stop is an examination of the curious
functional/dysfunctional epistemological relationships
between fisheries science and the inshore end offshore
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sectors of the fishery. Final.ly, we will conclude with a
more l.engthy and empir.ically-grounded discussion of the
relaU.onships between science and the state.
1. "NJ:FA is a coalition of people who fish for cod or work in or
own .inshore fish plants or simply care about Newfoundland's
environmant and inshore fishing communities."
The above is from 8n open letter included in NIFA's public
relet ions materials, dated November 27, 1989 and signed by the
organization's president, Cabot Martin of whom we shall hear lIIOre
1n ChaptQr Six.
2. FroID an interview with Bernard Brown Conducted in St. John's
on August 3; 1990. The full transcript 1.s Appendix B.
3. FrOIl sn interview with Bernard Brown conducted in St. John's
on August 3, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix B.
4. From an i..nterview with J.J. Maguire conducted on October 28.
1990 in st. John's. The full transcript is Ioppendlx J.
5. From an 1.ntCorviev with J.J Maguire conducted on October 28,
1990 in st. John's. The full transcript .is I\.ppendix J.
6. From an interview with Bernard Brown Conducted on August 3,
1990 in st. John's. The fUll. transcript is Appendix B.
7. From an interview with LeSlie Harris Conducted on August 29,
1990 .in St. John's. The full transcript is Appendix G.
8. From an interview with Chris Lang conducted on March 4, 1990
in St. John' s. The full transcript is Appondix o.
9. Ibid.
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10. From and interview with Chris Lang conducted 1n st. John's on
June 27, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix D.
129
CHAPTER FIVE
ZRRA'l'ZONAL DYNAMICS IN A RA'f'lONAL CONTEXT
Both science and the state bureaucracy are classically
rationalis't: institutions with structures wh~ch are intended
to insulate the process and production of these institutions
from the irrational forces of individual and collective
human social reality. That the state bureaucracy is,
nonetheless, capable of producing stunningly irrational
results is commonplace knowledge, That this is also true of
science is less well-known. Legendary battles have been
waged between eminent scientists with competing knowledge
clai.ms; battles that--in some cases--have eurvived the
deaths of the originating individuals.
What I .,.111 discuss in the fallowing chapter are the
irrational social forces that are generated--and can
powerfully impinge upon scientific knowledge production--
when science is embedded in the state. In the first section
we will get an unusual look--through the words <lnd
reconstructions of two of the prinCipal actors-~into the
heart of a virUlent micro-social conflict between factions
of the Science Branch. In the second section 1 will
identify a plausible structural origin for this conf1ict and
argue that, at least in the case of fisheries science, the
institutional marriage of science and the state is fraught
with irreconcilable differences. Finally, I will propose
that these differences are the source of social forces that
!,a'\,e had a significant impact on the production of northern
cod assessment knowledge claims.
Stock Assessment Science and Tribal Warfare
Thus far, we have seen that--with the extension of
Canada's management authority (and responsibility) to 200
miles--firm institutional and individual commitments were
made to the re-creation of an abundant, rationally managed
and, therefore, reasonably stable resource. Against this
backdrop, other social processes were also to have a
significant input into the creation of scientific knowledge
claims. Of these, the most archetypically human (and,
therefore, the most interesting) were conflicts and
occasional outright warfare between a shifting cast of
social groups. The membership in and organization of these
groups was not stable but varied in relationship to the
specific issues and over time. In many instances,
individuals and group Bub-sets were simultaneously locked in
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a bitter dispute over one issue while firmly un!ted on
another.
To attempt a holistic, synchronistic exposition of this
compleJt interplay of forces and interests would be
hopelessly confusing. For the purposes of this work, I have
selectEd one particularly consequential conflict as
illustrative of the tribal dynamics that may operate behind
the facade of dispassionate scientific rationality. It is
worth noting that--according to the primary sources--this
conflict is by no means anomalous, has yet to be fully
reSOlved, and continues to contribute to the production,
negotiation, and presentation of scientific knOWledge.
The data is presented in the form of excerpts from
interview transcripts with two of the principal antagonists.
Their reconstructions of the issues ara so radically
divergent as to be mutually exclusive. 1I.t issue was access
(or denial of access) to data among research scientists
responsible for northern cod stock assessment at the
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) research station in
St. John's, Newfoundland. 1I.s this internal conflict
escalated, factions formed around the nuclei of a few
highly-respected scientists on each side.
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My position is that their clashes are better understood
as a form of tribal warfare than as a normative scientific
debate. The consequences of their struggle were non-trivial
in that they can be shown to have prolonged what is now seen
as a persistent over-estimation of the northern cod stock by
as much as a factor of two. (Alverson 1987, Harris 1990]
Hacro-1evel consequences of a micro-level conflict
This delay in the reinterpretation of available data
and the ensuing revisions in assessment techniques
contributed significantly to the profound sense of
biological, social, and economic crisis when these changes
were finally made. The new perception of the state of the
stock precipitated drastically reduced quotas, the idling of
offshore traWlers, the closures of processing plants, and
the wholesale 1ay-offs of workers.
The consequences of their conflict--and that of the
schismatic forces that they represent--were not merely
"academic" but of enormous socia-economic significance to
the Province Newfoundland and Labrador. The Harris Report
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provides a quantitative description of the people dependent
upon the northern cod.
.. . . . . In actual numbers, this means
approximately B,lOO full-time fishermen, 8,200 part-
time fishermen, and 18,600 plant workers for a total
contribution to employment of 34,900 which does not
include deep-sea fishermen and plant workers from the
south coast communities that also depend, in part. upon
access to northern cod.
"In a province where the unemployment rate is 16%
[and the population just over 500,000J, some 35,000
jobs is a matter of very great consequence . . . ."
[Harris 1990 p.40J
.. . . . . For the vast majority of the communities
in question, northern cod was the only reason for their
existence and northern cod remains the only substantial
economic basis for their survival. And this is a
simple statement oE fact .... " [Harris 1990 p. 21]
The federal government's stated policy regarding the
settin'J of Total Allowable Catch (TAC) quotas for northern
cod was that they shOUld be set to achieve a target fishing
mortality of FO.lor approximately 20 per cent of the
fishable stock biomas9. The eventual acceptance of the
revisionist analysis of stock assessment methodology and
reSUlts implied--if the FO.I policy were, in fact, to be
adhered to--a decrease in the TAC from 235, 000 metric tonnes
in 1989 to 125,000 mt (approx.) for 1990. The estimated
socio-economic impacts would have been as follows:
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1) A decrease in employment of 2,530 person-years.
(But note that in an industry characterized by a high
percentage of seasonal and part-time participation, the
real number of households affected would be much
higher. ]
2) A decrease in landed value of $65 million dollars.
3) A decrease in product value of $162 million dollars.
[Dunne 1990]
From these figures it is clear that the stakes in this
conflict were considerably higher than those typical of
classical Kuhnianl scientific conflicts--not, perhaps, for
the scientists but certainly for the individuals, families,
and communities dependent upon the fishery and, to a lesser
extent, for the socio-economic fabric of Atlantic Canada.
I have chosen to characterize these dynamics 8S
"tribal M for two reasons. The first being that this is
precisely the word that one of the. most active. and
opinionated of the scientists used to describe an internal
dispute in which he had bean involved and about which he
still feels qUite strongly. Second, most of these conflicts
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are explicitly presented by the participants as cases of ·we
versus them, good guys and bad guys.· The antagonists
appeal for favourable judgement by references to well-
established traditions of belief and behaviour. The problem
in this case is that the respective trad1tions are not
necessarily those we associate with science and are
themselves mutually antagonistic.
Data wars: 'the old guard vs. 'the young Turks
Prior to the Third Law of the Sea Convention and the
subsequent 200 mile limit, the role of Canada's fisheries
scientists was quite limited and straight-forward. They
addressed themselves largely to single-species descriptive
biology. The microscope was the ubiquitous research tool.
Some basic work was done to locate offshore POPulations of
commercially valuable species and roughly describe their
movements. It was a slIlall cOllllllunity of scientists;
relatively sheltered from the winds of politics, clubby, and
comfortable. Such controversy as there was, was purely
internal and took the form of traditional academic
disputation. I should note that the above Characterization
is not a product of focused research but is my
interpretation of reminiscences and passing remarks by a few
of the older and retired scientists.
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In the course of the Law of the Sea negotiations, it
became increasingly evident that Canada would soon extend
its fisheries jurisdiction to 4::00 miles. If so, the
government would also assume formal responsibility for the
stewardship and rational management of the marine resources
in a vast and poorly-known araa. It was clear that the
federal governmant· s fisheries research program had to be
significantly expanded and restructured and that the
fUlfilment of these new responsibilities would require the
services of a new kind of scientist. The territory in
question was simply too great, the species too numerous, and
their populations too large to be investigated and
understood with the traditional tools and techniques of
classical marine biology.
Dr. Edward "Sandy" Sandeman joined the Department of
Fisheries research station in st. John's, Newfoundland in
1953 and, later, served as Director of the Science Branch
until his retirement in 1986. Thus, his career spanned the
transition from classical descriptive biology to the current
emphasis on quantitative, statistically-derived population
dynamics. He describes his recollection and interpretation
of this period:
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0: It's my impression frOlfJ reading the chronology of
DPO science. the history beginning with the little
station at St. Andrews [New BrunswickJ up till now.
that you were the Director (of the Newfounclland Region
Science BranchJ during a particularly crucial phase in
the transition of scientific activity ... the paradigms
under which it was conducted.
A: That might be so. I don't see it quite like that
because I think the really crucial change actually took
place back in the 'fifties with advent of landmark
books by Deverton and Holt [19S7) and Ricker [1948J.
It was during this period that the focus of fisheries
scienc9 changed to a mathematical approach and the
modern science of fisheries population dynamics really
took off. This was really quite a difficult time for
those in fisheries science because they were neither
trained or even had an aptftuds for this new
discipline.
Fisheries scientists of that era were trained to
taxonomy and the microscope, and it was a difficult
challenge to change from biology to mathematics. In
their university training. persons who tended to be
non-mathematically inclined turned toward something
like biology. They chose something that didn't require
a mathem.atical background and now found that the
calculator had to displace the microscope which
previously was their major tool. That was a major
challenge at the t1me and one which has continued to
influence the relationships between scientists even to
this day.
When I joined the station :in 1953. a major prior1ty
was on exploratory fish:ing. defining where the fish
were. and try1ng to understand their basic biology.
Because you can only apply mathematical techniques once
you know the population characteristics ••. the growth
rates, the mortality rates and that sort of th1ng. The
fishery was in an expansion phase and the expansion was
outstripping the science. Because there was no
shortage of fish. There was no need for conservation.
At least that is the way that the Canadian fishing
industry saw it.
The push didn't really develop unt:il 1970 when most
of the ICNAF community started to rdalize that there
were problems. That gross over-fishing was taking
place. rhat there was just too much effort no matter
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what mesh size you used. And I guess really that' s
when our scientists were forced to become much more
mathematically oriented. and to use the tools of
population dynamics. As we ventured into the realms of
population dynamics it became evident that we had to
get people on staff who were trained in more than
biology. Preferably a combination of biology,
mathematics. physics. and computer science.
Yes particularly computers. We required people who
were versed in computers and who were prepared to use
them rather than shy away from them as many of the
older "biologists" {quotation marks in the original]
were prone to do. Who were ... well, the modern
fisheries biologist as opposed to the one who was
;~~;~:~o~~:~ to classical biology and to the
The seeds of conflic't: one side of the story
I asked Sandeman if 'the classically trained biologists
had resented and/or resisted the introduction of these new
techniques, this new conceptual approach 'to their field. I
had frankly expected that they would have. His answer was
surprising (but see below for a radically different
perspective) . I reproduce the exchange in transcript format
to preserve the context, flavour and nuances. I have edited
the transcripts to eliminate redundant or digressive
material. In some cases the digressions would occupy many
transcript pages before returning to the SUbject of the
issues discussed here. I have chosen not to indicate these
deletions with ellipses for the sake of readability. In
making these editorial decisions, I have given a great deal
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of attention to accurately representing the sUbject's point
of view. By referring to the full transcripts in the
Appendices. the reader may judge to what degree I have
succeeded.
In the following exchange we see Sandeman recreating
the conflict in social terms and arguing his position by
appealing to the normative traditions of the political
bureaucracy. He denies thet the conflict was in any
meaningful respect about the cognitive content of science.
In fact, what we are seeing is the normative values of
science being dominated by their embeddedness in the
professional structure of state bureaucracy.
0: During this transition was there any resistance
from. for lack of a better word. the old guard. the old
microscope biologists. to the introduction of these new
techniques?
A: It wasn't the techniques. The problem was data.
You had guys who had worked for 15 years on a given
species: had worked hard. spending many days at sea or
in the field. to assemble a data set. which they were
looking forward to working up and publishing. {These}
papers would not only enhance their scientific
reputations but. because of the reward system that was
in place within the service. would also likely lead to
promotions and financial rewards.
As well. I think it is important to realise that
these people. who were now in the middle-management
category. also had administrative responsibilities
which ate into the time that they had available for
their research function. With the new emphasis on
"consultation" {quotation marks in the original} within
the department. more and more of their time was being
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devoted to attending meetings. Meetings with fishermen
and industry as well as the continual round of
departmental and international meetings such as those
of rCNAF or later those of NAFO and CAFSAC.
This gave rise to a situation where many of the
older scientists. the ones who had worked hard to
assemble useful databases that they had all sorts of
plans to use, got more and more involved in meetings
and less and less time was available to do the
research, analysis. and writing up that they wanted to
do.
At the same time. you now had the newer generation
of fisheries scientists who were entering the field who
were anxious to apply their newly-learned techniques
and. indeed. had been hired because of their capability
in this respect. rt was the task of the Director and
his management team to try to encourage harmonious
working relationships between the old and the new so
that joint papers became the accepted norm.
In this there were many success stories. but also
there were several failures. Clearly, good cooperative
ventures are more a function of the personality of the
scientists concerned than institutional regulations.
and personality disharmony occurred more frequently
than one would wish. My impression is that these
conflicts were more frequent when the new scientist was
a recent PhD. graduate who still considered that he or
she knew everything.
They are starved for data. wanting the data. And
yet unprepared to see the other side of the story and
not prepared to take the trouble. I guess. to accept
the fact that experience usually has something to offer
and that cooperation in this sort of situation is
almost always superior to an antagonistic approach.
Yes there was a clash for data. There probably still
is. and there probably always will be. The guy who's
invested 15 years of his life knows that his
advancement is dependent on publishing and he's got
this data that he wants to publish. He doesn't want to
release it to someone else. Okay. usually he'll do Ii
joint paper if it's apply1.ng new techniques and they're
working on the same data and they've got a nice team
going. Yes. But if they can't get that team going
then you've got friction. And that friction is likely
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to be relatively common when you have situations when
recruitment to the service occurs in spurt:s with
reLatively long pauses in between. This is not only a
problem of the laboratory in St. John's but it is
everywhere.
Q: I ask this question because I have had sources from
the younger scientists' side...
A.: You'll always get that.
Q: ••• telling me that they had data withheld from them,
that they were denied access to ...
A.: Oh. they will!
Q: And some of them have tended to paint it in terms of
scientific irresponsibility and outright malicious
withholding of. , .
A: It's possible I;hat there is some malicious
withholding but I think you have to see both sides of
it. Our promotional system is totally dependent on two
things: published papers and international reco!l~ition.
If you become chairman of an international commission
or chairman of a large scientific body or something
like that, you get credit for that. But you get most
credit for papers publishc>,:l.
Q: And probably papers published are among the criteriafor the selection of chairpersons of these bodies.
A: Well, to some extent that's also true. In fact,
that is the main criteria I guess. You've got to be
well up in the field before they select you. So, you
know, these guys have an investment of time in it. The
young guys don't realize that, I don't think, in most
cases.
Number one. they don't look at their promotional
problems, They aren't worried about promotion. The
world is theirs! The fact that in our promotional
system... and it's worth your studying it because it's a
very important part of a research scientist's thinking.
There are certain levels .... DO you know the system?
Q: Only very roughly.
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11: Well, I think you should know the system because it
really gives an insight into why you get these
problems. {The DPO reward and promotion system is
discussed more fully later in this chapter.}
Now the average Research Scientist 1 who comes in
doesn't think of the system. Doesn't think that some
of these guys who are at the top of RES 2. their only
way of getting further is to get some of these papers
out that they've been collecting the data for for
years I Xhat they've tried to write up and they just
don't get a chancel So there is a conflict there.
But my advice to any young person who's coming in
that has got ideas is to do joint papersl I mean
anyone ....And Ram Myers is a good example. Almost
every paper that he's done is a joint paper with
someone I He applies his techniques and uses someone
else's data and assembles a joint paper. And both
people get the credit for it then. Maybe not as much
as the first person, who is usually Ram. But his
publication record is supsrlative!
0: And yet there are stilL from what I understand,
echoes of hostility bouncing around the walls of DFO as
a resul t of his contributions to the Alverson
Commission.
A: Xhere may be hostility. I don't knoW'. But I expect
some hostility. Some of it's plain jealousy!
0: Because he's the one who did the reanalysis of
plotting growth rates to population density. Or did
Scott 11ikenhead do that with him?
11: I don't know. I've been gone for three years and
I'm not right up to date.
Q: But this was back in '86.
A; Well, I left just before the Alverson group came on,
I guess, And I don't know who did the work but I
expect some jealousy.
Q: Prom what I understand, this paper was the first
suggestion that the data ... or the extrapolations and
the conclusions reached from the data about abundance
and growth rates•.. were seriously flawed. Xhat, in
fact, growth, in terms of total biomass, had not been
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as great as hoped for and predicted. And that very
simple things such as the fact that cod in large
numbers grow more slowly than cod in small
numbers .... That they had been projecting growth rates
based upon growth rates observed during the depleted
years oE the early and mid-' seventies. And as the
stock rebuilt, growth rates tailed off as the
population density increased and this led to a serious
revision in the estimation of the total spawning
biomass. Are you familiar with thisi'
}I,: No. I'm not familiar with that. I haven't made a
point of keeping up with the 2J3KL stu.EE which is what
i1~~1:a~1t ~~te:';i~~e~~~;es~~P~~~i~~ ~~:tw;~~~ew:~~3a
Sandeman's reconstruction serves very well to create a
sympathetic understanding of his perspective and that of his
paradigmatic peers. (Note that tt.ere is no apparent
acknowledgement of any consequential interactivity between
this view of data as the stUff of which careers are buil t
and the more traditional, scientific view of data as the
stuff of which knowledge is built.) The older, more
experienced scientists are portrayed as wise in the ways of
the professional bureaucratic world, They know how the
system works and accept it. Uncomplaining, they do good
work under often difficult conditions. A.bove all, they are
tolerant and understanding of often over-zealous, sometimes
thoughtless youth. After all, they too were once young
scientists.
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The seeds of conflict: the other side of the story
It comes as a real shock to find that the one young
scientist whom Sandeman singled out as a paragon of what the
relationship between the younger and older scientists should
be, Dr. Ransom A. (Ram) Myers, is Sandeman's, and the older
scientists', most savage critic. Myers readily acknowledges
the socia-political motivations of the opposition in their
wi thholding of data but claims that the real heart of the
conflict was, in fact, scientific. His attack is grounded
firmly in the cognitive/normative traditions of classical
science and his reconstruction argues that the oppoaition' s
construction of the conflict is best understood as an
attempt to divert attention from their scientific negligence
or incompetence.
I began my interview with Myers with a blunt question
as to why the stock assessment scientists had, apparently,
so badly over-estimated the abundance of northern cod. What
went wrong? Again, I present the data as lightly edited
transcript.
A: There was a group of people who did not want others
to have a close look at the data. It was very
sUbjective. Virtually nothing was published.
Q: Who were these people?
A: You want names? Dick Well:'?'. He's dead now. They
were convinced that the stock was going up. Honestly,
145
completely convinced. There were other people ... I was
outside of the assessment process. People who were not
within a small group were very much discouraged from
examining the data, There's a long history of that.
0: So stock assessment was run as an exclusive club?
A: No. It was through CAFSAC. But if I wanted to model
the distribution of fish in relationship to
temperature. this was fought very hard.
Q: Why?
A: Paranoia.
Q: But if they were convinced they were right. who were
they scared of?
A: I don't know. But what went wrong with the process-
-Why the mistakes were made--was this exclusive
attitude to examining the data, That. and some
sociological reasons. The group dynamics of the
process. It's very unscientific. There's a local
group, none of whom have Ph. Ds.
0: These were people who had been hired under Sandy's
directorship?
A: Yeah. Some even before.
Q: Under Wilf Templeman,! Going back that far?
A: The key thing to understand is that it conformed to
What people, some people. wanted to believe. It's a
little more complicated than that. but I don't feel it's
a lot more complicated than that. In' 87, I was asked
by someone on the Alverson Comrnissio.p to examine the
data because I had developed new mechanisms for
evaluating research survey data. It had to be done
quickly. I concluded, in about four days--given access
to the data--that their claim that there was an
increase. from the research surveys, was simply false.
For various reasons.
0: Could you be more speci.fi.c?
A: [Long technical discussion omitted; a critique of
previous methodology and synopsis of Myers's
reanalysis. See Appendix M for the full text. J I did
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an independent analysis of the data--that the stock
simply was not increasing at that time.
Q: SO at that point you were not working for DFO?
A: I was working for DFO. But simply because you work
for DFO doesn't mean you're allowed to examine data.
0: So it took Alverson coming in from outside to force
them to let you see the data. To crack the safe for
you?
A: That's right. And this was just to do my job. And
it has created an enormous number of problems for me.
There are people who just hate me for doing t:hat. In
retrospect, with a lot more data now, it's abundantly
clear that it was true. After the Alverson Report.
;;~;~~~i~~r=a~e~~~~~~~f~dt~~~ete~~tr~~;~z~~o~~~~.sishing
After a long digression on other topics we returned to
the subject of the control of access to data as a strategy
to support prevailing knowledge claims and to thwart
possible challenges. Myers describes the consequences of
another scientist, Scott: Aikenhead, being denied access to
data and having his reSUlts suppressed by the same group
that had blocked Myers.
A: Mac Mercer [who succeeded Sandeman as Director of
the Science Branch] allowed the power blocs [to
continue]. He didn' t allow the data to be accessed
freely. And that was a very serious mistake. Let me
explain one simple consequence oE that.
When the Kirby Commission made their report:; they
projected an increase in cod based on their remai:li.ng
at the same weight [at age] per cod as when the 200
mile limit was imposed. It turns out that cod growth
is strongly reI",ted to density. The more cod there
are. the smaller they are. [This is critica~l.y
important where a stock assessment is expressed in
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terms of "b.iomass" or total we.ight.] This was. :J..n
fact. noticed several years before [f:.he synthesis of
the Kirby projections}. But it was never reported. It
was forbidden for thAt person to publ.ish anything.
That person was Scot Aikenhead.
0: So the knowledge was there but it was suppressed?
A: Yeo. And for no good reason.
0: By who?
A: In that case, D:J..ck We~ls. And Sandy Sandeman was
director and allowed it to happen. Mac Mercer, to his
credit. tried to change things but didn't try hard
enough. But that wasn't the only case. Derek Ross was
here and he was forbidden access to data. Jake Rice
was. for years, forbidden access to the data he was
hired to work with. This was before he became
management level. There were all kinds of examples of
that.
Q: Would you characterize it as a case of the old guard
versus the young Turks?
A: Yeah. And Jake Rice became an old Turk (sic) just
like that (snaps fingerS). It was an amaz:J..ng
transition.
0: After he became management?
A: Yeah. We're basical.ly a tr:J..bal society and once you
become a member oE a tribe, the tribe is a.l.l-important.
In this case the cod assessment biologists were the
tribe and they were certainly protected wh:J..ch was
~~e~~~s~~~~~gn to me. Through all of this I remained
Myers vividly describes the powerful, usually hostile,
social forces that are confronted by anyone who espousss a
critical or competing knowledgs claim. In th.is instance
Myers was presenting his work to the members of the Alverson
Commission--but also in the presence of his scientific peers
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at OFO, his direct boss, and representatives from the higher
levels of the federal bureaucracy that employed him. Many
of the people in the room had the power to make Myers's
professional life as a DFO scientist thoroughly miserable:
perhaps to end :Lt. The pressures to recant or modify his
iconoclestic ar:alysis must have been enormous. In Myers's
words:
A: Some times you have to go in there and s~ug it: out.
This is an important: issue. People's livelihoods are
at stake.
During the Alverson Commission. I sat a..ound a table
when I was giving my reanalysis. Jlnd there was the
Director of the lab. directors from Ottawa. Everyone
involved in the process. I was presenting this report
to John pope and John Poo~e. And, basically. I said
the cod population hadn't changed in the last six years
and that the fishing mortality was at least double of
what they were claiming. All my co-workers were there
and everyone oE them, without exception, Violently
disagreed with my analysis. Without exception.
It began with Dick wel1.s saying, "well, you really
can't expect us to say anything different. We've gone
through the process and this is the CAFSltC document and
this is what we've concluded. ThereEore. you can' t
expect us to say anything different." Which is an
incredibly anti-scientific approach to the topic.
You're talking about something that has more to do with
tribal societies •.•• But a~l sci-ence might be like that.
0: So in your opini.on. a ~ot of this talk about the
difficulties oE b4....~ding a new science is a cover up or
a way of explaining the Eailures of the past?
A: Well. I think that a lot of the fai~ures of the past
were tribal in nature. That has nothing to do With
science. Except scientists are human ~ike everyone
else. These people, generally. do not publish in the
peer-reviewed journa~s. There was almost nothing :from
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this group of people doing the work that was published
in open literature.
Q: And yet these were the people who decided what was
done by who and where?
A: Yes. More than they should have. The Director was
rel.uctant to exercise his full authority.
Q: And their re.lative authority was perhaps a function
of their long tenure and institutional inertia?
11: Yes.
0: May I speculate that these people were by-ann-large
~~:~~~~~~1~~e;:o;~~~~:; ~~:a~~~~~~~~ ~~~:_~~~~::;~=;;~
11: Yes.
0: So there was resentment of all these college-
educated mainlanders who were coming in and trying to
tell thom how to run their fishery?
A: I think it was much more personal than that. To be
fair, there were NewEoundlanders who fought long and
hard. There was George Winters who wrote that paper
saying northern cod assessment was not worth a rat's
asshole. So I don't think it's fair ... thera's a bit of
that but that's not the whole story.
0: I'm trying to see as many people on different sides
of this l.ssue as possible. I'm going to be seeing
Sandy {Sandeman] in a week or so.
A: Ask h1.m why data was not allowed to be analyzed when
he was d1.rector. And give him the example of tho
growth rate/population stUdy that Dick Wells kept the
data out of.
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SUlMlary and Analysi.s
In the above transcripts we have two fishari.es
scientists reconstructing the same social dynamic process in
radically different ways. Even taken at face value, the
mutually exclusive interpretations of a single series of
interactions are revealing. Whether or not one version or
the other is "true," is irrelevant from the social
constructivist perspective. what is relevant is that these
were/are two scientists deeply inVOlved with the central
function (stock assessment:) of a powerful st:ate institution
(DFO)--and that the development of the conflict, and its
quasi-resolution, had large-order, macro-level sooio-
economic consequences.
Having earlier established the unusual significance of
this debate, let us return to a closer analysis of the
content of the transcripts.
What is immediately striking is that thie not really a
debate about the validity of knOWledge but a dispute over
property rights--in this case, data. But, in this case,
there is no commonly-recognized statutory authority or body
of common law to guide mediation and closure. At its most
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fundamen"tal level, the conflict is over whether property
rights of any kind can, or should, be attached to scientific
date.; particularly to data collected at public expense in
support of public resource management.
Notice th ... t when I first suggested the possibility of
conflict over scientific methodologies between the "old
guard" and the "young Turks", Sandeman immediately accepted
the suggestion of conflict but denied that it had anything
to do with scientific issues. :Instead, he reconstructed the
problem as purely sociological.
From this perspective, data is treated as the raw
material from which professional careers are built. A
scientist's relative prestige in the community of his or her
peers is a function of the nUlllb£>r of papers published and
appointments to coveted positions in scientific
organizations. In turn, these crttical variables determine
a scientist1s location and movement in the bureaucratic
hierarchy of DFO--variables which are very pragmatically
expressed in terms of money and power,
Data can also take the form of a negotiable commodity.
where an older scientist with an accumulation of unpublished
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data can form a partnership with a younger scientist who has
a command of 'che latest--and, presumably, most prestigious--
analytical tools and techniques. Credit is then shared,
either equally or as first and second authors, according tu
previously agreed-upon terms of the partnership. It 1s
noteworthy that, in ciiscuss.i.ng this issue, Sandeman never
once links this problem with what we generally assume to be
the central function and concern of scientists; the
production of knowledge. There is no suggestion that this
confl.ict over access to data may have impeded or distorted
the process of stock assessment.
In the final analysis, if data is permitted to be
treated as property, the bal-ance of power lies in favour ot'
the owner of the data. The most powerful snd elegant
analytical. tools ara useless unless they can be app'.ied to a
data set. From this we can see quite cl-early why older DFO
scientists (who may have, to varying degrees, felt
threatened by the brash young Ph.Ds with their advanced
degrees, complex mathematics, and computer slci~IS) would
have .i great deal to gain from the priva1:izat1on of data.
Further, we can see why, as an older and class.i.cally trained
biol.ogist and Director of the Science Branch, Sandeman was
deepl.y sym~athetic to and support1ve of thsir perspective.
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"rurnj.ng to Myers' s reconstruction, we note that there
is no disagreellent between Myers and Sandeaan as to what
happe:n.ed--the ·facts· of the case. Data collected by publ.1c
servants at publ.1c expense was privatiz.ed with the
sYlipathet.1c sanction of the then-O.1rector of the Science.
Branch, Sandelllan, and that this practice continued--aJ.beit,
unsanct:ioned-~underh.1s successor, Mac Mercar.
However, to establish hi.s, and others', ri.ght of
to the data, Myers invokes the ideal standards of sc.1ence
(openness, intellectual riqour, end objectivity), compares
his adversaries against these standards, and finds them
great1y lacking. He .interprets the propr.1etary treatment of
data a.s a strategy to protect deepJ.y-held personal end
institutional bQllefs~ that DFO had been, was then, and
would continue to be, successful in fulf1.11ing its prolllises
of a rebuiJ.t and robust northern cod stock. H.is Crit.1qU8 of
their behav.1our and individual competence as scientists is
constructed as s nOIlllstive scientific argullent.
For the purposes of lIak:lng this particular point
clear1.y as possible, I have extracted the following quotes.
They are out of context and out of order but, I believe,
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llccuratoly and fairly represent Myers's position. The full
transcript of the interview can be found as Appendix M.
Myers states his hypothesis:
"Theg were convinced that: the stock was go:Lng up.
Honestly, comp~etely convinced. The key thing to
understand is that 1..1; {the assessments] conformed to
what people. some people wanted to believe. It's a
~:Li~~em~~~ec~~~f~~~~;~dt~~~nt~:~~ ..~ut I don·t feel it's
He presents data in support of the hypothesis:
"There was a group of people who did not want others
to have a close look at the data. It was very
SUbjective. Virtually nothing was pUblished. People
who were not within a smal~ group were very much
discouraged from examining the dat:a. Xhere' s a long
history of that ... . i.E I wanted to model the
distribution oE fish in re.lationship to temperature,
this was fought very hard. [Referring to work done
that contradicted the prevailing view] .• • it was never
reported. It was forbidden for that person to publish
anything. That person was Scot Aikenhead. But that
wasn't the only case. Derek Ross was here and he was
forbidden access to data. Jake Rice was. for years,
forbidden access to the data he was hired to work with.
~~iSk~~~Sb~~O~~a~:l~:c~~et~:~~~gment level. There were
Fina11y, he discredita the opposition by attacking
their credentials and competence as scientists and charges
that they avoided forums where their knowledge claims could
be challenged:
"There'S a local group none of whom have Ph.Ds.
These people generally do not pUb~ish in the peer-
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revi.ewed journals. There was almost nothing from this
~~~~pl~~e~:~~;:.~~bng the work that was published in
What we have seen here is a case of scientists in
conflict but not, 1n the classical Kuhnian sense, a
scientific conflict. Indeed, even the vary nature of the
conflict is a subject of contention.
The two individuals (and, presumably, the groups they
represent) are struggling to define the parameters and terms
of the debate in a way that will favour their discordant
constructions of the issue. And yet, the very existence of
this confl1ct--much less its resolution (.~ fever) --has
triggered large perturbations in the production of
scientific knowledge within DPO and has been the
precipi tatin9 causal factor in the creation of a crisis of
confidence--on the part of the consumers of i t8 stock
assessments and advice--in the validity of CPO's knowledge
claims.
Sandeman suggests that this 1s not an isolated or
unusual incident.
"This is not only a problem of the laboratory in st.
John's but it is everyWhere. When I was acting as
Director at "i:he Lab in St.Andrews. N.B. [New Brunswick}
I saw the same thing there and in fact I remember one
young fellow in one of the labs in the Maritimes who
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wrote someth.ing, I tlJink, like 18 papers in his first
one or two years. He mined the data that had been
collected by others, ignoring any plans that they may
have had to use it: and what was achieved? A series of
~~;~~~n~~~~r~i~;~ls~~~~~s~~ :~~1f~~ t ab~~~~~ed: ,.~l
It 1s worth consi~ering (as we shall do in the
following secti.on of this chapter) '~h9ther this kind of
conflict may be characteristic of inst1. tutionalized,
bureaucratically-directed science. In "this case, the root
cause of "the problem seems to be that the cr1. teria govern.:lng
the reward and promotion of individual scientists 1.s not
very stronglY correlated with thei.r production of useful,
empi.rical~y robust knowledge. It .1s n1.cely .ironic that
quantitat.ive measures of productiv.1ty--numbers of papers
pUb~ished--appear to be an unproductive technique for
evaluating the substantial, practical contributions of the
producers of quantitative knowledge.
The nFO Structure of Reward and Promotion as an Impediment
to Useful Knowledge
In the preceding section, we saw Sandeman invoke DFO' s
established evaluative criteria for reward and promotion of
its acient:lsts as 1'I rationa1e for 'the proprietary trel'ltment
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of data. Here, I will document and discuss other ways in
which criteria for reward and promot:i.on tend to deflect DFO
scientists from their mandated miss:i.on.
"Mandate:
Xo ensure that the highest standard of scientific
informatJ.on is availab1.e to the Government: of Canada for use
in developing po1.ieies, regulations and legislation
regarding the oceans and aquatic life, and to other
government departments, private industry and the public for
use in planning and carrying out aquatic activities"
[DFO/4155 1989 p. 8]
Notice that this mandate is unequivocally utilitarian
and that it is two-fold in nature. The primary mission is
the provision of useful descriptions, assessments, and
predictions to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans as a
factual basis for rational resource management policy and
practice. The secondary mission is to produce and
disseminate this knowledge as a service to the consumers and
users of aquatic resources. The largest and most important
of these consumers is tho fishing industry.
Tho industry I s rel.ative health and stability--and that
of its dependent and re1ated socio-economi.c structures--ia
signi£icantl.y affected by: 1) the consistency (or lack
thereof) of federal pOl.i.cy and regulations 2) the ability to
make realistic fishing end business plans baaed upon
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reasonably reliable resource projections and 3) the degree
to which the relationship between the industry and OFO is
chc:.racterized by a free exchange of useful information and
mutual respect. The degradation or absence of any of these
factors will, of necessity, have an adverse affect on the
profitability of independent fishermen, corporate fishing
interests, and the quality of life of thousands of
individuals and families in hundreds of communities.
Thus, it is of considerable importance to understand
how, and to what degree, the criteria by which DFO
scientists are rewarded and promoted may conflict with their
fUlfilment of their institutional mandate.
I return to the interview with Sandcman for a
description of the OFO scientific hierarchy and an
exposition of the mechanisms which determine an individual
scientist's location in that structure:
"Now the way it works is that there are basically
four levels. The RES 1 level--which is the Research
Scientist One level--is the recruitment level. A young
Ph,D. You have to have a Ph.D or the equivalent to get
into the RES scale, So the young Ph.D coming in would
normally be an RES 1. And if he's publishing
reasonably during the first two or three years, it's
almost automatic.. , three or four years ... that he moves
up into the RES 2 scale. And the RES 2 scale ... . Most
young scientists don't recognize this. They don't
think about it. But the RES 2 scale is figured as the
scale that most ... the average scientist will reach the
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top of. And not everyone will go on to the three or
the four scales.
"Approximately 60 per cent of tbe population of
research scientists are in RES 1 and 2. In order to
get up to tbe RES 3 scale, whicb is tbe next level up,
you've got to bave a very good publication record.
It's only 32 per cent of the total population of
research scientists in Canada (wbo) can acbieve that
scale. So you know tbere' 5 competition to get there.
Jlnd the competition is extremely vigorousl It 151
So that you ha.ve to bave, number one. a good
publication record and, number two. usually you have to
have something clse--like chairmansbip of something or
you're really top of your field in sometbing--in order
to get into tbat scale. And then the fourth scale.
which is only 5 per cent of the research scientists'
population in Canada, is the top scale. And that is
reserved. really. for people who are the best. The
Rickers and people like that b~';':"lle RES 4$. In
~~:~~u~~;a~~S~~b~~v~~oIo;h~~~e~i2' In Nova Scotia
The important point here is that the reward and
advancement of a DFO scientist is determined exclusively by
his or her p(!rformance as measured against treditiona I
scientific/academic standards; number of publications in
peer-reviewed journals and relativQ reputation within the
international cotl'Ullunity of fisheries scientists. It is
largely irrelevant whether or not a scientist's work folloWS
from, or even acknOWledges. the institutional mandato.
There is no consequential credit accrued for contributions
to organizational function or for work in establishing,
maintaining, or improving relations with the client groups.
There is no incentive for tackling problems of pArtiCUlar
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interest to the Minister's office or to industry, in
preference to problems that the scientific community
considers to be more interesting and worthwhile.
Henry Lear is a native Newfoundlander who grew up in
Port de Grave on Conception Bay, fishing with his father and
grandfather. His family has been fishing in Newfoundland
for over 300 years. f-ie is also a fisheries biologist who
spent the first 22 years of his career working out of the
Of0 research station in st. John's. His deep and abiding
concern for the welfare of the inshore sector led him to
work on problems of practical interest to inshore fishermen.
Additionally, because of his cultural roots, Lear was often
called upon to represent the Department in meetings--
sometimes qu;;,te confrontational--with various fishing
industry groups. The bulk of his career as a DFO scientist
was devoted to fUlfilment of the Department's institutional
mandate and to the defence and furtherance of its
institutional interests in relation to the fishing industry.
In retrospect, he describes the consequences this had for
his professional standing within the institution.
0: That's exactly what Sandy (Sandeman] pointed out.
That because the promotional and reward structure at
DFO is so heavily weighted in favour of publishing.
that you see data as your investment and your life's
work.
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A: That's all you have. It's not a level. playing
fieLd. This is the problem. I suffered from the same
thing. You're so tied up in doing your job that you
just don·t have time to pUbLish. You just can't
concentrate and Eocus on getting the pUbLications.
You're the OJle [speaking oE himself}, if there's a
brush fire, you get called out. You're the one who's
got the experience and you've always been there and
it's so easy, right?
And you hire someone, it isn't just Ram [Myers}, it
could be anybody. They're brilliant and they come in
and you've got this wealth of data you haven't
published and they say, "WeLL, this is not right. This
demands publication." So you hand it over and they get
halE a dozen papers and next thing you know they're two
levels ahead of you. And you say, what am I doing?
I'm only a slave I And this 15 where the problem lies.
People who are working very, very hard--working
overtime without getting any payor anything else--were
not getting any type of reward. Not even promotion.
Whereas somebody'd come in who was quite free to take
the data. You were giving them a fret? ride. It was
sort of creaming off in a way from someone else's life.
This is the crunch. That is the problem.
0: So the structure does not encourage cooperation.
A: You can call it the structure. But I think the
reward system for research scientists doesn't allow
that. You get penalized.
I spent a lot of time talking to fishermen Eor
example. It was interesting. I came from fishermen
and I could easily talk to thelll and I enjoyed that.
carrying them information and discussing things with
them. But in the end, it didn't do anything for me.
People were just passing me by. So that's just one
example. Now we've come to a crunch where we've got to
have people talking to fishermen, interacting and
liaising and all that stuff. When I was doing it, it
was nothing f
0: J.3. Maguire is quite concerned about. this.
Although there's a lot of talk about increasing the
communication with the clients. there are still no
points for it. no institutional rewards. When I talk
to other people about this problem, your name often
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comes up as an example of someone who has suffered
because of this.
A: Well, I have no one to blame, only myself. I knew
what the rules were and because I cared. I suppose. I
suffered. I'm not blaming the system. I'm not blaming
anything. I knew the rules and because I fel t a
certain way. a certain dedication, whatever. that's
what I did. Dick Wells did the same thing.
Q: What happened to you?
A: well, I just never got the publications to get
upgraded, pure and simple. NO one caused me to suffer.
The rules were there on the page in the book. You had
to have a certain number oE publications--which I
didn't hava--and there was no way I was going to get
them, doing the type of job I was doing. So it was a
vicious cyCle and I was party to the cycle because I
enjoyed what I was doing.
I thought at the time. and I still believe. that I
was doing a good job. But because I did a good job.
and enjoyed doing it. and kept doing it--which only
~~~~~~r~~o~u~g;;et~8~~h~~nd~:~;;;t~~~rests.13
I discussed this issue with Dr. Jean Jacques (J. J. )
Ma.guire, chair of CAFSAC:
0: How are you going to deal with the resistance oE
research scientists to spending their time in ways that
there are no points Ear within the internal structure
of DFO?
A: It's a very serious problem as a matter oE fact,
You need to Eind points. Simple. It's as simple as
that, 1 don't know hoW' to do it and it's very
difficult. we want to reward people who communicate
and exchange and do stuff like that.
we say that out oE one side of the mouth and then
when it comes time to look at promotions, we say this
one's got 15 primary pUblications this year. You've
got one. Forget it boy. You 've met with fishermen.
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You've met with broadcast people, radio people.
university people. You've met with all of these
people. But what do you have to show for iti' Nadal
You're out.
We've got to change that and I don't know how to do
it. I don't have a clue. But it must be recognized.
a: there's a second, more serious problem in the
surprising inability of stock assessment science to
produce practical or useful knowledge--knowledge of the
requisite precision--to fulfil the needs and
expectations of the management structure and of the
planning needs of the commercial industry.
A: You've mentioned something, it's the closeness to
the clients, I think that's what went wrong. We
distanced ourselves from the clients .. . from what we
were supposed to do. And we came to be seen as an
impediment for the industry.
0: And, in my limited experience, this attitude is more
common than not. Particularly because of the
evaluative and reward...
A: ., . structural appraisal system. You're totally
right. To me, that's not easily solvable. Very
difficult to solve. But I agree with the perception
that if you're too close to the fishermen you start to
see things their own way. And you lose ....
What it boils down to right now is that we've got
clients, and we're producing stuff that's totally
useless to them. We've got no links to the clients.
If we want to continue to do that, that's fine. But
we're going to be out of business. If we want to stay
in business we better get closer to the clients. It's
straight free-market economical forces.
If I'm close to the inshore fishermen and you're
close to the offshore fishermen, we're going to argue
and we're going to reconcile our perceptions some way.
And what's going to come out of it is going to reflect
:i~~t~~:t~H of both. So I don't see a big problem
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I discussed the same problem with Sandeman who--as a
former Director of the Science Branch--has a more applied
perspective on the conflict between service science and
"real" science:
0: You've talked about stock assessment science in
relation to values and norms. evaluative traditions
that are internal to science. But DFO science exists
to some extent--at least in the minds of the
bureaucratic and political structure and the corporate
sector--as a service industry. That's the public
justif.ication for the rather large amounts of publi.c
money that are expended on it.
Then the question arises. if science can't provide
us with knowledge at: the degree of certai.nty we
need... . From the corporate point of view. they need to
make five- and ten-year plans--to construct and
amortize plants and trawlers over a considerable period
of time based upon the projections of what their
allowed catches are going to be for that period. The
political sector has to make management decisions
based. .. They expect to be able to use science as the
legitimiZing or justifying ground for their decisions.
And if it's unreliable or unpredictable then they iJre
in trouble. Is there any recognition of this within
the scientific community and, if so, how do the
scientists feel about it?
A: There is certainly very strong recognition of the
basic fact that we're a service--amongst the
administrative side of it--because we are continually
having to justify this. that. and the other thing in
order to get funding.
As far as the scientists are concerned ... You've
talked to Larry Coady and Mac (Mercer] so you 'va gone
through our review system. right? Our review system
tries to bring our scientists into contact with the
fact that we are a service organization. That we've
got certain things that we've got to do.
And my own guideline. as a director and as a
research manager. was always that we try to spend
apprOXimately 80 per cent of our time on the service
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function. Research towards service. There are some
scientists. you'd let them gc much higher than 20 per
cent. But on an average, 20 per cent of the time is
devoted to things that are "may pay offs." Real
research. They're not the things that we have to do
every day to provide our assessments. To provide our
projections. Nor are they things which are keyed to
just improving our techniques. They are research lines
which are interesting. Which may pa!J off or may not.
We don't know. I think much of the work that Ram's
(Myers) doing is of this type. Not all of it. 1 think
he spends 70 per cent of his time in straight service
work. Service to others. But a good scientist should
be able to spend at least 20 per cent of his time on
long-term work which ma!J or may not pD.y off. In
addition to the service.
So 1 think a director has to recognize that. You
won't need scientists just to do the service work.
Scientists have to have more than just the service.
Especially when, if you are a stock assessment
scientist who has to produce his stock assessment twice
a year.. ,.1 mean, it's a relatively mundane job.
Reading your otoliths. Getting your age distributions.
Getting your weight/length curves and all the things
you need for the stock assessment. You've got to have
that extra 20 per cent to follow up lines that look
interesting and to do the other things. Nevertheless,
1 think that everybody in f:t, John's recognizes the
service side of it because of the review system that we
have that forces that.
The system has some extremely good features about
it. The main feature that I think is good is that you
can get a scientist who's on his own, He has no empire
under him or anything like that and he's earning as
much money as the Assistant Deputy Minister. If he's a
top-notch scientist he's working on his own at the
bench. Maybe with one technician. And publishing.
And publishing first-class stuff. The system allows
that and is tailorBd to allow that. So it means that
you don't have to spend your time in administration and
build up a pyramid so that the more people you get
under you the more promotions you get which is the
standard civil service way. That is a big strength,
I think that if there is a weakness, the weakness is
that there's not enough brownie points, for lack of a
better word, given to contributions made to the
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organization. You get a felloW' like Jake Rice
who.... rou know him. rou've talked to him so I can use
his name as a type example. A guy who is a program
head. Who is chairman of this and chairman oE that.
He' 5 a super chairman. He's got a broad spectrum of
interests. So he's doing all sorts of things of value
to the organization and maybe not publishing as many
papers as he would like. rou do get an imbalance. The
~~~e~~o~:eg;~~~~r~~;~i~f to the organization and his
Summary and Analysis
Maguire' 5 assessment of the problem is surprisingly
blunt and pessimistic. From the scientists' point of view
tilere are no extra "points" awarded for directing one's
research towards problems of interest to the client groups--
and there are actual disincentives for time and effort spent
in service to the institutional (non-scientific) goals of
OFO. Lear's experience establishes this point very firmly.
Most research scientists see such work as time-consuming and
a distraction from the kind of publication-oriented research
that will count towards promotion.
Additionally--by becoming too direotly involved with
the client groups--a scientist can easily become entangled
in the poJ.itical. economic, and social aspects of fisheries
management. This exposes a scientist to charges of
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subjectivity and the suspicion among peers that his or her
work is polluted by non-scientific considerations. Such a
judgement would be the kiss of death for any hopes of
promotion.
As a result, while the scientists may be doing "good
science" according to the norms and traditions of their
peers, they are "producing stuff that's totally useless to
[the client groups]." [Maguire above] Therefore, it should
not have been too surprising that--in the storm of criticism
of DFO science that followed the release of the Harris
Report--few individuals from the client groups (the federal
government and the commercial fishery) felt inclined to come
to the defense of the Science Branch. From the point of
view of the consumers of scientific knowledge, there was
little of any real worth to defend and, in fact, much to
criticise. Still, the scientists felt that they had been
abandoned, even betrayed, by their bureaucratic masters for
reasons of political expediency and vigorously, but
ineffectually, protested what they perceived to be shabby
treatment.
The following is from an articla in a St. John' s
newspaper headlined "DFO scientists fuming, say valcourt!§
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will not answer morale concerns":
"The Professional Institute of the Public Service of
Canada, the association representing the scientists,
wrote to the minister on March 6 and outlined problems
in the department,
"The scientists accused provincial and federal
officials of spreading misinformation about DFO
research and called the department 'negligent in
allowing this climate of disinformat1on to flourish. '
"The let=er said public hostility was being stirred
up against the scientists, who were being called
incompetent.' The DFO researchers called the situation
'volatile and dangerous ..
"Since the release of the Harris Report last month,
the mood among the fisheries scientists is reported to
have worsened.
" 'The tone of the report was condescending to DFO
scientists,' said Paul Howard, a PIPSC spokesman in
Ottawa.
" 'They have been working very hald to demoralize
researchers.' Ms. craig said. 'They don't seem to have
any understanding or appreciation about research. '"
[The Sunday Express, April 22, 1990)
Having been both a scientist and, later, a manager of
scient.ists, Sendeman's exegesis of the problem is more
equivocal and contains the internal contradictions and
conflicts that are at the root of the problem. A9 8 manager
he claims that there is "a strong recognition amongst the
administrative side" that their institutional mission is the
provision of services to their clients. As 8 soi;;ntist,
though, he tends to view the service work as a necessary
evil which must be done in order to securD funding for the
"real research."
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As a manager he sees the annual program review as a
usefUl way to remine\ the scientists of "the basic fact that
we're a service organization.,... As a scientist, he
somewhat ruefully continues" ... that we've got certain
things that we've got to do." Not, necessarily, things that
they want to do. The task most central to their mandate,
stock assessments, is dismissed as "a relatively mundane
job," for which scientists need to be rewarded by being
allowed to pursue "research lines which are interesting."
Finally, one should note that, in Sandeman's view, the
"better" the scientist, the more freedom should be permitted
in the selection of research topics. Remember that the
determination of who are the "better" scientists is not
connected to their contributions toward the achievement of
institutional goals. "Better" scientist are those who
publish regularly on "interesting" research lines. So--not
only is there a strong incentive for scientists to maximize
their personal rewards and professional autonomy by avoiding
"mundane" service work whenever possible in favour of
"interesting," pUblishable research~-but we can assume that
the bulk of the unrewarded service science is assigned to
and performed by those scientists least-esteemed among their
peers.
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In the next chapter I will shift and broaden the field
of enquiry to examine the nature and dynamics of the
relationship between the Science Branch and the commercial
fishery. We have seen that there is a serious discrepancy
between the institutional mandate of the Science Branch to
produce useful knowledge for the fishery and the actual
d.trection and production of its activities. In this chapter
I have shown that this is due, in part. to fundamental
conflicts between the evaluative criteria for reward and
promotion wi thin the Science Branch and the institutional
goals and responsibilities of OFO as an agent of the state.
ENDNOTES"
1. From Thomas Kuhn, author of the widely influential work, "The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions." [Kuhn 1962, 2nd edition
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3. Ibid.
4. Wilfred Templeman; a native Newfoundlander who was widely
t"('gorded as the Dean of Newfoundland fisheries scientists.
1'elllp1eman's career of significant research and publication began
ill the 19405 as a biologist at the Bay Bulls research station,
Included many years as Director of the Science Branch, and ended
only with his daath in the mid-1980s.
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provinces.
8. From an interview with Ram Myers conducted in St. John's on
August 28, 1990. The fUll transcript is Appendix M.
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12. From an interview with Sandy Sandeman conducted in St.
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13. From an interview with Henry Lear conducted in Ottawa,
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on October 28, 1990. The fUll transcript is Appendix J.
15. From an interview ~,ith Sandy Sandeman conducted in St.
John's, September, 1990. The fUll transcript is Appendix O.
16. Bernard Valcourt: then Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.
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CHAPTER SIX
.IS THERE A PLACE FOR FISHERMEN IN FISHERIES SCIENCE?
The recent development of Environmental Impact
Assessment and Social Impact Assessment processes is--,among
other things--an attempt to synthesize a progressive,
productive relationship between scientific knOWledge and
other forms 0:1.: knowledge. A.s anyone who has participated in
such a process or followed its media coverage knows, the
social and cognitive dynamics of these fora are often
adversarial. This is inherent in the structure of the
process and its goal--which is to achieve a negotiated
resolution of the disparate, usually contradictory, sets of
norms, traditions, end values that inform the cognitive
realities of the concerned sooial groups.
This has an analog in the relationship between DFO
stock assessment scientists and the commercial fiahery-··
partiCUlarly the inshore sector--and opens anothdr le\el of
analysis for understanding the persistent resistanca of DFO
science to directing its activities in the interests of the
fishery and to do so in a context of open com!llunication and
cooperation.
As we shall see, \'.'hen discussing this aspect of the
problem it is necessary to distinguish between the offshore
trawler industry and the traditional inshore fishery. In
the course of earlier chapters, I showed that the original
chall.enge to the Science Branch's construction of the
stock's status came from the inshore sector of the fishery--
and that this sector was able to mobilize and sustain
sufficient cuI tural and political resources to force a
genuine and substantive internal reevaluation of scientific
stock assessment. Whether or not this reevaluation wculd
have occurred without this external pressure--and, if so,
whether it would have occurred sooner or later--is a point
that will forever remain moot. What can be established, and
usefully questioned, is that the offshore sector did not
join in the criticism of OFO's construction of reality until
the critical reassessment of 1989 precipitated drastically
reduced quotas for the 1990 offshore fishing year. Even
then their perspective was not congruent with that of the
inshoro sector but diametrically oppof,;!ld. They argued that
DFO had been right the first time; that there were plenty of
Hah out there and that this was supported by the
operational reality of their skippers. l
175
TO more fully explain the pel:sistence of OFO's pre-1989
construction and its vigorous defence against the challenges
of the inshore fishery, it is important to reca'l from
earlier chapters that, by far, the greatest source of
assessment data is the offshore fishery, A.l though the
inshore fishory accounts for one-third to one-half of all
landings from the northern cod stock, it has been routinely
ignored by the Science Branch as a valuable or valid data
source. Why this should be is a question well worth
pursuing and one which will provide us with yet another
source of illumination of the central problem.
We can begin by noting that conflicts between the
cognitive reality of inshore fishermen and federal
scientists are not new. 2 In fact, deep resentment--of the
history of domination of OFO's reaouces by the interests of
the offshore sector and dismissal of the legitimacy of the
inshore fishermen's knowledge and ways of knowing--
undoubtedly accounts for some of the tenaciousness and
determination with which they pressed their attack on OFO
science. Although t:hey have won a tactical victory in their
battle with DFO, the strategic balance of power, from an
epistemological perspective, remains heavily 1n favour of
science. As we will see in \:he following pages, DFO has
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learned to respect the pOlitical power of th'il inshore
fishery but is still intensely sceptical of the value and
validity of their cognitive reality.
The inshore fishery aod 1ts advocates Claim that the
accumulated knowledge of hundreds' of years of fishing these
waters is resident in the tens of thousands of currently
active inshore fishermen. Further, they claim that this
knowledge 1s of at least equal validity to that of the
scientists when applied to questions relating to the
abundance and behaviour of the northern cod stocks and
should, thf'lrefore, be incorporated in the annual assessments
and the dependent setting of quotas.
The relative merits of this argument (although
fascinating and well worth detailed study) are not of
immediate interest to this work. What is of interest is
that it exists and is being formulated as a conscious and
concerted chollenge to the position of epistemological
superiority claimed by, and traditionally accorded to,
scientific knowledge. The Inst1tut10nal and individual
responseS by science and scientists to this challenge are of
interest, 89 are the cognitive structures and language that
they muster in their defense.
177
When examining this issue, it is important to make the
distinction between the scientific response and the
bureaucratic response 8S well as the distinction between the
scientists' conceptions of the inshore and offshore
fishermen as potential sources of valid knowledge.
The perspective of the State: The Political validit),· of the
Inshore Fishery
To the bureaucratic management of DFO, the claims of
fishermen, particularly the 20,000 or so inshore fishermen,
pose 11 political problelll. Not only are they--and the
voting-aged members of their families--a significant
political force but, as noted in thll introduction, the
inshore fishery occupios a position of disproportionate
cultural significance to the polity of Newfoundland. Issues
of concern to the. inshore fishery cannot be ignored or
dismissed by a bureauc::acy sensitive and/or vulnerable to
political forces. This sensitivity can be projected
downwards through the bureaucratic structure of DFO to the
scientific level. While active research scientists are not
directly VUlnerable to political forces, they are inevitably
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aware that their associated institutional authority and
their access to human, material, and financial resources is,
to some degree, dependent upon their institution's pOlitical
strength. In general, their scientific assessment of the
worth of inshore fishermen' knowledge claims is tempered
wi th an understanding and acceptance of their political
power as expres,;ed through a sympathetic media and the
ballot box.
The case of the offshore sector is quite different.
Here the power is not resident in the fishermen, of whom
there are relatively few. Nor is it resident in public
opinion or the voting popUlation, which tends to see the
interests of the capital-intensive offshore fishery as in
fundamental conflict with those of the inshore. The power
of the offshore sector resides in the two controlling
capital corporations, Fisheries Products International (FPl)
and National Sea Products (NatSaa), and is exercised through
the traditiona1 corporate mechanism~ of campaign
contributions and direct interactions with individual
members of state institutions, both elected and un-elected.
The forme::: tends to involve negot1ations for favourable
policy decisions or resource allocations in return for
corporate decisions of socio-economic benef! t to an elected
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representative's district. 3 The latter is through formally
established processes for institutional/industry information
exchangp and negotiations, usually on llIatters of operational
policy and practice. These fora generally include the top
managers frolll the Science Branch and, often, research
scientists as well.
The Scientific Perspective: The Epistemological ValiditL.£!
the Offshore Fishery
The attitudes of individual scientists toward the
inshore and offshore sectors are equally distinct. This may
be due, in part, to their relative power to intrude on the
normal routine of scientific activity. More importantly, 1
believe, 1 t is due to their relative standing with
scientists as sources of valid. valuable knowledge.
We have seen that of the two sources of raw data--
research vessel surveys and commercial catches of the
offshore trawlers-·the vast majority comes from the later
source. Although it con~ains some known and suspected
quaIltative problems. it's sheer quantity mitigates heavily
in its favour--and the inherent biases are thought to be
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amenable to compensatory statistical procedures. The data
are highly concentrated--originating from 50 or so trawlers-
-r.laking collection easy and, not least, it is frae for the
taking.
There are other aspects of the offshore fishery which
tend trJ render the dat.? it generates more acceptable to
science. First, it is perceived as recognizably rational.
The trawler fishery is pursued systematically with uniform
technology and techniques. The fleet effort is deployed and
controlled on the basis of operational principles developed
from an accumulating, well-documented, statistically
accessible data base. The reSUlts are evaluated objectively
by the directors of the corporations. In these respects the
offshore fishery shares a great deal in common with science.
By contrast, the inshore fishery is not seen by moat
scientists as a valid knOWledge source. Simply from the
point of data co110ction, it presents huge logistical
problems. Thousands of inshore boats are dispersed among
hundreds of communities--often quite remote and inaccessible
from DFO I S base of operations in 5t . .John' a. There is an
acutely problematic diversity of technologies and
techniques. Operational strategies are self-directed and
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tend to be based upon orally-transmitted accumulations of
tradi tiona I knowledge which is largely opaque to statistical
analysis. Because the inshore fishery is the foundation of
rural Newfound.land society--and because each individual
fisherman is so (leeply embedded in his communi ty--resul ts
are not evaluated ·objectively· but as an irreducible part
of an individual's social and cultural reality.
Science Vs. the Inshore Fishery: An Empirical Account of a
Struggle for Constructive AU'thori'ty
It is surely significant tha't the crucial reassessment
of data sources and analytical methodology was not initiated
by people or processes internal to DFO science, but by
political pressure from groups of independent insho~~
fishermen and their supporters--whose perception~ of the
state of the stock were at considerable variance with those
of DFO. Specifically, while the DFO yearly assessments had
been ~:egularly confir1l'ling their own predictions of a
steadily growing stock (the expected results of adherence to
the Fo.ll'anagement principal), the inshore fishery had been
experiencing ever-lower landings since 1982.
'82
A quanti1:a1:ive recen1: his1:ory of the inshore fishery
Initially, the inshore sector had greatlY benefitted
from the 1977 200 mile limit and the near-exclusion of
foreign fishing fleets from this zone. Inshore catches had
historically a ....eraged 'lround 150,000 mt until 1960, when
technologically-advanced foreign factory freezer trawler
fleets began to heavily exploit the northern cod in NAFO
zones 2J31<L. As the offshore catch rose from 301,500 mt in
1960 to 70B,OOO mt in 1968, the inshore catch fell from
157,000 mt to 101,000 mt in the same period. In retrospect
it is clear -that the stock (which had historically supported
a combined inshore/offshore sustained catch af 250, 000 to
300,000 mt) was being dangerously over-exploited. Inshore
catches continued to fall to an all-time lOW of 35,100 mt in
1974 while the offshore catches, in spite of increasing
effort, also began a steady decline to 100,000 mt in 1977--
the last year of effectively unrestricted foreign fishing.
With the ad....ent of the 200 mUe limit, the inshore
fishery continued its reco....ery from the 1974 low--landing
Bl ,000 mt in 1978 and 113,000 mt in 1982. The now largely
Canadian offshore fleet also made gains during this period,
its catches rising from 57,100 mt in 1978 to 116,000 mt in
1982. After that year, however, the E'lxperiences of the two
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sectors began a consequential divergence. Inshore catches
fell every year until, in 1986, the sector landed only
72,000 mt. Meanwhile, the offshore landings rose to 252.000
mt 1n the sallie period. (Keats 1986, Harris 1990] As early
as 1982, and in spite of a relatively good. year, the inshore
fishermen and plant owners who processad their fish thought
they recognized the beginnings of a depreE'oingly familiar
sequence of events and began to questien the accuracy of.
DFO's assessments. In particUlar, they were concerned by
the unusually high percentage of small fish in their nets
and the fact that the Total Allowable Catch (TAC)
(supposedly set in accordance with the FO.J'ule to realizo
the goal of rebuilding the stock by removing no more than 20
per cent each year) had been raised from 135,000 lilt in 1978
to 260,000 mt for the 1983 fishing year. This was in spite
of the fact that in no year since 1978 had the cOlllbined
inshore and offshore fleet landings met the quota. (Alverson
1987]
Questions and answers: the opening round
DFO responded to these concerns in a 1983 pamphlet
entitled "Trap Cod: Some Facts About Unpredictable Catches
and Small Fish." [DFO 1983J The tone of the response--and
DFO's conception of .1 ta relationship with the inshore
'.4
fishery--is made clear on the first page, headlined
"Questions and Answers." The explicit assumption is that,
while fishermen have "questions" or "concerns" or even
"demands" for information, OFO has the "answers." The text
states that there are many biological, behaviourlal, and
oceanographic factors that can contribute to the variability
of inshore catches ana create the appearance of abundance or
scarcity. Although one of these factors is, of course,
stock size, this was no longer a possibility as "The size of
the northern cod stock is currently estimated to be about
1,500.000 t (metric tonnes J. which should provide good
catches inshore." [OFO 1983 p. 10]
Bernard Brown, long-time information officer for the
OFO station in St. John's, summed up the prevailing attitude
quite bluntly: " ... essentially they were telling the
inS/lore fishermen who were creating all the uproar about the
destruction of the stocks. that you don't know what you' re
talking about. ,,4 But note that by 1986, OFO's revised
estimate of the 1982 stock had fallen by more than 30 per
cent to 1,097,000 mt. [Keats 1986]
As offshore catches continued to rise while inshore
catches fell, the men end women of the inshore sector grew
'.5
increasingly sceptical of DFC' s claims. By 1986 they had
become loudly and publicly critical and refused to accept
OFO's explanations as valid. Nevertheless, oro maintained
the official position that the management goal c:f Fa .1"as
producing the predicted, desired effect. The stock was
increasing on schedule and the reduction of inshore landings
must be due to other factors such as reductions in effort 0['
environmental changes affecting the annual summer inshore
TT,igration of the northe['n cod.
The metaphysical o['{gios of the inshore challenge
In the section above, we saw that the operational
reali ty of the inshore fishing community was at considerable
variance to OFO's science-based constructio!'l of reality: the
inshore sector was landing progressively less--and smaller--
fish while the offshoro trawlers' catches were continuing to
increase. Inshore fishermen began to claim that the stock
was in danger--that the scientific description of a heal thy,
growing stock must be wrong--and that the northern cod
quotas, particUlarly those for the corporato offshore fleet,
should be immediately and significantly reduced. The
official response from DFO was to dismiss the inshore
sector's perception of the stock's status 8S an artifact of
resource availability: the stock was healthy and continuing
,..
to rebuild but, for reasons probably related to changes in
the ocean c1imate, the cod were simply not migrating inshore
in their usual numbars.
There was, however, a deeper metaphysical basis for the
ir•.Jhore community's increasingly militant position. Bernard
Brown offers his thoughts on the development of the
disparate, conflicting constructions of reality by DFO and
the inshore sector.
A: YOU can go back to time immemorial. There have
always been fishery failures. Sometimes localized to
one bay. sometimes the entire East Coast, the South
Coast, wherever. The fish railed for a year or two. or
even three or four. It made for tough times. When it
was bad enough government would step in with some
little bit of assistance to help people stay alive.
Not on toddY's scale. But it really didn't mean too
much because people lived off the land and off the sea
anyway. But the important thing is that the poople
understood that it was a natural thing. The fish
failed. They didn't understand why. They just
understood that they did. But they knew that the
failure would only last for so long. The fish would
come back. That was as certain as God. The fish will
come back.
So there was never despair among the people and
never a reason to blame anyone for it, government or
anyone else. It was a natural thing. And of course,
there was only an inshore fishery. They always knew
that they could not fish out the sea. They couldn't
destroy the resource. And I doubt that anyone even had
a concept of destroying the resource. It wasn't even
imaginable,
But come the 'fifties, the offshore fisher!! started.
And it was a European fishery. Ths northern cod
landings peaked at something over BOO. 000 tonnes in the
early 'seventies, But over that period, people began
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to realize--and I think it took until the early
'eighties before most people in the inshore knew--that
an irrevocable change had taken place. That now you
could have a fishery failure that was not a natural
thing but caused by the fishermen themselves. Now they
could have a failure and, maybe. the fish would not
:;ome back. And that gives you a totally diffel"ent
inshore communi ty.
They have a new understanding of fishery failure.
Instead of saying, "Never mind. rhe fish will come
back," what stands between them and permanent failure,
is a few politicians in ottawa.
0: Would you say this new understanding was the
beginning of the serious criticism of DFO science?
A: I wouldn't say it was the beginni.ng. but that's when
it became mass criticism. Almost 1i](e a revolution. I
would say that the mass criticism from the inshore that
hit DFO three or four years ago was qualitatively
different than anything that had gone before. Almost
the whole inshore rose up and said, "DFO, you're
blowing it." And it was different in that they
concentrated on the science.
NOW 8 few mistakes and a few bad decisions could
cause a failure that was not natura~ but man-made. Now
there could be a failure and the fish wouldn't come
e~~:;'l/~if;~~~~tW~~a~o:~~~~i~~ ~~:~ehad~~o~~i~e~~:e. 5
Two soli"tudes: fisheries scientists and inshore
fishermen
Earlier in th1.s chapter, I claimed that OFO's
bureaucrats and scientists each viewed the problems of their
relationsh.i.ps with the inshore and offshore sectors of the
fishery quite differently. In tho following section I will
present data in support of this claim. I also suggested
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that the scientists' on-the-record evaluations of the
potential contributi.ons of fishermen's knowledge to the
sci.entific assessment process might well be tempered with an
awareness of their political power and DFO's vulnerability
to that power. This consideration did not apparently
restrain [lr. Edward (Sandy) Sandeman who reti:t'ed as Director
of the Science Branch in 1986 after a 3D-year career as a
fisheries biologist.
He begins by making a functional argument for Science's
neglect of the inshore fishery in favour of the offshore as
a data source Sandemsn then awltches to an epistemologic"ll
argument to flatly dismiss inshore fishermen as a valid
source of know1.edge.
Q: Let· s go back a bit to the discussion we were having
about the demands .from tho consumers of scientific
knowledge to participate {in stock assessments].
Especially from the inshore. there's a litany of
criticism. That science doesn't listen to our
knowledge. That they don't value our knowledge. The
inshore crowd fee1.s pretty ignored.
And then l.et' s couple this with your observation
that the scientists who attempt to address these
issues. these concerns. and attempt to participate more
fully with the fishermen, become less than optimally
productive as scientists. I'd be interested in your
thoughts on this general SUbject.
JI.: Wel.!. you've got several questions there. though
they are all related.
There is a fundamental reason why. to a large
extent. we ignored the inshore cod fishery. The reason
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being that it was an extremely difficu1.t to study. The
variability was such that--for meaningful estimates of
stock abundance--you had to study the whole coast of
Newfoundland. That's a very large area. Whereas. if
you leave it until the fall/winter period and you do
the work offshore. with the vessels that we now have,
you can at least get your estimates of abundance within
some sort of error bars that are at least acceptable,
But to do that within the inshore area is an impossible
task! So we tended to downplay the inshore area. It
was just too big an area to cover with the people that
we had. When the fish went offshore into
concentrations, we could much better devote our time on
those concentrations. So you're quite right, We did
ignore that inshore area to a large extent.
Now, the other part of it is the potential knowledge
to be gained from inshore fishermen, We continually
get blamed, for not using this fund of knowledge. r
have some very definite views on this which are not
necessarily supported by my colleagues. I think the
inshore fisherman has very little to contribute to the
solution of the fundamental problems oE stock
assessment. There are a few exceptions. There are a
few fishermen who think, and see beyond the bounds of
their local interests, But the comments of the vast
majority are self-serving and extremely restricted in
geographical range.
For the most part the majority of them have a litany
of mUmbo-jumbo which they bring forth each time you
talk to them. About where the fish are and why they're
not here. They relate it to things like the berries on
the trees. Sometimes ohservations of that sort have
some value such as "When the wind is such-and-such a
way, you get catches." That's acceptable,
When I was going around trying to understand a bit
more about Newfoundland ana the fishery, I just got
completely turned off by inshore fishermen and their
views. Because they were totally unscientif:1c! And
you 'a try to get them to approach it from a scientific
viewpoint and they would say, "yes," they'd be happy to
help. But in many cases they couldn't write--in the
old days, they can now--so they couldn't keep a log
book for you. You'd pick the one or two better ones
and they might keep a log book for so long and then
they'd [say], "B'ye. it's just too much trouble! I
just can't help you any more. sorry." It was just
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banging your head on a brick wall. So I tended to
downplay inshore fishermen as being useful to the
scientific process.
There are some who are di.Eferent. I worked on
shri.mps for a time, which tends to be inshore fishermen
in bigger boats. Most of these guys are the best
inshore fishermen. Because they're the ones who have
the gumption to get the boats somehow. They're not
content just to go out to set the trap the same place
their father set it before and. if the fish don't come,
complain. And I certainly got on very well with most
of these guys. They were prepared to think a bit.
They still didn't read and write. many of them. And
that made it di::fEicu~t to communicate by writing.
Writing is so important. Very little of wllat we do is
spoken. It's all writing. But on the whole they were
they best and I could get on with them and I could work
with them and I found it valuable. And they helped me
jU;~\lon~~\~~~a~~~gge inshore fisherman, no b'ye, I
While Bernard Brown, a native Newfoundlander, is not a
scientiet--Bs a long-time information officer for DFO with a
background J.n journal1sm--he los well-able to assesa the
prevaJ.l1ng attitudes of the scientists. It iB l.1kely "that
his cuItura~ rootedness predisposes his sYffipath.1es in favour
of the inshore fishermen's perspective. With that caveat in
mind, Brown claims that the op.1nions of Sandeman are, .1n
fact, genera~ly representative of those of most DFO
scientists.
A: I 've been watching the fish coming ashore from the
6S-foot otter trawlers--the guys that are going off the
Virgin Rocks--and i.f there' s one fish in a hundred
that's longer than 18-22 inches, that's about it. In
other words, they're getting a lot of small fish out: in
deeper water and that·s not a good sign. Now, I'm
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talking like a fisherman, the kind of stuff that the
scientists absolutely d.1.sparage.
Neverthe~ess, in all of this our inshore fishermen
have been proved to be right. unless our scientists
are going to turn around a couple years froID now and
say. "We were right after all. The stock did grow
five-fold." Which wou~d destroy any shred of
cred.1.bil1ty that they have left, We [DFO] were saying
the stock has grown five-fold and the fishermen were
saying, "You 're out of you mind." They were right.
But I still don't see any evidence among scient.1.sts
that they I re any more prepared than they ever were to
go out and ~isten to fishermen.
And it's apparently a matter of the difficulty of
dealing with tho kind oE information and evidence that
fishermen have, the so-called anecdotal stuff, which
you can't quantify very well and ana~yze very well.
Certainly can't computerize very we~~. So you just
don't want to dea~ with that kind of messy information.
They won't even call it data, as a matter of fact.
0: There's simply no cu~tural support or establ.1.shed
mechanisms within science for incorporating tradit1ona~
knowledge.
A: The department' s try.1.ng to force it to a certain
degree but I don I t know how much oE that's publ.1.c
relations work as opposed to a real effort.
Q: But, even if there were a genuine interest in
incorporating traditional forms of knowledge, it's
difficult to see how they coul.d be translated into the
language of sc1ence--mathematics--or conceive of
science learning to speak another language.
A: Yes. But that's only part of the problem. rhe
other part is att.1.tude. If the scientists reall.y fee~,
as a ~ot oE them do. that the fishermen have bugger a~~
to offer,., .
[long discussion of the new log book program to assess
inshore fishing effort. Brown notes that this is being
conducted by the Statistics Branch, not the Science
Branch and feels that this is a missed opportunity to
get scientists and fishermen actually talk.1.ng to each
other. }
192
I think it's a real problem that the fishermen and
the scientists operate in iso~ation from each other.
{NOTE: When they do have personal contact, it is almost
invariably in the context of conflict and antagonism.]
How the hel~ can some guy become credible to you if
he' 5 just some asshole out in a boat. believing what
~~~ ~~:d~~;h~~ut~~?evedi' If you're a scientist and
An integrative perspective
Henry Lear is a native Newfoundlander who grew up
fishing with his father and grandfathe:':' but who also has
spent the last 20-plus years with DFO as a fisheries
biologist. As one might expect, Lear's perspective on the
issue is quite different from that of h.is fel.l.ow scientists;
undoubtedly due to his much deeper, personal understanding
of the inshore fiehermen's cognitive reality. Not.ice that
he makes a clear distinction between the possibility of
active involvement of fishermen in the scientific process
and the incorporation of fishermen'e knowledge in that
process. Lear sees no real functional impediments to the
collect.ion of scienti.fically-acceptable data from the
inshore fishery. Unlike most of the rest of his COlleagues,
he sees fishermen I s knowledge as, potentially, being of
great value. :It's actual incorporation, however, is impeded
by difficult--but not necessarily insoluble·-methodological
problems. This raises the quest.ion of whether other
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scientists' seemingly rational constructions of the
difficulty of cO~lecting and incorporating valid, useful
data from the inshore fishery are, in fact, grounded in
cultural attitudes and prejudices.
0: There's a lot of talk now about trying to
incorporate fishermen's knowledge into the scientific
assessment process. The inshore logbook program is one
example of the attempt to do this. But: when I speak to
scientists privately, there is a wide ranqe of opinion
about whether this is ]I) possible and B) II good thing.
What are your opini0ns?
A: Back in '86 I think. it was, we looked at the
situation in a little technical report we did for the
Director General. As one of the first recommend<!llt.ions.
we said .it (lias of paramount importance to include catch
and effort data feom inshore fisheries .into the
assessment process. And really that's what counts.
You have to have some measure of your catch rates in
the inshore fi.shery to know what you're dealing with.
Just looking at pure catch is not enough. And you
don't have to give every fi.sherman a logbook. You take
half a dozen in La Scie and half a dozen in St. Anthony
and a sample from other major fishery centres. That' 11
pretty well give you a fix. That'll tell you what's
going on.
The one about the local knowledge, the anecdotal
information and the historical •.• 1 don't: know what: you
call it. The folk memory i.f you like. I think th.is is
valuable--extremely valuable. But the problem--and
1" 've thought about it a lot--is hor,l in the name of God
do you quantify it?
Because of our training-'-our W6stern thought, if you
like--everything has to be analytical. structured.
logical. clear. We don't have the scope for intuition
that the Eastern philosophies would allow. Ihis is the
problem I've seen with this type of information. And
there's a gold mine there I Or thece was at one ti.me.
A lot of it has been lost.
I remember making an observation. It was a good 20
years ago when people were leaV.ing--goi.ng to Toronto
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and then coming back. For three or four hundred years,
we learned from one another. It was an oral tradi tion
that was passed down. /lIld all fishing methods were
orally transmitted. It was a continuous chain. But 1
think the chain was broken in the 'fifties and
'sixties. Peop~e went away. And then sOllla of them
came back but the information flow was sort of
truncated.
And they went and set gillnets in a place where you
wouldn't set gi~lnets. Or they'd set gear in a place
where on~y one fisherman could fish·~or only fOij'f or
ha1.:f a dozen fishermen cou~d fish--because there ..vere
certain unwritten ru~es that said you set your gear
parallel on the slope. And another guy coming behind
you sets in a certain way. It was the socio~ogical
side of fishing I guess. It allowed for the
maximizaCion Of a piece of ground.
Because you can take the best piece oE ground in
Conception Bay. take five gillnets, and you can ruin it
~~~w~~iri~~d~o~~Zet~~ w~~; t t~:t~fm:i:hr:~~~~ht:~~~
they're not set right.
You look at your caCchleffort and you say, "I've got
five g.1llnets out there and I only caugh-- ten fish."
His grandfather would have taken those ~., five
gillnets and set them and probably have got twice as
many fish. Because he knew the way that; the fish moved
around that piece of ground in response to the way the
wind was the day before.
I grew up setting line trawls around Bell Island and
Kelly's Island and you didn't always set; tlle trawls the
same way every day because you knew that the fish Were
deeper or shallower depending on the way the wind was
the day before.
So intr:Lnslcally we were using (changes in waterJ
temperature. We couldn't detect Che temperature but we
knew tllat the water moved back and forth and around the
ground. We knew we had to go deeper if there was a
northeast wind. Because you had an influx of water
coming in that forced the warm water down and your cod
went: down another f1.ve, six, ten fathoms probably. And
when the wind went souChwest:, you'd go shallow again,
ilecause your warm water on the surface got swept back
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out again anl! your bot ~om water up-wel~Qd and the f::l.sh
came up the slope.
And how do you work t:hat in to a catch per unit
effort? We talk about the technology change with the
offshore draggers--tha~ they became so effic:1.ent that
we couldn't account foZ" it any more. The catch rates
were going up and up a71d up and yet the stock was
stay:1.ng level. But thoen you come to the inshore and
you have to look at th-e soc:1.ology as a technology.
Q: SO you' re suggesting that the opposite has taken
place in the inshore? Xhat know~edge has bean eroded?
A: It could be in some cases. No, I think it·s
balanced out. I have CO qualify that one. I think
it·s balanced out: now. Where most people have sounders
so they can actually gCJ along the slope and see where
the fish are. Or they can ~ook a t a trap before they
hau.l it. And the fish are just not there any more.
But I have heard a lot of fishermen complaining that
you get some fishermen going out who don't know what
they're do::l.ng and putting gear on the ground and
ruining it for anybodY else. Because you just can't
just set your line tra~~s. your gillnets, across the
ground.
There's one other th.ing I think we've missed. When
1 was grOWing up in the 'fifties, everybody had a trap
boat and was their own bOSS. But gradually. in Por-t de
Grave, 10'0 got away frOrrJ that: and got into longliners
and instead of waiting for the fish to come in. we went
out after the fish. So that's a whole new development
there. But it's really not new. Except that they go
to the Virgin Rocks nohi" _ My fi\ther and grandfather and
great-great-grandfather went up to the Labrador. Or
they went t:o cape st. Marys _ It· s not really
~~;f:.~~~tyea;~~ij .re returning to a cycle that was there
Structural illlpedillen-t::s to cognitive/cultural relativism
Dr. Jake Rice .is one of the new-style, stat.:lstica1ly
oriented fisheries biolO9'~stS. He wae recruited by DFO
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science Branch from a university position where he taught
and conducted research on quantitative population biology.
At the time of our interview, Rice was Head of the
Groundf!sh Division (which included all northern cod
research among other things) and had also been given the
responsibility of Acting Head of the new five-year, $50
million, northern cod research program. This Is the
scientific component of the federal government's response to
the f.1.sheries crisis; a five-year, $600 m1llion package
called the Fisheries Adj ustment Program.
:In our conversations, Rice often expressed a keen
awareness of the cultural conflicts inherent in the
inati tutional interface between science, the etate
structure, the capital-intensive offshore fishing industry,
and the traditional inshore sector. Shortly after our
interviews, Rice sought and received a transfer to DFQ' s
research station 1n Nanaimo, BritiSh Columbia on Canada's
west coast where, as he said, he is involved with the
supervision of research on "everything except groundfish."
We discussed the evident problem of reconci1ing the
cognit.ive reality of inshore fishermen with that of
fisheries scientists.
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0: One of the most common criticisms 1 hear from the
public about science is that you just hide away up in
the White Hills and we never see you except when it's
to tel.l us bad news. When we first met in that meeting
with Mac [Mercer} and Peter Shelton. Barbara [Neis}
asked a question about the place of traditional
knowledge in the process of resource assessments:
whereupon Mac launched i.nto a long story about a
scientist who had spent too much time with fishermen
and come to a bad end. The way he told it. the story
clearly hr,d a moral--and that moral was--that it was
not only a waste of time for scientists to spend time
with fishermen. but that it was potentiall.y dangerous.
A: I can't recall. that story exactly.
0: 1'he point was that this person had misplaced
sympathies which were very human and perhaps
understandable but--not only had he neglected his
duties as a research scientist--in the end. the
conflict between the two cultures had. in some sense.
destroyed him. The moral. of the story was very clear.
Don't fuck around with fishermen and if you do. l.ook
out I I was very surprised at the edge buried in that
story.
A: Mac. at the t!me that you talked to him. was not a
~~~~;~t~~~; o=j~~~~:el~:~~~~~teH~e~~d£o:Sh~; ~~~e~~~~!!!
But certainly. in the time I've been with the
department. there's been a long history .•• well. I can't
say long history because it hasn't been that long•••but
going hand in hand with spending a lot of time dealing
with the inshore fishermen. is a really severe case of
burnout. And a great deal of frustration. Not with
the system for discouraging you from doing that. I
certainly have ..• If 1 went back and went through my
book I probably went to 15 inshore fishermen's meetings
in the two years I was Head of Division of Groundf1sh.
xhet's not a great record but it's not a bad one
either. Jls Division Head, I wasn't always the
preferred••• If it was about particul.ar species, they'd
wl:!nt the specie b!ologist respons1ble for it. And
that's where the burnou t came.
Henry Lear is a classic case. 14 really excellent
cod biOlogist and son oE a fisherman who is 77 [years
old} and still out more days than not. The Port de
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Grave Lears. He became the person the department would
send to every host1.le meeting of inshore fishermen.
It's a real~!1 dif'f1.cult posit1.on to be in. they're
often angry about advice you never gave, Decisions
that aren't based on the advice you did give. Or you
can onl.y tell half the answer because the other hali is
still being debated in ottawa Eor its pol1.tical
sensit1.vities.
I, and no other scientist in the Department that I
know oE, have never been asked to lie. But we
certainly have, at various times, been discouraged from
revea~ing the whole truth. Every government has to do
that to its civil servants, You can't have everything
that's going on in the haIls oE gover1llllent ending up in
the newspaper the next day. You have to al.low the
people whose job 1.t is to make policy [tal talk about
what the adv1.ce is, what it means, come to the
conclusions and make the policy.
When it gets awkward is when you have a northern cod
assessment done in January and revealed in the middle
of May. That's a very long hiatus. Not to lie but
s1.mply say "Yes, I know what the results of the
assessment arb but I'm not at liberty to discuss them."
Dealing with fishermen's groups B lot you can't avoid
f1.nding yourself in situat;ions like that. Xhat context
of things is really B recipe to burn somebody out.
I don't know who Mac was talking about but certainly
Henry is the exampIe I've seen--and it wasn't that
anything bad happened to him. He left Newfoundland.
~::: ~;~~~ ~~~~.fie :~ga::m:::·a ::a:a;o:s v:~y good job
Newfoundland because he was a good biologist and so
deeply rooted in the inshore ii-shery that he could go
down to any dock in Newfoundland, be accepted as
someone who would understand tJlern, and come aWBY having
understood what they had to day.
a: So his burnout was due to the conflict between his
native culture and his adopted culture as a federal.
scienti-st?
A: 70 the extent that any case I1ke that has a one
sentence explanation, yes. Roughly that.
It wasn't just that he had B party line that he had
to toe. It was that he was really at a loss. He
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believed as much as any of us that the stock was 1.n
good shape but the inshore fishermen were not catching
fish. Now. people are saying. in h1.ndsight, that the
1.nshore fishermen's low catches were the first sign
that: the sdentists were wrong,
The fishermen's inshore catches were completely
incompatible wi til what we now view as the trajectory.
The stock built untH around '84. stayed stabl.e to '87
and then dropped probably 15-20 percent w1.th the real.ly
poor recruiting year-c~asses we've had coming .1.n. So
1.t went up, went fIat and now 1.t. s down. The inshore
went: up, dropped a lot, was down for two years. went up
and has been climbing slowly ever since. This year the
projections Bre that 1.t's probably going to be the best
year in 20 years for the inshore. So the inshore
catches are not tracking what we calculate as the total
stock trajectory.
Jl lot of his burnout: WlIS that he could relate to
these people. he could share the pain they were go1.ng
through. and, as a scient1.st, he didn't have any
answers I At that time we be~ieved that the stock was
sti~~ increasing and we weren't right. It wasn't. But
the stock wasn't collaps1.ng. At that time, when the
inshore catch was going to hell, the stock was
::;n~~;n~~~r: ~~:~l~h~t~~~hor~h~i;~:~~~~sh=~n~e~~~Y2d
Constructing the va1idity of the primary data source
Rice turns to a discussion of the scientific
interaction with the offshore inUustry. Notice that--while
science's relationship with the inshore sector is
reconstructed in terllls of irreconcilable conflict--
scientists' relations with the offshore fishery is portrayed
as one of increasingly fruitful cooperation. I\s discussed
earlier in this chapter. the corporately-structured industry
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shares a functionally similar approach with science to the
collection. documentation. and evaluation of information and
knowledge.
A: rndustry. whether it was vested self-interest or
nul --and I say "vested interest" because industry was
quite concerned with what a low influence the CPUE data
had on this year's assessment--has been incredibly
cooperlitive in mliking available to us really detailed
records of their best skippers. The skippers' personal
log books. Not the required information that goes to
Statistics Branch but what every skipper keeps.
They have come to us saying. "Tell us exactly what
you want and we'll provide it." They will try to match
vessels. Because both FPI and NatSea ha....e vessels that
are the same in everything but name. but they may
differ in the time that certain pieces of technOlogy
were introduced. "We'll try to match skipper
expertise. we'll give you two identical vessels. and
we'll give you the skippers' histories and the time at
which certain pieces of technology were introduced."
It was this trip that they first used the SCANMJl.R
sensor to say where the trawl doors were. They're
providing all this information to us and they've come
through with what we've asked. "Tell us what piece of
technology you're interested in and we'll give you the
data to refine what effect that technological change
had on your CPUE index."
We haven't solved the problem of getting effort
really reliably down, but boy, has industry shown an
incredible w1l1ingnes:J, to make available to us the
information that may help us do that. It's II non-
trivial analytical job to go through all the data--but
~~~~ ~~i~~V~ni~h~f~:~~do~h~~d~~~~~:l:lhOWS a real act of
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Neutralizing the opposition: cooption or
marginalization
The conversation then turned to the subject of DFO's
institutional response to the inshore fishery's persistent
demand for the inclusion of its operational reality in the
scientific assessment process. That response, mentioned
earlier, is the logbook program. There has been some
speculation, articulated by Brown above, as to what extent
this effort derives from a sincere interest in the data and
to what extent it is a public relations initiative aimed--
not so much at the inshore fishermen, but--at the general
public who share a sense of cultural solidarity with the
inshore sector.
Another plausible interpretation of this program is as
a strategy to neutralize the cultural/cognitive authority of
the inshore sector's challenge. This could be accomplished
in one of two ways. First, wide-spread participation in the
logt.ook program would bring the inshore fishery into
cognitive congruence and complicity with science. Secoof'!,
failure to participate in the program--whether by
individuals or by the inshore sector as a whole--could be
argued as illustrative of the fundamental irrationality of
the inshore sector and used to question the sincer! ty of
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their expressed interest in participating in the assessment
process. From this perspective, the logbook program is a
very effective piece of work. Any outcome serves to enhance
science's claim to epistemological authority.
11: The final index we hope to have very soon is the
inshore. We have the logbook program which. like any
big program. has had a rocky start but each year it
looks better. And one of the things that we're gotting
with the [additional] northern cod resources [S50
m1llion over five years] 1s a dedicated biologist to
spend the whole summer going from community to
communlty--whether it's the logbook program or some
mutational .~orm of the logbook program.
But this will be a person devoted to spending the
whole summer dealing day to day on the docks with the
inshore fishermen and spending the rest of the year
converting what he collects into some sort of an index
which will start off with equal weighting in the
assessment process: l.e .• it will have just as much
chance of influencing CllFSAC' s view of the stock as any
other index does. We hope to have that person staffed
by October so they can spend the winter getting to know
~~et~;Se~~~:~ ;~~ti~;sa~~c;~~~~~~4 Send them around
In attempting to assess the sincerity of DFO's
commitment to this project it is worth noting that, from an
institutional perspective, the resources allocated (one
fUll-time biOlogist) are relatively insignificant-~
especially eo when one compares them against DFO I sown
assessment of the relative complexities of the inshore
fishery versus the offshore fishery.
"The annual challenge of estimating stock
assessment--estimating the abundance oE each commercial
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fish stock--one good measure is the relation betwean
catch and effort . ...
"In the offshore fishery this is fairly
straightforward, so DFO uses catch/eEfort data from the
offshore as one of its sources in estimating the
abundance of different stocks.
"It would like to use siLlt1ar data from inshore, but
the inshore fishery is hard to get a handle on.
Thousands of full time and part-time fishermen in many
hundreds of boats, using different kinds of gaar,
chasing different species at different seasons. with
different priorities and different levels of effort and
different approaches in all the different bays -- it's
a bewildering picture.
"It· 5 like a jig-saw puzzle in which all the pieces
keop changing !;hape and colour. Ben Davis [the
biologist] will have his hands full." [DFO Fisheries
News Vol. 1 No. 2 Spring 1991 DFO)
The message seems to be that such a puzzlo is clearly
insoluble from any rational perspective. Collecting
catch/effort data from the offshore fishery is characterizod
as "straightforward," but considerable pains are taken to
establish the fact that data collection from the inshore
fishery is too logistically and methodologically complex to
justify the allocation of more than token institutional
Bureaucratic utopianism: and the scientist shall lie
down with the fisherman
Turning now to the bureaucratic perspective, oJ. J.
MagUire, chair of CAFSAC, constructs the problem and the
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solution very differently than do any of the scientists
(with the exception of Henry Lear) or their spokesmen. To
him, the pr...·. l,m is one of social and cultural impediments
to meaningful communications--the creation of a shared
context for a substantive reconciliation of currently
disparate cognitive realities.
Maguire sees the key to unlocking this problem as lying
with those who were responsible for creating it in the first
place -- the collective membership of DFO Science Branch and
the management structure. Their institutional assumption of
epistemological superiority placed fishermen, particularly
those from the inshore sector, in a position of inferiority
wher<;l; it was conceptually impossible for them to be a source
of valid knOWledge. This, quite naturally, alienated the
active participants in the fishery from the institution
that, in many significant respects, dominated their
operotional rCloli ty.
When the 1989 reassessment concluded that DFO' s
previous descriptions of the stock had been seriously
flawed, the public credibility and legitimacy of the
DFO/CAFSAC knOWledge claims were compromised while those of
the inshore fishery were proportionally enhanced. The
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insti tutional reaction of the Science Branch was largely
defensive. That of the bureaucratic/political management
structure--at least as articulated by Maguire--ls more
interesting.
As discussed earlier, the legitimacy of the
bureaucratic/pOlitical management structure of DFO is
derived and evaluated quite differently than that of
science. From Maguire's perspective, as a mediator of
competing interests. what was a crisis for science and a
victory for the inshore fishery, is seen as having
sufficiently reduced the disparity in ep:.stemological status
between the two groups that it was now possible to
realistically consider restructuring the relationship.
Q: There's been a lot of agitation for the need to
include so-called indigenous knowledge, fishermen's
knowledge, in the assessment process. This has a lot
of political and cuI tural currency at the moment. It
seems that there' s somB resistance within SciencB to
this idea. That's understandable because the language
of science is mathematics. Even if there were a
Willingness on the part of science to incorporate this
knowledge, it would be very difficult. It's like
speaking Mandarin Chinese and English. They're two
different systems of knowing. Different evaluative
traditions that seem almost mutually exclusive.
A: It depends how you perceive yourself. I think. for
a very long time. we perceived ourselves as holding the
true picture. You. the il.shore fisherman. have got
your perception. You. the offshore fisherman. have got
yO~lr perception. We see the big picture. You see only
part of the picture.
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And, because we thought we saw the big picture, we
thought we didn't have to explain too much to you wJAat
you wore seeing, Or to reconcile what you (the
fishermen) were seeing and what we were saying. We
thought it was good enough to be somewhere in the
middle of you two [the inshore and offshore sectorsl.
Jlnd that we didn't have to explain.
But if you change your position--or your point of
view. or your perceived role. and if your role now is
one of counsellor. of advisor, a useful counsellor and
advisor--if you're an inshore fisherman and you tell me
that you observe this, the cod not coming inshore.
whatever. my first reaction is go1.ng to be well. I'm
going to dream up an explanation. "Dream up" not
having a negative connotation, but I'm going to try to
think what the reasons are and to offer you that
explanation. And I'm going to hope that you're going
to be satisfied with that.
But we've got to do more than that. And the
difference of .language shouldn't be that much. The
onus is on us to be understood. .It's more difficult
for us to be understood. Because it's easier to talk
about "RV" instead of research vessel surveys. It's
easiez: to talk about "CPUEs" instead of catch-per-unit-
of-effort. "Non-linear least square minimization," and
stuff like that. Instead of verbalizing and explaining
wllat they are.
I think the question is not so much introducing
anocdotal and local knowledge and stuEf like that. The
objective is to understand what's going on and to try
to explai:. what's going on. It is to relate. It is to
go out there and say "'What do you see? What's your
explanation of what's going on? We'll go and check it
out." And we must go and check it out.
0: But 50 many of the people that I've talked to--
younger scientists as well as older--are either
implicitly or explicitly dismissive of this knowledge.
I've had people say. "How much can you learn rrom a
bunch oE stupid. illiterate fishermen? That the
dogberries are heavy this !.iear? What good is that/?"
And I suppose now that Mac [Mercer) is no longer there
I can say this. When I first met Mac and was talking
with him he went in to a long. seeming digression of
this business of scientists falling in to the trap of
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spending too much time with fishermen. They lose their
perspective. They lose their edge. They lose their...
A: Objectivity.
0: They lose their objectivity and inevitably come to a
bad end. And I think he was probably speaking of Henry
Lear. among others. At least that's what I've been
told. But the message seemed to be directed. not
simply at me but at the other people [DFO scientists}
who were in the room that day. And, in my limited
experience. this attitude is more common than not.
Particularly because of the evaluative and reward ...
A: ••• structural appraisal system, You're totally
right. TO me. that's not easily solvable. Very
difficult to solve. But I agree with the perception
that if you' ce too close to the fishermen you start to
see things their own way. And you lose ... . If I'm close
to the inshore fishermen and you're close to the
offshore fishermen. we're going to argue and I<'e' re
going to reconcile our perceptions some way. J1nd
what's going to come out of it is going to reflect a
little bit of both. So I don't see a big problem with
that.
C: That's in principle. But in practice there's not a
fishing wharf in Newfoundland where a DFO scientist
could go and not be laughed off.
A: Yes. Because what we see, what we're describing,
the status of the stock, does not jibe with what people
are seeing. Until now. most of what we've done is say,
"Look! This is the assessment and we know it. Okay?
This is it. rou may not like it but this is it."
And now I think we've got to change that. We've got
to go and say. "Th1.s is our best estimate oE what's out
there. What do you think?" And we're trying to do
that now. Formally.
You may have heard or seen that we're advertising
Ear invitations from groups to go and discuss the
assessments. All the assessments. And we're going to
go and say. "This 1.s our perception. This is our best
estimate. What do you think?"
They're gOing to tell us, "well, that may be so but
we've observed that seals have increased. We think
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that your perception of the inshore is wrong. Because
more of the gillnetters and longliners are now fishing
further offshore, 50 or 75 miles offshore on the virgin
Rocks. You're still including them in the inshore so
your perception oE the inshore is wrong. How much of
the inshore is that?"
we're going to get these questions. And what we
must do is go back next year, or in the meantime, and
say, "We presented you with what we thought the stock
was doing and you had questions. These are our
response to your questions. Those that we could
answer. The others we can't but we're working on
them." Or we're not working on them. But there must
be a clear, continuous exchange.
0: But even that. although that would be a
tremendous ....
A: We're doing that. we're doing that with people who
are directly involved with the assessments. I've done
it for several groups on northern cod. The main
players on northern cod, we've met with them.
Individually. We haven't met with, FPI. National Sea,
NIFA, inshore, and Fishermen, Food and Allied Workers,
all oE them in the same group. Because then they can't
talk with total honesty with us because there might be
something else at stake. When we meet with them
individually, they have been very frank, informative
and useful meetings.
0: Isn't there still a kind of residual assumption of
epistemological superiority here? That they have the
questions but you have the answers?
A: NO. Well, they have observations that they want us
to verify, I think. But it's not done in a spirit of
superiority. You can't feel that superior to these
people who make thair living out of it and knoW' more
about it than you do. You may think that you've got
the big picture, but there's all kinds oE information
that they have that W'e don't, They have information
about misreporting, about discarding. about all kinds
of practices that we don't take into account. Xhey
~~~~~r:x~~ln~e~~u::i~: ~~~:~'~~~~~Hied them. So
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The Martin Luther of fisheries science: Cabot Martin
Cabot Martin is a native Newfoundlander, a lawyer, a
partner in several experimental cod farming projects, and
president of the Newfoundland Inshore Fisheries Association
(NIFA). In this role, he is one of the most articulate,
persistent, and irritating critics of DFO science and
policy. Sandeman speaks for most of the scientists when he
attacks Martin's constructions as irrational and informed by
a hidden personal political agenda.
"I think they're [the inshore fishermen] being
exploited right now by people like Cabot Martin. He's
only got one real reason for it. He's going into the
political arena before very long. And that's his way
of getting there. And he's drumming up all sorts of
hoo-hah one way and the other. He's always been a
difficult person to get along with. If he had his way,
he'd have our management system the same as in the
'States. A thought I-Ihich absolutely appals me, because
~t;hi~~l~~e;~tm~~:i~~e~~i~~t~~~i~~~~av~~~i6has got
Notice that--by ascribing cynical and self-serving
motives to Martin's advocacy--Sandeman accomplishes two
things; one intended and the other not. First, he attempts
to de-legitimize Martin's claims by characterizing them as
essentially corrupt and, thereby, to separate both him and
his position from his constituency. Second, he tacitly
acknowledges the considerable political power exercised by
the inshore sector through 1ts widespread support among the
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general public. In the following transcript of my inb:trview
with Martin, it is clear that--from the perspective of
institutional legitimacy and prestige--the Science Branch
has good resson to fear for its monopoly on valid knowledge.
Notice also, however, that Martin is no neo-Luddite.
He does not reject the validity of science per se. In fact,
he is calling for more and "better" science. In his terms
"better" seems to refer to a reformation of scientific
ideology so that it accounts for, and is accountable to, the
larger-order social, cultural, snd economic realities within
which it is embedded. This strategy can be seen as a
counterpoint to what DFO is attempting to achieve with the
l.ogbook program. What we are seeing is a struggle for
control of the social authority for the direction of the
scientific construction of reality--at least with respect to
fisheries science.
"r don't know 1.£ 1.t's because of the organ1.zat1.onal
structure or the type of people or the type of
disciplines that are involved or whatever, but there
doesn't seem to be th1.s broad, open type of inquiry. I
think that's partly due to the pressure of the
political process tell1.ng the sc1.entists what's
important.
"They're Cthe politicians] saying I want numbers. I
need numbers. I want you to count fish and I'm going
to cut off your money 1.n other areas •.. or I'm not going
to give you much money in other aress. And that's
partly true--although down here [St. John's] they ""ere
given more money last spring and d1.dn' t bother to
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extend the scope of their inquiry to take in these
other things. I suspect there' 5 a significant amount
of inertia.
"It could be that they're just shell-shocked down
there. It could be that they t'eel criticised and under
seige. Many of these people have not been trained.. ,or
nowhere in their training are social responsibilities.
The scientists just took it upon themselves ... I
shouldn't say took it upon themselves ... found
themselves in this po~ition where they had tremendous
power over peoples lives. But I don't think that
anywhere in their training. or anywhere in the internal
culture of DFO. would you find a discussion about the
social responsibility of scientists to explain and
account. And I think that that's a very fundamental
problem.
"And there's a whole range of issues that come out
of that. The perception of the scientists and how he
feels he fits into the whole range of different
knowledge. of other questions. They seem to believe
that they have this superior form of knowledge which is
not additional to common sense or additional to the
experience of people working in the industry. It's on
a higher plane--somehow closer to the so-called truth.
"And the unfortunate thing is you get this tension.
You get many fishermen saying. "Scientists are full of
shit." By having that attitude. they tend to undermine
the legitimacy of the science in the process. And
that's not the answer. The answer is better science
and more accountable science and more scientists.
"Maybe it· s just the nature of our social
organization; that people who go to university and get
degrees and put shirts and ties on and work in ni.ce
offices and circulate in a social milieu that's
different than most fishermen ...maybe they inevitably
grow apart from the people whose interests they are
supposedly looking after or benefitting.
"It's perfectly possible to do internally
acceptable .. • from a competence point of view... an
acceptable type of job as a scientist and yet be
totally out of context--out of step with reality. You
can do that. The fact that you can do that is quite an
amazing concept. I don't think there are that many
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types of activities where you would get away with that.
Right?
"It's almost like the inshore fishery is too complex
for them to understand. The collection of data from
fifty or sixty trawlers and a couple of [research
vessel] cruises a year... that data base is a lot easier
to m.'lnipulate and easier to handle.
"The worst thing that has happened is that they have
been shown to be incorrect. I've heard scientists say.
"We can't afford to know how little we know because if
we admitted that then no one would listen to us."
That '5 twisted ....
"So when science is tending to put the all or
nothing question to fishermen and other groups, "I'm
either totally in charge or I'm not going to b8 in
charge at all. "--most fishermen. looking at their track
record. would say. "Well you're not going to be
involved. If you're not prepared to be reasonable.
~~~~e~y~an;tt~~~l~h~~·;ou~db; ~~;~:. ~~~t' s a great
summary and Analysis
In this work. I have set myself the task of identifying
and explaining the social forces that have shaped the
construction of the scientific stock assessments of the
northern cod. In the course of my research, it became clesr
that I would have to account for several aspects of the
cognitive and political relations between the Science Branch
and the commercial fishery. In the second half of Chapter
Five, we examined the structural factors that tend to
deflect the cours::: of scientific knowledge production away
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from areas of interest or utility to the institutionally
mandated client groups·-the political/bureaucratic structure
of DFO and the state. and the commercial fishery. Here 1
have shown that science and scientists have Illade a sharp
distinction between the inshore and offshore sectorA of tho
fishery with respect to the scientific relevance and
validity of their cognitive realities.
','he scientists explain their acceptance of stock
ass,)ssment inputs from the offshore fishery--and rejection
of the inshore fishery as a valid source of stock assessmEolnt
data--in objectivB, rational terms. Data from the offshore
sector is plentiful. dense. and efficiently and
inexpensively collected. It is either generated in
quantitative terms or is easily quantifiable. The relat.ive
standardization of technology and similarity of operational
strategies and practices reduce tha apparent number of
uncontrolled variablp.s--thereby .imparting familiar forn and
scient.ific legitimacy to the data. Above all, the offshore
fishery is a recognizably rational enterprise. The social
organization of the two dominant offshore fishing
corporations is similar to that of DFO--organlcally
specialized and hierarchical. Tho performance of the
fishing operations are moni tared and evaluated according to
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shared standards of quantitative objectivity. Finally, it
is important to note that when scientists speak of the
offshore fishery as a data source, they do not refer to
individual fishermen--but either to the two dominant
corporate 8ntities (FPI and NatSea) or to the sector as a
monolithic structure. By contrast, the inshore fishery is
portrayed by scientists as a hopelessly heterogeneous muddle
of uncontrollable variablee--individuals, gear types,
fishing practices, geography--from which it would be highly
ineff1c1ent, perhaps imposs1ble, to distil any meaningful
da.ta.
This rational explanation, however, is not consistent
with the findings of my research. We have seen in earlier
chapters that the data from the offshore fishery is
susceptible to error and bias from many uncontrolled and
unknown sources. Henry Lear--the only scientist 1n th1s
study with a more than superficial understanding of the
inshore fishery--has made several substantive suggestions
for the efficient collection of acceptable data from that
sector.
1\ more plausible explanation of the sharply divergent
att1 tudes of scientists to the two sectors of the fishery is
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to be found in an extension of our earlier characterization
of a conflict as tribal warfare. In that case the conflict
was internal to the Science Branch but was a war between two
distinct scientific cultures for the control of knowledge
construction. I suggest that the critical dynamics of the
relationships between science and the fisheries !ITO best
understood in similar, but more genera11y applied, terms.
In this case the Science Branch and the offshore fishery are
similar enough in institutional and cognitive structure and
function th",t they can be seen as sharing a broadly-defined
rationalist cuI ture with the authority and legitimacy of
their knOwledge constructions resident in the concept,
structure and function of that CUlture of rationality.
The inshore fishery. however, is embedded in a
distinctly different Bocio-economic and cogn1 tive culture
which has historically existed on th' margins of the
dominant liberal-capitalist-scientific society. The current
crisis in the fishery has destabilized preve11ing political
and epistemological power relations creating opportlmity for
renegotiation of those relationships. Tha most ~ogmaticallY
resistant to th1s possibility are those with the most to
lose--the scientists. We can reasonabJ.y hypothesize 8 deep,
tribal fear of 10S8 of prestige and authority. Their strong
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commitments to the shared cognitive rel'llJ.ty of scientific
culture is threatened. The perspective of the
bureaucratic/political culture is that this situation offers
an opportunity to reconcile, or significantly reduce, 10ng-
standing impediments to the state's role as a mediator of
conf~icting and competing constituencies. The inshore
sector--with the most to gain--is also the most open to a
restructuring of the power relations. Again, it is
noteworthy that what they have to gain are not necessarily
material benefits in the form of more fish (although that is
a hoped-for, long-term beneU.t) but an external validation
of their cognitive reality and an elevation to terms of
near-equality of their epistemOlogical status in the
assessment and management process.
1. The fallowing is from an op-ed piece .in the Evening Telegram,
1) st. John's daily newspaper. The author, Wl11.iam Cox,
identifies himself as "the captain of a deep-sea fishing trawler
for some 14 yeere." He also delivered the same message at a
press confer9nce.
"1 've been fishing northern cod for eight years and r
tell you there are more fish there now then £sic] there were
ei1ht years ago. . • •
"On our last rip (Jan.26-Feb.3/9D) we were £1shing for
cod in area 3K in water 300 to 400 fathoms deepr fish1J1g was
good. From where we were fishing we steamed south for 65
miles on a straight course. We steamed over one school of
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fish which was eight miles long. For nearly all of the 65-
mile steam there were fish showing up on the sounder.
"After the 65-mile steam we were in the area where the
freezer trawlers were catching 25,000 to 100.000 pounds for
one-hollr tows. The codfish were so large that the freezer
trawlers had to freeze them sepllrately in the fish-hold."
[Cox, William in the Evening Telegram, Feb. 24, 1990 p. A1J
2. Conflicts between federally-sponsored marine biologists and
fishermen over the construction of aquatic reality are,
apparently, nothing new. Johnstone mentions a confrontation
where Dr. A.P. Knight, circa 1917 " ••• told a group of sceptical
fishermen: 'You'd better listen; I know more about lobsters than
any man alive. '" (Johnstone 19771
3. An explicit, and classic, example of this was the apparent
deal cut between John Crosbie--Mlnister of Foreign Trada and
Newfoundland's only representative in the federal cabinet--and
Vic Young, the president of FPI.
"John Crosbie says he has been doublecrossed by Fisheries
Products International president Vic Young and 101111 never
trust the fish executive again.
"Mr, Crosbie said . . . that Mr. Young came to Ottawa to
explain FPI' s position if the northern cod rAC was going to
be set at 190,000 tonnes. FPI's share of the rAC at that
level would have been about 31, 000 tonnes,
"[Crosbie said) 'Based on that situation he [Young} said
that they would have to close . •. at least three plants.
That was repeated in SUbsequent meetings with our of£icials
and with us. But if it were possible to get a larger
allotment of fish ... then it would be possible for one or two
of the plants to be saved .
.. 'In order to try to save one or two of the offshore
plants, I did my best to see that we got a further allotment
£or the offshore companies. '" (Sunday Express Jan. 7, 1990J
As it turned out, both FPI and NatSea did receive additional
quotas as a result of Crosbie's effective lobbying of the
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. However. neither company
deferred its planned closures of idle or under-capacity fish
plants.
4. From an interview with Bernard Brown conducted in St. John's
on August 3, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix B.
5. From an interview with Bernard Brown conducted in St. John's
on August 3, 1990. The fUll transcript is Appendix B.
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6. From an interview with Sandy Sandeman conducted September,
1990 ..in St.John's. The full transcript is Appendix O.
7. From an interview with Bernard Brown conducted on August 3,
1990 in St. John's. The full transcript is Appendix B.
B. Fish and brawis is a traditional Newfoundland dish of salt cod
and hardtack biscuits stewed up together to a porridge-like
consistency and served with "scrunchions"--finely diced salt pork
fried crispy and golden brown.
9. From an interview with Henry Lear conducted January, 1991 in
Ottawa. The full transcript is Appendix K.
10. Mercer resigned as Director of the Science Branch during the
hight of the storm of criticism of DFO science that followed the
public release of the Harris report. The timing of his
resignation prompted considerable speculation as to whether he
jumped or was pushed. Insider opinion strongly favoured the
defenestration theory. However, I was unable to secure an
authoritative confirmation or denial of this from a source
superior to Mercer in the DFO hierarchy. Rice clearly intends us
to understand that Mercer's resignation was inVOluntary. Rice
was highly-enough placed that his claim carries considerable
credibiliti'--but it is not definitive.
11. Lear is currently working in ottawa as a research assistant
to Scott Parsons, Assistant Deputy Minister of SpQcial Projects,
who is writing a history of fisheries science in Canada since the
advent of the 200 mile l.:imit.
12. From an interview with Jake Rice conducted in st. John' a on
August 14, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix I.
13. IbJ.d.
14. Ibid.
15. From an interview with J.J Ma9uire conducted in st. John's on
October 28, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix J.
16. From an interview with Sandy Sandeman conducted in st.
John's, September 1990. The full transcript is Appendix O.
17. From an interv.:iew with Cabot Martin conducted 1n St. John's
on March 15, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix C.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE MACRO~CONSTRUCTION OF MICRO-REALXTY
Beginning with Chapter Five, we have been exploring the
social construction of fisheries stock asseasmonts at
progressively larger Bcales of eocial organization. We saw
how socia1 forces and events occurring on the micro-social
level--the data ware between a few individuals in the
Science Branch--are dynamicallY re1ated to forces and events
at other scales of organization: in this case, a large-eca1e
socia-economic crisis which, in turn, generated political
forces fe1t at the highest 1evels of the Cenlldian State. We
saw how mid-sca1e social etructure--DYO's reward and
promotion system--can be shown to have generated social
forces of sufficient magnitude to account for the data wars.
We saw that relative 1evels of dissonance and congruence
between the cognitive realities of four mid-sca1e soclel
organio:ations--the traditional inshore fishery, the
corporate offshore fif;hery, the scientific sector of DFO,
and the bureaucratic/political aectCJr of DFO--can been ahown
to have significantly affected the production and contont of
the Science Branch's knOWledge claims.
Now we will exam.i.ne issues arising at the largest scale
of social organ.i.zation show that social forces orig.i.nating
at 1:his scale are dynamically related to events and
knowledge cons1:ructions on the smallest scale--tha1: of
individual scientists.
The State and the Construct1.on of Scient1.fic Knowledge
At present, the Canadian state's pOlicy and practice of
natural resource management is theoretically informed by
various elaborations of Garrett Hardin's thesis of "the
tragedy of the commons.· which suggests that any resource
unprotected by property relations will, inevitably, be
exploited to extinction. [Hardin, 1968] This perspective
provides the underlying 109i.c of the state's declaration of
ownership of certain resources which are too vast, diffuse,
mob1.le, or elusive to be located within the context of
normal property and market relations--but which are,
nonetheless, deemed to be of signi.ficant value. A li.beral-
capitalist state tends to assume resource property rights
only under conditions of actual or anticipated market
failure.
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To be sure, there are dissenting and alternative
interpretations of the relationships between human soc.1eties
and natural resources. In Uncommon Property, Marchak [1989]
argues that there .1s no theoretical .1mped.1ment to successful.
cooperative or communal management of common resources.
However, it 1s fair to say that, at present, this is a
relatively peripheral position in resource management
theory.
Having briefly acknowledged prevailing and dissenting
thoory, I would like to move to an exploratory discussion of
the role of science and scientific knowledge--embedded in
the bureaucratic/pol.lUcal structure of the state--as it
relates to resource management and exploitation. I w.ill
show that, .in the case under study, the forces generated by
the tensions and conflicts inherent 1n the relationship
between science and the state impinged In s.ignif.1cant and
specific ways on the micro-level interactions of a small
group of scientists and the construction of thair knowledge
claims. The two most recent crises in the Atlant.1c Canadian
fishery offer a productive and extremely relevant empirical
grounding for an exploratory discussion of theoretical
issues. As a prelude, it may be useful to briefly recap the
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earlier review of the most comprehensive documentations of
these crises; The Kirby Report and The Harris Report.
The K.irby Report
The 1983 Kirby Report responded to a sharp decL.1.ne in
the overall profitability of the Atlantic Canad1.an f.1.sheries
due to a persistent "cost/price squeeze." Operating costs
were rising in the faco of a steady decline in the demand
and price received for the products. The report' s findings-
-and recommendations for 8 restructured fishery--were based
upon the explicit and reiterated assumption that the
resource base was strong and would continue to grow stronger
under the capable management of Canadian fisheries
scientists. And by far, the greatest growth in the resource
base would occur in the northern cod stocks.
"The rebuiId1.ng of ~he northern cod stock is
expected to continue through 1987 when a totaL
Allowable Catch (TAe) in the vicinity oE 400. 000 t
[metric tonnes} or moce is Eorecast. This level is
almost certainly below the maximum sustainable yiel.d
from the stock••• •By follOWing a conservative rate of
harvest ••• the eventual. long-term product;ion of the
stock is thought; to be about 550.000 t annuall.y."
(Kirby 1983 p.242]
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The text goes on to acknowledge a degree of uncertainty
in fisheries £orecasting and that these eetJ.mates.
therefore, are delibe~ately conservative.
This c~isis was not perceived as a ~esou~ce crisis but
a failure of market mechanisms that, in tu~n. begot soc1a1
and political crises. The Kirby Report recommended that
harvesting, processing, and marketing of the resource be
restructured to achieve the following primary objective:
"The Atlantic fisbing industry should be
economical.ly viable on an on-going basis. wbere Co be
viab.le imp.lies an ability to survive downturns with
only a normal business failure rate and without
government assistance." [Kirby 1983 p,v!i]
The clear impU..cation wae that. by using the fishery aa
instrument of Bocia1 policy, the state had upset the
natural and classic workings of the market.
Consequences and Crisis
Based upon the Kirby Report's recommendations. the
Canadian government restructured the offshore harvesting and
processing sectors of the Atlantic fishery by comb1.ning a
number of (unprofitable) small and med1.um-sized companies
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:lnto two pub~icly-held "super compan1es"--Nationa~ Sea
Products (NatSea) and Fisheries Products Internati.onal
(FPI)--with the intention of returning the1.r ownership to
the pr1.vate sector once market equilibrium and profitab.1lity
had been restored. (Sinclair 1985]
Based upon fa.1 th in the success of this restructur.1ng
and the Report' e predictions of an increasingly abundant
resource, individuals and corporations involved in the
fishery--and particularly the northern cod fishery in the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) management
areas 2J,3K, and 3L--made heavy capital investments to
update and expand their harvesting and processing
capacities.
Contrary to earlier OFO estimates of a 15 per cent
annual rate of growth in the stock and proj ected increases
in the quotas--the Total A~lowable Catch (TAC)--the northern
cod TAC was held at 266,000 mt through the 1988 fi.shing
year. In fact, the landings were lower than the TACs set
for the years of 1980·1986 even though the TACs were thought
to have been set to achieve a very conservative target
f.1shing morta~ity of F 0.1 pr roughly 20 percent of the
catchab~e stock. [See Table 7.1]
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People \fIith an interest j.n a sustainable, profitable
fishery began to suspect that the DFO/CAFSAC numbers might
be considerably less than accurate. Fol~owing the interna~
reappraisa1 of their assessment methodologies, for 1989
DFO/CAFSAC adopted a revised--and ostensibly more accurate--
mathematical. model to generate stock estimates from research
and commercial catch data. The reSUlts (and C1\FSAC's
consequent recommendations for a drastically reduced TAC)
were sufficiently alarm1.ng to precipitate the most recent
crisis and the formation of the Northern Cod Review Panel--
or Harris Commission--to investigate and rvport 1.t8
findings.
The Harris Report
Tho Harris Report suggested that the DFO/CAFSAC
estimates of stock strength were derived from data of
uncertain or suspect qual.ity and that these data were fed
1.nto mathemat.icsl models predicated upon highly speculative
assumptions. Therefora, the point was mootsd whether these
estimates had any utility as a rational basis for management
or commercia1 planning.
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In a recent public di.scussion of the cOmnUssion's
findings Harris stated the problem explicitly. ~We beHeved
our science to be much better than it was...• !'1I!s :fancy
method of counting went ",rong ... . The data ",as
wrong..• • Garbage in, garbage out is a standard formula. H
Harris concluded his presentation with the observati.on that
"[t:he} scientists are not all that credible gillen their
performance. On the other hand, if you don' t trust the
sc.1.enttsts. who do you trust?~l
From this perspective. the current crisi.s appears not
a resource crisis (which it mayor may not bel but 88 a
knowledge crisis. The simple conclusion of the Harris
Report was that the empirically robust knowledge base about
the Usheriss resources is surprisingly small and what is
known is inadequate as a basis for meaningful stock
assessments and, therefore. rational management policy.
In this highly charged, highly consequential context,
the pressure on DFO science is enormous from all tho
interested aocial groups to generate legitimating ground for
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tho strategic and tactical decisions that must: be made.
These groups include corporate harvesting and processing
interests, fishermen's and plant workers' unions and
'Issociations, federal and provincial governments, and DFO's
management structure i taelf, As a fisheries scientist said
during a private conversation at a recent international
conference in St. John's, Nfld. "'I don't know,' simply
isn't an acceptable answer." And yet there is a definite
and growing dissath.Zaction with the answers--to the point
where the legitimacy and/or utility of scientific knowledge
is being questioned as a voice in the process of fisheries
management. 2
The Problem
Al though the widespread awareness of a state of crisis
was initially due to the announcement of deep reductions in
tho 1989 and 1990 TACs for northern cod, the ensuing debates
as to the relative seriousness of the problem, and remedial
alternatives, have called into question the federal
government's management of the fisheries--particularly with
respect to its primary reliance on scientific knowledge
generated by DFO for guidance of its policy and practice. 3
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Some voices 1n these debates are challenging the
privileged epistemological position of scientific knowledge.
Various political interests clearly view this as an
oPlo-drtunity to increase their power and influence in the
fishery. [See Endnote 2] Other voices--primarily from the
inshore sector--argue that the traditional knowledge of
fishermen, Skippers, and other members of fishing-dependent
communities may be equally valid as an input to the
management process. [Neis, 1990] This is, in effect, a call
to qualify knowledge in terms of social relevance and social
responsibili ty.
The Structural Demand for Certain Knowledge
The present system of fisherie.<; management and
exploi tation planning is structured on the premise that
science is capable of providing the system with quite
precise and reliable assessments of stock strength as well
as realistic projections of the consequences of alternativG
management strategies. The sotting of TJ\Cs for each stock
in terms of a single number for a fixed period of time is
the practical expression of this premise. The question of
whether or not this premise is valid is of vital importance
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to the socio-economic interests of Atlantic Canada. And of
the Atlantic provinces, Newfoundland is mast deeply
dependent upon a viable and sustainable fishery.
However, in the current atmosphere of crisis, it is not
the system's underlying demand for and presumption of
certain knowledge that is being questioned, but the
competence of fisheries assessment science and scientists. 4
A review of the electronJ.c and print media coverage and
editorializing on the crisis shows--both expl1ci tly and
implic1tly--that fisheries assessment science is being
blamed, in part, by both the public and private sectors for
the current crisis. A further, much more crucial question
is just beginning to be addressed: Is it reasonable and
responsible to predicate policy development, management
strategies, and exploitation structureS on the assumption
that science is capable of providing knowledge of the
requisi te precision and certainty.
The Question of Competence
The question of the competence of fisheries assessment
science is SUbject to evaluation in a number of conflicting
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evidential contexts and the decisive factor is the
definition of "competence." On the macro-level, the
state's legitimacy as the manager of a common resource
depends upon its ability to successfully mediate the social,
economic, and political interests of various groups with
respect to that resource. The government cites the
recommendations of DFO--and, Ultimately, the fisheries
assessment scientists themselves--as the authoritative and
objective grounding for its policy and management
strategies. The generally perceived success or failure of
the state's management of the resource is the evidential
context for its evaluation of assessment science's knowledge
claims. Thus we see that--in the state's evidential
context--the answer to the question of the "competence M of
assessment science hinges upon its utility in meeting the
demands and avoiding the criticism of the existing
exploi tation structures and the social groups dependent upon
the fishery.
Dr. Brian Morrissey, DFO's Assistant Deputy Minister of
Science spoke to this point during our interview in his
Ottawa office.
A: The second question is expectations of certainty for
management. I would say, "Yes. There are expectations
that science produce scientific predictions for the
future of stock assessments." I see this not just in
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this department but in other departments where you deal
with numbers.
If. for example. we were to say that the total
allowable catch for. let's say. 250 thousand tonnes is
possible in a given year. 250 thousand tonnes is a hard
number. It's quite different from 251.000 tonnes or
249. Because you say a number. it has a precision that
covers the uncertainty on which it's based.
I really haven't found a good way, in this
department or in another department where I was
involved in residues in food. to say. "Seven parts per
million." Well, there you're drawing a firm lir.e with
a very unsteady hand. It could easily be p.;Jint six or
point eight. Point seV.<;ln implies that it's that number
and no other. It couldn't vary.
My other comment on uncertainty. particularly in
this department. is that people' s lives are affected by
the number that's given for the TAC. And because
people's payments on their gear and their beats are
fixed--and are dealt with with great certainty by the
bank--they are under pressure to have a catch and a
cash-flow that has equal certainty.
In consequence. for them looking into the future,
they are frustrated by not having consistent
predictions of catCh. In other words. 250.000 tonnes
every year into the fu ture. And because they are
frustrated. they become angry. And when they become
angry. they direct their anger at whoever seems to be
frustrating them. So I would say. "Yes. There is an
expectation for certainty." And we have become the
focus for frustration and unhappiness when we can't
provide certainty.
The big question was. "How does uncertainty affect
the day-to-day management?" I'll take the lead-off
from the last question. Because there's a perfectly
understandable desire on the part oE the fishing
community and the fish processing community to have
some certainty in the stock they can get. those they
can take. that translates into pressure on this
department to produce; JI. certain numbers and B.
consistent numbers over a period of time to avoid
fluctuations and C. to provide increasing numbers
because decreasing numbers are punishing.
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Punishment to them translates to punishment for us.
IE we don't produce those ever-increasing numbers. So
~~~fi~u~~~Sd say that uncertainty has made it more
On the micro-social level--within the relatively small
group of fisheries assessment scientists--theories,
procedures, results, and knowledge claims are judged within
a very different evidential context. The crttical frame of
reference is seen by the scientists to be delimited by the
very academic, object~.ve, evaluative traditions and
protocols unique to science itself. From their perspective,
there is no such thing as certain knowlsdge. All knowledge
is probabilistic, rendered more or less probable by its
ability to withstand disproof. Additionally, scientific
knowledge is held to be objective and aloof from human
social reality. This is the very essence of the scientific
method. Sandy Sandeman discussed this in terms of the
relationship between scientific stock assessments and the
political and corporate consumers of that knowledge product.
Ii: They (non-scientists] don't understand the basic
facts of science. They don't understand hoW" an
assessment is done. They don't understand that, in
doing an assessment, there are all kind of assumptions
which are there. They don't think about all these
things. And when our scientists are asked to make a
prediction, they make a prediction with all kinds at
caveats and "if" statements surrounding them.
Probability statements. If this happens and this
happens then something can be expected. But iE
something or other happens .. • and so on.
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And when this comes out in anything but a scientific
journal, it comes out 6S a bare prediction. That this
will happen/ Never mind if, if, if, if, iff And,
unfortunately, most of the trade and most of the non-
scientific people, all they read is the final shortened
~~~~~~~,6WhiCh says that this will happen. And it
In the course of a recent interview with Mac Mercer,
then-Director of DFO' s Newfoundland Region Science Branch,
he made it clear that--from the perspective of Bcience--the
origins of the crisis are to be found in the social,
economic, and political decisions and assumptions embedded
within the policy and practice of the management and
exploitation sectors. Another scientist present during the
interview mainta.ined that socia.l, economic, and political
factors are irrelevant to the conduct and evaluation of
their research saying, "The truth is discovered, not
negotiated • ..7
Complicity and Coercion: The Political Construction of
Expectations and Illusions of Soientific Precision
There are several important issues which I will discuss
in the context of my interviews with key actors. The first
is the political/bureaucratic direction of scientific
knowledge construction associated with the extension of
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Canada I a management authority and responsibility to 200
miles. The second is the changing nature of the Science
Branch t s conception of its relationship with the fishing
industry. The third is the relationship between government
and science with respect to the assessment of resource
status and the provision of scientific advice as an input to
management policy and practice. In practice, of course,
these issues and relationships are interdependent and
interactive. This larger-order relationship will be
discussed in the Bummary and Conclusions of the chapter.
Science, the 200 mile limit and resource projections
Having made very public, explicit, international
commitments to the responsible stewardship of the offshore
stocks, the political/bureaucratic structure of the Canadian
state turned to its scientists for guidance and advice in
the fUlfilment of that commitment. In particular, the
federal government--on behalf of both its own interests and
those of the Canadian fishing industry--asked DFO scientists
for resource projections; predictions of northern cod
abundance up to ten years into the future. Most scientiste
now claim that they were fully cognizant of the manifold
uncertainties inherent in such predir,;tions and wero
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extremely reluctant to make these definitive statements.
When they finally did succumb to the pressure to do $0, they
surrounded their work with strong statements of
qualification.
With Mac Mercer's resignation in 1990 as Director of
Science, Larry Coady, his long-time assistant and Scientific
Program Coordinator, became Acting Director of the Science
Branch. (Since conducting my interview with Coady, he has
been confir'lled as permanent in that position.) He
reconstructed the period of the extension of Canadian
management authority to 200 miles and the hugely increased
responsibilities and demands that placed on the Science
Branch. Coady suggests that the political demand to produce
projections originated in the fishing industry's need for
strategic financial planning.
11: We were asked to provide five-year projections of
stock status. We weren't able to do it. You may as
well have gone out and bought a crystal baIlor put on
a magician's hat and pulled out a piece oE paper. It
couldn't be done. And we were obliged to do it anyway.
Q: Where did that obligation originate?
11: From £isheries management and the fishing industry
who had to know. We had access to the 200 mile zone
and expected to increase our presence in that zone as
foreigners phased out.
0: So you £eel pressure from the upper levels of
management and Ottawa to do a job that you know can't
be done?
A: I wouldn't put it that coarsely, There was a genuine
interest at that time in knowing what the future held
for the fishing industry. Companies had to go out and
~~~ ~e;~~y t~~~~;~s;he~h~~~=:~et~~:;:r:t~~k:h~~l~g~key
Jake Rice was Head of the Groundfish Division of the
Science Branch at the time of our interview, He also
invokes the metaphor of the crystal ball to illustrate
science's assessment of the futility of making predictions,
Ul timately, however, the pressure to do so became
overwhelming. The government's threat to give the job to
economists--should the scientists continue to refuss--was
powerfUlly coercive given the professional reservations of
"hard" scientists as to the knowledge-value of the
production of the social sciences and, particularly,
economics.
A: At the time of the extension of jurisdiction,
Science was asked for a bunch of projections. The
economists need ten- or fifteen-year projections to
look at investment patterns and rebuilding things. Any
scientist would have said, "We can·t look that far
ahead into the future. Four years from now and we can
talk about right now. Four years from now. about
eighty per cent of the fish being taken by the fishery
will be from year-classes we have not yet seen today.
You're just gazing in a crystal ball." The scientists
were told ... they refused the first two times they were
asked for fifteen-year projections.
0: What years are we talking about?
A: We're talking about '76, '77, '78, in there, as we,
Canitda, was getting ready to extend jurisdiction. The
first couple of times they said, "We absolutely can't
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The reluctance of science to make the projections and
the current emphasis on the conditional clauses and
qualifications which surrounded those projections may well
be an artifact of the recent, wide-spread criticism of
science. There is no doubt that--in the wake of the advent
of the 200 mile limit and for ten years thereafter--there
was widely-shared and essentially unquestioned belief that
the northern cod stock could be and, in fact, was being
steadily rebuilt from its depressed pre-1977 state. That
this belief, irrespective of reflexive qualifications, was
also shared by DFO science is documented by the annual
current-year assessments and dependent FO. :FACs which--until
the critical 1989 reappraisal--generally followed the
predicted trend of linear increases. There is good reason to
believe that science had a large hand in the creation of the
expectations which it is now claiming to have warned
against.
Bern Brown, Public Information Officer at the DFO
station in st. John's, does not claim to be qualified to
judge the contant of the Science Branch's knot-lledge
production. He does, however, have the qualifications and
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experience to evaluate nuances of tha form and style with
which those claims were presented to the non-scientific
individuals and groups with an interest in the fishery.
A: I find it hard to deal with this ambivalence there
seems to be among the scientists. Because they did
know damn well that the numbers that they W'ere coming
up with could be W'ay out. Probably were way out a good
deal of the time. And yet they were quite free in
saying, "We're doing a pretty good job here folks." I
suppose they did feel, correctly. that they were doing
just about as good a job as could be done. What· s
caught up to them is that no one was willing to go out
and try to make it clear to the fishing industry and
the public how much uncertainty lay in a1 Z the science.
And the way in which it finally became clCl',~r was the
worst way possible for them. Instead communicating
:~~~;=;~~.iBout the uncertainties. every confidence was
Jim Roache is a c:areer journalist and public relations
professional who has, in recent years, been working for DFO
in ottawa. He was recently moved by DFO to St. John's to
coordinate the regional response to the rising tide of
cd.ticism. Roache makes the same point somewhat more
circumspectly.
A: What I see science as having done is haVing failed.
over the last ten to twenty years. to elaborate to the
public in a language that they could understand what
they could expect from science. In other words, it
should have been clear up front, communicated
consistently throughout, that here is the job that W'e
scientists are trying to do, here are the resources
that we're allowed to do that job, here is the short-
fall in those resources, here is the probability of
accuracy, and therefore, every number and every option
that we give the mangers is given with the caveat that
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within these conditions and limits. our best guess is
x.
It really wasn't made clear that the scientific work
that was being done wasn't foolproof. It wasn't really
made clear that the recommendations given to the
managers weren't really recommendations as you and I
understand the word, but were sets of options or ranges
of numbers lolhich had certain likely outcomes attached.
Now scientists understand that to be the case and
take it for granted that everybody else understands.
but people don't. Had people been properly attuned to
what was reasonable to expect up front. had they been
attuned to the fact that there was a certain element of
risk or uncertainty associated with the recommendations
that the scientists were producing, had it been
explained by the other parties (the managers and the
politicians) that there were other variables--that the
scientific output was only one of the inputs for the
fisheries manager or the pol1tic1an to weigh in
determining the TAC, and those other considerations are
equally important from other perspectives.
We all rode the wave of our own expectations. And
we're nOW' in the middle of a crisis of those
:~~~~;~Hons. not a crisis in the state of the
Larry Coady was more explicit than some of his
colleagues in the Science Branch in discussing the early.
post-ZOo mile limit. expectations of the scientists as to
the accuracy of their knOWledge of the system' e parameters
and the effectIveness of their management prescriptions.
0: I've looked at the resource prospect publications
going back to the late ' 70s and they're quite striking.
You have the bar graphs with the actual catches Eor the
previous years on the left going up and down showing
considerable variability and then the prospects on the
right are these beautiful linear ascending stair steps.
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A: See. that was assuming that the only change was
management practice and that we had control of it.
:~;~roios~~~i. itl~as more hit and miss. preemptive
Another factor that contributed to the illusion of
certainty and the expectations of control was the practice,
until 1989, of expressing the snnual assessments and quota
recommendations as a single number rather than as a
probabilistic range bounded by calculated confidence limits.
The reason for this is to be found in the dynamics of the
relationShip between the political bureaucratic structure
and DFO Science. The management bureaucracy of DFO was not
interested in probabilistic assessments and qualitative
advice. Their interests, as patrons of science, were in
assessments and advice expressed with sufficient precision
that they could serve as apparently objective grounding f(lr
management policy and practice. This permitted the
justification of contentious decisions by the simple
statement "Well, that's what the scientists tell us."
This construction is supported by Sandy SandE:lman. I
had asked him whether the scientists were justified in their
feeling that they had been abandoned by their
bureaucratic/political masters and left to bear the brunt of
the criticism for the drastic reductions in the northern cod
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TAC--a decision made by the .federal Minster of Fisheries,
not the Science Branch,
A: I think it's justified, yest In the same way. we
have seen that. as soon as any question comes up which
has unpleasant consequences. say down-sizing of a
quota. the decision makers (who are not the scientists)
usually take every opportunity to "protect" themselves
using such statements as. "well. that's what the
scientists tell us." However iE the quota is to be
raised. somehow the message seems to come through that
it is by their (the managers) diligence that this is
happening. Quota decisions are not scienti£ic
decisions. Xhey are socio-economic-political in nature.
And yet, when the news is bad, the answer always seems
to be "Oh, that's what the scientists tell us!" It's
~~:;!:I~o~e~~U~~ie~U~b;~~t~~.lgeeasy way out and we've
A somewhat less cynical reading of the relationship
would be that executive, decision-making structures expect
and demand that the various sources of information input to
the decision-making process pre-digest tt\eir data--t.o
present it in simplified, unproblematic form. This is,
after all, their institutional function and responsibility,
Ambigui ty and uncertainty from sources of specialized
expertise is not seen as useful from the perspective of the
executive structure of a rational bureaucracy. It is then
easy to understand why all the conditional clauses and
phrases--the caveats, that. the scientists routinely attached
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to their assessments, projections, and advice--were equally
routinely stripped away and discarded by the consumers of
scientific knowledge.
Here we have a clear example of institutional structure
and mechanism forcing the resolution of an indeterminate
natural reality. It is a truism that any decision is often
better than no decision, but in the case of fisheries
management, even this consideration is irrelevant. The
policy of setting annual quotas or TACs for each managed
species in each region means that a decision must be made
and that the decision is expressed as a hard, unambiguous
single number. The actual state of a stock may lie within a
large range of probabi1ity bounded by large confidence
limits but there is no mechanism in the present management
regime to accommodate uncertainty.
Adding a further complicating factor to the dynamic,
the scientists themselves had their own reasons for
accommodating this demand for unambiguous advice. They had
come to conceptualize their role as protectors of the
resource from a rapacious, irresponsible fishing industry
and did not trust the management structure of DFO to make
conservative, responsible decisions. In this we find
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another plausible reason for science to have been somewhat
less than assiduous in communicating the assumptions.
uncertainties, and known sources of error in its assessments
and advice. This dynamic is appEirent in the fo:llow1ng
comments by .J • .J. Maguire. Chair of the Canadian Atlantic
Fisheries Scientific Advisory Committee (CAFSAC).
Maguire explains the profound change in relationship
between OFO Science ana the fishing industry. particu~arly
the corporate offshore trawler fleet. when the 200 mile
limit became effective.
11: You've mentioned someth.ing. it's the closeness to
the clients. I think that's what went wrong. We
distanced ourselves from the clients .. • from what we
were supposed to do. And we came to be seen as an
impediment for the industry.
It was before my time. but I understand in the ICNAF
days. when all the foreign countries were fishing oEE
the east coast here. the Canadian scientists were very.
very close to the Canadian industry because what they
had to do then was to work Eor a common objective--to
build the resource and kick the foreigners out. That
was achieved in 1977. The rebuilding of the stocks.
most groundfish stocks, happened very. very rapidly.
By 1980. 1983. they were rebuilt.
Ths entire system I . lie known is that the industry is
going to .•..Well. let me rephrase that. Don't be too
close to the industry because the industry. their
natural tendency. will be to over-exploit the resource.
You're not at their service.
I think what I'm trying to say is that there was
some kind of a confrontation. That we're not on the
same team any more. We had been on the same team Ear
eight to ten years--working for a common goa~. And now
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we were on separate teams. And we had separate
objectives. The objective of the fisheries biologist
was to conserve and protect the resource. And the
perceived Objective of the industry--mOb:Lle gear.
offshore. capital-intensive--was to over-explo1.t the
resource. That's what was being expected. I think. So
that's one thing that went wrong. We distanced
ourselves from our clients.
The other thing is that--becBuse of the particular
management system that we choose. which is based on
Total Allowable Catch--there was more precision
required of us. fisheries biologists. than we could
offer. I think we thought, at least I did.
naively ... ten years ago I thought that our assessments
were much more precise. I think that the experienced
people at that time knew that they were not that
precise. But when you have a management system that
reacts. let me say. dramatically. to a change of five
per cent--if you change the TAC. any TAC. of northern
cod or any other one. by a very small margin. it's
going to create big problems all the way down the
pyramid. And when you realize that the precision Of
the stock assessment is. at best. on the order of plus
or minus 25 per cent. then you realize that there's a
discrepancy.
And what we were doing is that each year we were
adjusting the TACs in relationship with the variability
in the data. And there was total discrepancy between
what the assessments that we were doing were saying and
whar the clients were seeing. We had two groups of
clients. as well. with opposing views. The inshore
seeing one thing and the offshore seeing something
else. And often times we thought we were somewhere in
the middle but being somewhere in the middle. you've
got no one agreeing with you.
I think those are two of the main reasons. One, we
distanced ourselves from our clients so they didn't see
us as being helpful to them. Jlnd second. the system
~~;e;~£icting more precision out of us than we could
In the following exchange. Jake Pice has bean
contrasting with previous practice, the recent [1989] shift
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to probabilistic assessments and advice presented as a range
of options having probabi~istic effects. We discussed the
reasons why this information had previously been expressed
wi th misleading precision.
A: That·s a very different message [the new form of
advice} than scientists used to give. I agree. They
used to be guilty of saying. "The number is this."
The advisory system, up until the northern cod
problems. really wanted the scientists to resoLve 1t
down to a point. w1th the message coming back that, "If
you d~n't do it. who's going to? Who's in a better
posi t.1.on than you are to reconcile the conflicting
information?" lind that·s the kind of stroking that any
professionaL, not just scientists. [responds to}.
"Who's in a better posi ticn than you to reconciLe
divergent informa tion in your field of special.1.zation?"
0: And you never heard the bomb ticking?
A: we kept doing it. Because at the end of the day it
has to be done. You can't corne out and say. "Xhe TlIC
is go.1.ng to be somewhere between 150 and 250 thousand
tonnes and we're going to watch and see how it goes and
tell you haLf way through the season where we want to
end." You just can't manage the resource that way.
They need an answer.
0: Is this a symptom oE the long-standing position of
priviLege and authority that science has been granted
and enjoyed?
A: I W'ouldn' t: put it that strongly. Again. very
pragmatic people had been burned a few times. For a
couple of years they said. "Here's the confidence
interval that the answer lies within." And you give
that to peopLe who aren' t used to dealing with
confidence intervals. try to explain to them what a
confidence interval is, and they say, "Ohl That means
that I can take the number at the topl"
lIft::er two or three years of getting burned that way.
the eLder statesmen of the discipline deveLoped the
2'7
principIa that if you give them a choice. they're
always going to take the most optimistic interpretation
they can. So unless we believe that the upper number
really is as good as the mid-point. you better give
them the mid-point. And that was the reasoning behind
it--certainly going back to 1982 when I joined the
Department.
At no time. then or later, did I feel that the
scientists were deluding themselves about how accurate
their results were. It's just that they didn't trust
anybody .further on in the process to take a range of
options as anything other than an invitation to take
the most optimistic one. And I think that Eear on
their part was reasonably well-Eol/nded. But in doing
so. they really set themselves up.
Q: So through various pressures. some oE them
externally imposed and some of them internally imposad.
you came to deliver your advice in a Eorm that gave an
illusion of precision that was not warranted and that
you knew was not warranted. But you felt that both for
the good of the resource. and for your own personaI and
professional reasons. that this was the best of several
choices.
A: l'es. 15
I asked J.J. Maguire a similar set of questions. He
confirmed Rice's reconstruction of events and motivations.
0: Do you think that Science itself had any
responsibility in creating that expectation of
precision?
11: We created it ourselves. to a point. With the help
of fisheries managers. That, oE course. is my biased
perception.
I wasn't there so I don' t know if it was an open
demand. if it was implicit. if we obliged. but my guess
is that we were being offered a very gratifying and
important role. "Here's your raZe. What we have to do
is very. very complicated. So please don't make it more
complicated by saying that the TAe that you're
proposing is not precise." It could be anywhere from
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150 to 300 instefJd o£ being 200. "Don't say that.
please. Help. Help. Say just one number." And I
think we obliged.
And. as I said earlier, maybe we .••• I knoW' that when
I was rioing the assessments way back, I thought that
our precision was maybe p~us or minus ten per cent.
Maybe a little bit better. So we obliged. And we did
not come out and say "This is not very precise. 7his
is between this and there." There were other reasons
Eor that, one of them being our perceived role as
protector of the resource. If we gave a range we knew
that the upper end or the range would be chosen. So we
didn't know, at the time, how to present it and still
have people go with the mean. Instead of going with
one extreme of the range.
I think we did, yes, p~ay a role in those greater
~~~e~~~~~~~:dge~~16t:herewere a~ways caveats that were
What we are seeing in the above passages is 8
reconstruction of the social negotiations between science
and the state that: were to determine the language of
expression of stock assessments and resource projections.
The scientists now claim that they were well-aware that the
language favoured by the state gave a mis1eading sense of
certainty and precision to the assessments and projections.
They admit, howQver, that for the critica1 por:iod of 1977-
'89, they were persuaded to accept this language by a
combination of threats and fJ.attery from -the dominant
political forces :in the DFO bureaucracy.
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I"t is also wor"th no"t.ing: here that--while the scientists
were Quite willing "to accept the offshore f.ishery 8S a
primary source of raw assessllent C1ata--they were
silllu1"taneously convinced "that "the pursuit of rat.iona1
corporate goa1s--profits--was not compatible with the
rational sc.ientif1c 9081--a healthy, rebuilding: stock.
Although not specif.ically addressed 1.n the foregoJ.ng
.interview excerpts, the Science Branch was worried that the
corporate fishery would be able to exploit any apparent
ambiguity 1n the stock assessments through the exercise of
its political power--power based upon personal relationships
between the "top corporate executives and the domir.~ant
polit1.cal figures a"t the apex of the state bureaucratic
hierarchy. This concern was not without substance as is
shown by Fisheries Produc"ts International President Vic
Young's ability to seeura an additional 6,OOO.t of northern
cod for his cOlllpany in the 1990 quota. [See Chapter Six,
Endnote 3 for details and references.]
250
The CAFSAC Advisory Process: Artificial Closure of Open
Debates
The mechanism for distilling oncertainty and
reconciling differences of scientific interpretation of
indeterminate data is the CAFSAC advisory committee. The
CAFSAC meetings can be likened to 0 cognitive foundry where
individual, often disparate, constructions of reality are
sme1ted, alloyed, and the final, authoritative, construction
of northern cod reality is cast. Its existence and its
workings are an expression of the state's and corporate
structures' demand for regular inputs of unambiguous
knowledge that can plausibly be construed as "objective and
sc1entif1c K legitimation of political and corporate policy
and practice.
As we will see below, an understanding of the actual
dynamics of the CAFSAC process shows it to be more a forum
for projecting the POlitical interests of the state into the
sci-eoUfie construction of real! ty than the other way
around.
In the preceding chapters we have seen that the data
and methodologios of DFO' s stock assessment science
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permitted an unusua~~y high degree of interpretive
flexibility and that this opportunity was consistently
exploited to describe the condition of the stock in the most
optimistic way possible. The VPA, methodOlogy regularly
generated retrospective descriptions of fishing mortelity
and stock size that were considerably higher and lower.
respectively, than the original descriptions of any given
year's assessment (see Figs. 4.1 and 4.2). The C1\FSlIC
process, however, continued to recommend quotas ostensib1y
1n accordance with the FO.lllanagement principal (which was
thought to permit substantial growth) but based upon
current-year calculations of biomass.
This failure to link retrospective know1edge with
current knowledge permitted an operational description of
the stock that reflected institutional expectations,
projections, and commitments. The dependent Fa.FAe for
northern cod remained relatively stable at a relfltively high
level, irrespective of the fact that retrospective analysis
invariab~y concluded that the TAC for any given year
resultsd in fishing mortalities roughly twice ss high as had
been intended.
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One avenue to understanding this curious disassocia'tion
of current assessments and advice from retrospecti.ve
knowledge is afforded by an examination of 'the internal
dynamics of the CAFSAC process. Dr. Ram Myers is a
spvcialist in survey and assessment methodology. He offers
a blunt description and evaluation of the process.
A: ••. what went wrong with the process, why the
mistakes were made, was this exclusive attitude to
examining the data. That and some sociological
reasons. The group dynamics of the process. It's very
unscienti£1.c. Not in terms or the mathematics. Well.,
1.t's unscientific from my po1.nt of view.
There's a group of people that gets together and
they meet continuously. And 1.n order to make progress
lit these meetings. you have to accept certain t111.ng8 in
common, Otherwise you' d be arguing about every point.
This is simply the waY' 'the process worked. It almost
has to because these are human beings. It's one thing
to ta1.k about perLect people but they aren't. And
there are certain things that are inherent in ths
process of having a group of people examining things
like a small society. }llld within that group. there are
peop~e who are very much opposed to something in the
stock assessments.
One of the fundamental things to realize is that the
Canadian system works by putting together a group of
scientists at different levels. You try to shelter
them from outside interest groups. And they try to
come up with an independent decision. This process
probably works better than any other procsss r can
think of. Not that mistakes aren·t made. The only
interest Is in people Who've said something and they
want what they've said to be true. It's a decision-
making process without advocates, in the traditional
sense.
0: But certainly it generates advocates 1.nterna.lly?
Jl: Yes. But when the quotas were generated pre-CAFSAC,
when it was the old ICN}lP system, there'd be different
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national groups arguing for different things--advocacy
groups. As opposed to that. you've got a group as much
as possible shielded from the outside forces.
0: I seem to recall a note of warning in the '82 or '83
CAFSAC report ...
A: George Winters?
0: And then that voice disappeared until the '87
assessment.
A: No. That's not true. It didn't disappear. It
simply, . . Remember , it's a consensus process. Unless
!:lou're willing to go to meetings and just slug it
out .... The meetings aren't over until they've come to a
consensus. A decision has to be made. There' s no such
thing as saying. "I don't know." This is a process
where saying, "There isn't enough information." is not
acceptable. Decisions always have to be made. Jlnd
consistently, abundance was overestimated and £ish1.ng
mortality was underestimateJ for years and years and
years.
Q: But don't most other scientific debates get resolved
in a consensual wayi' They are debated in the journals
and at meetings and the eventual resolution is a matter
of consensus.
A: Not necessarily. You can have issues where a
consensus has not been reached for fifty years J
(): Ah yes. There doesn't have to be an answer
tomorrow.
A: Yes. That's the big difference. For instance,
interpretations of quantum mechanics. No one doubts
the basic formulations but there is not really 8
consensus in terms of the interpretation. {At CAFSllC]
A decision has to be made. A number has to be put
forward. "1 don't know," isn't an answer. And the
person who waits longest, the person who believes
strongest and is willing to stag out of town in a hotel
the longe~t, is the one . ... 50 it's not even a
consensus, it's., ..
0: A war of attrition?
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/I.: A~most. And most people are not wi1~1ng to stand up
and have a lot of people tel~ing them that they are
wrong. They won't do that. I don't usually go to
these assessment meetings because I don' t like them.
don't like the process because I get incredib~!J
aggressive.
Q: They are probably :Just as happy if you don' t goJ.
A: That's true/ 17
Once Burned. Twice Shy: The Sc1.entif.1.c Response to Pol1."tical
EXploi1=8tion
Yet another reason for science to have accommodated the
execut::l..ve bureaucracy's demands for certified, unequivocal
knowledge can be found in ita dependency on the state as its
sale source of operating resources and authority. It is
reasonable to SUpPOse that the state would not long continue
to sanction and support the activities of OFO Science were
it not responsive -to the needs and demands of its patron.
What happens 'then when--by accommodating its patron's
demands for knowledge eKpressed with misleading and
unwarranted precision--sci.ence and scientists suddenly find
themaelves in the glare of the national medi.a' 9 spotlights
being charged with gross incompe'tence? The answer is 'that
science becomes a great deal more explicit in clearly
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cornrnunicat:1ng the uncertainties inherent in :1 ts assessments
and the fact that the quotas ara not set by science but are,
in fact, a dac1.sion of the political bureaucracy 1.n which
the sclent.1.fic advice is but one of many (and not
necessari1y the IIlOst important) inputs.
Coady. Rice, and Magu1.re all addressed this point:
Larry Coady: This year, Eor the Lirst time, we're
saying, "we' ~l give you a range of options." Let's
assume that this year the recruitment is high or low.
Under each of those scenarios 1.£ you have a fishing
mortalit:yof 20 per cent, this is what's going to
happen t:o the stock in the long-term. It' s going to
increase. IE you have a 30 per cent: mortality it's
going to stay the same. If you have a 40 per cent
mortality it· 5 going to decrease.
0: So for the first t.1Jle you're providing your advice
in a way that llIaJces .it c~ear tha t the choices made are
management's choice and not Sc1.ence· s choice.
A: fhere w1.l~ always be some uncerta1.nty attached to
the advice we provide.
It ain't easy counting fish. It al.o't easy and it
never will be. And yet weather forecasters wou.1d
probab.1y find our track record enviable. The FConOllic
;~~~;~e~hcanadawould find our track record
Jake RLee: When J.J. MagUire had his big presentation
of the assessment back in May [~990J, the messa.ge he
kept stressing was, "We're not going to say whether
fishing mortality is .47 or .52 or .57. Relatively
small nuances of a number of things can influence that
bottom .1 in9. what we wi.11. say is that we Are damn sure
that fishing mortality is way above our t8lcget and we
need to lower it. And how lIluch we need to lower it and
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how we go about lowering it are decisions that we are
consulting with you people on."
The stock is not going to collapse overnight if you
keep fishing it at the same level it is. It'11
collapse .. . you can't fish it at this level forever.
But in the short-term. like 1990, 1991, the stock will
survive and stay healthy and continue to reproduce
itself. especially because there' s some evidence of
some good recruitment coming up. But the more you
;~~~I~~~fiShing mortality). the more it's going to
J.J Maguire: Where I see it (stock assessment sl.:ience)
gOiTlg is increased communication of the uncertainties
in the assessment. Part of the reason for the shit I\<e
got was that people thought we were 100 per cent
precise. So when they realized that t!iere was a plus
or minus 25 (per cent). at best. they think YOU're full
of it. Really, you're not being very useful. So
communicate the uncerta1nties. Be useful. Instead of
being theological about what should be done, provide
advice on what's feasible.
Recognize and make it known that some of the
variability in the assessments and the catch forecasts
is essentially based on variability in the system.
They're not real reflections of changes in stock size.
They'ro essentially reflections of variability in the
data. The difference between last year's assessment
and this years' assessment is a very good example of
that. Stock status is exactly the same between 1989
and 1990. Exactly the same. (Meaning, it's stable.)
Except that we've done the assessment slightly
~;f~:~e~;~t{i:h~~~a~e~~~;::si~~difference of about
This tentative and highly qualitative approach to ~he
subject does avoid the previous traps of illusory precision
and unwarranted expectations but it is not without its own,
unique dangers. Specifically, its knowledge content is
essentially indistinguishable from the claims of the inshore
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fishermen that touched off the whole crisis by challenging
the then-prevailing scientific constructions of increasing
abundance supporting higher quotas for the offshore trawler
fleet. Stripped to its bare essentials, all that science is
now willing to claim is that too much northern cod is being
caught and that quotas should be reduced to protect the
resource--which is exactly what the inshore fishermen have
been saying for some years.
IS this knowledge worth payina ~any tens of millions of
dollars for? The fallowing exchange with Sandy Sandeman
addresses this point. His final line of defense, that
fisheries science is no worse than economics as a guide to
rational management, is not a strong argument for continued
substantial levels of support from the public purse. In
fact, it is noteworthy that many of my sources, when pushed
hard on the SUbject of degrees of uncertainty and
imprecision inherent in their work, resorted to a favourable
comparison of their work with economics, weather forecasting
or, in one instance, both.
0: The bureaucratic structure of DFO was established in
light of post- '77 expectations. That with Canadian
control and good scientific management that the stocks
could be rationally managed. That forecasts could be
made.
A: Not necessarily. It depends on what you mean by
forecasts. Forecasts can be made ...•
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0: That stability could be brought to the industry.
11.: NO/ No one Jlas ever, ever said that stability can
be brought to the industry! I don't believe that.
0: Not from the scientific point oE view. But perhaps
from....
11.: Where you've got ...ariable recruitment you can't have
stability/
0: Rightl But 1 believe from my readings and research
that this was the expectation from the corporate and
political sectors ....
11.: I think that's probably true, yes.
0: A.nd a lot of the criticism that's coming from these
to sectors now against Science is a result of them
being disabused of this notion. Having to face facts.
A.nd they're saying, "we've spent mi.llions and millions
and millions of dollars on science which is of no
apparent practical use for our needs. Our political
needs or our corporate plarming needs."
JI.: That, of course is the question. Because if you
look at the stocks compared to '72 when this started,
they're all way upl They've been built upf They're
not continuing to be built up perhaps as well as we'd
hoped ....
Q: And yet these lads have just had their quotas
slashed drastically as a result of what looks to them
like scientific error! Screw ups/ So they're not
fishing for 450,000 metric tonnes this year {as
predicted by DFO in the 1983 Kirby Report], they're
fishing for 196.000 with the scientific adY'ice saying
that, "We got it so wrong that we think that you really
should be fishing for only 125,000 metri.c tonnes this
year." This is a shock to them. And it causes them to
say. "If you boys can't get it any better than that,
why should we keep forking over tens and hundreds of
millions of dollars to YOU?" This is their
perspective, not mine.
A: I can see their perspective, I llust admit. I can
see their perspective and it· s a hard one to answer
because they don't appreciate the fact that it's not an
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The irony, of coursn, is that during the period when it
is now thought that the errors were being made, 1977-1989,
DFO Science was held in high regard--both domestically and,
particularly, internationally--for its unusual effectiveness
in rebuilding a devastated stock. For as long as the annual
assessments reflected widely-shared expectations of e
strongly growing stock and, most importantly, the dependent
quotas reflected that growth, no one outside of the Science
Branch, and few people within it, were inclined to inquire
too closely as to the validity of the data sources and the
robustness of the analytical methodologies.
Summary and Analysis
The focus of this chapter has been an empirically-
grounded discussion of the macro-level social forces that
have contributed to the social construction of scientific
knowledge; specifically, the forces that are generated in
the institutional collision between science and the state.
As separate institutions, each ha.;;: developed distinctive
structures, values, norms, and traditions in pursuit of
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their institutional goals. Science seeks to defend or
enhance its epistemological authority through pursuit of the
"truth" while the state seeks to defend or enhance its
socio-economic authority through pursuit of political power.
Here, however, we have a situation where science has
become embedded in the state. The relationship is no longer
one between free-standing, autonomous institutions but one
where science is intended to be institutionally and
functionally subordinate to the interests of the state.
Science, as represented by the Science Branch of DFO, has in
turn, attempted to preserve the integrity of its
insti tutional cUlture and knOWledge constructions while
exploiting the substantial resources of the state. The
strategias employed by both the state and science in pursuit
of their respective goals have been both overt and covert.
From this macro-level perspective we can see that an
understanding (',f the conflicts inherent in this relationship
is of considerable value in the construct1.on of a
comprehensive analysis of the process and product of
scientific stock assessments for the period under study.
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1. From an address delivered by Dr. Leslie Harris at the Graduate
House in St. John's, Newfoundland on February 20, 1990
2. John Crosbie, the Canadian government's Minister of Trade, is
also Newfounland's only representative in the federal Cabinet.
A.lthough he has no official standing with the Ministry of
Fisheries and Oceans, as a long-standing power in Canadian
pOlitics, he wields considerable influence as we saw when he
successfully pressured DFO to incroase tho quota for the offshore
trawler companies in return for an apparent promise not to close
a few fish processing plents in his electoral district. [See
Chapter Six, Endnote 3]
The fallowing is from an editorial in the st. John's weekly
newspaper, The Sunday Express, December 31, 1989.
" .•. John Crosbie, without a doubt, has reason to view
scientific briefs with a sceptic's eye. After all,
officials at the Department of Fisheries and Oceans raised
alarms about the health of the northern cod and urged Ottawa
to lower the XAC (quota) to 125.000 tonnes only 12 months
after they assured cabinet the hardy stock could sustain an
annual ca tch of 295. 000 tonnes •
.. • • • the m1.nister insisted. 'I'm not a believer that
we must slavishl.y foHow the opinions of marine biologists. '
"That's when the story of the old minister and the sea
took a disturbing turn.
HThe minister shunned the best scientific advice federal
dollars could buy. And, armed with little more than gut
instincts, John Crosbie decided to tackle the mysteries of
the deep blue sea alone.
"Ottawa, he revealed, would not be strongly influenced by
scientific advice when determining the total allowable catch
of northern cod in 1990. Instead, John Crosbie and the
federal cabinet would establish a quota that would serve
Newfoundland's best interests."
3. The Evening Telegram, st. John's, Nfld .• Feb. 16, 1990
The Sunday Express, st. John's, HEld., Dec. 31, 1989; Feb. 11,
16. 1990; April 22, 1990
The Globe and Mail, Toronto, April 11, 1989
{See also Endnote 2 for a specific example.]
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4. Multiple sources inCluding the terms of reference of the
Northern Cod Review Panel [Harris 1990] and letters dated Feb.
13, March 6, and April 6, 1990 to former and present federal
ministers of fisheries Siddon and Valcourt from The Professional
1nsti tute of the Public Service of Canada, representing
scientists in public employment.
5. from an interview with Brian Morrissey conducted in ottawa on
November 2, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix L.
6. From an interview with Sandy Sandeman conducted September,
1990 in St. John's. The full transcript is Appendix O.
7. from an interview (not recorded) with Mac Mercer, Director of
the Science Branch, at DFO's research centre in St. John's,
Newfoundland; February 16, 1990.
B. From an interview with Larry Coady conducted in st. John's on
July 26, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix E.
9. From an interview with Jake Rice conducted in st. John's on
August 14, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix I.
10. From an interview with Bernard Brown conducted in St. John's
on August 3, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix B.
11. From an interview with Jim Rosche conducted in st. John's on
July 24, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix N.
12. From an interview with Larry COady conducted in St. John's on
JUly 26, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix E.
13. From an interview with Sandy Sandeman conducted in St.
John's, September, 1990 The fUll transcript is Appendix O.
14. From an interview with J.J. Maguire conducted in St. John's
on October 28, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix J.
15. From an interview with Jake Rice in St. John's on August 14,
1990. The fUll transcript is Appendix I.
16. From an interview with J.J. Maguire conducted in St. John's
on October 28, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix J.
17. From an interview with Ram Myers conducted in St. John's on
August 28, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix M.
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18. From an interview with Larry Coady conducted in St. John's on
July, 26, 1990. The fUll transcript is Appendix E.
19. From an interview with Jake Rice conducted in st. John's on
August 14, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix 1.
20. From a interview with J.J. Maguire conducted in st. John's all
October 28, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix J.
21. From an interview with Sandy Sandeman conducted in St.
John's, September, 1990. The full transcript is Appendix o.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS
In the preceding Chapters, I have worked within the
frame of a very specific problem area--the science of
northern cod stocl< assessment from 1977 to 1989. Now, in
this concluding chapter, I would like to generalize the
issues somewhat--to recapitulate my synthesis of the
spec.:! fie issues under stUdy in a way that may be taken up by
others and applied to other problems of state-sponsored,
scientifically-mediated interactions between societies and
the natural world. Finally, I will also have a few wortls to
say about lessons learned and opinions formed regarding what
I call meta-methodOlogy--that indeterminate region between
theory and the empirical ground--where the researcher
negotiates the construction of reality.
Prior to doing so, it may be well to briefly review the
ground we have covered to date. Structurally, the work has
been organized as follows: Chapters One through Four defined
the problem and established the far:tual and conceptual
context within which I would present the data and argue my
analysis. The analysis formed the substance of Chapters
Five thr'lugh Seven which carried the discussion through
progressively higher and more inclusive levels of social
organization. In the opening chapter I claimed that
"... this latest crisis (and the "success" and/or
"failure" of stock assessment science) is better
understood as a product of multi-levelled and
interactive social forces and processes rather than as
the ability or inability of science to objectively and
accurately understand. describe and predict the
dynamics of external natural reality." [po 17}
Next, I discussed the strengths and limitations of my
primary theoretical perspective--social constructivism--and
introduced several supplementary theoretical concepts which
I presented as being essential to my construction of a
comprehensive description and satisfactory analysis of the
empirical reality that had emerged from my research.
Chapter Three presented evidence that established the
development of strong commitments at all levels of social
organlzation--from individual scientists to the Canadian
state--to the idea of a rebuilt, rationally managed northern
cod stock. I located this development within the context of
international negotiations at the Third Law of the Sea
Convention.
'I'o pursue the argument further, it became necessary
that the reader have a b.asie understanding of the technical
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content of stock assessments. This permitted the
introduction of the concept of "interpretive flexibility."
I showed that, for the period from 1977 to 1989, the errors
and uncertainties inherent in sciantifie stock assessments
permitted an unusually high degree of interpretive
fleXibility in the construction of both current-year stock
assessments and rosource projections. Further, through a
close analysis of documentary evidence--much of it
originating from within OFO itself--I established that this
interpretive flexibility was consistnntly exploited to
produce assessments that are better understood as
expressions of pre-existing commitments and expectations
rather than useful descriptions of natural reality.
A second and concurrent theme of this chapter was the
initial appearance of a direct challenge frCllll the inshore
fishery to DFO's claims. Through an analysis of the reports
of a series of commissions of enquiry, we saw a protracted
re-negotiation of reality. This began with the OFO's flat
dismissal of the valid1ty of the claims of the inshore
fishermen as expressed 1n the Keats Report and progressed to
the point where the perceptions of stock status held by the
inshore fishery, DFO Scisnce, and the Harris Report were
broadly congruent. And yet, the general agreement on stock
2••
status onl.y served to reveal that. the real crisis was not
biological but a crisis of epistemological legitimacy and
institutional authority:
"""" the institutional and political authority of the
federal government, the epistemological and
professional authority of science and scientists. the
cultural authority of the inshore fisher",", and the
struggle for legitimation" of each of their respective,
conflicting cognitive orders and constructions of
reality." (p. 125)
By Chapter Five we were prepared to enter into an
exploration of the social construction of the cognitive
reality of the scientists themselves. I showed how micro-
level social dynamics could generate forces with highly
consequential macro-level effects. I traced the origins of
one particUlar conflict between two small groups of
scientists to the incompatibility between their
insti tutional mandate and their professional reward and
promotion structure. By extending this analysis beyond that
specific conflict, I argued that this could plausibly
account for the curious but persistent failure of the
Science Branch to produce knOWledge of practical utility to
its mandated clients; the state and the commercial fishery.
'fhis explanation, on its own, was not wholly
satisfactory" For instance, it failed to address the sharp
2.7
distinctions thet scientists made between the inshore and
offshore sectors of the fishery and their respective status
as sources of valid data. In Chapter Six 1 took up this
problem and argued that the distinction was not grounded in
a rational evaluation of the relative intrinsic merits of
the data--as claimed by most scientists--but, in fact,
reflected a reasonably well-founded fear on the part of
science and scientists that they were facing an
unprecedented challenge from the inshore fishery to their
institutlonal integrity and epistemological authority.
Finally, in Chapter Seven, I raised the level of
analysis to the broadest view of the problem and identified
the embeddedness of science in the state as a source of
powerfully influential social forces that could be detected
as effecting knowledge cOnstruction at all levels of social
organization. I suggested that the conflicts inherant in
this relationship were the ultimate source of the
dysfunctional dynamics that we had observed at work in
earlier chapters.
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In The Final Analysis
The political institution of federal government
operating through the Department of Fisheries and Oceans is
the sole source of the Science Branch's funding and
functional authority. However, the Science Branch's sole
raison d'etre within that pOlitical institution is precisely
due to the epistemological authority derived from the
putative independence of its knowledge constructions from
that institution and allegiance to the inst! tut!on of
science.
We have seen that the historical development of
Canadian fishery resource management policy and process has
been shaped by its attempts to incorporate and integrate the
cognitive contexts of two institutions with conflicting and
contradictory norms. The intention was undoubtedly to use
dispassionate, objective scientific knowledge to balance the
social, political, and economic inputs to issues of resourca
exploitation and management. However, to date, this effort
has not been notably successfUl.
Instead of achieving the desired balance, it seems that
the resul t of the interdependence of these two institutions
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has been to create a perpetual conflict. Each has a kind of
power that the other wants. The political-bureaucratic
soctor of the federal government possesses budgetary and
legislative power by virtue of its control of the mechanisms
of the state. The Science Branch possesses legitimating
power by virtue of its associatiol' with '~hEo institution of
science which, for most practical purposes, otill sits atop
the epistemological hierarchy.
The state's power created and enables the activities of
the Science Branch. The Science Branch's power derives from
its perceived ability to generate certified knOWledge to
legitimate the fisheries policies of the state. The
problematic aspects of this relationship !ire resident tn the
fact that the two institutions have evolvea highly
incompatible CUltures that operate in the context of
disparate cognitive models of the social and natural worlds.
Further, the evaluation of the two institutions' performance
takes place within disparate evidential contexts.
The state's performance is Gvaluated by the polity
within a very mundane, practical context. The continuance
in power of the rUling party, and the careers of individual
polit::'cians, are weighed in the balance. As a consequence,
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what counts as valid knowledge in this context is also
mundane, practical and, above all, non-controversial. The
closer that a knowledge claim approaches the status of an
incontrovertible fact, the better. The state, despite high-
minded election-year claims to the contrary, has no rational
self-interest in supporting the academic pursu:!.t of
knowledge for its own sake; at least not within its own
organic entities. Because its performance 1s evaluated
within this evidential context, the state tends to evaluate
that of the Sc.tence Branch in the same terms.
The Science Branch, however, dsrives its
epistemological power from its evaluation within the
international community of fishery scientists. The norms
and traditions of science form the evidential context. The
reward and promotion of individual DFO scientists 1s
adjudicated within this same evidential context. Work that
is considered to be mundane, practical and unproblematic
(such 8S stock assessments were seen to be untt1 1989) is
labelled Mtrivial M and not highly valued. Conversely, work
on problems that are not well-understood, containing
significant lacunae, is referred to as "interesting" and is
the path to enhanced status and material rewards wi thin the
scientific community.
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ThAre is yet ano.)ther very real problem in the
relationship between the state and its sponsored science
that is the source of a profound ambivalence between the two
insti tutions. This arises from the fact that the state's
fisheries policy derives its credibility and legitimacy
within its own critical evidential context by appearing to
bo in close association with science--but science derives
ite credibility and legitimacy by appearing to be
disassociated from the state. The result is a t"t"uly bizarre
relationship; one that has persisted in Canada, with
periodic ruptures and reconciliations, for over 100 years.
The Science Branch can only function in the state's
interests to the degree it is successful in preserving its
scientific credibility. However, the state will only be
willing to function in the interests of the Science Branch
to the degree it finds the knowledge production to be of
practical value in achieving its political objectives.
Beyond Stock Assessments: ElIlpiricisinq Theory
At the highest level of analysis, this wvrk has been on
attempt to build a dynamic, interactive bridge between
empirical reality and theory. Useful analogies can be drawn
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between the stock assessment models of the Science Branch
and social theory. Both are simplified abstractions of
reality. As such they can be powerful tools for distilling
and conceptualizing the essence of reality. However--as in
the case of Ptolemaic cosmology and DFO's pre-1989
assessment models--they can also embody distorting beliefs
about the nature of reality. Bodies of social theory, ne
more or less than stock assessment models, are
manifestations of be~rock paradigms--superordinate world-
views--and, as suci" can be profoundly determinant of the
results of their application.
It is a common characteristic 0.£ both theory and models
that they are constructed on a foundation of a priori
assumptions. Typically, theory is applied to empirical
reali ty. The paradigmatic core of a theory can carry a
powerfully deterministic inertia so that the result... of such
an application tend more to confirm the theory rather than
clearly illuminate the empirical problem. Perhaps it is
also necessary to occasionally reverse this order--to apply
empirical reality to theory as a test of a theory's
cognitive foundations.
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I suggest that empirica~ research can be more
interesting and its results more fruitful if we, as nearly
as possible, first approach our ground with an empty tool
kit. Leave behind our theoretical perspectives, analytical
frameworks, cognitive categories. Borrow from anthropology-,
-with deep gratitude--the ethnographic technique. Instead
of us trying to make sense of the natives, let them make
sense of themselves to us. Grant their cognitive and
epistemolngical reality the same validity that we grant our
own. Only then should we return to our familiar world and
begin a carefUl process of fitting our data to our theories.
Much of it may not fit our favourite perspective. Some of
it may not fit any theory at all. We may find. as I did,
that we have to disassemble several theories and, from their
bits and pieces, rebuild a new construct uniquely suited to
the empirical experience.
In conducting the research for this work, I found that
there was no one "off the rack" thAoretical perspective from
which I could adequately and plausibly account for the
empirical totality of my data, experiencos, and impressions.
This made my job somewhat more difficult but it alsO made it
a great deal more interesting and enabled me to contriblote a
distinctive analysis toward the understanding and resolution
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of a problem of vital importance to the 1\-opla of
Newfoundland and Labrador.
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APPENDIX A
A BRIEF HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT~SPONSORED FISHERIES SCIENCE IN
CANADA
The following review of the historical relationship
betwsen the federal government and fisheries science is
derived largely from "The Aquatic Explorers: A History of
the Fi!&heries Research Board of Canada" by Kenneth Johnstone
[1977] .
As alluded to in the introduction, Johnstone notes the
interconnectedness of the northwest Atlantic fishery and the
political and economic histories of the Canadian, US, and
western European countries; and since the 19€Os, of the
USSR, Poland, and--until its re-unification, East German as
well. He dates the beginning of this relationship as 1497,
the year. John Cabot returned to England from an exploration
of coast of what is now the Province of Newfoundland and
Labrador with his famous report stating that "The seB there
is full of fish to such a point that one takes them not only
by means of a net but also with baskets to which one
attaches a stone to sink them in the wate:"." [Johnstone 1977
p.4]
The initiel llwereness of the need for some measure of
federal management of marine resources is credited to Pierre
Fortin, a McGill-trained physician who, as Canada's first
fisheries enforcement officer (1652-67), conducted the first
systematic, scientific study and rElporting of the state of
the east coset fishery. Fortin noted general abundance in
all fisheries but also occasional failures. Fortin's 1856
report correctly predicted the collapse of the whale fishery
due to the introduction of harpoon guns and compared the
situation of whales to that of the walrus which, once
abundant in the region, had been entirely wiped out. He
later recommended regulation of mesh size and other measures
to protect salmon which were even then in danger of
extermination.
Peter r-':itcheI1, Canada's first minister of marine and
fisheries, proposed in 1868 that the fisheries be formally
rationalized and regUlated under Sate authority. The
Fisheries Act of that year included conservation measures
such as closed seasons, licensing, closed areas, and
prohibition of pollution of the fishing grounds.
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Johnstone quotas from an article by James P1ayfair
McMurrich in the University of Guelph publication "The
Week". 1\fter a formal nod to the practical advantages of
the application of Bcience to the fisheries (protection and
development) he makes a case that science il;l important for
its own sake.
"Apart. however. from the practical value the
establishment or such departments would have, the
scientific importance of their worle should not be
G·verlooked. Generalizations of which at present we
have not he slightest inkling, might be arrived at; all
departments of science would receive encouragement: a
new stimulus to science would be aroused in our country
and the present ban under which science lies would be
removed.
"But in this search for practical discoveries let
not pure science be neglected. Though apparently
valueless at the time. it will yield abundant fruit in
the future, not only by becoming in its turn capable of
direct application. but also by establishing a starting
point where new investigation may branch out in the yet
undiscovered realms." [Johns'tone 1977 pp. 24·,25]
McMurrich's call was joined by the Rev. Moses Harvey,
secretary of the Newfoundland Fisheries Commission, in a
paper presented to the Royal Society of Canada in 1892.
" ... the writer wishes to point out the
desirability of establishing a Biological Station for
the study of Ichthyology and Marine Biology in all
their branches . . . . The scientific and practical
should be so combined to render ita Fishery School .
"The interests of pure biology, as a science. would
be served b!:/ such an institution . ... If we want to
increase the qualities of our food fishes, our lobsters
and oysters. all our operations must rest on a
scientific foundation, and all our regulations of our
fisheries must have their basis in a sci..entifi..c study
of fish-life. Failing such accurate knowledge, our
legislation regarding the fisheries will be largely
groping in the dark: and all efforts for their
preservation and improvement will come short of the
objects aimed at." [ibid p. 25]
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Dr. E.E. Prince, a specialist in fish embryology from
Glasgow, Scotland was appointed minister of fisheries in
1893. In his U.rst annual report he wrote:
"There is a growing feeling in our country, which in
so many respects has taken a leading place among the
nations in regard to fishery matters ... (that it)
r,~10uld take a position of equality with other (;ountries
in the furtherance of marine and freshwater biological
research . . . . [these researches) all end in
supremely practical results. and bear directly upon the
welfare and prosperity oE the great fishing industries
. . . . Legislation has often been hazardous on account
of this lack of ascertained fact and the existence of
contradictory opinions. primarily, a marine station
would be a centre for investigation and research for
the promotion and diffusion of knowledge. Without
interfering with this first and most important work.
such a station might also be a school Eor teaching and
Ear scientiEic study..•.. " [ibid p. 26]
In May of 1895. Prof. A.P. Knight of Queen's Universit.y
wrote to the secretary of the Royal Society suggesting thet
the Society officially approach the minister with a request
to establish a research station and noted that Canadian
marine biologists were travelling to Woods Ho~e and European
stations to work.
"It seems too bad that her biologists should be
compelled to expatriate themselves in order to gratify
so harmless and ambition as that of adding a little to
the sum of human knowledge." [ibid p. 27]
Continued pressure was rewarded with the paesage in
Parliament of an act establishing a floating research station
to be staffed by scientists on lesve from their universities
and administered by a special board consisting of a
representative of the Dept. of Marine and Fisheries an
representatives from all tha supporting universi+:ies.
The first Board was chaired by Dr. Prince (Minister of
Marine and Fisheries) with the other eight members all being
distinguished academics. According to Johnstone they
immediately recognized the need to establish their legitimacy
in two separate, and possibly conflicting. evidential
contexts--polltical 81\d scientific. Funded with a one-time
appropriation of $15,000--S5.000 for construction of the
research station and $10,000 for five year's operating costs-~
there must certainly have been conflicts over the allocation
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of available resources to satisfy the demands of the two
evidential contexts.
On one hand, they would have needed to justify this
expenditure of public funds--and any further funding they may
have hoped for--by the production Of results that were seen as
useful by the federal political institution. On the other
hand. as eminent scient1sts. they would have also felt the
need to conduct research that would command the interest and
respect of their academic peers. This pressure 'to satisfy the
demands of disparatA evaluative criteria would be instantly
recognizable to the scientists working for DFQ nearly 100
years later.
"As it prepared to launch its investigations into
the fisheries of Canada, the Board was faced from the
start with two major tasks: it had to prove its value
to the Canadian government as an instrument of research
in aid of the Canadian fisheries, and it had to prove
to the scientific community that it could operate a
valuable laboratory for biological and fisheries
research. . . .
"Prince made himself chief propagandist with 'the
government for the work of the Board . . . and he
performed a similar role with the Roy,ll Society • . . .
But it was the scientific papers that proceeded to flow
from the summers at the movable station that persuaded
the scientific community that it was a valid and
important instrument in the development of the science
of ichthyology. Similarly. many of the subjects of the
papers were matters of practical importance dealing
with problems that faced the Canadian fishing industry
and thereby justified the enterprise in the eyes of
Parliament and successive administrations." [ibid p.
30]
Johnstone notes that the choj Je of the first site for
the station was a SUbject of conflict. The Board chOBe St.
Andrews, New Brunswick for reasons of scientific interest
while the auditor general objected on the grounds that the
Parliamentary appropriation was for a station on the Gulf of
st. Lawrence. The Deputy Minister of Fisheries replied
that. since it was a floating station, it couJ.d be towed
anyWhere in the G\\lf. Dr. Prince, reporting to the Royal
Society, justified the St. Andrews site in terms of
scientific priorities. In understanding the early
resolutions of conflicts in favour of sc1ence, it is
important to know that Prince personally conducted research
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at the station as well as being Minister of Marine and
Fisheries.
In 1902, the Board approached the government for a 50
per cent increase in the annual. allocation of operating
funds and additional. money for a number of substential
capital. expenditures. Further, they proposed that these
al.locations be turned over to the Board an bl.oc to be
dispensed as deemed necessary. The avallabl.e evidence
suggests that the research programs conducted through 1904
were designed by Pr.1nce and the Board to impress the
government with the practical value of the station and
justify requests for more liberal allocations of funds.
The choice of a site for the first permanent station
was subject to the same sorts of pressures as the mobile
station. While St. Andrews was again the scientists'
choice, they created the appearance of evaluating several
other possible sites before drawing up a lengthy
justification for St. AndrewS. A perusal of rosearch
conducted in follow.1ng years shows increasing emphasis on
programs of scientific interast as opposed to practical or
commercial value.
In discussing the conflicts between the Board (all were
scientists and only one, Prince, was a govt. employes) and
their political mas tors, Johnstone says
"The two objectives which both boards undertook to
achievo, one of independent aquatic research and the
other of providing answers to the practical problems of
the fisheries, required that they do a nice balancing
act, with the pole tilted now one way. now the
other . .... In their own un.'.versity departments the
members of the board were laws unto themselves,
respected for their scholarship and achievements, and
not at all prepared to have their decisions reviewed by
'bureaucrats' unfamiliar with biological
matters .... [but} They understood very well that the
government would expect to see some tangible results
feom the sum that it was spending, modest though it
was." (ibid p.72)
"From the beginning, Prince and his colleagues on
the Boaed insisted that: puro and applied science went
hand-tn-hand: that there could be no valid applied
science witJlout the basi.c knowledge furnished by a
total study of the environment. This view was to be
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repeatedly challenged over the succeeding years, but it
was never abandoned by the Board." [ibid p. 74]
"lthough the 1912 "ct of Parliament that replaced the
original Board of Directors with the Biological Board gave
the naw Board a great deal more financial and prograll
autonomy, the work began to move IIlOre in the direction of
practical and applied science.
Through the early 'twenties, the work becBe
increasingly applied with extensive work on lobster farm.1ng
and the solving of technical problems in the processing of
d.1fferent species for the market. COld storage and freezing
technology was developed that would later fundsllental1y
reshape the industry.
There was a significant turn of events in 1924 when the
Department succeeded in staffing the new fisheries
technology research statton in Halifax under civil serv.ice
rules so that all its scientific ataff wars federal
employees as opposed to Board-sponsored researchers who were
volunteers from various univers.itiee. Through the Second
World War and up unt:1.l at least 1947, the Halifax station
focused nearly exclusively on applied science such as
product processing and handling technology and lIethods.
Following the end of WWIl, the rapid development of a
mechanized offshore fishery made obvious the need for an
international forum to control the potential for the
overfishing of cOlMlercially valuable stocks. Rather qu1.ckly
it becatne necessary for Canada to develop a much broadu, and
deeper expert.1se in marine sciences in support of :1.ts
ant.1cipated role in the creation of the organ.1:t8t.1on which
was, in 1949, to become the International Commission for
Northwest "Uantic Fisheries (IeNAF).
Two points are of illportance. The first is that the
l.1mit of Canada' e authority extended only twelve miles froll
shora. The second is that the furtherance of Canada's
interests in these negotiations was seen to depend on the
degree to which it could support its arguments from a
position of scionUf1.c authority. In this, the e.1tuation
much resembles that o"f 30 years later when Canada made .1 te
case durin9 the Third Law of the Sea Convent:1.on for the
ox-tension of its exclusive jurisdiction to 200 miles.
The objective of establishing the international
prestige of Canadian fisheries science justified greatly
expanded acientific research activity. This fitted well
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with the interests of the burgeoning Canadian fishing
industry which saw a useful role for science in enhancing
its productivity for domestic consumption and competitive
position in foreign markets. In 1972. A.lfred Needler. a
former member of the Board. recalled this period.
"I think you might say from the years 1945 to about
1960. and even to 1963 and 1964. research was the magic
word in government finance. Research. on the whole.
received more assistance than anything else. It was
al.lowed a higller rate of increase. . . . The activity
[at st. Andrews] expanded very quickly from a bUdget of
$55,000 or so in 1941 to I suppose over half a million
in 1954. maybe more than that. I don't recall exactly.
That was one thing,
"there was a tendency in the early days of the
Board's history for industry to be very sceptical of
the value of any research being done • , . • People had
the feeling that they were doing research but it wasn't
being appreciated. or it wasn't being applied. and
while they believed in what they were doing. they felt
a feeling of frustration. Well. sometime during this
period ••• the balance swung the other way, so that
industry in the early 19505 was wanting more things to
be done than the Board was able to do . . . . This was
really quite a definite change." [ibid p. 185J
In 1971 the Trudeau government created the Departmant
of the Environment which was to oversee all natural resource
management activ.ities. Chairman of the Fisheries Board,
J.R. Weir waB cl.early concerned about the potential of
poli tical objectives to dominate and distort scientific
activity as the state increased its structural and financial
control of fisheries science. He wrote:
"There is an ever-present danger that public
policies and goals may be guided in the future by the
most pragmatic and expedient calculations. Scientists
have been increasingly subjected to public criticism
for being too abstract . • • .
In the absence of any accepted mechanistic approach
to the setting of goals and priorities. and to evaluate
research. forums must be sought to use this experti.se
to capacity, and to bring them in concert with
information users. Provided that objectives are in
harmony with national goals, it is imperative that
project: managers and scientists on site have freedom to
pl.an and execute their project operations so that their
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resourcefulness will not be constrained." (ibid pp.
299-300]
The Trudeau government actively pursued a poHcy of
centralization of authority and, in 1973, control and
operation of fisheries research was fina~ly removed from the
Board and given to the Department of the Environment.
Former chairman Hayes construed this change as deriving from
the 1091c of bureaucratic rationality when he wrote:
"In a late 1972 restruct:uring of Environment, the
FRB lost its independent status and was brought into
line authority, reporting to the new assistant deputy
minister for marine and fisheries . . • . The
overnmen1: slm 1 cannot cantero 181:8 'the con.trol of
policy and funds by any bu't Us own employees." :ibid
p. 307 emphasis added]
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P.PPENDIX B
In'terview with Bernard (Bern) Brown. DFO Information Officer
Conducted in St. John's, Newfoundland
Auqust 3. 1990
A: ••• looking back on it now. their report was almost the
worst th:lng that could have happened given what we know
about the state of the northern cod stock. Because the damn
Alverson report basi,::ally gave our fisheries science a clean
bill of health.
Our scientists were saying that since '77 the northe;f\
cod stock had increased five-and-a-half fold. And they we;'""
saying all sorts of other things around that basic central
fact. So our scientist: were saying that our f:lsheries
sc:lence effort and our fisher:lee management effort. based on
our science effort. has been a rip roaring success. Where
else on the face of the earth have we gone from s situation
like we had in the late 'eixtiee and early 'seventies where
we bloody near Wiped out the stock, to a point where we now
have this huge stock of fish out there. And essentially
they wore telling the :lnshore fishermen who were creating
all the uproar about the destruction of the stocks, that you
don't know what you're talking about. The Alverson
Commission confirmed v:lrtua11y all of that.
They said. "Well, i--<)u're a little bit out on your
calculation of how much the stock has grown since '77. You
say it's grown about five and a half fold. We thi',;: it's
only grown about five fold." Well, shit! That's ......dbble.
right? And it had a few other Quibbles about our
methodology. But whatever criticisms that were in the
Alverson report at least opened cri tlclsm or disagreement
wi th our fisheries scientists. But they were not great big
substantial problems. They were little matters of
adjustment here and there.
Now to anyone who read the report closely snd read it
with an open mind from the point of view of. maybe our
critics have got a point--if you read the Alverson report
carefUlly from that point of view. 1: think the signs werd in
there that the problems were worse than stated :lo the
report, First of all the report was a horror as a piece of
writing. It's interesting to read the Keats report by some
peop1e at MUN [the Memorial University of Newfoundland]
which was done at the request of Cabot Martin and his
people. You [the interviewer] read that ...And that was part
and parcel of the whole effort that went on for a year or so
of criticising DFO science that eventually led up to the
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appointment of the Alverson group to review our scientific
effort.
That thing done by Keats really set off a little
firestorm of criticism. Our scientists ridiculed it--who
are these people? They aren't fisheries scientists. They
don't know fuck all--they were absolutely ridicUled. My own
feeling is that they did a neat little piece of work. Real
neat.
Then you read the Alverson report. As I said, a real
horror. God what a struggle trying to read it. And I got
the sense, that while {Ilverson was asked to go and do an
objective evaluation of DFO fisheries science, he was most
reluctant to come out and be critical. So:t have a feeling,
and this is purely a feel.ing based on the tone of the thing
and so on, that he could have been, had he been willing. a
good deal more critical of our scientific effort. But
having said that, he did say flat out that baaically OFO
scientists are doing a damn good job.
What did our people do with that7 They ignored even
the quibbles that were in it. And I suppose that they
ignored them because they were quibbles. They went out to
the public and said, ftLookl Alverson has confirmed that
we're doing a damn fine job in science. They think we're
out maybe five per cent on our estimate of the growth of tho
stock but basically Alverson is saying that we're great
guys.ft
Well, this was e complete put-down of all the criticism
that our scientists had been getting. Troubla was, over the
next couple of years, the inshore fishery got even worse.
So we end up a year and a half 1atar with another
independent review.
It would naver have happened of course if the
scientists, a year or so after Alverson, hadn't started to
realize that their own numbers were wrong. And a good deal
more wrong than Alverson was Baying. In other words, they
started to get a handle on the numbers for the first time
since '77. That's what's happened in the last couple of
years. Cod being a 7 to 10 year old fish, it takes a decode
to gat a handle on a stock in terms of assessing it.
Granted, we've had fisheries science g01ng on in this
province for a long, long time but fUll-blown stock
assessment has only been going on on the northorn cod since
about '77. So they're just starting to get a handle on it.
Particularly with a little kick in the ass with all the
criticism that forced them to be a 11. ttle more careful in
their research.
They carne to realize a year or so ago that they were
very seriously out. And as soon as that dawn started to
break, the people in ottawa reacted with another fUll-blown
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review of fisheries Bcience. It's not funny for the peor
bloody scientists. They' ve been crucified through all of
this. Really quite unfairly when all is said and aone. You
can go and quibble at Borne of their behaviour, their
arrogance in their belief in the correctness of their own
knowledge. But they were really trying and, god damn it,
they're only people and they have been left to hang out to
dry.
But here comes the Harris panel and that's when the
bottom fell out. By this time our people knew how badly
they'd been out on the numbers and of course Harris went out
and redoubled all the criticism from the fishermen and the
industry generally. Took a good hard loolc at our science,
using our own information ..... It's like walking up to a
baseball player, saying you can't hit the god damn ball,
hitting him over the head with his own bat and saying,
here's how you do it. And what made the Harris report so
much more critical of our scientists was basically another
year or two of findings by those Bame scientists.
So in a way Harris con:t: ...rms that our scientiste are
doing good work but that good work is only beginning to bear
fruit in terms of the correct assessment of fish stocks.
Harris stated that plainly. It aoes take a decade or so to
begin to get a handle on a cod stock. But the previous
decade's work resulted in some very wrong numbers. Harris
concluded that the stock had only grown by something like
two and a half times. How did :I get into all this?
0: I asked you what oro was like when you first joined the
department [9 yee.rs e.go).
A.: OFO has always come in for a fair bit of criticism a11
the time. You're always arbitrating among these competing
interests. Because you ecce.aionally make a mistake and you
are occasionally caught quite plainly making e. decision for
a poli~':;ical reason. But that's just the stuff thet goes on
in government.
It's a little bit more so in fisheries becausa people
are so dependent in a fishing area. But it's only with this
problem in the last three or so years that we've had this
constant concentrated criticism. And of course it just
feeds on itself. The Department reacted to cri'.:icism with
the Alverson Report and then the Harris Report and now it's
reacted again with the five-year 580 million dollar
fisheries adjustment program. :It just goes on and on.
Naturally enough. The government COUldn't just sit back and
say, "Fuck 'eml Let ttlem [fishermen and fisherY-dependent
communi ties] starve. II
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Q: The irony is that the northern cads stocks probably have
increased significantly since '77. So the crisis is real~y
due to unrealistic expectations based on previously £aul ty
projections of 'the stock's incrE)ase.
/I.: I wl1~ bUy the unrealistic expectations line as ~ong as
we realize where they came from. I think that there is an
effort now by the governmen't, without being too open about
it, to pretend that the expectations of the fishery have
always been unrealistic. Which is not the case. There were
unrealistic expectati.ons but both federal and provincial
governments were more than Willing to pour oil on that fire.
Q: When the i',irby report was published projecting TACs of
400,000 tonnes by '89, I assume they were relying on OFO
data?
A: Madness! Of course that· s when the province jumped on
the bandwagon and licensed fish p~ants and boats left right
and centre.
Q: So they created a fishery with an economic structure that
depended on the avai~abi1ity of steadily increasing numbers
of fish and when they didn't show up...
/I.: The province wss very much to blame in all of that. The
200 mile 1imit. That' s what started the bonanu attitude.
It was El Dorado again. The Canadian offshore boys got in"to
the fishery and started landing a~l the fish here. The
processing industry went right through the roof. It was
fabulous. For two or three years. lmd then of course we
got a market down-turn and soma currency value shifts and
the bottom came out of her just as fast.
[break, next si.de of tape lost due to operotor error.)
A: 1. think that a major pattern of mistakes that's besn made
at DFO is that our senior managers making decisions at the
ottawa level, have ignored certain things that they knsw in
their decision-making process. The senior people, and I'm
talking at the Assistant Deputy Minister level and just
above and just below, including the Minister, have always
known, for exsmple, that any given assessment 1n any given
year of any given fish stock can be out essily by as much as
fifty percent.
0: And that's still the case?
298
It.: Yes. That's atill the case. :r:t could easily be more.
Now that's one hell of a level of variability. Politicians
have to deal with the real world. They've got to deal with
lIIore than scientific calculations. Just; the 8ue, we would
not be in the political pickle that we're in now if they'd
taken a little more account of that sort of factor and been
a little more conservative in theJ..r fisheries lIanagement.
0: And been 8 little more brave and honest and said, ·We
really don't know....•
A: Speak1.ng as sOllIeone in the communications business, a
glorified PR hack, that'g been their major bloody mistake.
An unwillingness to cOllIe clean. And it's still our major
mistake. But the politician, as an animal, that's the way
he's bred. That's the kind of person that gets into
politics and partiCUlarly that ends up being successful in
pol.1t1cs. Getting up to the level of M.1nieter of Fisheries.
That's the nature of the beast. With rare exceptions.
We had a minister in the 'seventies and 'eighties,
Romeo LeBlanc, and I remember Romeo from my time in the
media primarily, who tended to be far more open. Also,
another pattern of mistakes in Fisheries and Oceans over the
last seven or e.1ght years, particul.arly under the Mulroney
governllent. And that may merely be coi.ncidental. :I'm not
saying it'!iI because .1t's a Tory government. We have not had
anyone in thAt department w.1th a basic philosophical
grounding or approach to the damned industry. You always
have this prob~em of management making decisJ..ons on things
other than dol.lars and cents. Keeping Bung Hola T:1.ckle
alive. That sort of thing. We've not had any Ilinistsrs who
based their dec.1sions on any philosophy, however vague.
By contrast, Romeo LeBlanc, who was there from about
'74 or '76 up to about '82, had a philosophical groundi.\g
about the way he approach)d fisheries management from the
lIIin.1oter's lavel.. He was regarded, rightly, and stJ..ll is
tOday, as a fisheraan's lIin.1ster. That's not to say that he
ignored the processors. Obviously you' ve got to have the
processors to procoss the f.1sh snd get thell to lIarket. But
his first concern was the poor bloody fJ.shermen and the
fishing commun1.ties. Now that doesn't mean that he was
always r:1.ght in his decisions but it does Illoan that there
was some sort of cons.1stency in the way he apPMached the
management of the fishing industry. There was some
predictabJ..lity that people could work w.1thin. So Romeo had
a rock to stand on and was ~ess open to all the pressures.
Everyone s.1nce has been more open to pressure because they
didn't have a good solid rock to stand on. So whoever
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pushes the hardest, that's the direction they end up 901.n9
in.
[long digression on the political process]
A: I find it hard to deal with this ambivalence there seems
to be among the sc1.entists. Because they did know damn well
that the numbera that they were coming up with could be way
out. Probably were way out a good deal of the ti.me. A.nd
yet they were quite free in saying, we're doing a pretty
good job here folks. 1 suppose they did feel, correctly
that they were doing just about as good a job as could be
done. 1\nd what's oaught up to thelll is that no one was
willing to go out and try to make it clear to the fishing
industry and the public how much uncertainty lay in all the
science. And the way in which it finally became clear was
the worst way possible for them. Insb:aad of that, instead
of communicating something about the uncertainty, every
confidence was expressed.
[further discussion of the political mechanisms that select
the highest end of a suggested range for the TAC]
A: Look what's happening right now on the East coast,
particularly on the Eastern Avalon. .J'esus Christ! They're
buried in fishl L:i.stened to a guy from the Battery the
other day. He hasn't seen the like of it 1.n the 20-odd
years he's been fishing. Had over a million pounds in .July.
On the other hand, I've been watching the fish coming ashore
from the 65 foot otter trawlers, the guys that ere going off
the Virgin Rocks, and if there's one fish in a hundred
that's longer than 18-22 inches, that's about it. In other
words, they're getting a lot of small fiah out in deeper
water and that's not a good sign. Now, I'm hlking like a
fisherman, the kind of stuff that the scientists absolutely
disparage.
Nevertheless, in al~ of th1.s our inshore fishermen hovo
been proved to be right. Unless our scientists are going to
turn around a couple years from now and say, we were right
after all, the stock did grow f.1ve-fClld--which would destroy
any shred of credibility that they have ~eft. We were
saying, -The stock has grown five-fold,· and the fishermen
were saying, "You're out of you mind." They were right. But
I still don't sae any evidence among scientists t:hat they're
any more prepared than they ever were to go out and listen
to fishermen.
And it's apparently a lIlatter of the d1.fficul ty of
deal1.ng with the k1.nd of information and evidence that
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U.shermen have, the eo-called anecdotal stuff which you
can't quantify very well and analyze very well. Certainly
can't computerize very well. So you juat don't; want; to deal
wi th that kind of messy information. They won't even call
it data, as a matter of filct.
0: There's simply no cuItursl support or established
mechanisms within science for incorporating traditional
knowledge.
A: The department's trying to force it to a certain degree
but I don't know how much of that's public relations work as
opposed to a real effort.
C: But even if there were a genuine interest in
incorporating traditional forms of knowledge, it's difficult
to see how thoy could be translated into the language of
science, mathematics, or conceive of science learning to
speak another language.
A: Yes. But that's only part of the problem. The other
part is attitude. If the scientists really feel, as a lot
of the do, that the fishermen have bugger all to offer•...
(long discussion of the log book program to assess inshore
effort. Brown notes that this is being conducted by the
Statistics Branch, not the Science Branch and feels that
this is a missed opportunity to get scientists and fishermen
actually talking to each other. ]
1 think 1t's a real problem that the fishermen and the
scientists operate in solation from each other (NOTE: when
they do have personal contact, it is almost invariably in
the context of conflict and antagonism] How the hell can
some guy become credible to you if he's just some 8sshole
out in a boat believing what his grandfather believed? If
you're a scientist and you know the truth?
TAPE #2
A: You can go back to time immemorial. There have always
been fishery failuros. Sometimes localized to onB bay,
sometimes the entire East Coast, the South Coast, wherever
The fish failed for a year or two or even three or four. It
made for tough times. When it was bad enough government
would step in with Bome little bit of assistance to help
people stay alive. Not on today's ecale. But it really
didn't mean too much because people lived off the land and
off the sea anyHay.
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But the ihlportant thing is that the people understood
that it W<l.S a natural t:ling. The fish failed. They didn't
understand why. They just understood that they did. But
they knew that the failure would only last for so long. The
fish would come baek. 'l'hat was as certain as God. The fioh
will come back. So there was never despair among the people
and never a reason to blame anyone for it, government or
anyone else. It was a natural thing.
And of course, there was only an inshore fishery. They
always knew that they could not fish out the sea. They
couldn't destroy the resource. And I doubt that anyone even
had a concept of deLtroying the resource. It wasn't even
imaginable.
But come the' fifties, the offshore fishery started.
And it was a European fishery. The northern cod landings
peaked at something over 800,000 tonnes in the early '70s.
But over that period, people began to reslize--snd I think
it took until the early '80s before most people in the
inshore knew--that an irrevocable change had taken place.
That now you could have a fishery failure that was not
a natural thing but caused by the fishermen themselves. Now
they could have a failure and, maybe, the fish would not
come back. And that gives you a totally different inshore
community. They have a new understanding of fishery
failure.
Instead of Baying, "Never mind, the fish will come
back," what stands between them and permanent failure, is a
few politicians in ottawa.
0: Would you say this new understanding was the beginning of
the serious criticism of DFO sc1.ence?
A: I wouldn't say it was the beginning but that's when it
became mass criticism. Almost like a revolution. I would
say that the mass criticism from the inshore that hit DFO
three or four years ago was qualitatively different than
anything thet had gone before. Almost the whole inshore
rose up and said, "DFO, you're blowing it." And it was
different in that they concentrated on the science.
Now a few mistakes and a few bad decisions could cause
a failure that was not natural but man-made. Now there
could be a failure and the fish wouldn't come back. Now
there was someone to blame. And this waa utterly different
than anything they had know before.
0: I see this same qualitative difference happening on 0
global scale. For the first time in history. significant
numbers of people are coming to realize that we can damage
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our environraent so bodly that it cannot recover. That we
can quite easily make this planet uninhabitable.
A.: [Brown argues that this awareness by the inshore
developed independently frOlll other instances of 8CO-
awareness/activism]
0: [The interviewer argues that it i's linked to a pervasive
zeitgeist]
A: I suppose that the thing is that the impact of science
and technology is happening allover the place at the same
time. So it's giving rise to similar reactions allover the
place.
But this change in the fishermen hae fundamental
importance to government in how they relate to fishermen and
develop policy. And I don't think that the politicians have
realized that this change has happened and that it's
fundamental. 'l'hey realize that the inshore fishermen are
more active and cantankerc~J~ and political than they ever
have been before. All they know 1s that they have a harder
crowd to handle.
0: So they see them as a political nuisance rather than 8
bellwether?
A: Exact1y 80. I tried to talk to our people about this
when the massive criticism first hit, before the Alverson
COmmission was appointed. It went right over their heads.
It had nothing to do with science, so who cared?
I tried to tell them that it isn't really DFO science
that's being criticised. It's the fishermen realizing now
that all that stands between them and disaster are political
dec1Rion-makers so the fishenaen decided that they have got
to get into the political process and start hammering the
government.
And either through a lucky shot or some very shrewd
thinking, the pressure point they picked to hit was the
science. DFO is so proud of its science. And we have done
8 lot of good science. So to come Bnd hammer our strongest
pOint, our little area of purity--it was devastating to our
scientific people. It was puzzling to the senior managers
and politicians. "Why are they attacking our science?
That's the one thing we do right! We could take criticism
of our management decisions because we are used to that but
to come and condemn our science!"
It's hard to exaggerate the first reactions of our
scientific people. The were puzzled, upset angry. For a
while they were just like children. The ehock was horrible.
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Here we were being attacked in the one area in which we
thought we were unquestionable. We were used to criticism
from allover on our management decisions because you can
never please aU the competing intEorests. But we always
thought that the science was the one pure areB, free from
political interference.
I look at this from the point of view of my job, which
is a PR hack. And when the whole racket started. when the
Alverson Commission was appointed, my advice to our managers
was ... and everybody was in a quandary. How are we going to
stop all this criticism? My advice was, and I exaggerate to
make a point, go out on our hands and knees and say. ~Please
forgive us. We've done the best we can but we realize we
have to do a lot better. Work with us and help us."
Instead we took the Alverson report, which quibbled with our
science but didn't condemn it, we took that Bnd ran Bll over
saying, ~Look. aren't we greatl~
0: So you counselled humility and they responded with
arrogance.
A: Precisely so. And from a public relations point of view
that was a fundamental mistake and we're still making it.
The fishermen were basically understanding of the fect that
we were doing our best. All they were telling U9 was that
our best, because of the difficult nature of the science.
was not good enough. And they didn't expect us to become
good enough overnight.
They wanted us to admit that our science wasn't good
enough and to make fisheries management decisione wi th that
understanding in mind. Not to keep gambling on the
optimistic side that we were right in our science. That's
what they were t~l1ing us. "Quit gambling. Quit pretending
that you know more than you know. ~ They basically had the
same understanding--that it was an extremely complex
business and that all of our calculations had huge levels of
uncertainty.
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APPENDIX C
.Interview with Cabot Kartin
Conducted in St. John's, Newfoundland
March 15, 1990
[response to suggestion that NIFA is posing a challenge to
science's traditional autonomy]
A: I don't know if it's science as opposed to the management
procoss. I think thara's a fairly big distinction to be made
there. You're right in a sense. On the other hand, I
suppose there are not many economic and social activities
where tne role of science is so prominent as it is in the
area of fisheries management. So if you want .•. if science
wants to have that direct role in ordering peoples lives,
then they naturally have to take the commensurate
responsibility to account for i tsalf, right? The
intaresting thing that I find about fisheries science, 1ts a
relatively imperfact and relatively young science, in
certain ways, but it has a vary diract .•• it makes judgement
calls on the way people live.
So it's an interesting process. The environmental
assessment process is probably not the ideal process but
it's the only formalized one that we have. A.nd the
scientific community .•. and they'd probably have ... and I
noticed in the paper that some scientists, through their
professional organization, are criticizing someone ... I'm not
sure who they're criticising•.. whether they're saying that
their professionalism is being questioned by groups like
ours or whether they are complaining about the minister's
attitude or the ... say Crosbie's attitude towards the use of
science. Right now we're into a science gap as far as
management is concerned.
0: [observBtion about distinction between (Jcience and
management at DFO and the stated interest of the scientists
in preserving their traditional epistemological privilege
and autonomy]
A: I'd agree with that, but wouldn't you say that someone
like Mac Mercer [at the time, Director of the Science
Branch] is in the management side. I've always heard him
described as a manager rather thai\ a scientist. So within
the Scisnce Branch itself, there is a solid break internal
to that. I don't know exactly where that is but I suspect
that it's certainly below Mac Mercer.
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But one of the things that we think would be very
helpful is 1f the scientists were given quite a bit of
independence. You don't know these things until you
actually go to talk to them and all the rest of it but, from
what we can understand, the Icelandic system of having this
marine research separate from the management process is very
helpful in preserving the integrity and independence of the
scientific process. And that takes organizational
independence and job security independence. They can't be
under budget pressure either.
They can't be totally independent obviously but there
are models, for instance in the offshore oil. .. or we can go
back to Alberta and the board that managed the oil for
Alberta was always quite independent. And even went so far,
in their case, to have 50 per cent of their revenues come
from industry. 1 don't think the industry here is rich
enough for that kind of thing but the model here, with the
joint off-shore [oIl) board, 1 think is part of the solution
because we also have this problem of split jurisdiction.
And a joint management board ... you could make a case that
the joint management board for the off-shore oil is a proper
way of doing things •.. given oil. ostensibly, anyway, the
province had .. not a lot of direot interest in it. It
certainly had an analogous interest in co~trolling on-shore
activity ...much as it does in the fisheries situation, .. And
there's obvious benefits from a joint board on merging the
two ... federal/provincial jurisdictions on the oil. So I
suspect that the joint board .•. nominees from both
governments .•. with a staff that had independence would be 8
big part of the answer. 1 think that Dr. Harris says
something about that in his report.
0: So your criticism is not of science and scientists so
much as management and the way in which...
A: That's right. The way in which the scientific process 1s
used in the decision-making process. There's obviously got
to be a two-way flow becaUse social and economic objectives
obviously have to be projected down at the scientific level.
Saying "These are the kinds of things we're worried
about ...we need a scientific analysis. Give us your ideas."
Whether that's the number of fish that shOUld be caught in
anyone year or the relative appropriateness of any
technology ... these are social questions that need to be
framed.
In addition to that, you need this ongoing,
unstructured scientifio process, just the prooess of
learning about the ocean which is very, very critical.
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A prime example of that would be tbe whole issue of
trawling on the spawning grounds. In Iceland and Norway
they don't allow trawling on the spawning grounds. Partly
to restrict competition between the gears and partly to
protect the stock frOGl fishing too many of the stock
biomass. Also because intuitively in the minds of the
fishermen ... because it interferes with the reproductive
process.
The same goes for haddock on George's or Brown's bank,
where as recently as the Hache report. tho governntent, the
DFO was saying, ·Well, since 1970 we've had closed season on
the spawning grounds. The fishermen believe that there's
some direct effect on the reproductive process. We don't
have any scientific evidence of that but we'll go along with
it because we see some other benefits--in protecting stocks
when they're at very low biomasses." It prevents efficiency
of directed fishery. But there was this underlying idea
that there wasn't any scientific evidence to support the
notion. And that was the pervasive view in DFO and it was
the thing which really sort of reflected the disciplines
that were traditionally looking at stock assessment.
Meanwhile, down in Logy Bay for instance, there was an
ongOing process of research which dealt with endocrinology
dealing with the whole hormonal aspect of fish growth and
life. We found that there was more work like that being
done in Europe. This parallel work ... because people
h!lppened to be interested in this aspect of the thing .•. that
body of knowledge was never incorporated in the management
process ... but that's the evidence, or that' 8 the scientific
analysis part that i8 the clue to why trawling on the
spawning grounds is not a good practice. So there's got to
be support for basic science.
One the one hand you've got this important aspect of
basic science going ahead that you never know when it's
going to be \"'·.ful. But on the other hand, the process of
the fishery science can get dogmatic in itself, like all
aspects of sciencs. -The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions· could be named "The Structure of Scientific
Inertias", right? There are scientific inertias. Because
people get focused in on their own aspect of knowledge.
The common criticism that I hear of this unit down here
at DFO and perhaps other units is that there 1s not enough
cross-disciplinary interaction between scientists. Not
enough...what are the fUll range of gaps that wo have here?
I don't mean that to be an unfair criticism but the fact is
that, for instance in Iceland, they don't do this
endocrinology approach. They ban the traWling on the
spawning grounds and then they don' t worry about it any
more.
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But you'd hope that in a s1tuation where they say that
we're not prepared to ban trawling on the spa.wning grounds,
then you look at all aspects of it. And you don't find, for
whatJ.Jver reason, down here you don't find them saying],
"Let's write down all the things that we need to know.
Let's get all the disciplines in. Let's have a totally open
discussion anc1 here's what we need to know."
So 1 don't know if it's because of the organizational
structure or the type of people or the type of disciplines
that are involved or whatever, but there doesn't seem to be
this broad open type of inquiry. 1 think that's partly due
to the pressure of the political process telling the
scientists what's important. They're [the managers and
politicians] saying, "1 want numbers. 1 need numbers. I
want you to count fish and I'm going to cut off your money
in other areas., .or I'm not gOing to give you much money in
other areas." And that's partly true although down here
they were given more money last spring and didn't bother to
extend the scope of their inquiry to take in these other
things. I suspect there's a significant amount of inertia.
It could be that they're just shell-shocked down there.
It could be that they feel criticised and under seige.
Many of these people have not been trained ...or nONhero
in their training are social responsibilities. The
scientists just took it upon themselves ... I shouldn't say
took it upon themselves ... found themselves in this position
where they had tremendous power over peoples lives. But I
don't think that anywhere in their training or anywhere 1n
the lnternal cUlture of DFO would you find a discussion
about the social responsibility of scientists to explain and
account and 1 think that that's a very fundamental problem.
And there' s a whole range of issues that come out of
that. The perception of the scientists and how he feels he
fits into the whole range of different knowledge, of other
questions. They seem to believe that they have this
superior farm of knowledge which is not additionel to common
sense or additional to the experience of people working in
the industry. It's on a higher plane, somehow closer to the
so-called truth. There's this self-image problem of the
scientists.
And the unfortunate thing i8 you get this tension and
you get many fishermen saying, "Well, scientists are full of
shit. " And by having that attitude they tend to undermine
the legitimacy of the science in the process. And that's
not the answer. The answer is better science and more
accountable science and more scientists. Whether you can
devise a system where that's actually realized is a big
question.
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Maybe it's just the nature of our social organization
that people who go to university and got degrees and put
shirts and ties on and work in nice offices and circulate in
a social milieu that's different than most fishermen .•. maybe
they inevitably grow apart from the people whose interests
they are supposedly looking after or benefitting. If that's
so, then we'll always have this tension. 1 think that's a
big part of the problem... this remoteness ... the unreality
where you can actually sit 1n your office and have an
opinion and have an explanation which is aotually totally
out of step with reality. Where people can be totally
unrealistic. It's perfectly possible to do internally
acceptable ... from a competenoe point of view... an acceptable
type of job as a scientist and yet be totally out of
context, out of step with reaHty. You can do that. The
fact that you can do that is qUite an amazing concept. I
don't think there are that many types of aotivities where
you would get away with that. Right?
There is a big challenge. There are 80me 8cientists,
fisheries scientista for that matter, who are attempting to
incorporate mostly in the context of third world
countries who are attempting to incorporate so-called
indigenous knOwledge •.. mostly world funding agencies.
There would be resistance -to that: hero. Most times
when 1 talk to fisheries scientists, they enjoy close
contact with the fishermen. You don't hear people ... a lot
of them actually physically enjoy the work. It'a a strange
problem there. 1 don't know exactly what it is.
It's almost like the inshore fishery is too complex for
them to understand. The problems in the inshore sector are
because there aro so lQany different types of people and
different types of gear and different types of fishery and
so many different places. It's alltlOst like it's too complex
for people to understand. And -the collection of data from
fifty or sixty trawlera and a couple of cruises a
year ... that data base is a lot easier to manipulate and
easier to handle. 1 think that's an apparent •... l keep
hoping that if tho scientists got involved in the in-shore
1Il0re they would find the collection of data to be easy and
qui te pleasant. That would help .
There's another aspect to it which is changing the
SUbject completely ... and that is the whole notion of the
responsiuility of the scientists to speak out. In the case
of the letter you see in the paper ... the impression I
get ... you don't know the full contents of the letter so you
don't know why they wrote it ..• it seems to be a kind of
notion that as profeseionals, our reputation has been
sullied and we want our name Cleared. There doesn't seem to
be any hint of the public interest as opposod to their
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professional or collective interest. In other words, what
duties do they see themselves having to speak out when they
know that therQ are cases of mismanagement or cases of
information being mishandled or suppressed.
0: (question about internal debates in OFOl
A: We were told that there was an internal debate back in
1986 and we know that there were papers pUblished at that
time pointing out that they knew that they were
overestimating the size of the stock by nearly 100 per cent.
Those thoughts got submerged in September of 1986 and then
didn't reappear until February of 1989. There's •.. this
would be ... a fair indication as far as 1 know.
And I know that one of the parties to that debate
stated in '89, last spring, that he kind of lost the debate
in '86 ... a couple of papers were published but the general
view of the department, the public stance of the department
was very much the opposite. That there was nothing wrong.
They said afterwards that they felt vindicated among the
peer group. But that's not enough.
That's the internal structure of the scientific
communi ty. What's the duty of a person in that sort of
soituation to come forward and to say, look, this 1s not
right?
0: {question about policy preventing public employees from
speaking out independently]
A: It's a general problem in government. There's no doubt
about it. But the kinds of sanctions against speaking out
on a moral issue, I would consider this to be a moral issue,
they turn out to be moroa apparent than real. You do get the
union protecting them .. These kinds of large ... l would
consider that to be an anti-democratic rule. The power of
that rule is more in the unwillingness of people to test it
than in its reality.
But 1 think the more important thing there is that the
scientist is in a CUlture in which ... the person didn't say,
"I've been vindicated by my peer group but I wish I could
find some way of discharging my larger responsibility to the
community but I'm afraid for my job." The fact is that the
scientific community ought to define the bounds of its own
morality. "I'm Vindicated," and that's the end of the
question. It's not that I have a duty which I am somehow
being forced not to execute or live up to.
It's just that scientists would say, "I have no duty.
I don't want any duty. I don't see the purpose of any
duty." Right? "I'm vindicated." Not frustrated. "I'm
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vindicated because my peer group now recognizes that 1 had
the better analysis of the situation. ~ It's a game. "I can
hit the ball harder and farther and 1 won the game." The
fact that tens of thousands of people suffered because he
didn't speak out back in '86 is irrelevant.
I think that the kinds of questions .•. this is obviously
on a far lesser extent ... that the association of atomic
scientists have always grappled with.•. the IllOrali ty of
science.•.what is your duty to the public when you're
engaged in a government activity which you find to be
morally offensive?
Q: (question about the environmental assessment process
being the way to force scientists to face the social
realities of their work)
A: 1 think that's an interim step. The first step is to
shake up the system. That's what the environmental process
would do. But what you do want tn also create are
structures, orgenizational structures, such that open debate
is relatively free and open. If someone feels that there is
a problem, they wouldn't feel constrained by the
organizations1 structure. It might be an ideal world.
I think the independence of the scientific group is the
Ultimate objective. But right now you just can't get to
first base as far as accountability is concerned. There's
no notion of accountability. There's a whole problem there.
There's a very rigid bureaucracy in 81 country where
bureaucracies have tremendous power. This particular branch
of the bureaucracy has more power than any others I can
think of.
An example would be something like atomic lllaterials
where there is fairly tough control. But most aspects of
life like forestry end raining there is more of an
open ... your goverrunent isn't crawling allover you without
much accountability.
The first step is to bring in the notion of
accountability. Bring in the notion of the relative
contribution... and it is a relative contribution. It's one
of a number of ways of looking at the problem..• that science
can make and then setting up a context in which scientists
will admit will willingly and enthuaiastically participate
in a management system in which the fishermen are much more
involved and then I think the structures will follow.
1 think there will still be a need for annual public
hearings on the important questions. 1 can't see in our
society...we say we're a democracy .•• 1 can't see why anybody
would have any problems with public hearings on critical
quota questions. And I can't see why we couldn't have
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independence for the scientists organizationally. I think
that those things arB not unattainable but there's a
tremendous amount of inertia in the system.
The worst thing that has happened is that they have
been shown to be incorrect. Science can play ... the
fisheries can I t afford ... I' ve heard scientists say, "We
can't afford to know how little we know because if we
admitted that then no one would listen to us." That's
twisted. You get leadership ... you're recognized as a
leader ... one of the qualities that people like in a leader
is an openness and determination to find the truth. You get
respect for leadership for that and you ... the fact that you
don't know everything and that your techniques are not the
be all and end all ... and you need input from fishermen and
you need someone 1:0 haUl you back from the brink of being
totally out of touch with reality. All those things are
quite acceptable.
So when science is tending to put the all or nothing
question to fishermen and other groups
themselves ... unfortunately if you put the all or
nothing ... "I'm either totally in charge or I'm not going to
be in charge at all," ...most fishermen looking at their
track record would say, "Well you're not going to be
involved. If you're not prepared to be reasonable. then I
can't handle it." And I think that's a great tragedy. 1
think that would be worse.
Q: [question about the Stein group]
Ken Stein is his group ... they hElve office there in
Atlantic place and basically what their mandate is to try
to see what programs can be brought to bear on the social
and economic outfall of quota cuts. Whatever quota cuts are
deemed necessary ae a result of the scientific reanalysis.
So you've got ... they've been working now since last
May some time ... and I think by now that he has 8 pretty
healthy attitude towards the complexity of the problem. The
depth of the problem. But his group really hae been
carrying the ball as far a coordinating the social and
economic response and working with the province to develop a
response program or response package. I suppose there
really is a subtle interplay between the work of his group
and the whole stock management process. Because once you
accept the physical analysis of the stock one way or the
other, there will be a whole range of options ... once you
move away from stock extinction, commercial stock
extinction ... once you feel safe about that question, then
you have to say, "Well, what rate do 1 want to rebuild the
stock and how high up do I want to rebuild the stock? What
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are my social and economic objectives for 1990?~ And our
position, for instance, would be we want to put it back to
'65. We want '65 again. We want the sea ... the sea was such
before the trawlers came and destroyed the etocks. We got
the 200 mile lilllit.
The lIIandate of the governlllent in '77 was to rebuild the
atocks back to the level of 1965. And that was between four
and four fifty hundred thousand tonnes for northern cod.
AOId commensurate increases for the other stocks. So that's
the objective. That we're taking longer to achieve it, that
we're having this dip in the meantime .•. so the scientific
analysis that we want is to tell us how to get there. How
do we get to that objective?
Unfortunately, to get to that objective, you've got to
cut deep now. To allow the escapement of a lot of fish. To
allow the breeding to go on uninterrupted on the spawning
grounds. All of this comes at a tremendous ooonomic cost to
the federal treasury.
So one wey the Stein group put forward was, we won't
bring it back to '65. We'll only bring it back to '81 or
'82 which is only half of where it could be. So we're
missing a couple of hundred thousand tonnes of northern cod
which is worth a couple of hundred million dollars to the
local economy on an annual basis. So his group is posing
the questions that .•. to the scientists... hie group is
saying. "We want a slow growth and we want to cap it at say
220,000 tonnes." A ten percent increase over ten years. So
I go back to the scientists and say, "What's my annual TACs
to do that? There's my rate, there's my cap and you tell me
what my TACs should be." :
And that is the big social and economic debate that is
not vet joined. That's the big debate. If we can save the
stock, then where do we want to go? What are our
objectives? The scientists are increasingly being asked
Questions that are depending on how you view the world.
In Iceland, they say we've analyzed the stock, .•• and
it's something like what Harris din in his interim report
and hopefully in his final report •.• and we're giving you
three levels of exploitation and we're projecting them out a
bit and this is what we think would happen if you did this
and this and this. And these three lE:lvels of exploitation
have certain social and economic costs associated with them.
But we don't want to have anything to do with that ... you go
do that ... you don't want just one number, we understand
that ...we're giving you three numbers, three cases but it's
for you to make the choice.
When you think about it, the Stein group is really
critical to what the scientists are being asked to do. At
least on the stock assessment. The Harris report with its
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emphasis on caplin and l>eals and shrimp even, will force a
broader, mUlti-species view on the management process. Its
much more difficult to do. And there are these social and
economic questions being put to scientists now. So with the
crisis like it is, that's understandable.
In the rebuilt ideal world, maybe there would be less
of these type of questions, I don't know. But in the
process of rebuilding, the amount of social and economic
input to the management process is just gong to be
incredible. And I think scientists are going to have to get
used to that.
[while walking out, not recorded}
We I re in the curious posttion of beating up on them
[scientists] on the one hand and calling for increased
support for them on the other.
[re science's position that forcing them to submit to an
Environmental Impact Assessment-like process would
compromise their autonomy]
That's not autonomy, that's lack of accountability.
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APPENDIX D
!!n,-,.",e1jrV~i!JeW~W~H~h~Ch~r~i~Sbuilds and 0 era
Con uctad n
Harc
Part One of Two Parts
A: I perceive that the scientific information or advice or
gut feeling .. ,it prObably amounts to little more than
that ... is not weighed very heavily in management decisions
in any event. Decisions are made ...•
Two years ago, was it two years ago? when they
(scientists] set the TAC for northern cod at 125 (thousand
metric tonnea] it was what? 238. This year again they said
125 and its 190-something. Harris said 125 and Valcourt
(Minister of Fisheries and Oceans at the time] said, "Go
fuck yourself."
So if 125 is deemed to be ...when 125 was first
suggested I think that the perception was that i ..t was a
conservative number and that you'd best err on the light
aida. But three different occurrences of that number would
seem to indicate to me that 125 is more like what it really
should be and if you want to be conservative maybe it's 100.
But in any event, that doesn't seem to have much impact on
the decisions that are made about what the fishing level is
going to be from year to year.
0: Siddon [the minister prior to Valcourt] and now Valcourt
seem to be ignoring the advice completely.
A: They would probably maintain that they are not ignoring
it but there's economic pressures or social pressures or
whatever to have the TAC at 230 or 450 and that he's
compromising.
0: What do you do at. DFO?
A: Dh, I'm very down into the bits. I'm primarily
developing equipment for acoustic surveying.
0: Is acoustic surveying a relativoly new tool in the kit?
A: Well it's been used routinely here since about '73 but it
is very new in the sense that there's an awful lot of
poten(.. ial for what can be done.
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0: But the question is, does acoustic surveying work?
A: No. (laughs) Well, there's no doubt that they work. The
problem is interpreting the results. But there's an awful
lot to be learned and there's Q lot to be done techni.cally.
Q: Is acoustic surveying seen 8S a replacement or supplement
to test-trawl data?
A: Well the big appeal is that trawling is a very expensive,
slow, waste of time. If there was some other way you cQUld
sample the popUlation. then :Let's go do something or tty to
develOp .... acoustics seems to be the only way. I can't
think of any other conceiva.ble way of doing it. So they'vo
turned to echo sounder technology which has been around for
a long time ... just where are they?
They I re trying to expand that question into "Okay, here
they are, how much of them are there? what kind are they?"
those kind of things which we're not real good at yet.
0: So you look at the blips on the printouts and try to
determine both species and number?
A: That's the objective, yeah. It's a very noisy
environment. It's a terrible place to try and deploy people
and equipment and boats to do anything. Trying to survey
the northern cod stock... perhaps the best time to try to
survey them is during the spawning concentrations which is
February which is a terrible time to be on the Grand Banks.
Good luck putting out some equipment and dragging it along
behind a boat and hoping that it lasts more than an hour
before you beat that crap ou"t of it. So you've got those
kind of problems to overcome before you CAn ..ven start
approaching the scientific questions.
0: Do you do your acoustic work on the spawning grounds?
A: On a trial basis. This year was the first time we had
any equipment that would last longer than an hour. This
year we had equipment developed specifically for that
environment.
Most of what we've been successful at has been pelagic
species. Which are mid-water ... they're not near the bottom
which is another problem with cod to distinguish them from
the bottom echo. They tend "to be right on the bottom. The
pelagic species school a lot and in higher watar and not as
far away from a transducer in terms of trying to get some
power down there and listen to what's coming back and not
get confused with the noise of the environment. So actually
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using the acoustic data has helped with the assessment of
pelagic species for a number of years now but i.t's not
really an input to the assessment of cod because it's still
too raw right now.
But this year there's been some data collected,
nobody's looked at it yet but it may be useful.
0: From what little I've read, I get the impression that the
Soviets are qUite advanced 1.n the use of remote sensing for
stock assessment. Do you know anything about this? Does
your department use any satellite data?
A: It's used primarily for plankton and oceanographic
temperature. There's soma sort of sensors, light sensors,
that they usa for tracking caplin schools from aircraft.
0: So since caplin are a primary food source for cod, you
could use this information for determining the relationship
to cod strength?
A: Yes, there's some people who look at that but, the aerial
photography, it's primary goal is 1n the assessment of the
caplin stocks. Which is treated as a separate stock right
now. But obviously, if you want to understand cod you've
got to understand their whole environment. For a satellite
technique to be usefuL in measuring the cod themselves, I
don't eee that it' a feasible.
0: No but current shifts and changes in ocean temperatures
saem to be quite important in determining the ways 1n which
the cod herds locate themselves and distribute themselves.
Temperature seems to be very critical.
[long digression on unrelated topics]
0: Do you go out on the [research vessel] cruises?
A: Once or twice a year. Somebody has to go. Our systems
are not idiot-proof enough yet that ....Our job is to get
this data on computer tapes of higher quality than the
scientists can deal With so we can stay ahead of them. So
that their problem isn't us.
0: Is this kind of like a game?
A: Not really. It's CYA •.. cover your ass. That's really
our job. If the limitation becomes the quality of the data
or the quantity of the data, then it's obviOUSly our
317
problem. There's a l.ot of analysis techniques that have to
be daval.oped to interpret the data. It's st1.ll too raw.
Q: Who does that?
A: Someone else. I'm low .1n the decis.1on-mak.1ng process in
the TAC. I cal.1brate the equipment so in that aense I can
bump th.1ngs up by 20, 000 tonnes here and 20, 000 tonnas there
or bump them down by 20,000 tonnea.
Q: How?
A: I could just cheat on calibration .1f I wanted to. I
could say that this many bl.1ps means that many fish when in
fact it only means hal.f that many fish.
0: How do you do your cal.1brations?
A: Honestly.
Q: What's the techn.1cal process?
A: That's another iSBue that's under development. The best
way to do it r.1ght now is to use what's called a standard
target. Which is something whose reflective properties are
well-known on whatever frequenc.1es you're working on.
Target strength ie the parameter that characterisss a
target. How much echo it will give back for how much energy
h.1ts it •.. So they're able to build a tungsten carbide
structure, a ball, whose target strength doesn't change much
w.1th temperature or time. You put it on a cable under the
transducer and measure the response. You know what the
response should be so you can ..•
Q: But then there's the problem of tranSlating that
knowledge into fish.
A: Which isn't my problem! The target strength of a fish
wil.l change with its aspect, will change with its depth.
The swim bladder is the major th.1ng which causes the echo
from an acoust.1c point of view and the deeper the fisll is,
the more pressure that's under. And that characteristic
changes with depth and the age of the fish and the size of
the fish and everything else so •..
0: Temperature, salinity, current flow?
A: Yes.
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Q: [long introduction of the concept of Mtheory-ladeness" of
observation)
A: And that problems represents itself in perhaps 25 layers
before some number cornea out of a survey.
For instance, you I re trying to measure the spatial
distribution and concentration of fish but you only have one
boat and one transducer..• and there are survey 13esigners who
say you' re going to drag it across this path and then you'll
go up there and drag it and then go down there and drag it
here so that we can look at it all and get something out of
the whol~ thing. If you had the luxury of 25 ships you
could go through the one area at the one time and gather tha
stuff in parallel and then you could structure your analysis
a whole different way. But ... The fish could be chasing
your boat around, for example. They might l1.ke the sound of
it.
Q: So research design itself is theory-laden. (long intro
of concept of social creat.ion of scientific knOWledge) So
there's a tremendous amount of roOlll for social input into
stock assessment.
A: Or maybe there should be and isn'tl
[long digrASsionl
In the first part of the process your trying to determine
how many fish there are. Then there's another part. how
much death can they withatand?
[third party 0: but surely in the first part the number is
generated in as pure a way aa possible?]
A.: Ideally, yes. But I'm sure it gets polluted aomewhat by
expectations. I would hope not, but I'm sure it sneaks in
here and thsre. They' re tracking some stock and all of a
Gudden you get a blip in li.fe. Someth:ing might be wrong,
right? So you go back and do it again. MI don't know if I
believe thie or not. Well maybe I screwed this up. There's
some amount of evidence to suggest that I did and some to
suggest that I didn't. Or, maybe I screwed that up
or. M... there's always subj ective inputs all along the
process.
I guess that there are social inputs in that scientists
read the newspapers and they know that they need to have
more fish than they are saying that they have. If he's
stuck wJ.th e question with a fifty-fifty answer, he's go:ing
to teke the one that gives him the answer he's looking for.
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If you wanted to insure that a truly objective job be done,
you should lock the scientists up somewhere, don't let them
read any newspapers, don't let them talk to anybody.
Q: Are the theories and methods of stock assessment science
under any internal debate at DF07
A: Yes; I know that there are but I'm not a participant in
these debates. It would be a sick place if there weren't.
I would hope that it's hot and heavy all the time, but I
don't know.
Q: Cabout the dissenting opinion in an '83 CAFSAC report
about the methodology that disappeared until it reemerged in
'87 as a majority opinion]
A: They've recantly set up a group of statisticians 1'11
call them. Survey designers. I don't know really what it
is that statisticians do. They are participating in the
debates or the discussions about what's right and what's not
right. So I guess that somebody recognized that there was a
problem and now they're addressing it. Now what actually
has come out of it at this point I don't know.
Q: (about the shift from single-species to multi-species
modelling]
A: That's not really a new idea. It's been around for a
while .•. up and down and up and down several times. The
first time I heard of it was around 1981. Let's do away
with dividing up everybody's tasks according to
species ... having a cod group and a herring group.
[Third party comment: "But it all cornea back to the fact
that the biggest problem with super computers is that they
still can't predict atmospheric phenomena. No matter how
many super computers you l.ink together and make intI') one
brain, it's impossible for them to predict a cyclonic
tropical storm. Once they know the data, they can post-
forecast it. That's no problem. But they can't actually
forecast it. So I really think that ... there are simply too
many variables. And the weather business and the fish
business are all the same. You can't possible understand
all the variations and fl.uctuations and especially given the
single-point sampling processes that we use. One pass over
a herd 0' cod tells you fuck all. Except that for 20
minutes on a certain date at a certain place there was X
number of cod in that herd. But that doesn't tell. you
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any"th!ng about the next day or a month from now or a year
from now]
A: If you're not tracking one, "the weather and two, the
oceanographic weather, bOth of which are impossible to do,
then you can't achieve the third one. (biosystem modelling
and forecasts)]
0: So it's futile?
A: It's futile to get an absolute answer with no error bars
on .it. You can forget. that one. So it's on~y a question of
how big an uncertainty you are willing to accept as a return
for Jour dollars. If the country is spending this many
dollars and we know that we should be catching 100,000
tonnea of codfish plus or minus 200,000, Which is to say we
should be catching nOlle or 100,000 or up to 300, 000 •.. to me
they're wasting their money.
0: So everybody wants to be~ieve that we can know when in
fact we can't?
A: Well, that's not the fault of science ... that's human
nature. We want to believe that we can control the
env.ironment. We want t believe that we are divine beings.
Q: Is there even a remote possibility, given sufficient
resources, to come close to the goal of ~knowing?"
A: I'd have to believe that or I wouldn't be doing what I'm
doing. I think you can come up with a number that's botter
than a sp.in on the old whee~. But whether it's economically
feasible to fund it, because it's expensive. And:if you
don't want to count any scientific g!lins that don't have any
immediate or intrinsic value, then all you're paying for i.s
the numbers that we're putti.ng out every year •.. if you put
it i.n those terms, which for example, the Conservati.v8
government is perceived as doing, it may not be cost-
effective and it's just a waste of time.
The scientists might be better at doing :i.t in ten years
from now, but what does it get us? We still don't
know ...our error bars are down from 100,000 tonnss to 90, 000
tonnes. Big deal. It's sti.ll a shitty number and it's no
good to us. If your pluS or minus starts to approach your
absolute value •..
The infrastructure to evaluate 8 stock is expensive.
The operation of a ship is S10,000 a day. Not count.ing the
people you're putting on it and the equ.ipment, the computers
and the stuff they're dragging around w.ith them. And
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they're totallY under-sampling it. Which is obviously
recognized because the inputs to determine what the total
stock is ... there's not enough data available.
So they take catch statistics and level of effort
statistics, all of which are polluted. There are guys
catching fish that are not getting reported. There's fish
plants staying open 2 o'clock in the morning till 6 o'clock
in the morning processing fish that some guy brings in that
nobody ever knows about. There's such s paucity of data,
it's so under-ssmpled that you'll take any information
source you can get, however polluted it might be, to try and
give you a feel for how much fish there really is. But all
of that costs money. It' s coming out of income tax money
and should we be paying for it?
Maybe it doesn't matter how much fish we catch. Set
the TAC at whatever you want. You may not being having any
impact whatsoever. I don' t see any eVidence to suggest
otherwise. That if we just stopped catching fish for five
years or fifteen years it might not make any difference to
the popUlation. Any population goes through all kinds of
ups and downs and it might ba near extinction just through
environmental and biological forces that may have nothing to
do wlth us. We, maybe, have an insignificant impact. I.t
could be cosmic rays I
Second Int.erview with Chris Lang
Conducted in S't. John's, Newfoundland
June 27 r 1990
Q: What do you here about Mac [Mercer]? What are the
rumours about where he is going7
A: He apparently has had an interest in the privat(l
sector •.. been thinking about jumping over into something for
some time. And he probably saw the golden grenade comJ.ng
and said "Now's the time. See you guys. Call me when you
straighten it out."
Q: Is there any indication that he mJ.ght have been pushed?
A: SpeculatJ.on I guess.
Q: Is there any talk about where he might end up?
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A: He's got a part: time .•• 8 little project going with
OttaWB. I don't know what it 1.s. Something he was working
on for the Deputy Minister. He's st1.11 go1.09 to be working
on that so he'll still have his foot in the fisheries door.
I. £ they parachute socebody in to take Hac' a pod t.1on rather
than.. _Larry's [Coady] doing it on an acting bas1.s now ••. if
they parachute a person 1.n who .is we~l~suited for it, then
maybe you could use that to support an argument that Mac got:
pushed _ But we could be Meeched out on this yet!
0: What do you Ilean, -Meeched out?·
A: That money could be .• _did you here Michael Harris th.is
morning on CaC? He was talking abOut the Hibernia thing and
the other agreements th".t have COllle up to the po1.nt of
91.gning ... federal/provincial agreements. There are at 1east
three. A.nd soma of them may not make it now.
0: So that money is not in the bag?
A: No I. don't think so. It still could be scrapped upon
regionally. There's the gang in Nova Scotia and there's
several other gangs in canada who could be after chunks of
that money now.
0: But I. thought it was officially earmarked for northern
cod?
A: So did I but Hibernia was officially earmarked for
agreelllent. And these other federal/provincial agreements
are supposed to be in the bag too but •..
0: What are the plans for your section when and 1.£ this
money does come through?
A: Nobody knows. I.t Illust have been as long as f1.ve or six
weeks ago now, when Mac was stiJ.:t there, they had little
meetings among all the sc:1entiF.ts and they said 1. t looks as
if everything is going ahead and you can just plan like 1.t's
going to be and in about thrde weaks tille there w:1ll be hard
cash here to delll with stuff. So start planning ahead as if
you were going to have money in three weeks. About two
weeks after that, his prediction ",as in three weeks. And
thatls 1ike four or five weeks ago now.
0: So the money hasn't shown up yet?
A: No. And Larry and Jake are very busy and inaccessib1.e so
I don't know. We're trying to get a meeting with Larry and
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Jake now ••• a bit of logistics. We're doing a bit of field
work and thay're back and forth to Ottawa all the time ... but
it looks to _e like they're being kept in the dark. But:I
haven't spoken to either of thelll for a long time now.
Q: Jake told llIe that they got all the money they asked for
but they couldn't hire any more bodies. So they can buy all
the equipment they want and generate ell the extra data they
want but they won't have they bodies to work with the
increased data flow.
A: I didn't hear that there was a free<J::e. There was
supposed to be as many as 11 PYs tied up in this northern
cod fund.
Q: PYs?
A: Governmentese. Jobs. Person years. There wa8 supposed
to be 11 jobs coma out of this ..• or that was the estimate
that I heard from La.,ry. But they don't have anywhere to
put them. The building is blocked right now. They don't
have anywhere to put them. They don't have room for what' s
up there now. So if there's 11 more people coming they're
going to need 20 more offices and so many more labs
presulllably.
This money is supposed to be divided up over five years
and that's approxilllllotely S8 million a year which is about
what the science budget is now. So that's a doublJ.ng and I
don't see that there's the capacJ. ty there to handle it.
Purchasing. for example, and supply and services. It' e
all they can do nov to keep up wi th the work that they hsve
to do. However necessary or unnecessary that .ight be.
It's s pain in the sss from our point of view. But I can' t
see that they CGn handle twice the level of work all of a
sudden wi thout SOlllethinq giving.
It's my perception that a lot of thie work is going to
have to be done outside. If you're talking about doubling
the science budget you're talking about twice the level of
work. So either people are only working at the 50 per cent
level now and they'll ba able to handle it or we're going to
have 8 serious problem. But if people are only working at
the 50 per cent level now, they al.ready have a serious
problem.
But it's interesting that you mentioned that job
freeze. Maybe that's what's hOlding things up. If thoy
can' t have people then I don't know how they're going to do
it.
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Q: With a~~ theso problems, it rea~ly doesn't surpri.se llIe to
hear you say that Jake is consider1.ng ba1.Ung out
A: He hasn't sa1.d that to me but that's how I view
it .••espec1.ally after read1.ng that article in the Express.
Q: He wasn't talking ~ike a guy who plans to be around for a
long time.
A: Not rea~ly. no. "Fattening up one's bank account for the
long weekend!"
Q: It's the sort of remark you'd eltpect from someone who had
a job offer or two in their back pocket.
A: I can just see him swinging the bat at the hornet's nest.
Q: He was expressing a good deal of frustration with the
fact that his administrative duties mean that he can't do
any science.
A: That's a fundamental problem that they have up there.
There' 5 no incentive for a research scientist to take on
administrative duties. Because there's no points in it. It
detracts from their ab1.lity 0 pub~1.sh. And a research
scientist exists to pUblish and if he's not publishi.ng then
he's not doing h1.a job.
But they keep coming to these research sc1.entists to do
these adm1.nistrative jobs and they end up pU8h1.ng paper 8l~
the ti_e. There'll no points in that. .. Instead of
publishing these three papers instead of the six or eight
that I wanted to, I a~so did this and th1.s and this and had
75 meetings in Ottawa and 40 here and thero," ••• that doesn't
count. That's nothing.
Q: So once you cross 1.nto adminstration it's l:ike the land
of no return. You lose your status in the scientif1.c
community and the only thing you can do 1.8 to continue on 1.n
the bureaucracy?
... : E:1ther that or the administrative pos1.tions could be
treated as a short-term thing that everyone had to share in.
Ono scient1.et would do it for two years and then he'd get to
go back and do real work and some other guy would get the
finger for tho papor shuffling. But there seems to be no
presence of professional managers ••. peop~8 whose interests
and skUl are in manag:1ng people and money. You know it's
the old Peter Pr1.noipa~.
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There's obviously a probleJ1. :I don' t know what
management skills are because I don' 't have any. But 'there' s
guys who spend their whole lives developing .anagpent
skills and part of those skills is being able to extract
from technical people some area of expertise that you are
not up on.. _what 'the important points are with respect to
managing in "that field.
But from the scientific point of view there's no
incentive for them unless he likes getting frequent flyer
points or staying in II nice hotel in ottawa. r can't see
why anyone would want to take a senior administrative
position.
0: Is there more money in it?
A: I think so but not a lot. Not so you get people l.ining
up for it.
0: But not enough to compensate for the loss of research
time and professional status?
A: Certainly not for me. But there's two kinds of
scientists. ThElre's research scientists and ecientist
scient.1sts .
0: What's the difference?
A: Scientists ... there .1s an incentive for scientists to
become a .anager... financially. Research scientists are
paper publishers. That's it. That their job.•. to liaise
internationally with people 1.n their field and to develop
research and to publish 1t.
0: Kat necessarily to serva DF01
A: Right. Which is what a normal scientist or a non-
research scientist does.
0: So are the scientist scientists more technically oriented
people?
A: Right. I 'Ill a scient.1st. Not a research scientist.
We're categorized in the union by research group ... physical
scientist end bio~ogic81 scientists Bnd then there's the
research scientist which aren' t categorized. So I guess
that scientists do the services and 'the research scientists
publish.
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0: Where do the research scientists get their direction? Do
they decide what projects to pursue or are they directed by
the administration?
A: SOme amount of each 1 suppose. You might talk to ten
research scientists end three would say that they are free
to pursue their own interests end some are given some smunt
of d.1.rection. The research scienti.st needs a Masters
degree, preferab1y a Ph.D whereas the sc.1.entists are
Bachelor level jobs.
0: Have there been any new developments .1.n the hydro-
acoustic businClSls7
A: There's potential for big developments. Hydro-acoustics
figures prominontly in the northern cod thrust. It was
October or November of last year that we finished II national
review that was conducted by the [..."'\puty Ministers office
that was, where ero we in hydro-acdusticSl? Where should we
go and how can we get there? And everybody hed a bunch of
meetings regiona1ly snd thsn when the northern cod money
came we had some plans and di.rections sbout what we'd like
to do. I showed up in about three of eight places in the
Hsrris recommendations. If everything comes to fru!. tion
we're looking to double our survey 10vel and devolop sOlie
new techn01ogy.
0: For instance?
A: HU1tibeam sounding systems.
Q: What does that mean?
A: TherE" are sOIIle things that are not clear about the data
that we get with an acoustic survey now••• that wa have to
pin down by catch1.ng f1.sh with a traWl whereas you could
measure them directly with a multip1e beam systelll. What
you're doing 1s measuring the return from 8 cloud of fish
which depands on how big and what the distribution is of the
individual members so you have to ca"tch thelll and take 8
semple of thell'l to come up with a number. But these multiple
beam systems 8110',01 you to lIeasure that.
0: So you'd be ab1e to see individua1 fish?
A: Yes. Then you could scale ths c10ud on the basis of the
measurement:s that you make on individual fish. But there
ara some things that ere unknown. Some research that hilS to
work out some of tha details. Not so much on "the
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implementation of the technology but in how to interpret the
data and how t remove some of the biases that shoW up.
Q: What sort of biases?
11.: Well it's easier to get good quality measurements on fish
that are bigger and to reject smaller fish because the
quality of the measurement is not good so you tend to bias
the population that you are characterising on the high end
of the she of the fish that are in the cloud.
0: So you'd end up overestimating the older year classes and
underestimating the younger?
11.: Yes. If you're not careful you cou~d come to the
conclusion that there are very few little fish in the cloud
and its mostly big fish because the single fish measurements
that you have which are useful are the larger fish. But all
those things can be worked out.
0: So do you drag a trawL through a population at tha same
time that you are scanning it to calibrate the equipment?
11.: No you sample a population al."ternately. You pUll the
survey "transducer behind the ship all the time in 8 regular
survey design. Within the parameters of the survey design,
you periodicaJ.ly stop eurveying and pUll the survey
equipment in and let the trawl out, tow it for half and
hour, pull it .in and let the survey equipment back out.
0: So you're not fishing the same fish that you are
&urvey.ing?
A: In a global sense only.
Q: Wouldn't it be better for cal.ibration to be beaming down
onto a populat.ion just before you dragged a trawl through
H?
11.: A trawl isn't a rtlal good sampling tool for fish in that
respect bsceuse you're looking down from a survey transducer
at a depth of five to ten meters clear to the bottom whereas
a trawl can onl.y sample soma subset of what' a right in front
of the net. There's something to be said for what you
suggest but there's a long way to go yet before that's
necessary. The calibration is not that precise yet anyway.
F.ish look very different with behaviour. The aspect of
a fieh changes its acoustic signal, its reflectivity,
tremendously. So if you are sampling a population that for
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sor.e reason is more vertical in the water or making vertical
depth changes as you are measuring them, or if you are
mear..uring a population that's turned broadside to you and
swimming on the level ... even though it's the same population
of fish, they will look very different acoustically.
'ii,are's more uncertainty there than you would ramove
simp:"y by counting all the fish that you were sampling
acoustically. They have sampled caged fish but the
behaviour is al tered enough that it's difficult to
generalize to a free-swimming population. So it's not an
exact science by any means. There's a lot of work to be
done.
Q: Last time we were talking you mentioned error bars and it
wasn't clear to me whether you were talking about errors in
the TAC or in the whole populatj,on.
A: Well just from an acoustic point of view. you can have as
much as one quarter as much peak response from one
popul.ation. So you could survey one popul.ation and have a
certain beam response and another time you could get as l.ow
a one quarter of the same popul.ation if they were all.
hanging around with their noses up. So there's that l.evel
of uncertainty.
0: So you're saying that with the technology and the
techniques that you are using now you coul.d be deal.ing with
levels of uncertainty as much as "15 per cent one way or the
other simpl.y due to variabil!ties of fish behaviour?
A: Yes. Just on that one alone. Just on behaviour. And
it's going to be difficult to deal with that. Maybe you
could run video cameras or you could deal with it
statistically somehow if you had larger data sets over more
time. But there's that level of uncertainty in acoustic
estimates right off the bat.
Someone could have studied a population in Norway,
herring say, and applied the results to a survey of herring
in the Bay of Fundy. Well whose to say that the herring in
the Bay of Fundy are behaving the same way as the herring in
Norway?
And on top of that there's another level of uncertainty
in the physical calibration of an acoustic system. Your
dealing with inhomogeneous water when you are trying to make
your measurements and there's a certain amount of
variability all the time. So if you are try.t.ng to make one
measurement, for example with a transducer and a microphone
at a fixed distance in water with no targets in between,
just trying to measure the power of the signal, it bounces
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around a bit. There's no such thing as standard sea water
or the standard amount of bubbles that can be in it 50
"there's a lot of uncertainty inherent in the acoustic signal
of a fish population.
Then there's the survey design aspect of it. You're
going to "~ke a ship over a three-week period of time and
you're goi"g to plan to tow from here to there, and there to
there, and there to here, and how relevant that is to the
actual population I don't know. There are people at work
who know about those things but how well that's done is
another level of uncertainty when you're setting a
TAC... saying there are this many £ish and this is how many
you can take without damaging the population...well
probability just creeps in allover the place.
Q: If everyone contributing their specialty to population
estimates is dealing with anything close to the level of
uncertainty that you are dealing with ... they might cancel
out or they might add up to huge errors.
1>.: Well a statistician might have some idea about that ... how
they might line up or misalign but I don't know how bad that
might be but at the TAC level I can feel certain that the
number is very large ... the error bars ... but I would guess
that it's been reduced somewhat over the last five years.
Q: Given the current state of your research technology and
survey designs, do you think that the information that you
are generating is of any practical use as a basis or guide
to management?
A: It's certainly of some practical use. Xt's a matter of
degree I suppose. It's very expensive data to collect.
It's [hydroacoustic sampling] cheaper than dragging a trawl.
But it still has that problem fundamentally, that it's an
expensive sampling technique. Behaviourial biology comes
into it allover the place. And I suspect that that's
rather a raw science.
[speaking about unmannod, automated hydroacoustic sampling]
The limiting thing about it ... the raw data ...we have a
raw data problem... the true measurement data that· s
collected. There's too much data. You can't transmit it.
You have to process 1t locally and accept the assumptions
that were made in the design of tho processing hardwaro and
software. So you're forced to take the processed results.
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Q: If this northern cod money does eventually show up, what
sort of things will your unit be doing? I assume that
you've made some provisional pJ.ans.
A: Our big project, in the short term, would be directed
towards physical calibration. Essentially we'd be
coordinating work by outside people ..• to come up with a
quote unquote state of the art physical calibration of our
transducer systems.
0: What does that involve?
A: What kind of a project would it be?
Q: Yes. Last time we talked you mentioned 'the ship board
calibration of your equipment against a tungsten ball.
Would this be a further refinement of 'that technique?
A: Yes. A physical calibration as opposed 'to a behaviourial
calibration or .... We've had inter-ship calibration attempts
in 'the past. With one physically calibrated system on this
ship and another physically calibrated system on another
ship. They both survey the same populetion and come up with
different numbers.
Q: To what extent?
A: I would say you could talk ... off the top of my head ... 20
to 20 per cent difference.
Q: And this is the level. of uncertainty due simply to the
physical calibration of the system itself?
A: That's right.
Q: And this 1s as close as you can get with current
techniques and technology?
A: They could be improved.
Q: SO to what extent are you dealing with uncertainty now in
your physical calibrations ... a rough percentage?
A: We do it by collecting a long time series of data and
then meaning it, if that's what you mean.
Q: 8ut you have a physical target of known size, depth and
reflectivity ... 1
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A: No. We're not using that now. Right now we're using a
secondary standard which is an underwater hydrophone that
has a measured, stable known response. You take you unknown
and calibrate it relative to a secondary standard. Whereas
the tungsten ball is a primary standard. You can have a
tungsten ball with a known acoustic reflectivity at whatever
frequency you're working at and ..• it's better from the point
of view of the user. It's a more direct, less noisy
calibration than the one that we do now.
0: So you're not yet using the ball?
A: No. Not properly. We play with it a little but the
actual calibration number we use is based on calibration
with a secondary standard.
Q: Do you have any idea what the range of uncertainty is
with your current standards of calibration?
A: No. When we're able to work properly with a physical
standard, then we'll have a better handle on what
performance has been. But we've recently been able to ge·1: a
more repeatable result with the secondary standard than we
were able to do over the last year. We've taken control of
that enough that we're able to repeat a measurement ..• narrow
down the range of variability from one shot to the next.
Q: So what's the current range of variability?
A: In terms of population impact, probably ten percant. So
you go calibrate your system today and calibrate it tomorrow
and the effect of the difference in the calibration would be
a ten percent change in the population that you' ret
surveying. Which is much les9 than the uncertainty of the
behaviourial aspects of the population that you're dealing
with anyway so it's probably sufficient. You could spend a
lot of money and bring it down more but •..
Q: SO the other uncertainties don't make it worthwhile to
have more accurate equipment?
A: That's my personal opinion, yes. 1 think they're so far
off on the behaviourial aspects that it' 9 not prudent to
spend a lot of money to come up with a very, very good
calibration.
0: So in your opinion the behaviourial unknowns are the
biggest source of uncertainty in the data?
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A: With the possible exception of survey design.
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APPENDIX E
Int:erview with Larry Coady. Acting Director of Science
Conducted in St. John's. Newfoundland
July 26, 1990
[Response to general intra from me re the confluence of
social interests and influences being brought to bear on DFO
science. ]
1\: Well, 1 don't pretend to understand the sociology of the
fishing industry. But 1 can certainly provide you with
perceptions about how 1 see fisheries sciences' role in the
fishing industry changing over the last ten years and where
I see it: going over the next little while.
This lab dates back to about 1931. set up in Bay BUlls
with a very small group of scientists. They had a five-year
mandate intitially. Their first order of business was basic
biology. Where are the fish? A.nd also work on seafood
technology like the improved utilization of cod liver oil,
stuff like that. Some pretty basic fundamental things.
At confederation in 1949 we became part of the
FishAries Research Board. The first major research movement
offshore was when we got the A.. T. Cameron, a ship that gave
us the capability to move offshore in a big way and to go
north as well. The first few decades were involved almost
entirely with exploratory fishing. We advised the fishing
industry about: where fish were, where they were to be found.
We also worked on gear technology introducing, for example,
certain long-lining technOlogies to thE' near-shore fishing
industry. So the direct benefits wore very tangible.
In the early 'sixties, in response to the increasing
international fishery, there was more pressure for
information and advice on mesh-size restrictions. The first
Total Allowable Catches were introduced. And then
scientists got more and more involved in assessing the
abundance rather than the availability of fish, And so we
switched from basic biologists to quantitative biologists--
assessments oriented people.
This attained greater importance in 1977 when
jurisdiction was extended to 200 miles. All of a sudden, we
were faced with the responsibility for providing advice on
the status of 24 groundfish stocks, 19 pelagics and
shellfish stocks, all of the marine phases of Atlantic
salmon including maritime stocks as Canada-Denmark issues at
West Greenland and as arctic char stocks in north9rn
Labrador. No more blood and guts biologist. We were
looking at people with a very strong capability in computer
science and statistics.
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Then we were asked to provide five-year projections of
stock status. We weren't able do it. You might as well
have gone and bought a crystal baIlor put on a magician'S
hat and pUll out a piece of paper. It couldn't be done but
we were obliged to do it anyway.
Q: Where did that obligation originate?
A: From fisheries management and the fishing industry who
had to know. We had access to the 200 mile zone and expected
to increase our presence in that zone as foreigners phased
out.
0: So you feel pressure from the upper levelS of management
and Ottawa to do a job that you know can't be done?
A: 1 woUldn t t put it that coarsely. There was a genuine
interest at that time in knowing what the future held for
the fishing industry. Companies had to go out and buy
ships. Should they buy ten trawlers or should they buy
twenty trawlers? Where were stocks going7
Keep in mind that we'd just gone through a period where
there was massive depletion of the most significant stocks.
I mean there were northern cod catches in t:he 800,000 tonne
range about 1960. Well, here we were trying to rebuild the
resource and trying to provide advice to management and to
industry as to where we were headed and how fast. To give
them some information.
0: Of course their demands are for precision because they're
dealing with la, 20, 30 year amortization, capital expenses,
etcetera, they want to plan hoW' many ships to commission,
how many crews to hire, how many plants to open or close and
their demands are for fairly precise knOWledge.
A: Yes.
0: Now as far as making projections as to what the state of
the resource and the TACs are going to be in even five
yoars, from what I understand of your business BO far, it's
very speculative.
A: It is.
0: The environmental unknowns, the behavlourial
unknowns ... there are so many sources of uncertainty.
A: Exactly.
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0: That this is the nub of it. The source of the conflict
between the larger-order social reality and science is that
they expect science to provide absolute facts.
A: The word "science" conjures up images of absolute
precision, yet there are many types of science. Mathematics
is probably the purest form of human thought. If you apply
your formulas properly, you cannot make a mistake.
Fisheries science is not as procise.
a: Here's where it gets interesting. Ma....,hematics has always
been billed as the language of science.
A: Statistics is not mathematics but a mathematical science.
a: Do you think that there's been .... For 300 years or so
science has enjoyed a position of epistemological privilege.
Since Newton certainly, science has been accepted as the
authoritative form of knOWledge. And society at large has
accepted that. But in recent days, there have come to be
challenges to science's authority.
A: I really wonder if science has been that well-accepted
since Newton's time. The theories these guys were
professing were that the earth was not the centre of the
universe. Heresy, condemnations and all that. Beyond that
Darwin's theory of evolution. Look at the fuss that
created: a challenge to religion. It may have been more
recently, at least in my v.iew, since the space age where man
has put the species on the moon where, and medicine with the
direct benefits to the human species, where science has
really gained more general acceptance.
Q: It delivered the goodies?
A: Einstein brought a lot of focus to .it with a theory that
no one understood but he was accepted as a genius. Maybe it
was Einstein, maybe it's 20th century communications. Maybe
it's better education. But people view science as being
extremely precise. Science is science.
But there are many forms of science. Math is math and
then there' $ weather forecasting. Economists use
statistics, psychologists use statistics and most statistics
professors will warn you that you can use statistics like a
drunk uses a lamp post, for support rather than
ill.umination. So you have many types of science.
1 like to think of fisheries science as somewhere in
the middle and wandering towards the mathematical end 8S the
methodology improves.
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But the big problelll. the five-year forecasts, for
groundfish but even more so for other species, short-lived
species, we were speculating on where the resource was
headed for anilllais that weren't even born yet. Mother
nature hadn' t had a kick at them yet and who was to say that
the average productivity and the average recruitment to the
stocks as we saw them in the' fifties and 'sixties would
continue?
0: I've looked at the resourC3 prospect publications going
back to the late 'seventies and they're quite striking. You
have the bar graphs with the actual catches for the previous
years on the left going up and down showing considerable
varieblli ty and then the prospects on the right are these
beautiful linear sscending stair steps.
A: See, that wae assuming that the only change was
management practice and that we had control of it. Prior to
that it was more hit and miss. Preemptive sort of stuff.
Q: Do you think t-his has something to do with the old order
of ... the concept of the balance of nature. If there' s some
Rousseauian notions still lingering around. That nature, in
the absence of man's interference nature finds a perfect
balance. But when we do interfere with natural systems, we
also have the power to control them. That we can then
create whatever balance we want. Whereas it's now becoming
possible in the last few years to think that natural systems
are perhaps not balanced but in fact chaotic.
A: Fisheries science is a very new science. Canadian
fisheries scientists, on the international level, are ranked
among the best. If you look at the fisheries literature
you'll see evidence of Canadian pre-eminence. And that
shOUld be no surprise. Canada has one of the longest
shorelines and one of the largest fisheries to mAnage. So
we've developed the expertise to support that.
What fisheries science has learned over the last eight
to ten years ia to be more precise with the statistical
methods that are available to them. As the dota time-series
improve. you have a much better understanding in hind-sight
as to whether your predictions were off-base.
We only had the first comprehensive offshore groundfish
survey in ] 982. It was the fall of 1988 that we realized
that we had a a major problem in our assessments. We
recognized and corrected the problem in six years which is
good science.
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Q: It seems like stock assessment science is at the
relatively early stage of development where you are just
beginning to be able to identify and quantify the error
factors, the levels of uncertainty that you're dealing with.
It's still a very new science and yet you happened to
intersect with a phase of the economy that is characteri'l.ed
by a rather hard-nosed, cost-accountable approach to publiC
exponditures. And yet, from the outside, it looks like the
people affected by your work, the consumers of scientific
knowledge, are getting less reliable information for their
money rather than more.
A: We will continue to use statistics and the jargon of
statistics reflects very well what we're dealing with.
You've got terms like "bias", "precision", "confidence
levels", "error factors" and "adjustments." The new
assessment methodologies that have been developed by
Canadian scientists (e. g ADAPT) are proving to be among the
best around. It deals more objectively with what the
different indices are telling you. It tries to explain
inconsistencies. Rather than treating your research vessel
data and your catch/effort data subjectivaly, we developed a
way to treat the data objectively and rank and weigh these
indices in a more statistically objective way.
0: You mentioned '88. I think it was a change in the
weighting of commercial and RV data.
A: We had looked at the two and they were telling us totally
different things. Wa made a judgement call which was in
favour of CPUE and learned later that we called the wrong
one.
0: But for some time more woight had boon given to the
commercial data than the RV data. Why was that?
A: Thinking back to the assessment documents of that period,
the feeling was that if you took the average productivity of
the stock the catch/effort was probably more in line with
what was happening. We had information on the average
recrui tment to the fishery in the northern cod stock. And
we used that average. But what we found was that the
productivity of the stock in the 'eighties was far less than
we had imagined, less than even any of the low points back
in the 'sixties.
Presently, there are some preliminary indications that
we have a couple of good year-classes coming through. In a
year or so we'll have some firmer indications so there's
some sense of optimism that productivity is coming up a
33.
little bit. The feeling is that we' ro going to have a
downturn yet for another year or two and after that let's
keep our fingers crossed and see what happens.
It was the use of the CPUE and RV indices plus the fact
that the productivity through the 'eighties was atypically
low that led to the assessment problem.
Now keep in mind that the year before, the fall of •88,
there were problems with the inshore availability of cod.
The federal government created the Alverson task force. An
international group of scientists, 'two of which participated
in Harris; Alverson and Pope. They reviewed the scientific
methodology, looked at our reasons for why we felt the cod
weren't coming inshore and concluded exactly the same as we
had done. That the stock had indeed rebuilt five-fold since
1977. Tha following year we recognizad that we had a
problem.
Q: Certainly for their assessment they must have been
relying on the same data and methods that you were.
A: They were used a number of methods; e.g. the Lsurec-
Sheps1'd method. They were evaluating tha methods of our
scientists and they were found to be as good as any
available.
Q: That might be the key to this conflict. What's "good as
any available" is not good enough for commercial and
political purposes.
A: The responsibility of fisheries scientiete is not to
determine management strategies. We are asked to supply
advice with a target fishing mortality of F 0.1 which with
northern cod represents 20 per cent of the exploitable
biomass. Managers ask, "At F 0.1, what shOUld the Total
Allowable Catch be?" We give them that information and they
incorporate social, economic and other factors before taking
a decision. That's been the way it is and that's the way it
continues to be. Scientific advice is just one contribution
to the management process.
0: Do you feel that in the last yaar or so, 80iantif10
advice has not been used rationally, that soiance has become
something of a ..•
A: We revise our assessments every year. They change each
year. Prior to '88, estimates were revised upwards. No one
worried about it. The first time we revised our estimate
downward. it became a "mistake." We do an annual
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assessmen1:, we correc1: as our 1:imes~series develop. Stock
assessmen1: will con1:inue to be a correc1:ion, year-to-year.
Q; Do you have any guess, off the top of your head, as to
what the levol of uncertainty is for northern cod?
A: The general rule of thumb is that the best we will ever
achieve is plus or minus 20 per cent to 25 per cent.
0: Are you achieving that now?
A: No. But the ADAPT framework that we're using now,
increased survey coverage and other factors, will bring it
down.
0: Where do you figure you are now?
A: Harris deals with that. That .instead of an assumed
fishing mortality of 20 per cent it was up around 40 per
cent or higher and so that's where the difference was. And
that was due to a lot of extraneous factors like by-catch
and discards and predation, seals and everything else that
comes into the picture. We' re ac~c'\Imodating those variables
the best we can. In some cases we're relying on foreign
data which is not as good as ours. We are dealing with
these things and incorporating them 1nto the assessment
models as best we CDn.
0: Hydroacoustics is being billed as a way to acquire a
large amount of data for less money, at least as opposed to
trawling, physical ssmpling. But there are still rather
large sources of uncertainty in the interpretation of the
return signal and the biggest of these is fish behaviour.
As much as 60 or 70 percent.
A: This lab has more expertise in hydroacoustics than the
other DFO Regions. It's a very s1:rong program. We've got
people who are dealing with companies like Biosonics where
Biosonics is actually providing us with prototype equipment
to evaluate in the field.
0: Biosonics is from where?
A: Well there are two major companies that produce high-
resolution sonars. They produce ships' sonars primarily but
are getting more involved with high-resolution sonars for
fisheries applications. One 1s B10sonics which is based in
the States but has an office in Canada and the other 1s
Simrad which is S~andinav1an.
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· Our people have also developed their own systems in-
house which reflects the fact that there was nothing off-
the-shelf just a few years ago. We've got electronics
engineers who have developed a hydroacoustic system which
was first used on caplin quite successfully. It has since
been modified to a dual-beam system with in situ target
strength so you get the target strength as the data is being
collected.
We've also developed very fancy data-editing systelll9
for all these billions of blips of information that you 98t
on a transect. So we are on the leading edge of fisheries
hydro-acoustics. And there's a long way to go. We've used
it on caplin very well and we've used it on herring very
well. We're using it on red£ish because even though they're
groundfish, they don't sit on the bottom but move up and
down so it's a better way to enumerate stock status.
Right now there's a push to use it for cod. We can use
it for tracking cod schools and enumerating school
dimensions, particularly when you're dealing with massive
amounts of fish. We can also go out in February when
they're spawning or just before apawning on the continental
edge and try to get another independent estimate of
abundance which is what we've been working on.
If you look at the European experience with
hydroacoustics in evaluating the abundance of demersal
species, groundfish species, there are mixed signals. Most
people would say we've got a long way to go and that's true.
Species like flat fish you don't get any target strength at
all. They don't have an air bladder. They're tight to the
bottom and you get a lot of backscatter; geophysics becOlnes
a factor. The nature of the sediments behind the fish. So
there are all these factore.
But what we're saying is that the technology holds
tremendous promise. To develop independent measures of
abundance. And if you look at the northern cod ecience
program being mounted over the next five years, there's
money in there for technology advancement in hydroacoustics.
0: From what I understand this money just about doubles the
science bUdget.
A: It doubles the science budget for northern cod. It:
doesn't double the science bUdget. Two years ago we spent
about 20 per cent of our bUdget on northern cod. Last year
we doubled the amount of money spent on northern cod, this
was in '89 after the interim Harris report, which
effectively increased it to 30 per cent of our operating
budget. With the northern cod money coming in that Will go
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to 40 per cent. So right now and for the next five years 40
por cent of our resources will be focused on northern cod.
Q: So roughly, before this 42.8 million dollars [over five
years), what was the normal operating budget for the science
branch?
A: About 3.6 m1llion dollars a year for northern cod, last
year we doubled that and this year we' rEt adding .•. that 42
was over five years don't forget.
Q: So that's about 8 mil110n a year extra.
A: Right. This year we're getting about eeven so we've gone
from ...
0: That's an astonishing increase in northern cod resources.
A: At long lastl
0: How are you going to spend all this money?
A: Last year we received about 3 milliOI1 dollars in June snd
we spent it extremely effectively. We purchased
workstations for our CODE group, resource assessment
methodologists and our oceanographers. We modified the
Gadus, which is our primary hydro-acoustics research vessel,
to deploy and retrieve towed bodies in ice. And that worked
extremely well last February. We cleared up the backlog of
observer data and purchased some traWl monitoring sensors.
So that money lest year was spent very effectively.
Right now we've got scientists involved. in planning
sessions for about 20 projects. We'll nail down work plans
for that money within the next week or 80. So I've no doubt
that the money will be spent effectively. We've got the
benefit of last year's experience and some of these projects
are extensions ot what we did last year. For a number of
the new initiatives we've got them arranged so that they
won't start till the second year so we have more time to
p: p.n. We want to make sure that we get the best bang for
the buck.
But we are talking about an entirely new dimension in
cod research here. We're looking at the role of cod in the
ecosystem. If you'r.e a marine ecologist, you can do
reeearch for tho next 150 years and still hove twice 8a much
to do. So it will hove to be well-focused and relevant.
0: Do you have any concern that Ottawa and the general
public are going to expect more fish for thia money?
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A: I question how they can because spending money on
research doesn't increase the size of the fish stacie. It
will simply al.low you to determine more precisely, more
correctly what the size of that stock is and provide a
better understanding of cod's role in the ecosystem in
support of assessments.
0: I would suggest that it's clear from the tone of the
television and newspaper coverage, comments and criticisms
from the corporate and political sectors, that they not only
don't understand the role and nature of science; they are
not interested in knowing.
A: The new research will allow us to provide better advice
to managers. Better advice which means we can manage the
stock to allow rebuilding at a faster rate. There's already
evidence of change in the advisory proceAs where we've
started providing a range of options. This year, for the
first time, we're saying we'll give you a range of options.
Let's assume that this year the recruitment is high or low.
Under each of those scenarios if you have a fishing
mortal.ity of 20 per cent, this is what's going to happen to
the st:ock in t:he long-term. It's going to increase. If you
have a 30 per cent: mortality it:'s going to st:ay the same.
If you have a 40 per cent mortality it's going t:o decrease.
0: So for the first time you're providing your advice 1n a
way that makes it clear that the choices made are
management's choice and not science's choice.
A: There will always be soms uncertainty attached to the
advice we provide. It aint easy counting fish. It sint
easy and it never will be. And yet weather forecasters
would probably fine! our track record enviable. The Economic
Council of Canada would find our track record enviable.
343
P.PPENDIX F
[standard .intra re request to tape record, conf.ident.ialH:y
of anything designated as off the record, explanat.ior. of
archiving and review of raw transcripts]
Q: We're on the air.
A: This .is for your thesis or part of your studies or what
is .it?
Q: [short explanation of my academ.ic standing and future
plans} Since my time is limited I'll be qaite direct.
A: Sure.
a: As a manager of a large and valuable public rasource,
what do you expect from science? What do you need from
sc.ience?
A: Essentially what we nead .is good, solid, rel.iable advice
on the state of the stocks. How good they are or how bad
they are depending on the situation. And how much fish can
be harvested from those stocks. That's the essence of what
we need.
We also need science, generally speaking, to be able to
explain, clearly, what is the state of those stocks. And
what a certain degree of harvesting, a certain level of
harvesting will do to the stocks. And science must be able
to communicate, not only to us as managers but specificall.y
to the industry. To the participants in the industry. If
you have a fish stOCk, whether it be northern cod or redfish
in the Gulf or whichever, if you harvest 50,000 tonnes, this
is what it's 90.ing to do. If you harvest 100 or 150 or
whatever level. And a~so move on to the .implications of the
method of harvesting.
And this gets us i.n to another dimension which I think
is very important. The method of harvesting, .in that if you
use draggers you may be catching a certain percentage of
small fish that, theoretical.ly at least and practical.ly
also, you would want to proteot. Let them grow and spawn.
etcetera, etcetera. So what are the implications of that
versus 10ngl1ning? Gill netting versus cod traps, and so
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forth. And be able to communicate the manner in which the
stock generally, the biomass, is affected by these different
methods. And steer the industry, generally speaking, in the
right direction. The buzzword these days is "sustainable
development" where you harvest a good level of the fish but
you leave enough for growth or sustained development of the
stock.
0: That's certainly the ideal. The theoretical idea of how
science shoUld perform. The information that it: should
provide. Do you feel that it's doing it's job, currently?
A: I think it's doing a good job at most of those issues.
There's room for improvement, however, in many of those
areas. Keeping in mind, of course, the resources that they
have available. It's obvious that if you have x number of
scientists with two research vessels you can do so many
things. If you d.ouble all of that you can do so many more
things. And have that much more accurate information. That
being said, I think that the quality of the information that
we get, the quality of the scientific advice that we get is
improving. It's getting a lot better.
And, I think, only recently, perhaps in the last few
years and perhaps in the past year, we are placi.ng more
emphasis, not quit:e enough yet but more, on the
communications aspect. On explaining to everybody, to the
monagers, to the indust:ry generally, to the pub1.ic what this
is a1.1 about. How it works.
0: It's no secret that science, particularly in Newfoundland
and t:he Atlantic Region, has a severe credibility problem.
A: Yes.
0: That, in fact, it has come under rather substantial
criticism, especially .in reaction t:o the large reaesessment:
of 'the northern cod stock. And this must creat:e very
specific and serious problems for you as a manager.
J\: It does in the sense that you are then dealing wit:h an
indust:ry, as we do in the advisory process, in the advisory
committee process, you're then dealing w.it:h an indust:ry
which is a bit sceptical about the scientific advice. And
does not understand how a stock can staty for a number of
yeArs at a given level and even the proj ections are that it
will sustain or grow and all of a sudden it falls. The..e's
a reaction I suppose. You don't understand and you have a
very serious credibility problem. And I t:hink .:l. t is based
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as much or more on the communications aspect as it is on the
quality of the scientific work itself.
Not being a scientist I hesitate to make very firm
statements on science but human beings are human beings and
if you establish a rapport, a degree of credibility, with
somebody, with a group, with a client group. a degree of
credibility whereby you explain how the stocks grow and why
they grow and what will make them grow. You're talking
about the protection of small fish, the environment and the
habitat. etc. etc. If that is well explained and
communicated then I think it will become easier to explain,
at the same time, the downfall. In other words, if the
credibility is established in the good times I think there
is a better chance for the credibility to be maintained in
the not so good times. But perhaps that has not been done.
When times are good we tend to take things for granted.
The stock's going up. We don't need to. And again, human
beings are human beings. If I'm a fishing industry person
and you say northern cod is going to go from 175 to 210 you
say great, thank-you. And you're not so much interested in
knowing why. You just take it. But if you are told that
it's going to go from 210 to 170 you say what happened?
Why7 How?
0: And who's to blame?
A: Yes.
0: Now. what seems to be happening from the scientific
perspective is that, whethflr science was responsible for
this i taelf or whether there were other outside assumptioo9,
it seems that from '77 until very recently there were
unrealistic assumptions about the degree of precision with
which science could estimate the size of the stock. The
current size and the projections it could make. The degree
of precision. What seems to be happening recently is a
reeva~.uation of the probabilistic nature of the work that
they are doing. In fact. they are dealing with much higher
levels of uncertainty than were previously thought. Again,
this has very serious impJ.ications for both management, the
public sector and the private sector, fishing interests. Is
this an issue that you're aware of?
A: That angle might be getting a little technical or
scientific. From my perspective, what has been happening,
which I think is good, over the last few years is that the
industry and, again, the managers generally. are presented
basically with two things. With facts. This is where we
are. This is the result of our survey and the result of the
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information that we collect from the industry, from the
fishermen etcetera. These are the facts. Now, based on the
facts, these are the options that you have. You as managers
or stakeholders or decision makers. These are the options
that you have.
If your objective, your objective I stress again is the
industry's objective generally and that includes the
Department, if your objective is to rebuild a stock rather
quickly then obviousl.y you will want to reduce the level of
the catch as much as possible. So if your objective is to
go from 50,000 tonnes and, within the next three years or
five years you want to build that stock to 100,000,
theoretically speaking, then you will reduce your catch
quite drastically for a few ye~rs. If your objective is to
go up to 75,000 instead of lOO""then you can increase your
level of catch. And you will still get there. It may take
you a few more years. If your objective is simply to
maintain the current level, if the socio-economic
environment is such that you say 50,000 tonnes is what we
think is the optimum, the you can increase the catch level.
So that the ultimate responslbili ty, the ultimate
advice to the minister, and in the final analysis he
decides, but the Ultimate responsibility for the advice is
with those who will be most directly affected.
0: You began your answer by sayir.g that the scientJ.sts
present you wi'th fac'ts about the current atate and then
options that are predicated upon these facts. What if the
facts are wrong? What if there aren't hard facta but large
degrees of uncertainty? What if, as seems likely now, you
are dea1.1ng with levels of uncertainty of plus or minus 25
to 30 percent? As far as estimations of stock size go. And
this is a commonly discussed range of uncertainty as to the
state of the art.
A: Yes. It's not an exact science by any means.
0: So, if you don't have hard facts to work with, reasonably
hard facts. Then hnw are decisions made?
A: Well, then we have a problem J: guess. We have a problem
in that we are still presented with sci-entific advice. And
that gets ue into the quali.ty of the scientific advice.
Because we still recei.ve through the scientific process
advice on stock X. Whether or not that advice is excellent
or highly accurate or not so good or not accurate at all is
something that, I guess, no one will know for sure. The
reSUlts show down the road some years later. And that's
where, as I said earlier, if you have twice as many
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scientists or better scientists or more equipment and so
forth, sure, you can do a better job.
But the quality of the advice is something that l' m not
sure to what extent it is possibH:I there and then to
ascertain that that advice is very good or not good. You
have to wait until the results show up a few years down the
road. And perhaps that's the down side of an inexact
science of that nature.
0: So the reassessment of the northern cod stocks that came
in light of the Alverson commission and so on, of course
there was the later Harris commission, must have created
some problems in the management structure. Because it seems
then that you can't trust science I s advice to you because
they got it terribly wrong and that caused a great deal of
trouble on the federal level. Some embarrassment. Some
confusion perhaps.
A: I'm not sure that 1 would say that you can't trust it.
You know the weather man in the morning tells you that there
is a probability that it will rain at, 1 don't know, 90 per
cent or 10 per cent or whateve-c-. Most of the time he's
right. Some of the time he I s wrong. Whether or not he' s
wrong once in a while, whether or not you choose to
disregard him because he has been wrong a few times, becomes
a question of, in a sense, what degree of perfection you
expect, you anticipate.
The same can bo said, 1 suppose, of othor activities in
every-day life. If scientists are wrong, as they have been
and as they will be, I'm much more interested in knowing A)
are they prepared to admit that they were wrong? B) can
they find out why they were wrong? And C) can they do
something about it? To try and prevent that same mistake
from occurring again. My view, 1 guess going in hindsight.
is that they have been right much more often than they have
been wrong.
Q: What if, in this case, it wasn't a mistake but that the
nature of the system that you are dealing with, the ocean
climate, the inorganic and organic system and the
interactions between the two, is so complicated, so complex,
the dynamics are so non-linear, that this 25 to 30 per cent
plus or minus is the best degree of precision available no
matter how many resources you throw at the problem? What
then are the implications?
A: 1 think you've put your finger there on one of the key
elements. You can have the best scientists in the world and
the best equipment. The fact is that Mother Nature is
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probably the most important factor in all of "this. To what
extent one can control the fact that in a given year you
have an excel1ent year class and the following you don't.
It's a disaster. You say, "Why?" And all those other
environmental factors, "environmental" in its broa<1est
sense, the ocean climate and whatever other factors one may
be talking about whether it be acid rain or so forth. How
long it will take to know what impact those other factors
h.ave, h.ow much they influence recruitment, the pattern of
stocks et catera.
Perhaps, again as ear1ier you mentioned, it is, and the
scientists are, I think, the first ones to admit, it is an
inoxact science. I-t is not a two-pIus-two type of equation
that we're ta1king about here. Given "the fact that we're
dealing with a population that is miles down in the ocean
and you are still trying to count them without seeing any of
them.
I think it's rather remarkable that we have achieved
the degree of precision tha"t we have given 811. of those
obstacles. A.nd I don't know if one can say that it is 20 or
25 per cent, you know, within that range of exactitude, or
inexactitude. But the fact is that it may be possible to
become more precise, I'm not sure.
As on the one hand science and scientists, the
equipmen"t are getting better. There's no question about
that. A.t the same time, the other factors, -the external
factore, the environmental and so forth, are becoming more
important and I don't know how long it will take to have a
more precise and solid hand1e on the facts controlling, or
the facts that we know control the stocks.
Q: Whats' becoming clear to the scientists, I think, is that
it's tough enough to tell you what's out there righ"t now.
As far as projections or predictione, it's becoming clear
that tha"t taek is not only extra-ordinarily difficu~t, it
may be impossible to make usefUl predictions for more than a
season in the future. Because recruitment is so highly
variable. Because there are so many factors affecting the
sys"tem. For instance a strong exalnple of this problem is
the Kirby Report. It was projecting TACs for '88, '89 of
somewhere around 400 -to 450.000 tonnes of northern cod.
It's 197 (thousand metric tonnes] this year and it's headed
lower most likely. Given this unpredictabili ty in the
system, this conflicts with some of the essumptions of
management. Because management is largely about the future.
Creating a desired future. Working toward desired future
conditions in light of stated human social goa1.s. Or
economic goals. What if the system is unpredictable to any
useful degree over any significant period of time?
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A: I'm not sure that I would sa~' that it is unpredictable.
I th.ink what I would rather say is that .it is unpredicteble,
perhaps with a 100 par cent degrea of certainty. And it is
pred.ictable, perhaps, not in tone long term. It is, I think,
predictable in the immediatE' future. I am relatively
confident that whatever thr~ scientists tell us the stocks
will be in 1991 and 1992 '\.8 fairly accurate. Aga.in, within
the percentages or with.i~\ the degrees that we referred to
earlier.
If anybody says, "~fE>ll, wh,\t about 19951," then I would
start gett.ing sceptical. eecauH9 it's too far away, I
think, to have a very h.i,~h deg:cee of confidence. Of the
projections that far down the road and perhaps that's what
happened in the example that you referred to with regards to
Kirby.
In my mind, what I think we have to work with now, the
tools that we have to work with now, the data, the advice,
the analyses done by the scientists are generally reliable
within reason. It's a b.it like a Gallop poll. It is
reliable within reason. Sometimes 1t's wrong. Generally
the industry and, I think, we accept that that's the best
advice we have. It's not 100 per cent accurate.
But if, as I mentioned earlier, we go through the
necessary effort of explaining that advice and communicating
the haws and whys. HOW we arr1ve at that conclusion. What
is it that we know for sure. What is it that we do not
know. And not be able -to admi.t or to explain why we cannot
give a specific answer. The industry, collectively 1 think,
are generally very wise and will see through flimsy
explanations. They would rather be told the truth, no
matter how bad it is, rather than be sold something that
will not stand the test of time. And I think if we go
through the effort of doing that, the degrees, the
probabilities that sometimes science and scientific advice
will not be exact are acceptable.
Q: Of course for the industry's point of view... ! understand
that the industry is quite sensitive to variability. To
uncertainty. Because large corporate industriee are based
on five and ten year financial plans, amortization and
depreciation schedules of trawlers and plants and so on. So
to some extent the overcapacity in the industry r.ight now is
due to the optimistic errors of the Kirby Report. The
crisis in the fishery then was not a stock or biological
crisis. It was a fiscal crisis. The Kirby Report was
r/ilally about the unprofitabiU.ty of the industry. Not a
crisis in the stocks. And the p'cojections for only five
years later being inaccurate by approximately a factor of
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two. TO some extent I believe that the predictions from
OFO, from the scJ ence and management siae and the economic
branches are responsible for the unprofitable position that
the industry is in right now. Because they built more ships
and so forth with the expectation that they would be
catching a whole J.ot more fish instead of a whole lot less.
So industry is not awful pleased with science and with DFO
right now. Some people have been qUite clear about that.
A: Oh, :I have no doubt. No doubt that the degree of
credibility can be improved. There's absolutely no aoubt
about that on the scientific advice and I think it can be
improved. That being said, I would not hasten to ascribe
blame here or there or any where else. There's plenty of
blame for everybody to share in. T~ere I s no qU9stion about
that.
There are other factors that I think must also be taken
into account. The stocks ...There is overcapacity, both in
the harvesting and the procassing sector on the Atlantic
coast. A tremendous overcapacity problem. We have far too
many trawlers and draggers of all kinds chasing the
quantiti.es of fish that are available. We have far too many
processing plants to process the fish that ara available.
There's no question about that. When the conditions are
good, when all conditions are good, all of thoae can aurvive
and even do quite well. But when you have external. factors
that come in to play, and it can be anyone or e combination
of, market price, .if there is a down-turn in the market
price for cod in the United states for what ever reason.
They prefer Alaska pollock because it's much cheaper. If
the Canadian dollar goes from about 70 cents two years ago
to about 86 now. That, for the Canadian industry, is a l.oss
of. I don't know, around 20 per cent margin that you don't
have any more. That I s a hell of a blow. When you have, as
we have right now, all. increase in the price of fuel., it's
going to go up. I don't know what percentage. It depends
on events on which we have very little controL All of
those factors •.... And it also depends on how the fishing
industry 15 doing in Europe. If they are doing well
obviously our markets in Europe will be affected. If the
herring fishl3ry in the North Sea is very poor then obvious
our herring industry will do better because the markets will
be open. If the Emperor in Japan dies, and they stop
importing high quality stuff because they don't eat high-
quality product in periods of mourning, that wUl affect our
market tremendously and 1t did.
So ell of those factors, coming sometimes one at a
time, sometimes two, sometimes all of them at the same time.
And if you have all. irtdnstry that is operating with too much
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capacity and it's hit by a number of those factors, it's
more likely to be affected than if you did not have those
other problems. So I guess you are dealing with those
uncertainties that you have in the management as well as
those uncertainties that you have in the scientific
analysis.
Q: Is it fair to say that DFO has a great deal of influence,
potentially, in determining the size and the structure of
the industry? You can create incentives or disincentives
that will help shape and size the industry.
A: We have some influence, I suppose. We have some
influence, for instance, on the number of fishing vessels.
Because there is a limited entry policy so that you and I
cannot get a license tomorrow unlesa we are qualified
fishermen and we buy a boat already in existence. So
there's a ceiling there. That being said, there are other
ways in which the industry can and does increase its
capaci ty.
For instance a 25 or 30-year-old trawler is replaced by
a new trawler of the same size, as it can. Chance are, that
with the new technology that you can put on board now, the
new gadgets that they have on board vessels, the fish
finders and all this incredible technology, you increase the
effort. Engine power. You increase the effort. But you
increase the cost tremendously. And of course if you have a
vessel that costs three times more than the other one you
will need more fish to pay for that vessel.
In the same manner on the processing side, DFO has no
control over that. That's provincial. So if a
province .... So if John Smith decides to build a plant
somewhere, unless the province says, sorry, we are not
licensing new processing plants. You cannot build a new
plant. Then you have an increase in the processing sector.
And as the processing sector increases, you have more
processors putting pressure on fishermen to bring in more
fish.
So in a way, I suppose, OFO does havo some control but
by far it cannot control, by itself, any limit on c:apacity.
Q: Given that there is an overcapacity in the harvesting
sector now, the offshore fleet and to some extent the 65
footers. And it looks like the TACs are headed lower and
lower for conservation reasons for the foreseoable future.
What is going to be DFO's response to .•..Well, first of all,
do you think it is necessary to down-size the harvesting
sector to match the down-sized quotas? And, if so, how do
you plan to go about it?
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A: Well, I think if we're going to have a stable industry
that wiJ.1. have a certain degree of comfort and not be
constantJ.yon ups and downs, yes, I think you do have to do
something about the harvesting capacity. There are two ways
you can do it.
If you have a harvesting capacity that is at level X
and you have a resource that is at level X minus la, you can
do one of two things. You can 1ncrease your resource to
level X by rebuilding stocks. And that is not necessarily
possiblE'!. Or you can decrease your harvesting capacity to X
minus 10. How you can decrease your harvesting capacity, I
think there are two ways.
One is that which has been done in the past in certain
fisheries is you have a buy-back program. Buyout licenses.
I'm thinking about salmon licenses. Particularly in the
Maritimes over a number of years there have been a number of
buy-.,back programs. The other 1s that you let the industry
do it i taeH. Through buying each other out.
And that leads us to the individual transferrable
quotas. Which are in place now 1n a number of places on the
Atlantic coast. A number of fisheries. A number of
regions. If you and 1 are fishermen and 1 decide for some
reason that l' m retiring or I don't want to fish any more,
and you simply buy my quota. I sell you my share of the
fish that have been divvied up before based on our
historical participation in the fishery. And in that way
the number of participants can be reduced to a level that
~~~~ find its own ... "that will define itself over the long
For instance in the Bay of Fundy herring seiner
fishery. I think about six years ago there were something
like 51 herring seiners. And through this individual
transferrable quota the number of seiners has gone down, I
believe, to something like 39 or 40. And now the stocks are
at a fairly heal thy level and the number of seiners has
remained constant for the past few years.
0: So by privatizing the resource, or transferring a public
resource into quasi-private property through transferrabl.e
quotas, you then alloW market mechanisms to ••.
1>.: Determins the level of harvesting effort. And then it's
up to the industry to decide. If I feel that I have enough
fish to make a decent living of 1t I w111 stay in the
fishery and I will continue to fish. But if I feel that I
don't have enough I can do one of two things. I can sell
you my share or I can buy yours or somebody else who's
willing to sell. And if I comb.ine two quotas •.•. And there
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are variatJ.ona on this theme. Both you and I can decide to
stay in the fishery but rather than use two boats to harvest
your quota and my quota, we use one boat. Wa join forcss
and we harvest our quotas in a much more economical manner.
0: Do you think this principal works well enough to be
applJ.ed more broadly in the fisherJ.es to other stocks? I'm
thinking about cod stocks.
A: I think so. I think so. It is, in fact, being applied
right now to certain cod stocks in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.
For the last two years. We will be implementing such a
program on the Scotian Shelf start1.ng in 1991. It has baen
in place for the offshore traWlers, the large offshore
fleets since 198'? ..not transferrabl.e though. I shOUld
speci.fy. Not transferrable. Just 1ndiv1dual quotas. They
are transferrable only on a temporary basis. But the
indiv1.dual quotas have been in place for seven or eight
years. But the transferrable part of it will be in place 1.n
the southern Gulf of St. Lawrence, for instance, in 1991 for
cod stocks. And it's in place in a number of other places.
I mentioned the herring fishery earl~.er and I think that's
the direction in which we are head1ng.
I say we, I mean governw'3nts and industry. That the
semi-privat1zstion or quasi-privati.zation, I'm not quits
sure what the right word is, of s public resource will lead
to the part:1cipants themselves bas1.cally deciding what level
of harvesti.ng capacity they need. And to turn the industry
into the optimum economic benefits for them.
0: You've been very generous with your time. Do you hsve
any brisf, concluding remarks you would caro to make'? Where
we are headed?
A: I think where we are headed, and I th1nk, generally, the
direction we are heading is a higher and higher level of co-
management. Between governments with an "5·. The federal
governmsnt hae the responsibility for fisheries management
but the provinces are 1.nvolved to a large extent.
Especially in the processing sector. And industry. More
and more the industry are inVolved 1.n the decision-making
process. And are aware of certain policy decisions that are
made and the directions that are taken.
Changes in the fishery, as one finds out, do not come
quicklY. It's an industry that is very much, largely, based
on tradition as much as anything else. And it takes time
and patience to change things. I don't think one can think
of fisheries management in terms of revolution. It's a very
slow evolution. One year you might get an enterprise
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allocation but people say that transferring quotas is
totally out ot the question. We are not prepared for that.
We are not ready for that. And it Iltay take two or three
years for the industry, the fishermen thelllSelves, to come to
the conclusion by themselves that, yes, it would make sense
if I was allowed to sell My quota to you. And it just tokes
time for those changes to occur.
If you just look back 12 years to 1977. The 200 lIlile
limit. And you conSider (I'flI think.ing groundfish here) we
had no such thing as a fishing plan 13 years ago. The
fishing plan, the quotas, the sub-division of quotas between
fixed gear and mobile gear, offshore and inshore and aU
that. That is only 13 years old. And if you think of all
of the progress that has been made since, in various
management measures, and all of the progress that has been
llIade in the scient1t:ic information. God knows we still have
a long way to go.
But I think one must not lose sight of where we are
coming from. And it is a relatively new industry in terms
of management. In terms of -the way it is n\lmsged. The idea
of enterprise allocations, of individual quotas, is from the
'eighties. ~nd the idea of -transferrable allocations,
transferrable quotas, the Belling of that quasi-property
from one fisherman to another, is even more rocent. So tha-t
gradually, I think, we're getting :Ln to a direction -that
seems to be acceptab~e by the industry.
I think we must not kid ourse1v8s either that that w11l
be the solution to all of Our problolllS. The fact is that we
are dealing with a limited resource. And it can not sustain
an .infinite number of people. It is limJ.ted and it has a
limi-ted econOlllic potontial. It has a limited aceio-economic
impact on the Atlantic coast, for instance. And, in that
sense, whether the eXisting resource is divided into qussi-
property or whether it ia pUblic property, common prop¥rty,
the fact is that it is ati11 a limited resource and, froa
the socio-economic view we will always be faced with the
dilemma, if there's nothing else in community X or Y, &hou~d
IlOre licenses be ia&ued? In other words, shOUld the fishery
be the employer of last resort if there 1.a no other
poSSibili ty7
A.nd :I think what seems to be happening now, wha t has
been happening for the last number of years, is that, no, it
shOUld not be the employer of last resort. It should be
msnaged as a limited resource but the objective shOUld be as
much to increase the incOllle of those who are 1.n the fishery
than to increase the number of people dependent on 'that
resource.
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APPEHD:IX G
:Interview with Dr. Leslie Harris
St:. Johnts, Newfound~and
J\ugust 29 , 1990
Q: Could you give me your understanding of how this crisis
came to be. What were the contr.ibuting factors7
A: I think the principal contributing factor to the creation
of our panel was, 1n the first .instance, the successive
years of decline in the catches of inshore fish and in the
size of the fish bei.ng caught, which was noti.ceable to
fishermen. And the tendency of the inshore fishermen to
rule out the natural phenomenon theories that might explain
this and the counter tendency to blame the offshore
exploitation and, therefore, to cast doubt upon '(he accuracy
of the forecasts that were being issued by DFO.
On the other side of the problem was the statistical.
abberation that emerged in respect of the' 86 survey data
and the SUbsequent drop in the numbers indicating that
something might be wrong with the models heretofore used t.o
make the forecasts.
I am referring to the '86 fall survey whicl\ was
SUbsequently shown to be aberrational, but Which was fed
into the system Gnd used because et the time it tended to
fit the growth projections that had emerged from earlier
applications of the model. The subsequent reeliza1:ion that
the figures were aberrational led to attempts to juetify
them, though soon there was a realization, which was e quite
obvious conclusion 1: suppose, that the data series and dato
sets that they were using were of such short duration that
they hadn't had time to converge toward accuracy. The
nature of retrospective analysis is such that it promotes
backward convergence. The data set simply wasn't 1.oog
enough to accommodate this.
Also, the models that DFO were using were too reliant
on one or two data sets, neither of which was virgin pure.
Each.of Which, in fact, was subject to a fairly wide renge
of possi.ble error.
The culm.ination of these th.ings and the 010 scientists
being required to say "mea culpa" led the government,
because of the pressures from the fiShing community, to find
a way of eddressing the questions. Not to bring in a bunch
of high-powered scientists who would probably create new
models but a bunch of people whose credibility in terms of
their capacity to assess the s1 tuation and to state their
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findings without political bias of any kind, would not be
questioned.
I think it was in those terms that I was approached.
Not that I was a fisheries scientist or a mathematician or
statistician. But that I had a common-sense approach to
matters and appeared to be able to isolate critical issues
and identify what they were. To get to the real issues
through a lot of other stuff. And also to help the process
of educating the fishing community and the scientific
communi ty about what each was thinking about the other and
why.
So when I took on the mission, I was quite clear in my
mind that a large part of my function was educational. And
when you say that the level of debate was raised and more
focused on the crttical issues, I take that as a great
compliment because that is what we set out to ,",0. I think
it worked. I think our discussions with the fishing
interests and with the fishing community did focus
attention, for the first time, on what were the critical
issues in the situation. And also I think, for the first
time, elucidated for the ordinary people in the industry and
in the fishing community generally some of the more simple
concepts that were being employed by the modellers and that
related to the manner in which you actually go about
counting fish in the ocean.
People were, I discovered, using words and phrases like
"F 0.1" , "retrospective analysis" and things like that
though, as we soon discovered, other than the scientists,
very few people knew what they really meant. I certainly
didn't and I don't think any of my colleagues, with the
exception of Dr. Alverson, did either. Maybe Max Short, the
union representative who had been around the situation for
so long had a good idea. Certainly, I found in the broader
community and even in places like the AGAC council [Atlantic
Groundfish AdVisory Council), people who had been working
with these organizations for many years, saying "thank-you
for making that so clear. I've never understood it before"
So that was part of it. It was an attempt to educate.
Not only to make fishermen understand what scientis· s were
trying to do and how they were trying to do it and what the
constraints upon their capacity to do it were, but also to
make the scientists understand where the fishermen were
coming from. And what value, if any, might be attached to
their knowledge and wisdom derived from their experience.
And how you integrate the knOWledge derived from official
scientific surveys, on the one hand, and the knowledge, or
presumed knowledge, that the fishermen have gained from
observation over centuries.
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It I S a very interesting problem. There is a tendency
on the one hand to discount totally. as being irrelevant,
the anecdotal information that fishermen posessed and were
eager to transmit and which they believed in and the
"scientific" information that DFO scientists gathered in the
appropriate ways and on which they were inclined to place
much greater reliance. So that too became part of our
mandate. To see if there were ways in which both kinds of
knowledge could be put to use--to the benefit, at least the
psychological if not the scientific benefit, but I think
both the psychological and scientific benefit. of the
organized systems.
I may have strayeCl a little bit from your question
because you question was the background to getting it
started. But I think that the real reason why we were
called into being was a perceived crisis in credibility
deriving from errors that had been made and which were now
acknOWledged. And the juxtaposed positions on how these
errors had come to be: the scientific vl!·rsion that it had
been a modelling error based on insufficient data and an
inadequate time-series and one aberratir:oIal set of resul ts
that loomed very large in a very short time-series. Or the
fishermen's view that it was a set of errors deriving solely
from scientists being unwilling to listen to what the
inshore fishermen knew and to put their trust in the
information provided by the "rapists", that is, the offshore
as opposed to the inshore fishermen. There was a crisis of
credibility of the scientific community.
I don't think the scientists themselves felt any
particular sense of crisis in terms of their own functions.
I think they were fairly confident that what they were doing
was fine. It was just that for reasons that were quite
explainable they had gone awry and they were prepared to fix
it up.
I think on the political level, the credibility issue
was one approaching crisis dimensions. So we were called
into being as an impartial third party who could look at
both sides and reach some conclusions.
Q: My observation is that one of the reSUlts of the wide
publicity that your report received and the fact that you
were able to state the case in something very close to plain
English is that, for the first time, the consumers of
scientific knouledge, those people with interests in the
fishery and the public at large, had a good idea of how
really uncertain this business of counting fish is. To the
point where there are some interests that are questioning
the value of the information at all. If we are looking at
levels of uncertainty of 30, 40. 50 percent in the
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SS138SSment, what good is that? From the commercial point of
view, this is unacceptable for long-range fiscal planning.
From a management point of view, it doesn't provide the kind
of unassailable scientific authority which the politicians
need to justify their decisions. For the inshore fishermen
it simply confirms what they had been saying. That OFO
doesn't know what it's doing.
A: That's true. We, of course, took the position in the end
that there need not be such high levels of uncertainty as
that. There certainly would continue to be uncertainties;
perhaps not forever but certainly into the future until such
time as we became much more scientifically competent in a
great number of areas that we now are and have accumulated a
great deal more data than we now have done
But we felt that, even given current constraints
within the system, its enormous complexity and our
incapacity to really come to terms with it because of lack
of resources, in many instances, on the oceanographic side
partiCUlarly, that there were technological possibilities
that could be applied but that were not being applied. That
there were, in fact, possibilities, checks on the data.
assessment of data quality, that could improve the situation
vastly.
That if you have a reliance on types of data that tend
to be error-ridden, that to rely on one such source or two
such sources when ten are available is to invite disaster.
That by spreading your net over a wider range of options and
incorporating increasing numbers of data sets based on
differer.t techniques and usages within the fishery, you can,
in fact, eliminate the possibility of the kind of gross
error that affected the 1986 survey reSUlts.
We believed, and still do, that the kind of serious
problem that occurred with the survey data in 1986, would
not have occurred 1f oro had been using, at the same time,
and giving some credence to, for example, an inshore index
of catch per unit of effort. It could have been mobilized.
It would have been difficult but it could have been done.
Or if e.g., they had had better acoustical data to
supplement their survey data. If they had egg-mass surveys,
larval surveys. Even juvenile animal surveys. If they had,
perhaps, broken down their CPUE research or data gathering
by gear-type, by area, by region. If they had known a
little bit more about the differing population groups that
made up the stock or stocks. If they knew a little bit more
about the migration patterns; whether they are constant or
variable. There are all sorts of ways. 'f they were more
conscious of the discard problems, of the unreported catch
problems, of the under-reporting and misreporting. If there
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were better surveillance. There are all sorts of ways that
we thought the data could be improved. If they were using
the model which subsequently they did adopt that subjected
the data to better testing for credibility.
Q: Why, in your op~nion, hadn't they been doing all of these
things which seem, in retrospect, pretty obvious?
A: I think they hadn't been doing them for two reasons. Two
principal reasons. There may be a host of lesser ones. But
the two principal reasons were, one, their absolute
conviction, their mind set, which showed them that the stock
was growing at the projected rates.
They had set out in 1977 with a very optimistic wor1d
view. That if you do thus and so, the stock will grow at
this particular rate. And the evidence they'd been getting
in that first decade, 1977 to 1986, showed, in fact, that it
fitted in to the growth curve that had been projected, even
the aberrational data from the '86 survey, fitted in to the
growth curve, showed that there had been a slight abberation
in the previous year in the other direction but that things
were now back on track.
The great excitement that came with the 200 mile
economic zone and the possibilities that that opened up;
finally we've got it under our control, finally we can
manage it, finally we know what we're doing, finally we have
the power to do what we want to do. And certain goals were
set based on the best data they had at the time and the
figures coming in on the growth of the inshore fishery
during the early 'eighties showing them that everything was
on track and everything was fine.
So they really believed that things were going as they
want.ed them to. As they believed they should. Why bother
with other unnecessary labours when what you had was giving
you the results that you required? I think that is the
first reason.
0: By "they" do you mean there was a monolithic body of
opinion or were there dissenting voices?
A: I think this was the attitude wi thin DFO and wi thin the
commercial industry there was another phenomenon. I'm
speaking now of the offshore fishery. They tended to accept
this world view, that the stocks were, in fact, growing
quite satisfactorily thank you, in accordance with all the
projections that had been made. Because they werB not able
to see what was the impact of their improving technology.
And of their improving competence to manage the technology.
I think they estimated, both the commercial industry
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and DFO, underestimated in a very serious way, the effects
of improving technology and of improving competence and of
improving knowledge and skills among the fishing community.
And tended to downplay the effort side of the equation. And
they tended to keep in their minds effort as a constant. As
if they were dealing with the same kind of trawlers and the
same kind of circumstances without realizing that over those
ten years there had been a very large growth both in the
gear configuration, in gear quality, in materials quality
that was used in gear, in the capacity of ships, 1n better
Clnd more powerful engines, in winches and so on, in the
electronic gear that allowed them to identify end locate
fish populations, in the skill of the crews, in the
knowledge and experience of the fishing skippers.
We, believe, our panel believes, that all of these
growths in technological competence and capacity
overshadowed the downturn in the fish stocks and were far
more important than anyone realized at the time. So I think
both groups suffered from the problems that arise from
having a peculiar mind set which simply blinds you to "Ihat
is happening around you.
And you must remember that the catch rates of the
commercial fleet have not substantially declined. In fact,
if they were permitted to fish ad lib, the quantities of
fish landed would go up and up and up. Whether the rate, if
calculated properly, would have gone up is another question.
But certainly the quantities would have gone up.
And this is not a unique experience. This process has
happened elsewhere in the past. Repeatedly, in fact. It
just shows the perennial thick-headedness of humans who are
very slow to learn from other's experiences.
0: In the course of my research, I have been told by some
people that there was and, to a lesser extent, still is a
problem with factionalism wi thin DFO over the quality of the
work that they are doing. And it seems to have broken down
along lines of age and academic credentials. In broad
terms, a case of the old guard versus the young turks.
A: Well, I think there is some merit to that. I'm not sure
the breakdown was totally old versus young but thare's some
element of that, I guess, there. There is a tendency for
the young to place a ..• largely, not because they were young
but because of the kind of training that they had... a
tendency to over reliance on techniques that were new and,
therefore, ipso facto better. I think the biggest split
arose between those who, as it were, were sold on the model
and those who weren't.
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0: Because the model was giving them the answers they
wanted?
A: Because the model was giving them the answers. But not
only because the model was giving them the answers. And
this is where a subtlety creeps in that I'm a little bit
diffident about.
The danger in all modelling, in my view, is that you
become trapped by it to some extent. It's self-fulfilling.
You're dealing with data which are manipulable and variable
and uncertain. You have a variety of ways that you can
interpret the data. If you've got a model that you believe
in you will interpret the data in a way that makes the model
work. I don't think there's any dishonesty in this, as
such. A completely and perfectly honest scientist or, at
least, a person who believes that he's honest and
scientific he may be honest but he may not be
scientific that's another issue too. But he will tend to
see the data in the way that will make the model work.
That's what happened.
And I think that there are still people in the
organization, call them the old guard, who still don't
believe in models. They want to see real fish. Real
animals in their hands. Real tags and real data that you
can count and not have numbers spewed out by a computer.
But I think the real trouble is of another kind. When
I was talking to fishermen and fishing groups, I used two or
three analogiQS to try and explain this phenomenon which I
think is a universal one and has occurred throughout the
whole of the history of science and technology.
A simple example is, perhaps, the Copernican
revolution. You have a couple of thousand years of people
looking at the earth as the centre of the universe. And the
mind set is there, firmly fixed, that the earth is the
centre of the universe. There's no question about that
whatsoever. So you see all this other data, the orbits of
planets, and it doesn't fit. But what you do instead of
saying "our premise must be wrong because these orbits are
impossible, II you say "we have to find a fancy way f)f
modelling to prove or to show that these sorts of orbits can
be created with the earth still at the centre of the
universe. " So you have brilliant minds deVising weird
mathematics to show why planetary orbi t9 are the way they
are. Defying all logic but very seriously presented until
Copernicus cernes around and says "Look. You've got it all
wrong. Let's suppose that the sun is the centre of the
universe. All these orbits suddenly work." Well it's the
same with this fish model or any other any other model.
Take William Harvey and the circulation of the blood.
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People had been cutting open cadavers for years and years
and years and looking at the circulation system. Looking at
the veins and the arteries. Looking at the whole system.
But they couldn't admit what their eyes saw because they had
a conception of the heart which indicated that it was more
than a pump.
Q: SO theory and expectations can overpower data?
A: Exactly. And I think that's what happened in this case.
Or, at least, in part what happened and I think, 1n part,
explains why honest scientists trying to find ways to make
the data fit the model ....Perhaps I shouldn't have said that
as bluntly as that because that's perhaps not what they did.
Why honest scientists saw the data in accordance with rules
of interpretation which would make it fit the model. And I
think that's the danger of all mod91li09 and it's a danger
when you have a particularly unsophisticated model.
And I think the model that was being used, the bulk-
biomass method, is essentially an unsophisticated, primitive
model. The one that's being used now is another generation.
It's better. It's still not totally sophisticated. But
it' 8 better and it does submit the data that are being used
to certain testa that attempt to eU.minato thia phenomenon
to which I refer. But that was and is the danger.
And I think without the older scientists in the
establishment even being aware or thinking along those
lines, because I don't think they did, concretely, at any
rate. Nevertheless, being suspicious of the model and the
modelling technique because it was so alien to the way in
which they had done their science and were trained to do it.
It was fairly difficult for them to come to tenns with.
The other probleM, I think, was the failure of DFO to
open i taelf up to examinetion and testing by outside and
totally dispassionate intereets. An in-house operation,
even though 1 t is allegedly a peer-review process in which
their science is tested, doesn't work very well if all of
the peers ero working from the same set of assumptions and
the same set of objectives.
Another problem is that the various units or divisions,
groupings into which the scientific establishment were
broken, tended to function in compartments that were too
nearly watertight. There was not enough exchange or cross-
fertilization or integration of data or of ideas or of
systems. The caplin group, the crab group, the cod group
and so on were working independently. Whereas the e~~osystem
with which they were all concerned is not so broken down.
It is a unitary system that functions in an integrated mode.
3.3
They attempted to deal with the component parts end not with
the system as a system.
I know that this is all very easy for me to say but
it's very difficult to do. It constitutes one of the really
difficul t problems. particulary when you expand beyond the
biological system into the physical system which integrates
wi th the biological system and interacts with it in a way
that's critically important. So you do open up a whole new
range of problems. And, of course, you get into modelling
exercises which are enormously complex if you try to produce
an integrated model.
Q: This brings us to a point where I'd like to shift to a
discussion of the future. For the purposes of social
planning, corporate and economic planning, certain
assumptions have to be made about the future. What the
state of the stocks is going to be and how many fish we are
likely to catch or will be allowed to catch in five years
and ten years and so on. It seems, tilis is my analysis,
that with the modifications that have been made to the
assessment process, they can do a pretty good job of
retrospective analysis. They can know pretty well how many
fish there were. And, this is my rough estimate, within 20
to 30 percent plus or minus what there is out there now.
But the system is so complex and the variables affecting
fertility, larval survival and recruitment are so huge and
so variable that there are some, inclUding ,Jake Rice for
example, who feal that it is pra<'!tically impossible to do
any sort of useful forecasting. Here's whare things get
really sticky. Because there are demands place on DFO to do
forecasting which they know is impossible but they do it
anyway because the preseures are so hoavy. Knowing that by
pleasing their political masters and other clients today,
they are setting themselves up for somebody to be shown as
terribly wrong tomorrow.
A: That is true and that is a problam. I think Jake
recognizes that very clearly and I think that moat good
scientists recognize this. Not only in this lab here but
across the world. It's a critical problem.
From our point of view, the point of view of our study,
the best evidence you have to go on, or the best pradictive
model you can use, is one based on historical experience.
And the historic experience of this particular cod stock,
and this is setting aside any major environmental shifts
which may occur with global warming. These are likely to be
so totally disruptive that anything you say makes no sense.
But setting aside that and assuming a continuance of
the present physical environmental regime over time, the
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historical experience would seem to be the best one we've
got at the moment. And that indicates that over a period of
Bome 400 years the northern cod stock sustained an annual
TAe of around 300,000 tonnes. We don't know if that was the
maximum sustainable y1eld.
In my view, llIaxill'lUID. susta1.nable y1eld 1s a concept that
should be discarded anyway. I don't th1nk. 1t works. It
hasn't worked 1n Europe. It hasn't worked in the North Sea,
the Barrent Sea, in Iceland. It hasn't worked anywhere. So
you have to playa game of caution. You have to err on the
side of caution all the time. Both 1n your projections and
1n your practice.
But we do know that when the catch went up to something
greater than 600.000 tonnes a decline set 1n illUllediately.
We know that at 300,000 tonnes 1.t was sustained over
approximately 400 years. We know that between those two
numbers must bet the magic number that we're looking for.
Provided the stock can be rebuilt to its pristine levels
which, of course is the other proviso. And that was the
foundation of Cenad1an management strategy from 1977 up
until the crisis came in '86!' 87.
0: But that historical average was achieved with very
d1fferent technOlogy. It was largely a hook and line
fishery which tends to catch larger, older fish. Whereas
now the technology is catching a lot of pre-reproductive
fish. They recruit to the stock two or three years before
they are sexually mature.
A: If you look at our report we suggest ..•of course we don't
suggest that you go back to hook and 1108 technology,
although that might not be a bad thing in some cases. What
we do suggest is that we modify our technology so as to
eliminate the catching of juvenile fish. We think that a
critical part of the problem if you're going to rebuild the
stock to its earlier levels •.• I don't know if we can ever
rebuild it to its virgin levels. But If you're going to
build it back to a level with which with some confidence you
can project a sustainable yield of 250 to 300,000 tonnes,
then you've got to find the means of eliminating the heavy
plundering of the juvenile animals in the popUlation.
Q: I'm told that the inshore fishery as it's currently
practised with traps and bottom gill nets is primarily a
juvenile fish fishery.
A: Yes. Not the gIll nets so much. It depends on mesh
size. The current law, which is reasonably well~enforced
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and reasonably well-observed, precludes the catching of
really small fish in gill nets.
Cod traps are a different story. They don't
necessarily .... It 1s a bit of a problem. Fixed gear is a
bit of a problem because of the phenomenon ••. But even if the
population were 1n its virgin state, the juvenile animals
are the ones that come closest to the rocks. That' a a
behaviourial matter which you are not going to change. The
larger animals tend to loiter off in deeper water. The
younger animals pursue their food supply right to the shore
and in doing so become accessible to the fixed gear. So
that is a problem.
But you can, I think, even there, do some weeding out
of the smaller fish. If you really want to, there's no
reason, for example, why you shoUld use mesh sizes smaller
than 4 inches at the back of the trap. If you go much above
that you would wipe out the trap fishery because the very
young animals that come to land are the ones that make
themselves accessible to that kind of gear. So you have to
pay a price, certainly, in terms of the inshore fishery.
0: There is considerable debate about whether there are
separate inshore and offshore stocks and, if so, to what
extent. But lets assume that there are reasonably discrete
inshore stocks. Or were. Given that the cod trap is a
relatively recent piece of technOlogy, is there the
possibili ty that the inshore has been the author of its own
demise?
A; Yes, that's partly true. I think, insofar aa there were
discrete inshore stocks that made up a substantial part of
the catch. The evidence for that is very thin. There is
some evidence to suggest, strongly suggest, that there were
inshore stocks in certain of the bays. I don't think
there's been any suggestion made yet, at least not based on
substantial evidence, that those inshore stocks constituted
a major part of the total of the inshore catch. I don t t
know what part it did constitute. But I think there
certainly were inshore stocks. I think that they succumbed,
not so much to the cod tra.p fishery as, to the gill net
fishery when it was first introduced and when all of the
inshore gill netters had access to the near~shore deeper
trenches where the inshore population lived and really
cleaned out the breeding stock pretty well completely.
Whether these would regrow if they were protected if you
stopped, for example, thQ inshore catch of all juvenilaa,
whether they'd reestablish the bay stocks, I don't know and
I don't think anyone knowa. It's an important area for
research.
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I think the possibility for genetic tagging studies,
that now appear to be possible, may be the way to go. It
may be that we have to do much more tagging studies. We may
have to get in to "smart" tags that record fish movements
and so on.
But certainly it's possible that the inshore has been a
significant contributor to its own demise. But,
nevertheless, if you really try to look at what's happened
as subjectively as you can. there is an undoubted
relationship between the level of offshore catch and the
subsequent level of inshore catch. The two seem to be tied
[inversely]. So even though there were inshore stocks at
one time that still exist, much reduced but still existing,
the bUlk of 'the fish that came to coastal waters on a
feeding migration originated on the offshore banks which
have always been the major spawning arAas. The inshore
spawning areas, if the existed, were relatively small,
confined to a few deep trenches in several of the bays.
Placent1a Bay, Bonavista Bay, to some extent, perhaps, Notre
Dame Bay. Trinity Bay maybe. The bulk of the fish still
came in from the major spawning banks and I think that's
where the salvation lies.
You'd have to change your models and the numbers, the
data that goes into the models, if you discovered that there
were discrete inshore stocks. But in terms of future
forecasting, it's not an easy matter.
I sympathize with the scientists who are forced by
pol1tical and economic considerations to venture in to that
domain. Because they don't have the capacity to make
accurate forecasts, really. And they certainly don't have
the information to make accurate forecasts for the inshore
fishery. Because the variability of the fish inshore will
depend year to year on minor environmental shifts and
changes that are thoroughly unpredictable given our current
knOWledge.
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APPENDIX 1
Intf'!rview with Jake RicB. Head of the Groundfish Division
Conducted in St. John's, Newfoundland
JulY 6. 1990
Part One of Two Parts
0: Has the first instalment of the $42.8 million of northern
cod money arrived yet?
A: Yes. My understanding is that the first instalment
showed up here June 22nd. 1 was in travel J;or the two weeks
bracketing that but that is what I understood to be the
arrival date. We're spending it. that's for sure.
Q: You didn't blow it allan the long weekend? [reference to
remarks quoted in the June 30, Sunday Express]
A: No, we didn't blow it allan the long weekend after all.
Q: When I read that comment I just about fell out of my
chair. This is so refreshing, a sense of humour. Then it
occurred to me. this isn't the kind of comment that somebody
who's expecting to be around in the senior levels of
bureaucracy is going to make. It's more like what you'd
expect from someone who has a couple of solid job offers in
their back pocket.
A: [chuckles] Well. that comment. as far as 1 can tell, was
met with uniform good humour in Ottawa. [Later
amplification: ~I did get called about it. naturally--but
not scolded. I gather people at the very top weren't happy
but the senior civil servants needed a laugh worse than
anyone. I think."
Q: something else from the news. I think it was three days
ago in the Telegram there was a little box down at the
bottom that said that [cod] landings in Nfld. for the first
three months elf 1990 were up over 110 per cent compared with
the three months of the previous year. Is that accurate?
A: We don't collect the statistics in Science. By that I
mean catch statistics. We collect lots of data, but
landings are monitored by Stats. Branch. We get the same
circulars from the Statistics Branch that the press does.
They, the reporters, read the numbers the same way we did.
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0: Doesn't that [the increase] seem curious to you?
A: The offshore has been arguing, more and more vocally in
recent years as they see their quota being cut, that their
experience has been that, not only is there no shortage of
fish, but they really have never had it so good.
And our research vessel was out in February doing an
annual hydro-acoustic survey and we were trying to do a lot
of tagging work. We added almost two fUll weeks on to the
time we were at sea. And there's a lot of fish out there.
Wa got, I think it was 80,000 pounds in one fifteen minute
tow whan we w~re trying to get just a few fish to put tags
on. By a few I mean several hundred to a thousand is about
all you can tag and keep them 1n good shape. You use a
fish-finder to delineate a schOOl and then you go out and
fish right on the edge of it. And what we had identified as
the edge of a concentration had that much fish in it.
One of the difficulties we have, communicating to any
individual in a plausible way. is that each person's unique
experience can't be taken as the average condition. The
fact that the cod do aggregate very densely 1n the pre-
spawning period, aggravated by the much more extensive than
usual ice coverage that we had, so the fish we don't know
what goes on under the ice. But anecdotal It seems that
all things being equal, these fish prefer not to be under
the ice. We can't documant it but it's folk-wisdom that
fishermen as well as fieheries scientist share in. Given
the extent of the ice coverage ... if the fish do build up
right on the edge of the ice, that's another aggregating
measure an off-shore trawler can find incredibly dense
concentrations of fish. Sustainable for several weeks.
That doesn' t mean that, integrated over the whole 2J3KL
area, there's huge amounts of fish.
0: So environmental and other variables can combine to
create the appearance of abundance when, in fact, that might
not be the case at all?
A: Yes. Just as they can con,:line to create the appearance
of scarcity, particularly for the in-shore. Whereas
averaged over St. Mary's Bay at least to Makovik and out two
or three hundred kilometres, there can be a lot of fish but
individual communities for a whole season can see none of
it. That happened in Notre Dame Bay last year where most of
Notre Dame Bay experiencsd an abysmal fishery. While the
Labrador coast and a lot of the Southern Shore of the Avalon
did extremely well and plant capacity rather than product
was the limiting factor.
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c: The more I read in the technical literature of stock
assessment ... 1 just finished a book by Gulland, an FAO
publication, which seems to be a pretty comprehensive ...
A: Very good overview I Incidently, John passed away a week
ago Friday. The word is just spreading through the
fiGheries community.
c: He seemed to do a very good job of assessing the
strengths and weakness of the various techniques end almost
ran a counter argument to the fashion of whole-systems
modelling now. That until you have your basics down, you' r("
simpl.y dissipating resources and scattering data points.
That, in fact, environmental variabl.es might be so great an
unknown, uncontrollable, that there's a possibility that
management in any sort of precise sense on anything other
than a single-species basis might not be very reasonable.
Which I thought was an interesting counter to ...
A: Ves, that's an issue that gets discussed at length in
several fisheries science bodies. CAFSAC has a whole sub-
committee on whole-systems and environment. ICES has sub-
committees on multi-species management, a Buite of sub-
committees on environment, another sub-committee on
hycJrography. And the fisheries science community i:;.
continually seeking a balance between not boing totally
myopic and not being so dissipative of their resources that
you don't know enough about anyone thing to provide advice.
Q: There was another point, or underlying assumption, that
there are natural equilibriums. That in a theoretical
global ecosystem without man's interference, there is 8
"balance of nature." And given stable fishing pressure,
stocks will reach some sort of equilibrium. But what I've
read of Robert May's recent writings suggests that natural
systems might behave more like quantum states, which is real
interesting and then you can tie this in with the stuff
coming out of chaos theory and the picture gets real
interesting.
A: 1 was last week ... well, the two weeks I was away,
bracketing that June 22nd date, was all at meetings about
how to relate fisheries management, fisheries science, to
what we're learning about global climate change. Because we
can't wait till the final data are collected that convincas
every one that, yes, the climate is changing and this is the
direction and this is the speed. We need to begin to think,
what is it we want to know about the marine ecosystem,
370
pacticulary the resources in it that provide wealth. In
light of the fact that the environment that they ere living
in might be changing out from underneath them. And a lot of
these things about, is it going to be a chaotic responae,
that you keep monitoring and monitoring and IIlOnitoring and
you don't see much change and suddenly you get a uass1ve
switch to a different position.
Many of us think. based on what we know of ecosystem
theory, and just what we know from personal experience with
details of our :&.1tt18 piece of it, that's very likely what's
going to happen. Certainly a lot of the problem with
northern cod, 1n terms of the industry' 3 expect:'Jtions of
what would be available by now, may reflect the fact that,
tor long periods from the late ' fifties through the
'sixties, were producinq about two and a half times what
we're pretty confident was produced from about 1970 through
to the present with annual growth rate and recruitment
fluctuating but it's been fluctuating Bround a pretty stable
average for twenty years. And its an average of less than
half what it seemed to be fluctuating around before.
But the data start to get really shaky. By the time
you're back into the •sixties you're relying very largely on
foreign fisheries where you don't know anything about the
sampling and the quallty control on the aging and stuff. So
we're 'Jncertain of the quality of the data. It could be
prett~ shaky and still suggest that there was a long period
of time when, not just the northern cod stOCks, but e! 1 the
cod and haddock stocks, both on the North American side of
the Atlantic and the European side of the Atlantic, all
seemed to be producing annually many IIIOre young fish with
quite reasonable growth rates, than have been produced in
the last two decades.
We can't go back and do the sort of 9cosystel'll-level
research back then to figure out what it is that changet1,
but there's certainly reasons that any cautious scientiats
should pay close attention. It goes through, certainly,
gradual changes. You fish a little hardor, you're going to
get certain things and if you ease off you get responses.
You can show that the short-term behaviour is pretty
predictable on a year-to-year basis. But the long-term
behaviour is golng to be influenced by stuff we don't havfl
pinned down yet.
0: One of May's point seemed to be that, as far as the
ability of man to mange an ecosystem or even 8 part of it,
you probably can't control these phaae chenges but you can
effect the time periods between them. Comproes them or
oxtonJ them. And he was looking at the history of ::atchos,
from the North Sea particularly, and they showed random
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variation around some equi~ibrium point and then a phase
change, either up or down, to a new equi~ibrium point and so
on .... I've lost my train of thought ..•.
A: Management can effect the intervals between them. A~~
other things being equal, it's easy to defend a decision
that we shou~d concentrate on things that are under our
control. And that's why, I think, that a lot of money is
spent on looking at the fishery. Because that is something
wo can control, in theory, to the oxtent that a government
can control the behaviour of its citizens.
"Ie can control the amount they're catching, the age
compositIon and stuff like that. We can tune that as finely
as the participants feel is in their interests. Which gets
back to the importance of communicating ... they realize what
they gain by playing by the rules.
As opposed to some of these environmental influences
where, even if we could quantify in detail how it affected
catcl;, there's nothing you can do. You're the relatively
,essive recipient of what it chooses to do to you. We need
to know something of these environmental influences
because ... if for no other reason than to make the data we
COllect meaningJ:Ul.
We're seei:\g a lot of variation. It' B nice to be able
to know that you can attribute it to some known influence,
even if you can't control that influence, 51:) that what's
left you can make better decisions about. And as you said,
if the system does have non-linear responses to some of
these kicks, it tells you something about the margin of
error you do or don't need to leave.
{Later amplification: " The point is to have confidence that
if a lot of the variance can be shown to be due to the
environment, you can factor it out. The remaining variance
might be more tractable as fisheries management impacts. 01]
0: You go through the DFO forecapts from the 'seventies and
early 'eighties, the three or four or five bars on the right
are all forecasting a linear increase .•.
A: Go talk to the economists. Those resource prospects come
from the economists. They're the bane of our existence. I
understand very well why they're n€leded, Industry ...we
could argue to industry that we can't predict that far into
the future but until they figure out a way to build a ship
in six months and decommission it in two, and still run a
viable operation, they're going to need five-ysar and t(\O-
year planning horizons.
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[Later ampliZication: "My answer is not entirely true.
Science in ,)ttawB contributes to the resource prospects a9
well. There is a decade-long struggle between regional
scientists ar.d headquarters. In all the regions, Science
argues that we cannot guess future recruitlllents and can!Jot
project five-plus years into the future. Headquarters deals
deily with politicians, other departments, end induetry.
All those clients have legitimate reasons to want to know
what the future holds. The right position isn't all that
obvious to a third party is it7"]
0: So there's a tremendous amount of demand, whether it's
realistic or not, frolll the corporate fishing sector and
probably finance and industry••. they need to deal in
certainty.
A: And not just... it is most acute for the big industrial
fishery, where I'm using the word "industrial" not in the
European sense, but in the North American senSB, big capital
investment. The small in-shore fisherman is less dependent
on 1t, but certainly the ramifications for the inc'lvidtlal
for allocating a whole lot less capital ass8ts incorrectly
costs the individual inshore fisherman at least aa much aa
it costs the president of some big fishing company ... or the
shareholders. Most of the shareholders of these companies,
often... this is just one piece of a big portfolio.
0: I suppose that the last thing that Vic Young [president
of Fisheries Products International] would want to hear is
that he's operating in a non-linear, chaotic environment.
A: The thing is, that in a way, they know it. I'. in a
position now that I deal with these guye ••. maybe not at the
level of Vic Young ..• on a day-to-day basis, but people like
Herb Carter and people like that I see at meetings all the
time. And I had my preconceptions of bloody
capitalists.... These are people who have good brains, tlave a
certain amount of humanity, as much as you'd find in any
individual picked off the street as far as I'm concerned,
and they know the diffiCUlties that they're dealing with.
And yet, to use the anal~y that I used at the ISOF
[International Symposium of Oporational Fisheries] meeting
last fall, you can't put the genie back in the bottle, in
the sense that tl"le technology exists to incraase the
efficiency and othor peoplo are going to opt for it even if
you could argue that, in the long-term, you could argue
avoiding the technological advance because eventually the
systems's going to switch back to tho old etoto ...or at
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least to a different state incompatible with your big
capital investment.
You cannot maintain viability on a short-term if. you're
not keeping up with those who've taken what may be a short-
sighted option bocause the system's been in this ~hase, if
it is a phaso, for twenty years.
So who knows? It's a very difficult syndrome not to
get into. If the rest of the fishery is committing itself
to an avenue that: is profitable under the existing
conditions, you're not going to be in the game long enough
to benefit: from ignoring the short-term conditions because
the long ones could ba difft.l:ent.
0: If it is a non-linear, chaotic system then there's
absolutely no point to strategic planning or thinking
because you can never know which way it's going to jump or
when.
1\: We hear that fro:n many components of the industry, not
just big off-shore companies. Why keep such a restrictive
target harvest level when you can't be sure that there's
going to be any benefits from i t7 You can be sure that
ther~l' s going to be a cost from keeping the harvest levels
down. The degree to which we can convince people that
there's benefits has been really we,lkened in the last half-
dl:!cade.
0: Because you know you're giving it [the system] a nudge,
you just don't know in what direction. This could be very
disconcerting for some of the more traditional reductionist
scientists.
A: Yes.
Q: I'm reading a little monograph written by Werner
Heisenberg, written in the late 'fifties towards the end of
his career called "A Scientist Looks at Nature" (actually
"The Physicist's Conception of Nature"] discussing the
evolution of the scientific conception of nature and
observation and the scientific process through the quantum
revolution which he more or less precipitated. So these
sorts of debates: have been going on in physics for some
time, at the most rarefied level of scienca but now they are
spilling over into resource management, corporate reality,
daily reaHty.
A: Yeah. I, personally, am very uncomfortable with their
implications although I can't counter them as being
inaccurate. The implications are, generally, that the
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rewards of being a cautious steward are probably going to be
lower than you used to think. And how do you defend being
really cautious in your management of any resource if it's
likely to change dramatically despite your best efforts to
the contrary. We can fall back on Bob May's argument that
it appears to be possible to extend the period that it stays
in favourable phases and hopefully shorten the periods that
it stays in unfavourable ones;
Q: Have you read the boole "Chaos: the "'laking of a New
Science"?
A: No.
Q: It's real interesting because a non-linear equation with
only thr~'~ or four variables and an energy input ... you have
a damping component and an energy component in this
equation. You start to run it on a computer and it will run
along with random variations around a certain point. Well.
they start to feed more energy into the system and it will
go into a thoroughly chaotic state. And then they feed even
more energy in and it will settle down into another sort of
equilib1.'ium state with emaIl perturbations. Andso ... this
actually is hopeful. You start to theorize about how you
csn do your work by modifying ... adding or subtracting energy
from the system or increasing or decreasing the damping on
some part of the system. You can actually kick it up or
down in phase shifts. Now this is in very simple,
theoretical mathematical models. but one would assume that
if this has some useful correspondence with reality. not an
actual description of reality but a useful correspondence,
there':3 some very interesting work to be done.
A: There's some very interesting work being done ... in
Canada. The leaders I know of are Louis Legendre And hi 9
brother Pierre who are at. I believe. Laval and UQAM but
they're both biological mathematicians, they're mathematical
biologists. I don't know what the relative emphasises are.
Very capab~.e. competent people. I've been impressed with a
lot of the work that they've done. Louis in particular has
got into arguing that the things that we should be studying
about ecosystems are not a lot of the traditional stability
and connectivity properties but the total energy in the
system and those mechanisms in the ecosystem which r~ltain
energy and those that dissipate energy. Once you've
identified what those mechanisms are. studying the balance
of the dissipative versus the retentive mechanisms is the
thing to study about ecosystems.
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And a lot of the talk at the meetings, particularly the
one in Halifax, on the northwest Atlantic, what should we be
doing? We've had people all the way from Chesapeake Bay up
through Norway, Denmark on behalf of Greenland and Iceland,
talking about what we should be dcin; to prepare the
fisheries' response to climate change. And the focus is on
these dissipative and retentive energy mechanisms on the
fishery supporting (continental] shelves was something we
felt was .•. a way of ....
A lot of ,",ork we do comes into that framework. We just
haven't couched it that way. And it might be the way of
viewing our work that begins to help us to cast our results
in ways that are relevant to the climate change question.
Q: There's one other item I'd like to talk about if yOU have
the time.
A: Yes.
Q: This money that's coming, is it specifically earmarked
for northern cod research?
A: The $42.8 [million] is specifically earmarked for
northern cod research. That doesn't mean that it all going
to be spent on cod. There's things like a fair bit of money
for studying physical oceanography and biological
oceanography. But that is specifically in the 2J3KL area
and of all the things you can ask about biological
oceanography and physical oceanography the things ... there's
a direct one-to-one correspondence between each initiative
and at 11::l8St one recommendation in the Harris report.
So there's a proposal to ..• the jargon is "quantify the
biomass spectrum." It's been proposed that the amount of
biomass at each size category, from microscopiC up to whales
is ... it's log-linear. If you put everything on a log scale,
you get: a line that's a straight slope. And the steepness
of the slope is a function of how productive the i:cosystem
is. And how efficiently...well, the intercept is how
productive the ecosystem is, the slope of the line is how
efficiently it passes energy to the phytoplankton on up.
And it is a ... it's been a theoretical idea that's been
around for a long time with some support. It's a way of
looking at things that stimulates interesting questions and
uses of data even if it turns out not to be true in detail.
But that's a case where it's clear from the beginning of the
ontogeny of this project on quantifying biomass spectrum,
our resear~h surveys do a real good job on things from about
twenty centimetres up. That leaves a lot.
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And rather than try to do the whole thing, we're going
to focus on that slice of it that is about the size of
things that cod eat. So rather than doing 8 poor job of
pushing it all the way up from nanometres to two
centimetres. we'll focus in on the twa centimetre to twenty
centimetre categm:':'f', From little bugs that you can actually
see up to capolin. A..'d see if we can get that part of it
quantified well.
The decision to focus there is based on the fact that
this is the suite of things cod eat. And once we' VB
quantified the relationships between everything 'we know
about cod and everything we know about their food, we're
going to want to know how the food is balanced with its
food.
Q: One of Gulland's main points was that the thing that
affects stock strength most is recruitment and we don't know
much about what affects recruitment. The early .... A.ny fish
is most vulnerable from the egg stage 'till recruitment.
And that where there are a host of environmental unknowns
including food supply, tea:perature, drift, predation and
this is what you're going to be ...
A: We've got projects on drift, we've got projects on simply
delineating exactly where the 0 group, the age one, the ago
two are before we can get into process studies, what causes
the variation. We know places where we can go and reliably
get them every year but that's differont than knowing how
typical those places are of the areas that they occur and
don't occur.
So, among the first things we're going to try to do
down there is do a defensible survey of the candidate
nursery areas. Nursery areas being the jargon for where
fish younger than those caught in the nets hang out. Onco
we've delineated the areas which they prefer and which they
clearly avoid, the you're faced with all the work of saying,
what are the differences. That's a descriptive task.
You've got the descriptive task of trying to differentiate
the area.
And then you get into the experimental task of, now,
can we charactAriz9 the mechanisms, out of all the
differences between these areas, what mechanisms is it that
lead to this differential survivorship or mortality.
0: So the money is :a-l'ead over five years. That's roughly
eight million a year for science. How does that compare
with your existing annual budget?
A.: For science, we have about seven million a year.
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0: So this effectively more than doubles your bUdget.
A: The budget that we in science have to deal with this
region.
0: I should think that this will put rather a strain on your
infrastructure.
A: Yes.
0: How are you going to deal with that?
A: With the money comes ~ome new positiona. We're going to
get about a dozen new pos.itions. We have commitments of
using what's called "py I,;lippage." That's, at any given
mo,nent, not all the pos1.tions that exist a~ a station are
occupied. And every day that an existing position is
unoccupied, you get what they call "py" or "person-year
slippage" that you can allocate.
So the sc1.ent1.sts, the hands-on scientists, we get more
bodies. The paper work we handle out of py slippage. And
the paper work out of northern cod has been flagged
as •.. well, not just northern cod but the whole fishery
adjustment package. Because there are also more people in
surveillance and stuff like that. So that means more paper
is going to be generated. And where before, the needs that
we got money and people to fill, have been the priority
needs for this PY slippage, we now have the resources off
the top.
For instance, the data from the observers [on the
offshore trawlers]. Collecting it on the operations side,
processing it on the science side. For a long time, a lot
of the slippage that we had available to us had gone to get
more bodies handling those data, because we think they're
important. And we've getting more of them than the people
allocated several years ago. Now we've got enough bodies to
handle the data. And we have ellough resources in the
package to handle the data when it comes back to the lab.
And we don't need to keep devoting several integrated years
of Slippage to processing the data and getting the observers
out there.
That filters down a level now. We've met our needs 1n
science so now the people down in purchasing can get new
people to come in Slid help them buy the stUff and handle the
requ1sitions and stuff.
0: It's probably still going to put something of a strain on
the system.
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A: Yes. And what I've been doing is putting together ... I've
got to have done, hopefully by the middle of next week,
detailed bench marks for this year for every single projllct
in the 28. Some of them are just not ... there's no field
work we can do "thais year. But we can do a lot of the
planning and buying hardware this year. Do the shake-down
work on it when it doesn't matter. So that next year's
field season ... because it's a five-year project, not a one-
year project. we can schedule things to be really demanding
at different times through the five year period. So we can
spread the impact we're having on the infrastructure over
that five year period.
Q: You mentioned 28 projects. I assume that they respond t,)
recommendations in the Harris report.
A: Some of them respond to more than one. Harris had, I
think, 31, 32 recommendations. And we've got 28 components
in the science package. About half of the Harris
recommendations deal with the management, not the science.
And thare are some of the more open-ended recommendations
that we've got two or three projects addressing it.
Q: Have you set this response, these projects down in
printed form?
A: This is part of what I've got to have done. What I've
got ... what I was playing with when you came in is something
mailed through the computer in Ottawa. Basically it's a
docuw.ent from the Treasury Board itemizing funding. And
what. I want to do by the end of the long weekend we've got
is to have gone through this, pullout the stuff the
Treasury Board wants in terms of accountabilities and
deliverables, which are irrelevant to any audience that
isn't an accountant.
And that will be going out to all the scientists in tho
lab and to our public mailing list, everybody who gets our
pre-documentation, will get a copy of .... "Here's what we're
up to," ... an invitation to come talk to us about idoas they
have within that. So that, I hope, to have in the hands of
people by the middle of next week.
[Later amplification: "There were two things--t.he financial
stuff for accoun~.'lOts, and the paperwork on the projects
with levele of funding. It was the latter which was to go
out to the public. There was nothing secret about the other
documents--just boring. "]
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Interview Jake Rice
Conducted in St. John's, Newfoundland
August 14. 1990
Part Two of Two
Q: In the course of talking to DFO scientists, my thinking
has changed considerably. I'm moving more and more away
from the theory of the sociology and science and toward the
practical realities. The lives of tens of thousands of
people and hundreds of millions of dollars are at stake
here. It's no longer a t~eoretical exercise for me. I find
myaelf in the midst of something that has extraordinary
consequences. My sense of responsibility is growing. It's
not the Bort of situation that academics, especially young
'mes, find themselves in the midst of. A typical MA thesis
is not something of such moment.
A: It's interesting to hear you say that because it's an
evolution that I can really remember going through. When I
joined the department, I was hired out of the university
with 8 ... twelve years as a graduate student and a faculty
member. I can remember pontificating to my students about
"Well, if you grasp the theory really well, the special
cases will fallout just fine." I carried a very
theOl,"atieal, arm'S-length attitude into my first-year
fisheries meetings.
I had the good fortune, sbout a month after I joined
the department, to go to a big international meeting that
happened to be held in Halifax. One of the days was devoted
to looking at mUlti-species management models. It was an
area that I was hired to work in because my background was
in community analysis. So I went there and listened to the
papers for the day. I w~mt there feeling really intimidated
because I had been reading the fishery literature and it
seemed really sophisticated, equations and stuff. 1
listened to these talks the whole day, got invited out for a
beer afterwards, and made the comment to &omeone, who was,
fortunately, quite tolerant, "Well, you know, after
listening today to a whole lot of talks, my feelings about
working on mUlti-species management aren't quite so
intimidating. It's clear that there are a lot of people
working on it but they haven't got very far." And this
person looked at me and smiled benignly and said "Yes. And
they were very bright people too."
A.nd that has always stayed with me. A lot of the
people that I have met, a surprisingly high proportion of
them, are very bright people and they work really hard. But
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they don't get very far in terms of solving the problems so
that we have recipe that works and you get the right answer,
or something very close to the right answer, every time.
And unlike some kinds of fields where maybe you do have
some uncertainty, in the fisheries thousands of people's
jobs, just as you say, depend on the answer. 1o.nd it's just
really hard to get it 1n a way that anybody is sure 1t· s
right. 1o.nd it turns out to be right 1n ret:r;ospect.
Q: My thumbnail analysis of the situation at this point is
that fisheries stock assessment science had the extremely
bad luck to run into a set of shaky socio-economic and
bio:!.ogical conditions at a time when it is at a very young
stage of its development as a science. In the beginning you
were using very simple production models snd now you are
trying to make the transition to much more complex and
sophisticated models. But at this point in the development
and the transition, you are putting most of your effort into
finding out how much you don't know ... discovering the
sources of error snd uncertainty, So in feet what appears
to your critics as incompetence, the downward revisions of
stock strength estimates, are in fact signs that you are
beginning to get a grip on sources of error. But it doesn't
look like that to the pol!tical types or the corporate
fishing interests or the larger society. It looks like
incompetence.
A.: It's interesting, again, the history of fisheries is a
little different than any other natural resource that I know
of. People talk about: the golden age of fisheries in the
'forties and 'fifties when a theoretical foundation with
really good popUlation dynamics, mathematical foundation was
laid and it was vastly beyond any data that were available.
1o.nd it was vastly beyond the theoretical foundation of any
other resource that I'm aware of, renewable or non-
renewable.
All the other resource that I'm aware of have built
there management on the gut feelings of the old guys and the
new changes have been totallY data-based. You just collect
enough data and then you just run it through these big
multi-variate analyses to beat it into shape. When geology
went from the old prospectors to a modern science, they did
it with kreiging and it was totally data-driven.
Fisheries is the only natural resource, either
renewable or non-renewable, where there is a really big
theoretical framework and it took us about 25 years to
collect enough data to catch up to the theory. 1o.nd the
theory, at the time it was developed, was vastly better than
that available to any other resource. And the problem came,
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not because the theory was wrong ... any theoretician will
tell you that any theory is better than before the theory
but the people who come after me are going to make it much
better.
But what happened was that economist and sociolo{lists
and people like that could read these good theoretical
papers, recognize the mathematics of it ••. they weren't
dealing with some old forester's or prospector's intuitive
knowledge of what's out there. "Give me an equation. I can
use the equation," says the economist.
So the whole economics and sociology of the fishery, to
the extent that it was built on anything besides expediency,
~/as built on the theoretical framework that the fisheries
people were using. AO(\ now that the data have caught up and
the fisheries scientists .....
It's only been since about 'the mid-seventies that we've
had enough data to say that this pl.lrt of this theory should
not be the basis of management. It's too weak. And we
should replace it with something nearer to the data. Not
back to something intuitive that there's no way to defend or
explain after the fact. Like any science, the goal is to
collect so much data that the description of the data is the
description of the stoclt.
0: My reading of the early theory is that it reflected the
dominant ideology of western liberal market capitalism.
Very Adam Smithian. The myth of the balance of nature.
Equilibrium states. In a free market all forces are
balanced. In nature all forces are balanced. And that goes
back further to Rousseau. And what seems more likely now is
that the concept of the balance of nature is a myth that's
tied to a specific political and economic ideology.
A: I see the same parallel. I'd add the caveat, though,
that it's not just fisheries but all of mathematical ecology
evolved in an equilibrium framework. Fisheries wasn't being
left behind by the theory of ecology at all. I can remember
the last population dynamics course, a graduate course, that
I taught at Memorial; 1980. 1 brought in a couple of papers
that for the first time were talking about multiple stable
points in populations
[Later amplification: "And this i8 important. Until the
early 1980's, every widely·acknowledged theorist dealt
primarily with equilibrium models in ecology. Only since
the mid-1980's onward has this been debated: Schoener, Cody,
Diamond, U.S. Strong. Simberloff etc. "]
Q: Would this have been [Robert] May?
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A: May was one of the very first. [digression on May's
lecture technique] But from the time that somebody gets an
idea in print, to tho time when all the applications of
theory lise these new ideas, ... a decade's not a bad
timetable. In fact, fisheries population nynamics was the
focus of ecological theory in the' fifties and 'sixties
along with MacArthur and Hutchinson and a bunch of
orni thologista.
They took the fisheries population dynamics models,
generalized them to vertebrate population dynamic:; where
things are a little more measurable, because birds only lay
a fe'4 eggs a year, but it was all very lIi:Jch, as you say,
equilibrium theory. The idea that change and ... change was
fine. BeCause it's a variance around a mean. But the idea
that the mean itself is meaningless was really hard for a
lot of people to accept.
Q: What, in your opinion, is the reason that fisheries is
taking such a slagging right now1
A: Right now .... I had to spend the morning at a meeting with
Saga Communications, and 1 'm not going T"') put this off the
record, as far as I'm concerned it ought to be talked about
freely. Two weeks ago we had a woman who's holding science
responsibility in the department's communications branch
come down [from Ottawa] and talk about what the
communications plan should be for the Atlantic Fisheries
Adjustment Package, not just the science. She was
interested primarily in the science part of it but it was
the whole package.
Saga communications is a private communications
consul tant company. They've been hired, I don't know
whether it's by the minister or by the cabinet, to put
together a communications plan for this area as well. And
it was very interesting to listen to the two •.. even in
communicating science you've got this adversarial
relationship or the potential tor it. There's certainly
jealousy anC' distrust between the two communications groups.
Each one seeing the othor as a threat. The in-house aild the
out-oi-house.
Q: 00 you know who hired them [Saga)7
Po: No. I'm not high enough to know. Certainly Saga reports
at the mInisterial level or higher. So I'd say minister,
cabinet or someone like that.
Q: Federal1
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A: Federal. But particUlarly with the out-of-house
communications group, and to some extent with the in-house
communications group, it's getting clearer and clearer
talking to them that people have known for quite 8 while
that some kind of restructuring of the fishery, and not just
what they did back in the big restructuring in the early
'eighties when they took a whole bunch of small bankrupt
companies and made a couple of big bankrupt companies, but
the capacity to use resources ....
The scientists knew in tho mid-'eighties, when all the
predictions 1"lere gOlden, that the capacity to consume
resources was growing faster than the resource was. And now
that the resource isn't growing, for what we hope will be a
short period of time, the crunch is in there. And everybody
is looking for someone to step forward and take
responsibility and be the one who says "The buck stops
here. "
We have to do something about too much capacity chasing
too little resource. Which doesn't have to be the same
thing as too many fishermen chasing too few fish. There are
ways to run a fishery which involve ways of minimizing the
capacity of fishermen and keep an awful lot of fishermen in
the game. But you can't maximize the players and maximize
the capacity of each player whatever the resource is doing.
We in science played into the hands of this political
hotbed by being incorrect, by being wrong in our projections
of what the stock was going to be doing in the late-
'eighties. So we were an easy person, in the Short-term, to
put the blame on. But all kinds of people that 1 hear from
now, not just fisheries scientists who have reason to feel
burned by the whole issue, but people in communications,
critics inside and outside the department, and in other
branches.
When you get individuals sitting down like you and I
are in somebody-'S kitchen talking frankly, they knew all
along that something was going to have to be done. And what
I hear is the last ministar who was willing to stand up,
take the heat and give a clear message to everyone who
reported to him, "This is the type of fishery that I see and
this is the type of fishery that is consistent with all the
information that I get about the resource," was Romeo
LeBlanc.
He made a lot of people angry but he made very few
enemies. Because he could justify everything he did and
everything he did WIIS consistent with an image of the
fishery that could be defended. And there hasn't been a
minister since him. So its's not saying that the Liberals
were right and the PCs [Progressive Conservatives] are
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wrong. There were Liberal ministers following LeBlanc as
well.
But the complaint that keeps coming back to other
branches 'Zlf DFO, not just science, is that you cannot get a
single, consistent message of what this fishery should look
like. Managers, even more than scientists, need clear-cut
objectives in order to achieve anything. And the more
conflicting and diffuse and unspecified tho objectives are,
the harder it is to implement the policies of the will of
the people as reflected by the government in power.
For science, it's the same thing. We can provide
advice on the consequences of this activit~·, that activity.
Some activities are just not compatible with good
oonservation of the stock. Of the wide range of activities
that may be compatible with the conservation of the stock,
you can support this, you can support that, but the choices
among them are going to make some people angry.
If we'd been right in '86 and 'B7 and the stock had
continued to grow... it will never grow forever ... and if it
hadn't been '88, '89 was basically tho big explosion of
science credibility, it would have been '91, '92. It had to
happen.
Q: Could you elaborate on that?
A: To the extent that the stock could not continue to build
fore-ler, but the capacity of industry, even 1.£ you cap the
number of participants and allow them the ability to
increase their ability per capita to catch fish, there was
going to come a time when the capacity of the fleet exceeded
what the resource could supply.
And at that time you' ve got the choice of do you have
many fishermen living in marginal poverty or fewer fishermen
living in something resembling a comfortable middle-class
existence, maybe. even better.
Southwest Nova Scotia is in that problem right now with
that huge, capital-intensive middle-distance fishery. I
can't recall exactly the figures. It used to be that the
boats were capable of catching, let.'s say, 300,000 pounds a
year. Dut they could break even at 200.000 pounds. If they
caught 300,000 pounds, they made a hefty profit. Now
they've got better boats but instead of being able to catch
300,000 pounds a year, they can catch a million pounds a
year. But they need 900,000 pounds to break even. And
that's not big factory freezer trawlers versus little
inshore fishermen. These are single owner boats, not a big,
corporate flee.';. This is just unrestrained technology.
It'S sort of a cop-out to make technology the villain.
But the analogy I used at a talk that I gave back at ISFO
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[International Symposium on Operational Fisheries] on a
panel is that technology is like any other genie. Once you
let it out of the bc"t:tle, you can't get it back in. And all
the stories about genies getting out of bottles that have
tragic endings happen because people want the genie to make
them rich. If you would just use the genie to keep yourself
from getting poor you might not need to put the genie back
in the bottle.
And that's what I meant when I said that it had to
happen. Ao long as the interests in the fishery, on every
scale from smalle"3t to largest, have an interest in using
improved technology t.o get richer and richer, there had to
come a point Where, whatever the euphemism that's in vogue
at a partiCUlar time, restructuring, down-
sizing ... restricting the number of participants to a number
that's smaller and putting a limit on how much the
individuals can take out of it.
It had to happen and people are g01ng to be unhappy
about it. Communities are going to be hurt badly by it. It
takes a very strong poli ticien to stand up and say "It was
inevitable and it's my job to make somA hard choices and
take the heat for it." I wasn't with the department when
LeBlanc was minister, but an amazing spectrum of people from
card-car::ying pes to card-carrying NDP [New Democratic
Party) and the Liberals in the middle of course, seem to
speak of the LeBLanc days with a great deal of nostalgia.
It was a department that had a clear idea of where it
was going and a department that could count on a good deal
of support all the way up the line as long as all the
decisions and actions were consistent with that vision.
0: Let's go back a bit to where you said that science had
got it wrong. Can you give me a bit of background on how
and why you got it wrong?
A: My analysis of that is that the tools we were using .•. and
this gets beck to the faci; that we ere only just beginning
to get the data to find the weakne:.;ses in the theory that we
are using ... the tools WEI were using were flawed and we knew
they were flawed but they were the best on the market. You
can go back to the A.lverson report and see that stated quite
clearly. And what Harris makes a big deal about, to use the
jargon, the age-disaggregated versus the bUlk-biomass
tunings, within two years of the first age-disaggregated
tuning method being put on the table in a meeting, it was
being used by CAFSAC. And that gives you about a year to
pick up the technology and become familiar enough with it to
use it. Decause we experiment very cautiously with
sorr:~thing as monumental as the fishery.
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So it took us a year of using it to be confident that
we understood what it was doing. And the next year we were
using it in the assessment. And it gave a better focus, 8
better fix on what the stock was doing, than the previous
tools we were using. And what it meant was that whQre we
had esi::imatQd that the stock had been grOWing about fiftoen
percent a year all the way back to the ldd-'seventies, it
had in fact been growing about 10 to 11 per cent a year.
When you compound that over the better part of a
decade, the end-points are pretty far apart. A message that
still hasn't gotten through to the public. They really
believe that the stock went frOlll an end-point of a stock
growth rate of 15 per cent compounded over a decade to the
end-point of an 11 per cent growth rate compounded over a
decade. And they say that we were wrong on the whole
trajectory. It's not an easy thing to explain to people who
are not familiar with compound interest rates. Not just
looking it up in a table but the mathematice behind compound
interest.
{Later amplification re management under conditions of
uncertainty: ~We are working VERY hard on 'management under
uncertainty.' unfortunately, the greater the uncertainty,
the more conservative the management must be to avoid
eventual crisis (where 'eventual' is one to three decades).
Governments (and managers) need VERY strong will to keep
things restrictive whan short-term signs are good. But ell
models of management under uncertainty (and unreliable data,
or incomplete data, are an excellent source of uncertainty)
reQuire such strategies.·]
Q: They're not interested in that stuff for the simple
reason that the effects are as real to them as if you had in
fact removed a third of the fi.sh from the ocean.
A: Yes.
Q: Quotas disappear, jobs disappear. You've just wiped out
the stock as far as they're concerned.
A: And to say that it was never there is irrelevant. I
agree with you. The other thing that has been the bane of
us, and I'm speaking ill of people who are no longer around
to defend themselves ...But at the tints of the extension of
jurisdiction, science was asked for a bunch of projections.
The economiats need ten or fifteen year projections to look
at investment patterns and rebUilding things.
Any scientist would have said "We can't look that far
ahead into the future. Four years from now and we can talk
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about right now. Four years from now about eighty percent
of the fish being taken by the fishery will be from year-
~~asses we have not yet seen today.~ You're just gazing in
a crystal bell. The scientists were told ..• they refused the
first two times they were asked for fifteen year
projections.
0: What years are we talking a~out?
A: We're talking about '76, '77, '78, in there es we,
Canada, was getting ready to extend jurisdiction. The first
couple of times they said we absolute~y can't do it. But
the word came back down, "We must have these projections.
If you don't give them to us, we'll give the job to the
economists and they'll do it."
Q; This would have been from Ottawa, DFO central?
A: I don't know if it was DFO or one of the economic
portfolios. This greatly precedes me. But there was very
strong pressure put on the scientists to produce long-tBrm
projections. 1 've had hauled out for me copies of the
documents that went uP. loaded with qualifiers. "This is
assuming that the recruitment stays at the historic
average ... " We're talking about 1976. The last year-class
they saw was 1972. So they're taking the average
from... basically '62 was the first one they had a fi" on, to
, 72.
And that was at the time when they had the huge
removels from the stock. And we have lata of reasons now to
believe that the numbers that were being reported and t:he
aga composition of the catch being reported in the 'sixties
was really inflated compared to what was actually being
taken. The age composition particularly. Likely they were
mining a much older stock than was being reported as being
harvested.
Because if they keep the age composition young, we say
this is the rate at which the fish are replenishing
themselves and they can continue. But if they were
reporting a really old age composition, it would have become
evident much earlier that thoy were mining a stock of old
fish and the age composition of the harvest could have been
seen to bs shrinking over the decade they were harvesting.
It would hevt', been recognized then, before the collapse, as
a warning si£ln.
So we have reason to believe now that the numbers being
reported in the 'sixties were systematically manipulated in
some way. The fact that the scientists were really
suspicious of them at the tima made them reluctant to use
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them. But being put in position whQre thQY werQ being told
"You must produce these figures," they took thelll.
The average number of fish entering tho stock through
tho 'sixties was up around BOO million. We haven't had a
year-class that size since the l.ate 19609.
[Later amplification: -This doesn't make clear that the
suspected (we have no evidence) misreported catch by
European countries was due to their interest in keeping
ICNAF assessments optillistic, and each country's share of
the catch as high as possible, because they all knew that
when ICNAF did go to quotas, each country's share would
reflect their historic reported share. Hence, report as
much as possible. Canadians were reporting truthful.ly, 8S
best we can tell now."]
Q: Do you think that was actually the case or is this what
was deduced from the suspect catch data?
A: There's no way to go back and determine whether it was
miareporting of the catch data or the fact that ... thesQ high
recruitment figures were reported for cod stocks everywhere
in the world. It could have been that the environmental
conditions..• certoinl.y in the lat:e 'f.1fties and early
'sixties were the warmest period the ocean' 8 Been since the
1920s. You've got this long-term climatic signal. And.it
could have been that the ocean really was that: productive
t:hen and it simply hasn't been since. For most of the
decade its been the coldest per.1od since 1900 to the 'teens
(1913, 1914).
People who like to model these things will tell you
that there's a 37 year cyc1"".
Q: SO you coul.d use a very si.pl.e energy llOdel of the ocean.
Heat is energy and in the fan of solar energy it's the
primary sourCQ of energy for the system. You pump more
energy in and you get more biotic productivity.
A: That's anot:her case where the first reliable data
collected anywhere in the world, start:ed coming in in the
1950s. And if we're looking for signals on decadal
cycles ...we're looking at the 'fifties, 'sixties and
'seventies. We've had three decades. But meteorologists
looking at sun spot cycles and continental cycles of
temperature and moisture and stuff ... I said 37 years because
t:hat's where a lot of people say you've got these long-term
cycles, a third of 8 century long. And if it is about a
t:hird of a century long, the 'sixties would be a peak and
the eighths would be a trough,
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So we were projecting what would happen through the
late 'seventies and 'eighties, if it is climatic ... and this
is strictly conjecture although there is all sorts of
analysis; being done on the problem. There's lots of
plausibl.e theories to tie it all together. The problem is
that we can't test them till we get another 30 years of
data.
So whatever caused those really high recruitment,
either lying or climatic influences, the recruitment levels
in 'the 'eighties were less than half. So industry was
expecting gearing up for an annual inflUX of resol,lrces that
were twice the size of the influx that actually
materialized.
If I: were an investor I: would feel rightly outraged.
An investor in my own boat or a million dollar investor in a
major fish company. Probably a smaller fisherman more so
than a big one because what he has left to live on is a
smaller pool than a major corporate investor. But those
investors were banking on projections bl\sed on the best data
available but the data simply didn't apply to the 1980s.
If the political system had evolved ten years later, if
they'd been looking to extend jurisdiction in 1986, 1987, if
this cyc1.e continues, and we've got a cnuple of good
recruiting year-classes coming in right now, snd the inshore
fishery is going quite well this year. The prognosis looks
good in the short-term. We could have been blamed for being
pessimistic in five years ... 1.993-1994. The fishermen would
be complaining every year of a cod glut. They WOUldn't have
the processing capacity to process it or the harvesting
capacity to harves"!; it.
Because the data was giving a really pessimistic
9ignal. And I don't say that beceuse I feel persecuted, but
all the time i've spent talking with bioJ.ogists, they're all
qui te comfortable now talking about the variance in the
system that we're dealing with. If you look at northern cod
recruitment eince 1972 it's been down in the neighbourhood
of 1. 7S million fish and as high as 400 million three times
each. Throe full cycles of nearly three-fold change in
size.
Q: You're speaking of numbers with a fair degree of
precision. Is that warranted?
A: Talking about the history from 1972, which was a big
turning point in the way that the old ICNAF countries ...
0: Let me interrupt for e moment. What I'm trying to get at
hera is whether science has brought criticism on itself by
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pretendi.ng to or seeming 'to be capable of delivering
knowledge wi'th a degree of prec1.sion 'that was not warran-ted.
A: 1n this case, the recruitment from 1972 -to I'd say about
1983-'84 now, we're Quite confident of. And we're Quite
confident of them because we can count them. The sampling
starting in 1972, international standards were adopted,
exchanges of 'the o-toliths so you could check that the
Spanish end the Portuguese were aging fish the same way we
were. The da1:a becam'" much mora standardized in how it was
being collected and handled.
You take the year-class produced in 1972. There are
almost none of them around now. All you have to do is count
up the number of four year old fish in '76 and five year old
fi.sh in '77, that were caught, and so on. You tota~ them up
and you've got a bottom li.ne, :It had to be at least that
bi.g because we've seen that many fish. The natural
mortal1ty is a wild card that you through in but i. t' s a
scaling factor and there's any number of ways to go about
showing it. Unless l,;here' s a systematic change in natural
mortality over time, and that's not out of the Question .if
you're dealing with a heavi.ly pOlluted body of water like
the Bal t.ic sea, ...
0: Or in our case possible changes in the ocean c1i.mate like
a sudden influx of cold water.
A: Yes. But that's a point event: and would show up as a
marked ... let's say that you're 'tracking a year-class and the
bottom fell out of .it. 1 certa.inly wouldn't suggest that
that has never happened. But when it happens it really
stands out from your relatively smooth decay of a year-class
over time.
0: So what you're saying i.a that you're getting pretty good
at virtual population analysis but prediction is still
anybody's guess.
A: Still anybody's guess. The totRlling up of what was out
there is now getting t the point ·...here I would say ten
percent error is generous.
0: But what's out there right now is still a big question
m.uch less what will be?
A: Yes. What's out there r.ight now I l·;ould say 30 (i.e. 30
per cent conf.idence interval around the esti.mate) ... for a
stock where you can trust the data that you' re getting from
industry.
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Q: And is that a given now1
A: In northern cod we believe it is with the small proviso
that we don't know about discarding in the inshore. But the
observer coverage on the offshore really is working.
They've had all kinds of undercover experiments and the
observers really are doing the job of keeping the industry
honest about whet goes in the log books. You occasionally
heer accusations that there's collusion, the observer's
being paid of by the captain and stuff like that. I've
heard, they'd never consult science about it because it
would blow the whole th:f.ng, but we've heard of at least
three investigations all of which came out with a complet'Q1.y
clean bill of heal"th for the program. So the offshore is
being reported accurately. The inshore, because it is on an
allowance rather than an allocation, is free to overrun the
allowance any time it wanta to.
Q: What about the middle distance crowd?
A: The middle distance crowd is a new kettle of fish and
it's one that many of us, and I don't mean just scientists,
arG really wary of. I don't know what's going on on the
middle distance trawlers.
Q: It sounds like no Olle does. There are continuing reports
of massive discards and unreported night-time 1anrJ~ngs at
fish plants.
A: Tha"t would not have been a problem until the last few
years. For the core per.1od of late 'seventies and first
half of the 'eighties they don' t represent a source of
substantial error. But they certainly COUld now.
The scientists are ••..When J.J. Maguire had hie big
presentation back in May of the northern cod assessment, it
wasn't just the northern cod advice, it was, here's the
assessment. And the message he kept stressing was, we' re
not going to say whether fishing mortality is .47 or .57. or
.57. Relstively small nuances of a number of things can
influencs that bottom line. What we will say is that we are
damn sure that fishing mortality is way above our target and
we need to lower it. And how much we need to lower it and
how we go about lowering it are decisions "that we are
conSUlting with you peop~e on.
The stock is not going to collapse overnight if you
keep fishing it at the same level it is. It'll
collapse ... you car~' t fish it at this level forever. But in
the ehort-term like 1990, 1991, the stock will survive and
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stay hea1thy and continue to reproduce itse1f, especie11y
because there's some evidence of sOllIe good recruitment
coming up. But if you keep fishing at this level, the more
you lower it, the more it's g01ng to rebuild. That's a very
different message than scientists used to g1.ve. They used
to ... I agree. They used to be guilty of saying "The number
is this."
Q: Is this a symptom of the long-etancUng position of
privilege and authority that sc1.ence has been granted and
enjoyed since Newtonian times?
A: When I came into the CAFSAC steering committee .•.. 1
wouldn't put it that strongly. Again, very pragmatic people
having been burned a few times. For a couple of years they
said, "Here's the confidence interval that the answer lies
within." And you give that to people who aren't used to
dealing with confidenca interva1s, try to explain to them
what a confidence interval is and they say "Ohl That means
that I can take the number at the top!"
After two or three years of getting burned that way,
the elder statesmen of the disc.ipline developed the
principle that, if you give them a choice, they're always
90.ing to take the JIIost optimisti.c interpretation they can.
So unless we believe that the upper number really is as good
as the mid-po.int, you better give them the mid-point. And
that was the reason1.ng behind it. It wasn't ... certalnly
901.ng back to 1982 when I joined the department.
At no time, then or later, did I feel that the
scientists were deluding themsel.ves about how accurate their
results were. It's just that they didn't trust anybody
further on in the process to take 8 range of options as
anything other than an invitation to take the IlOst
optimistic one. And I think that fear on their part was
reasonabl.y vel.l-founded. But in doing eo, they really set
themselves up.
Q: Because that created the illusion and assumption of
precision on the part of the consulllers of scientific
knowledge.
A: One of the really frustrating things, to the working
SCientist, about both the Alverson and the Harris report and
many of the people 1.nterviewed frequently from the
univorsity, b1.0logy people, ocean eciencee and stuff. They
will never stick their neck out and say, "The answer that
they gave of X wss wrong and it shOUld have been Y." They
are quite happy to say, "X is wrong," but they will nover
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allow themselves to be pinned down to what the substitu4;:e
is.
Q: That's not quite true. I seem to recall the Harris
report, equivocating a bit but saying things like, "On the
whole, we are inclined to think that fishing mortality has
~~:nr;~~:i~:r~~~yt~i~~~ri~~~~a~s~~m:a~f.~nd is probably in
A: Yes. We have learned from their equivocation, and 1:
think there's a little bit of bitterness that doesn't have
to be there. That if they can do it and be recognized as
the leading experts on the cod stocks, we're gOing to start
doing it too.
It would of been very easy, when we did the really
controversial assessment that lead to the Harris report, to
have said, the answer must lie somewhere between "this figure
and this figure. Rather than spending another day and a
half in a room with twenty people saying, "If we give 100
per cent of the weight to the commercial catch rate we get a
.3. If we give 100 per ce;·' of the weight to the research
survey we get a .55. How do we reconcile them?" If we'd
been willing to stop there and say. "This range bounds the
answer and we tend to think it's on the upper end because we
have reasons to believe that the research vessel is likely
to be more accurate."
That's about what Harris did. And there were a couple
of people who didn't went to go any further then 1:hat. But
the advisory syetem, up until 1:he northern cod problems,
really wanted the scientists to resolve it down to a point,
with the message coming back. that, "If you don't do it,
who's going to? Who's in a better position than you are to
reconcile the conflicting information?" And that's the kind
of strOking that any professional, not just scientists, but
any professional wi.thin his field .... "Who's in a better
position than you t:o reconcile divergent information in your
field of specializa"tion?"
Q: And you never heard the bomb ticking?
A: We kept doi.ng it. I'm sure there's a part of me that's
responding defensively but there's a part of me that's also
responding very honestly.
I sat through a lot of discussions with those people.
And I think the conviction was that if we don't do it, the
people who w1.l1 .... Because at the end of the day it has to
be done. '{ou can't come out and say, "Tho TAC is going to
be somewhere between 150 and 250 thousand tonnea and we're
going to watch and see how it goes and tell you half way
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through the season where we want to end.· You just can' t
manage the resource that way. They need an ansver.
Q: So through various pressuros. sOllIe of them externally
imposed and some of thea interna11y imposed, you came to
c!e1iver your advice in a fora that gave an illusion of
precision that 'Was not warranted and that you knew was not
warranted. But you felt that both for the good of the
resource and for your own persona1 and professional reasons
that this was the best of several choices.
,..: Yes. I think it's roally ieportant that at some point in
your work you go back snd 100k at the NAFO reports because
up until 1987 the assessment was done in NAFO. And in the
NAFO Redbook is where the annual assessments are reported.
And in the Redbook you' 11 see, going back as fer as I went
to check in preparing for the court case, the quali.fiers are
a11 there in the text. There'e this c1sss of reasons to
worry that it could bd higher end this class of reasons to
worry that it could be lower.
CAFSAC has been active since 1978 but, for a lony t1.me,
because there were both foreign allocations of cod within
the 200 m1.le l1.mit and a fishery outside the 200 mile limit,
it was treated aa 8 stock that was a trans-boundary stock.
And trans-boundary stocks are assessed in an international
forum. The southern Grand BankS stocks are stUl done in
NAFO. The dec1.sion to do the northern cod assessment BS a
strictly Canadian stock was made in 1987, I believe. It was
resisted by a ~ot of European countries which fish outside
the 200 mile 11.mit.
They argued vary strongly that it should not be treated
8S a sole1y Canadian stock because there is a trans-boundary
component to it and Canada .1a signatory to agre8lllents which
acknowledge the legit.1llacy of internationsl review of trans-
boundary stocks.
Q: Let's shift to current stock assessment practices.
'lou've sai.d that you think that cOlNlercial catch data from
inside the 200 mile limit 1.s now roasonably reliabl.e. Let's
talk a b1.t about RV data, survey design, physical sampling
and some of the hydroacoustlc work. What's your assessment
of the state of the art?
A: The research vessel 8urvey... I:t's time to review the
stratification program where we use a random atrat1.fied
design. You know about stratification in things. I think e
lot of the stratification theory came from the social
sciences rather than the physica~ sciences. It's time to
review the stratification design to see if it's the JIlOst
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efficient one possible. You can't do such a review until
you've had the better part of 8 decade of surveys. The
whole point of stratification design is minimizing the
within strata to among strata variance. And you have to
have several replicants to get a handle on those variance
estimators.
There 1 S no question that stratification is a gain over
completely randomized design. Whether we have the optimal
stratification design is one of the j(.lbs that has been on
the plate for about two years and we're into the third year.
We just can't get to it because we're busy servicing crises
instead of doing something like that. We're looking at
whether there might be a gain in going to fixed stations
rather than a new random sample each year. You run a risk
of increasing your bias in exchange for gstting a much lower
variance in your estimate. But with ten years of data we
can get a handle on how big the bias is.
It would have to do with whether there are systematic
changes in the dishibution of fish over time. It's quite
likely that there are. Cold years are systematically
different than warm years. That's an ampirical question
that we now have the data to look at. And we plan to have
that work done. not in time for this year's survey but in
t1me to design next year's survey.
So the design i taeU is pretty well grounded in
statistical theory and I feel pretty comfortable with it.
Whether we've got an adequate sampling intensity is hard to
know. More data are always desirable. Certai.nly being able
to increase the number of sets by only 20 per cent with the
extrs money we got last year enabl.ad us to take the variance
in the estimate of numbers down 42 per cent.
And if we can increase the sampling effort a little bJ.t
more we m1.ght be ~blG to get it down a ] Htle bit more. It
looks like there is an asymptote. That's part of the
si.mulat1on study we'll be doing. What happens if we only
increase the effort 10 percent, fifteen percent, twenty
percent? So you can begin to plot the shape of the decline
in variance. Is it still decreasing qUickly so that there
wi.l1 be more ga1.n or is it at the point where it's beginn1.ng
to flatten out? For a further meaningfUl decrease in
variance you m;lght have to triple the sampling effort and
that's just impossible.
Q: But you're not sure whether you're at or approaching that
point yet?
A: We'll know by this time next year.
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0: To what extent are you using hydroacoustic data and is it
seen as a replacement or supplement to physical survey data?
A: Supplement to. One of the things we've discussed,
because there's a lot of money in the northern cod package
for hydroacoustics ••.. It was suggested several places,
including the Harris report, that we get a hydroacoustic
index from the inshore.
Everyone that we've talked to who's knowledgable about
hydroacoust.ics haa said emphati.cally that the technolOgy
does not exist to give you a reliable index during the
inshore mid-June to mid-September period. The spatial
heterogeneity of distribution is so great that you'd have to
have thirty boats .•• ,
I mean, if you could have thirty or forty boats ell
working full time with a full complement of scientists on
them you could cover the area from Cape Race up to Makovik.
But you'd have to do it on a scale of half a kilometre at
most to do a decent job of getting something reliable.
That' a just impossi.ble right now.
Offshore, we' va tr.ied for thrse years to ge't an
offshore biomass estimate when they're in their pre-spawning
aggregation. For a couple of years we've had technology
problems because all the hydroacoustic gear ie still
reasonably delicate instrumentation. We used to wreck it on
the ice and do hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of
damage each cruise. We have those problems solved and we're
off to a good start in mapping the total si.ze of the
offshore concentration during the pre-spawning period.
So we're pretty opti.mistic that by this winter, .. 1:' d
say that the winterization program we had 1ast year was
about eighty per cent succeasfu1. And the twenty per cent
that kept us from completing the job, we expect by next year
to have it really well worked out. The kicker thers is tho
winter ics conditions. Now that the hydroacoustic gear
works during the wi.nter we can deploy it essentially
anywhere the boat can go.
Unfortunately there will always be ice so thick that no
boat that tows fishing gear can get through it, But what we
will be able to do is say that the absolute biomass esti.mate
.in the area that a boat can operate in is this much, And if
'the number is big we'll be happy. If the number is smal.l
and there'a a lot of ice, there's always the posSibility
that the fish are simply under the ice. It is folk wisdom
that fi.sh don' t like to be onder the ice.
0: But that may simply be an anthropomorphic projection.
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A: Yas. You ask people why arid they say that it's so dark
down there. Well they're down 350 metres or more and
there's no light getting down there whether there's ice or
not. It· s dark wherever they are.
Q: I've talked to some people doing hydroacoustic work and
they've told me that thfo,re are still a lot of sources of
error that they can't control yet. For instance, they took
two identical machines, e81ibrated them identically, put
them on two similar ships steaming side by side over the
same aggregation of fish and the variance in the return
signal was something on the order of twenty to twenty five
per cent.
A: That does not surprise me.
Q: And the technical people I was talking to said that that
isn't the big problem. That isn't the reel source of error.
They're not working too hard on "that yet because the
behaviourial variables are even greater. There's no point
in making the machinery more accurate when the signal
strength va1·ies so widely depending upon the orientation of
the fish in the water column. I was told that in the most
extreme cases, the variance can be as much a seventy per
cent.
1>.: And that also doesn't surprise me. For a long time the
Norwegians were being held up as the great example of the
application of hydroacoustics. They were actually doing the
hydroacoustiC surveys and using it to tune their cohorts.
When they were over here last November for the cod/caplin
working group meeting, they said they had abandoned the
hydroacoustic index for assessment purposes.
They still did the survey. You learn a lot about the
biology of the species because you can map local patterns of
distribution, do some oceanography, differentiate cod and
caplin and stuff. We would neve:r cut back on our
hydroacoustic efforts because we are learning so much about
cod from them.
But people who think that in the short-term
hydroacoustics are going to give us direct biomass
estimates, replace traditional indexes, aren't really
familiar with what people who are trying to apply it to a
fisheries context will say. There's a great deal of private
sector interest in hydroacoustics and you can find
promotional litorature that promises everything. But if you
look et people who are applying it ...Everyona says it's
extremely valuable, extremely enlightening to do, but to
take a number anti say this represents the fish that are out
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there is a step that I don't know anyone who' £I in fisheries
is willing to take.
Q: It seems to me that at present it is the moat theory-
laden of all the sampling techniques and the most sUbject to
influence from other unknowns.
A: That fish orientation problem you pointed out. I know
of three different groups of people who have worked on the
pure mathematics of what happens when 8 signal is bounced
off randomly oriented objects. How can you reconstruct the
total number of targets? It's a problem that's of interest
because it has Star Wars applications. You've got a radar
signal showing a bunch of objects coming over the horizon
and you want to Jc"\ow how many of them and what they are.
Star Wars money has bought a lot of bright people working on
the same problem but we still don't have that nuclear
umbrella up there yet. Radar and missiles or hydroacoustics
and fish. Mathematically it's the same problem.
We were talking about indexes. the research vessel
index, hydroacoustic index, the catch per unit effort from
the offshore. The catch data, as I've said, we're quite
happy with. The effort data is shaky. Not because they lie
but because there's no reason that they've ever had to be
systematic in what they do and how the skippers keep their
log books. What's effort? From the time the net hits the
water until it's back on the deck or from the time it hits
the bottom until the time you start to haul back? And
there's been an awful lot of technological progress.
Industry. whether it was vested self-interest or not,
and I say vested interest because industry was quite
concerned with what a low influence the CPUE data had on
this year's assessment, they haVe been incredibly
cooperative in making available to us really detailed
records of their best skippers. The skippers personal log
books. Not the required information that goes to statistics
branch but what every skipper koeps.
They have come to us saying, "Tell us exactly what you
want and we'll provide it." They will try to match vessels,
because both FPI and NatSea have vessels that are the same
in everything but name but they may differ in the time that
certain pieces of technology were introduced. "We'll try to
match skipper expertise, we'll give you two identical
vessels, and we'll give you the skippers' histories and the
time at which certain pieces of technology were introduced."
It was this trip that they first used the SCANMAR sensor to
say where the trawl doors were.
They're providing all this information to us and
they've come through with what we've asked. "Tell us what
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piece of technology you're interested in and we'll give you
the data to refine what effect that technological change had
on your CPUE index." We haven't solved the problem of
getting effort really raliably down, but boy, has industry
shown an incredible willingness to make available to us the
informatic.'O that may help us do that. It's a non-trivial
analytical job to go through all the data but just to have
it offered that freely ~.hows a real act of good faith on the
part of industry.
The final index we hope to have very soon is the
inshore. WS have the logbook program which like any big
program has had a rocky start but each year it looks better.
And one of the things that we're getting with the northern
cod rasources is a dedicated biologist to spend the whole
summer going from community to community, whether it's the
logbook program or some mutational form of the logbook
program.
But this will be a person devoted to spending the whole
aummer dealing day-to-day on the docks with the inshore
fishermen alld spending the rest of the year converting what
he collects into some sort of an index which will start off
with equal weighting in the assessment process, i.e., it
will have as much chance of influencing CAFSAC's view of the
stock as any other index does. We hope to have that person
staffed by October so they can spend the winter getting to
know the fishermen and the associations. Send them around
to the winter meetings and stuff.
0: One of the most common criticism I hear fro the publiC
about science is that you just hide away up in the White
Hilla and we never see you except when it's to tell us bad
news. When we first met in that meeting with Mac and Peter
Shel ton, Barbara asked a question about the place of
traditional knowledge in the process of resource assessments
whereupon Mac launched into a long story about a scientist
who had spent too much time with fishermen and come to a bad
end. The way he told it, the story clearly had a moral and
that moral was that it was not only a wastA of time for
scientists to spend time with fishermen but that it was
potentially dangerous.
A: I can't recall that story exactly.
0: The point was that this person had mis-placed sympathies
which were very human and perhaps unde:::'standable but not
only had he neglected his duties as a research scientist but
in tha end the conflict batween the two cUlturas had in some
sense destroyed him. The moral of the story was very clear.
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Don't fuck around with fishermen and if you do, look out! I
was very surprised at the edge buried in that story.
A: Mac, at the time that you talked to him, was not a
completely objective person. He had, as it afterwards
turned out, a quite legitimate fear for his own neck.
But certainly in the time I've been with the
department, there's been a long history, well I can't say
long history because it hasn't been that long, but going
hand in hand with spending a lot of time dealing with the
inshore fishermen, is a really severe case of burnout. And
a great deal of frustration .• Not with the system for
discouraging you from doing that. I certainly have .•. If I
went back and went through my book I probably went to 15
inshore fishermen's meetings in the two years I was head of
division of groundfish. That'e not a great record but it's
not a bad one either. As Division Head I wasn't alw&ye the
preferred... If it was about particular species, they'd want
the specie biologist responsible for it. And that's where
the burnout came.
Henry Lear is a classic case. A really excellent cod
biologist and son of a fisherman who is 77 and still out
more days than not. The Port de Grave Lears. He became the
person the department would send to every hostile meeting of
inshore fishermen.
It's a really difficult position to be in. They're
often angry about advice you never gave. Decisions thet
aren't baced on the advice you did give. Or you can only
tell half the answer because the other half is still being
debated in ottawa for its political sensitiVities. I, and
no other scientist in the department that I know of, has
ever been asked to lie. But we certainly have, at various
times, been discouraged from revealing the whole truth.
Every government has to do that to its civil servants.
You can I t have everything that's going on in the halls of
government ending up in the newspaper the next day. You
have to allOW the people whose job it is to make policy talk
about what the advice is, what it means, come to the
conclusions and make the policy.
When it gets awkward is when you have a northern cod
assessment done in January and revealed in the middle of
May. That's a very long hiatus. Not to lie but simply say.
"Yes, I know what the results of the asseasmsnt are but I'm
not at liberty to discuss them." Dealing with fishermen's
groups a lot you can't avoid finding yourself in situations
like that. That context of things is really a recipe to
burn somebody out.
I don't know who Mac was talking about but certainly
Henry is the example I've seen and it wasn't that anything
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bad happened to him. He left Newfound1.and, he's still with
the department. He has a very good job he's happy with.
But he was a real loss to Newfoundland because he was a good
biologist and so deeply rooted in the inshore fishery that
he could go down to any dock in Newfoundland, be accepted as
someone who would unCI ,"gtand them, and come away having
understood what the:r ..•..1 to say.
Q: SO his burnout was due to the conflict between his native
culture and his adopted culture as a federal scientist?
A: To the extent that any case like that has a one sentence
explanation, yes. Roughly that.
It wasn't just that. At the time he was being sent
out, '85, '86 when they had their big trough in catches, it
wasn't a stock decline because the stock was stable for the
period when the inshQre catches dropped for a couple of
years real1.y serious1.y. No question about it. They went
from over 100,000 tonnes down to about 70,000 tonnes for a
couple of years. Then they jumped back up to 100,000
tonnes.
It wasn't just that he had a party line that he had to
toe. It was that he was really at a loss. He believed as
much as any of us that the stock was in good shape but the
inshore fishermen were not catching fish.
Now people are saying in hindsight that the inshore
fishermen's low catches were the first sign that the
scientists were wrong. The fishermen's inshore catches were
completely incompatible with what we now view as the
trajectory. The stock built until around '84, stayed stable
to '87 and then dropped probably 15-20 percent with the
really poor recruiting year-classes we've had coming in. So
it went up, went flat and no it's down. The inshore went
uP. dropped a lot, was down for two years, went up and has
been Climbing slowly ever since. This year the projections
are that it I S probably going to be the best year in 20 years
for the inshore. So the inshore catches are not tracking
what we calculate as the total stock b:ajectory.
A. lot of his burnout was that he could relate to these
people, he could share the pain they were gOing through and
as a scientist he didn't have any answers I At that time we
believed that the stock was still increasing and we weran't
right. It wasn't. But the stock wasn't collapsing. At
that time, when the inshore catch was going to hell, the
stock was maintaining a stabl"~ state. The years it has
declined are the years that t;he inshore fishery has gone up.
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0: Does this provide Borne credibility to the proposition
that there may be discrete inshore and offshore stocks?
A: Everybody believes that once upon a time there were big
inshore stocks. There are certainly remnants of them but
the remnants aren't large enough to support much of a
fishery. And the evidence for that is how hard we work, not
just in DFO but in Memorial, to get 30 or 40 fish to tag in
the winter. It's a hell of an effort. If there were enough
fish in the inshore stock to account for these fluctuationR,
we would be able to find enough fish to apply a 1,000 tags.
Aside from fluctuations in the stock, the contribution
of the total stock to the inshore fishery has to be
influenced by some kind of environmental factors. One of
the excellent correlations, and these are only correlations,
is the one between winter ice and inshore Catch. The years
of really heavy ice have been years of good inshore
fisheries.
Now it's being said, flWell, heavy ice nleans the
offshore trawlers can't operate. fl So it's the absence of
the trawlers that gives you the good fishery. The thing is
that this correlation goes back to the 'thirties. Since the
sinking of the Titanic, there' ve been reasonably good ice
records. And the correlation holds up back to the thirties
and before we had the fleet of offshore t:a."awlers.
0: What's your personal opinion about the controversy
surrounding dragging on the spawning grounds?
A: I had to read every paper and everything that's ever been
written related to that topic for the court case. So my
personal opinion is very much tied up with the science
background. And 1 think it's a total crock of shit. Every
component of it is being misrepresented.
The territoriality component of it is really
characteristic of large numbers of adult fish being held in
a small container than should be there. Anytime that
happens, what you get is two or three of the largest fish,
and it could be one or two depending on how crowded they are
relative to normal conditions. They'll simply become
dominant and control the core of the tank and drive
everybody else off into the corners. Anybody who studies
animal behaviour will tell you that's not evidence of
territoriality, that's evidence of interspecific
intolerance. You don't want other individuals close to you.
And if you're in a limited space whal: that means is that the
most dominant individual controls a lot of the space and the
next dominant controls the next dominant and eventually you
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run out of space and all the sub-dominants are crowded
together.
Even the people who've done the basic work which was
being presented by NIFA as evidence of territoriality, say
right in their papers that when you get the fish down 350
meters, when they're up off the bottom, which they are
during the breeding season, there are no physical cues to
begin with. The classic concept of territoriality is
completely inapplicable because there is no space they're
going to defend.
What they are going to do is try to keep other
individuals, except sexually receptive members of the
opposite sex, from approaching very closely. A net going
through a group of inoividuals who are not tolerating close
approach by others simply means that they move relative to
the net. Maintain the intolerance. And it doesn't break
down any social structure at all. If it were traditionally
t.erritoriality and you drive them off their space, the way
you talk about birds, that could be more of a problem .. But
there's just nothing to suggest, from cod or any other
schooling deep-water fish.
The thing about screwing them up so that they don't
produce any fertile eggs that year ... certainly if the net
goes by a pair that is just ready to mate and drives them
apart and they each release their eggs and their milt, then
you've lost one spawning. But it's well-established in any
study that's been done, lab or field, that cod are batch
spl::lwners and they don't release all their reproductive
products in one push.
For an adult cod it will be about a dozen time over a
three-week period, usually about three days apart, they will
release a pulse of eggs or sperm. So if you do screw up one
mating, you've got 11 more chances.
Do you have permanent residual effects? We can catch
fish in February, put them in a hOlding pen that' s the size
of this tablb, keep them there till the boat docks, throw
them in a carrying case which fits in the back of a big
station wagon, take them to the lab. throw them in enother
holding tank, and three weeks later they're courting
normally and producing fertile eg9s. Ken Waywood, who's
working on cod aquaculture down in st. Andrews, has to make
sure that he keeps the males and the females separate
because he's doing this under controlled conditions. And he
sey you c.:'m hand strip them throw them back into the tank,
and if he :>uts a male in with the felnales, within a day they
are courtin'.i' And these are females who've been stripped as
well as males, they're courting and producing fertile
eggs.
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And it's really hard "to believe tha"t a trawl going by
but not catching you is more stressful than being dipped up
with a net, being hand stripped of everything that can be
milked out of you and then being thrown back in the tank.
Having said all that, industry is capable of catching
fish in large numbers in January and February and early
March. And they seem to be capable of catching fish in the
late fall. TO put the public at esse, the government may
decide as policy, no, we're going to close the offshore
spawning banks for three weeks at the Clnd of March and early
April when they're a"t the peak of spawning. To leave them
alone.
But I've told other people and I'll tell you, I'm
wiling to bet a dinner for four at The Stone House [8 very
expensive restaurant] that there won't be a shred of benefit
accrue to the stock from the closure other than if the
closure results in catching a total of fewer fish.
I think the stock would be much better off if people
who were concerned about recruitment postponed the fishery
in January and ;" ,bruary into March and April so that you get
some of the eggs and sperm released. If you drive the
fishery into January and February you're catching a lot of
reproductively capable fish a month before they're going 'co
spawn.
And that's a likely thing to happen. If you close
March and April, you're going to increase the catch in
January and February. All those fish you're taking the last
two weeks of April have done most of their breeding before
you've caught them. If you drive 'that fishery into
February, you're going to lose all of them.
My guess, my professional opinion, it's not a guess.
It's based on more hours of reading than I've ever chosen to
do about anything. The issue of disturbance is really
anthropomorphic red herring. Particularly because cod ....
A mature female cod will shed two million eggs in a
year. And the difference between a really poor year-class
and a really good year-class is the difference between two
out of two million and eight out of two million surviving.
I have a lot of trouble believing that anything other than
the environmental conditions the eggs encounter are the
really dominant feature. Two out of two million or eight
out of two million is the difference between riches or
poverty.
0: So it seems that except perhaps in the heaviest fishing
years of the' sixties, that environmental factors affecting
the natural mortality of the pre-recruitmClnt stock are more
important than fishing mortality in determining the size of
the fishable stock?
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A: Yes. But we focus on fishing mortality because we can
. control it. And we learned from the 'sixties that if you
don't control it, even under what appear now to have been
fairly benign and favourable fishing conditions, you can
still drive the stock to hell.
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APPENDIX J
Interview with Jean .Jacques Maguire. Chair of CAFSAC
Conducted in St. John'.. Newfoundland
OCtober 2B, 1990
0: I'll start right in the middle of it. I think I'm
beginning to unOerstand Why fisheries stock assessment
science is having such a difficUlt time meeting the
expectations of its client groups. It's an interesting form
of science because it does exist to serve the interests of
essentially two client groups: one, the industry and two,
the needs of the political and management structure. So it
is very different from academic science in that respect.
There is sornB conflict resident in that distinction because
the evaluative structure and advancement criteria for
research scientists in DFO is based on academic traditions;
on research and publishing. Not, particularly, their
effectiveness in meeting the needs of the client groups. So
there's potential •..•
A: It's a very serious problem as a matter of fact.
C: There's a sacond, more serious problem in the surprising
inability of stock assessment science to acquire any
practical or useful knowledge. knowledge of the requisite
precision, to fulfil the needs and expectations of the
management structure and of the planning needs of the
commercial industry. It's not simply, I don't think. that
the systems involved•.. the macro-system and the sub-
systems•.. are so complex. They are. But that we've tended
to think in linear terms of management. Of lIlan' 8 Illanagemen t
of natural systems. Rather in classical liberal lIarket
terms. If you take less fish now, if you kill less fish.
there wi11 bo lIIore fish 1ater..• all other things being
equal. But I've begun to read sOllie chaos theory ..• the
theory that natural systems are essentially non-linear.
Existing in quantum states, if you will. Bob May started to
do some work in this area, his work in population dynamics.
50 these are some of the sort of things that I'm beginning
to think about. I guess now I'd liko to backtrack and
review your background and your current work.
A: Okay. I started working with DFO in 1977 in BIO, Bedford
Insti tute of Oceanography. I' va essentially worked in
asseSSli,Elnt. I've worked on north weat atlantic mackerel
assessment. Several cod stocks. 4V5W--the eastern Scotia
407
Shelf, and 4TVM--the southern GUlf of St. Lawrence.
Pollock, redfish, various stocks.
I got involved in the Canadian Atlantic Scientific
Advisory system, which is the only one for Canadian
scientists, since 197B. The way the system is structured,
you may know, there are five species sub-committees;
groundfish, pelagic fish, invertebrate/marine plants, marine
mammals, and anadromous/catadromous fish. And the way these
work is that they are peer review groups that meet and
review individual scientists' work. And there's a second-
level peer review. So I have chaired two of these sub-
committees; ground fish and pelagic fish .•. in reverse order.
Pelagic first and groundfish second.
Groundfish is the most complicated. Not really the
most complicated. That's where the analyses appear to be
the most complicated. In fact, the most complicated are the
anadromous/catadromous and the invertebrate/marine plants.
Because invertebrate/marine plants is so diverse. There's
not a standard, agreed-to methodology that you're going to
use. And I've been chairperson of the committee of CAFSAC
since 1989.
0: Of the groundfish committee?
A: Of CAFSAC.
0: There's been a history of crises in the fishery.
Particularly the groundfish industry which is, of course,
the most economically significant, culturally rasonant and
politically sensitive. But it seems to me that this current
crisis is the first one where science has bean challenged
and criticised. The previous crises, especially the one the
Kirby task force responded to, were essentially socio-
economic crises. At that point the projections were for
TACs of 450,000 tonnes by now. What is your analysis of
what went wrong, if anything went ~wrong~, in stock
assessment science?
A: You've mentioned something, it's the closenes9 to the
clients. I think that's what went wrong. We distanced
ourselves from the clients ... from what we were supposed to
do. And we came to be seen as an impediment for the
industry.
It was before my time, but I understand in the lCNAF
days when all the foreign countries were fishing off the
east coast here, the Canadian scientists were very, very
close to the Canadian industry. Because what they had to do
then was to work for a common objective. The common
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objective was to build the resource and kick the foreigners
out.
So that was achieved in 1977. Kicking the foreigners
out was achieved in 1977. And rebuilding of the stocks,
most groundfish stocks, happened very, very rapidly, by
1980, 1983, they were rebuilt. That's the system I've
known.
The entire system I've known is that the industry 1s
going to ....Well, let me rephrase that. Don't be too close
to the industry beoause the industry, their natural tendency
will be to over-exploit the resource. You're not at their
service. I think what I'm trying to say is that there was
some kind of a confrontation. That we're not on the same
team any more. We had been on the same team for eight to
ten ye!".... .<J. Working for a common goal. And now you were on
separate teams. And you more or less had separate
objectives.
The objective of the fisheries biologiat was to
conserve and protect the resource. And the perceived
objective of the industry, mobile gear, offshore, capital-
intensive, was to over-exploit the resource. That's what
was being expected, I think. So that's one thing that went
wrong. We distanced ourselves from our clients.
The other thing is that, because of the particular
management system that we choose, which is baaed on Total
Allowable Catch, because of that system, there was more
precision required of us, fisheries biologists, than we can,
than we could offer. I think we thought, at least me,
naively, ten years ago I thought that our assessments were
much more precise. 1 think that the experienced people at
that time knew that they were not that precise.
But you have a management system that reacts, let me
say, dramatically, •.. or there's a strong resction to a
change of five per cent. If you change the TAC, any TAC, of
northern cod or any other one, by a very small margin, it's
going to create big problems all the way down the pyramid.
And when you realize that the precision of the stock
assessment is, at best, on the order of plus or minus 25 per
cent, then you realize that there's a discrepancy. And what
we're doing is that each year we were adjusting the TACs in
relationship with the variability in the data.
And there was total discrepancy between what the
assessments that we were doing were saying and what the
clients were seeing. Because we had two groups of clients,
as well, with opposing views. The inshore seeing one thing
and the offshore seeing something elae. And often times we
thought we were somewhere in the middla but being 90mewhare
in the middle, you've got no one agreeing with you.
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So I think those are two of the main reasons. One, we
distanced ourselves from our clients so they didn't ses us
as being helpful to them. And second, the system was
expecting more precision out of us than we could offer.
C: Do you think that science itself had any responsibility
in creating that expectation of precision?
A: We created it ourselves, to a point. With the help of
fisherie3 managers. That, of course, is my biased
perception. You probably haven't been to an advisory
meeting where the TACs and management measures are being
discussed.
C: No, but I'd very much like to if it's possible.
A: It's possible in the Scotia/Fundy regio:l where these
meetings are open. Here, it used to be that clients were
consulted each on their own. You go and consult with the
inshore and then you go and consult with the offshore. But
on the Atlantic-wide it's combined. So fisheries managers
have a very difficult task when it comes to discussing TACs
and management issues.
I wasn't there so I don't know if it was an explicit
demand, if it was implicit, if we obliged, but my guess is
that we were being offered a very gratifying and important
role. "Here's your role. What we have to do is very, very
complicated. So please don't make it more complicated by
saying that the TAC that you're proposing is not precise."
It could be anywhere from 150 to 300 instead of being 200.
"Don't sey that, please. Help. Help. 5ay just one
number." And I think we obliged. And, as I said earlier,
maybe we .•.• I know that when I was doing the assessments way
back, I thought that our precision was maybe plus or minus
ten percent. Maybe a little bit better. So we obliged.
And we did not come out and say, "This is not very
precise. This is between this and there." There were other
reasons for that, one of them being ..• aga1n, our role, our
perceived role, was protector of the resource. That if we
gave a range we knew that the upper end of the range would
be chosen. 50 we didn't know, at the time, how to present
it and still have peoplo go with the mean. In stead of
g01ng with one extreme of the range. 1 th:t:nk we did, yes,
playa role in those greater expectations. But there was
always caveats that were either not read or not remembered.
And the number that you've quoted for the Kirby report
for 2J3KL cod, those numbers, they were worked up especially
for the Kirby Report. But they were also, at the same time,
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in the five-year report which are called MResource Prospects
for Atlantic Canadian Fisheries."
0: I've read them.
A: And you've seen the caveat in the introduction which says
these should only be taken as guides to likely events, or
something like that.
0: There's one thing that's remarkable about those, that's
striking. Every ....You'll have a zero date, the present.
And on the left hand side is a bar graph with the actual
TACs and catches and there's quite 8 bit of ...
A: Variability.
0: ...variability. And on the right hand side are the
projections which ascend with a beautiful, linear stair-step
precision.
A: Yes.
0: Always going up. Always linear.
A: Not for all of them.
0: For northern cod for the last ten years that I've looked
at.
A: Probably, except for the most ....Yeah, well, that's right
because I don't know that thare has been 8 resource prospect
produced since 1989 which was the new perception of the
stock. But for northern cod, there was no way to calculate
it differently.
The way this works, th~ way the assessment works. this
type of catch projection werks, is you look back and you say
this is what history tells us. The history of northern cod
was that average recruitment was about 600 million fish a
year. So when you do your catch projection, you say average
recruitment has been 600 million, our best guess is that
average recruitment in the next five years is going to be
about 600 million.
But what did happen is that those high... strong
recruitments, are based on data from the 19608. Several
hypotheses. Maybe northern cod was more productive in the
19608. Maybe there was some over-reporting of catches by
foreign countries because the TAC management system was
gOing to be put in place and your share of the pie WOUld be
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based on what you did catch. There was same incentive for
that.
But for the last 20 years, since 1970, it's remarkable
that the recruitment goes up and down and up and down and up
and down with an average of about 300 million. Half of what
the long-term average is, Quite a striking difference. So
there was no way in 1980 or 1983 that that could be seen.
Being, at the same time, in a psychological climate where
the inshore was doing very well in the early 'eighties and
the offshore was doing extremely well. So, yes sirl 'l'he
stock is rebuilt. We're going back there.
0: What lead to the re-evaluation of the degree of precision
that you are working with? You said that when you first
became involved with the assessment you assumed that you,
and I presumEi your colleagues, were working with .•..
A: I'm a bit more naive than my other colleagues.
Q: But there certainly has, in the last two or three years,
been a ...
1\: Recognition.
0: ... a recognition that you are dealing with levels of
uncertainty far higher than was previously thought. Are you
familiar with the events and, perhaps, the internal debates
that lead to this now recegnition'?
A: Yes. I think, for most people, it looks as if the 1989
assessment of northern cod was where it started. But it
didn't start there. In my view, northern cod was the last
one to be revised and not the first one. The first one was
4VSW cod. About 1985 or 1986. I'm l'ot totally sure which
year.
One of the characteristics of the technique which we
use, which is sequential population analysis on which you've
probably read, ia the further back you go, the more
confidence you have in your assessment. It's called a
"convergence." When we extended jurisdiction in 1977, we
said there was all those big foreign trawlers out there.
Fishing mortality must have been very high. We've kicked
them out and replaced them with large trawlers but much
smaller and much fewer of them. Fishing mortality must have
gone down. If fiShing morality is down, stock size is
higher. We held that belief for five, six, seven years.
But aa time passes, you do the assessment and you
estimate the fishing mortality is .2. So that was in 1980.
Yeu do the aame assessment in 1981 and you estimate that the
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fishing mortality was again .2 but when you look back, you
see that it was .25 for 1980. Whoops! What happened there?
After a few years, you look back and you do the assessment
in 1985 and you see that for the first part of the 'e.ighties
the fishing mortality was about .4. So you say. why would
it be .2 today? There's no reason for it to be .2. The
boats are fishing as hard. They're out there as long.
Their efficiency has probably increased. Which we didn't
take into account. And there's nor reason for fishing
mortality to have decreased. So it must be .4. And of the
alternative explanations, .4 was totally acceptable.
The first one was 4vsw cod and then all the others,
more or less, came that route. And 4VSW cod went, at that
time, from probably 54, 55,000 tonnGa TAC to 38 or 40.
Which was a big drop. But it's only 14 or 16,000 metric
tonnes compared with 266 to 197 which is a perception of a
much larger change. That was the first one. The others
fallowed.
Q: Are you familiar \:lith the history of the Alverson
Commission and the Alverson Report?
A: Yes.
Q: Until some recent discussions, I was under the
impression, as perhaps most outside observers were, that
first critique of the way science was doing its jab came
with the Harris Report. Because the version of the A~verson
report thet was made publiC, to the extent that it was
critical, it was very mild and, in public, it was called a
vindication by the scientists.
A: Yes.
Q: I've been told by several sources that the origina1, the
first draft of the Alverson report was coneiderably more
critical and the lessons msde public in the Harris report
were originally .••.
A: That I don't know. That J: don't know. But the Keats
Report was the first one. That was commissioned by NJ:FA.
And that was not taken very seriously at the time.
Q: By science?
A: By DFO science. Yes. Because the analysis was somewhat
naive, I think and because it was eesy for us to discount
it. The TGNIF report, in my eye, the way I read it, .• I
don't know if I've seen the same version, but most
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liko~y ... was crit.1.cal. It was critical. Maybe it's the
broadcasting of it that was more positive. But I think it
was critical.
It must be remembered, as wel~. that there were not
that many conclusions that could be reached. The TGNIF
report suggested, when you look at 1.t, that the difference
between the TGNIF report and the CA.FSAC assessment was much
greater than between the Harris report snd the CAFSAC
assessment. The Harris report and the CAFSAC asssssment are
essentially the same. They're bang on. They're saying
exactly the same thing. While the TGNIF report was saying
that CAFSAC has over-estimated stock size.
0: But, as I recall reading, the difference was something
like five per cent.
A: It was more than five per cent because our assessment at
that time was for a fishing mortality of about • 2. And
theirs, their range, was from .2 to .4. And they picked in
tha middle•.3. So there's a much broader range. A.nd tha
difference was qu1.te large.
Q: What I'm thinking of is not the original but the DFO
report called "The Science of COd" and the first page was
about how DFQ hod estimated that the stock had grown 5.5-
fold and this independent review had concluded that it had
only grown five-fold but real.~y, that's pretty close and
really we're doing a terrific job.
A: That was the interpretation that we wanted to give it.
If you look at it from a different perspective, the
assessment that TGNIF d1.d showed that there was about a
third less cod than we said. And the Harr.:Ls report says
exactly the same amount. So for TGNIF, that's the
interpretation. For broadcasting, for publicity. the way we
decided to use it.
0: Where was that decis1.on made. That certainly would have
been made at a level higher than the Science Branch.
A: Probably. I don't know. I don't know.
0: And YQt science is taking the public heat for that.
A: I wouldn' t say that it was higher than science branch.
0: No?
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A: I think if ....Again, I don't see ourselves having done
much different with the Harris report than we did with the
11.1verson report. We used the Harris report a lmost the same
way saying, "Lookl Harris reaches almost the same conclusion
as we did." That's the way we used it. Except that the
no.:l..se that was generated has been much higher because the
stock status that was estimated was much smaller.
Q: Perhaps the trigger was that the Alveraon report did not
result in a direct reduction in quotas whereas the Harris
report did.
A: From the handling of it, as well, there's another slight
difference. Which is that the Alverson report was
presented, more or less, by OFO and the Harris report was
presented by Harris.
Q: So there was more of an opportunity to manage the
presentation of the Alverson report.
A: I think so.
Q: I recall reading comments by John Crosbie and others to
the effect that, if this is the best that DFO science can
do, it's not good enough. And why are we ... why do we
continue to support their massive budgets? Th1e would have
been back in ... right around the release of the Harris
report. Do you recall that incident?
A: Yes.
Q: What would be your response to that?
1\: The response is a question. What do you need to manage
fisheries? You need some kind of scientific .:l..nformation to
follow up. The second question is. how do you want to do
it? And from my perspective now, and this is really my own
perspective and not DFO-wide or CAFS1\C-wide, is that doing
it by managing catches, by regulating catches, may not be
the best way to go. At least from our perspective. Because
our precision on catches may be only plus or minus 25 per
cent. I say "minus" but in most cases it's plus 25 per
cent. We rarely underestimate the stock. We more often
overestimate it.
But if you look at some other things, like fishing
mortality, the reason that we're that imprecise, we1l, plus
or minus 25 is not bad, is that incoming recruitment ... we
don't know very well what recruitment is going to be and it
has a very large influence. But on fishing mortality we're
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a b.1 t better. And I'd say that there are things we can say
with more precision, almost absolute precision. 1 can tell
you right now that fishing mortality for northern cod is
most likely above F-max. That we should decrease it. So
that's relatively clear.
0: Even at 196 [thousand metric tonnes]?
A: Yes. The Canadian TAC. There will be foreign fishing
outside on the Nose in 3L so we expect that the catch is
going to be something like 215 or 220 right? Total catch.
So the f.1shing mortality needs to be decreased. We know
that. If we were managing sea-days or Borne fishing
mortality units instead of catch units then we would know
that we need to decrease that amount. And then once we have
decreased, we can assess ag8.1n. Have we decreased enough?
A.re we below? Have we reached our target? This is
potentially a more stable way.
I WOUldn't want to give the impression that it's
totally simple to do it because it's not that simple. If
you decrease the number of sea-days, then you wIll make
sure, as a fisherman, that the number of sea-days that
you're left with are better used. So you're more efficient
during these days. So .1t's not straightforward.
0: And that would then create •...
A: Our conclusion....What I wanted to say is that our
precision may be a little bit better. And still, weather
forecasts is probably something like that, Plus or m.1ous 25
per cent, right? Depending 00 what you do. If you say,
"It's go.1og to rain," you probably have a better chance of
being right than if you say, "It's going to rain and the
rainfall is going to be this much." So if you ask me if the
fishing mortality is above F-maK, I tell you "Yes. It is.
Most likely." "How much?" "Probably this much." I have
less confidence in that amount. So really, it boils down to
what is the question.
0: So personally, your assessment is that the stocks are
still in deoline?
A: No. The stock is stable.
0: So what is F-max?
A: There are two things that are easily mixed. F-max and F-
MSY. And they come from two entirely different modelS. F-
MSY .1s from a general production model that has a shape
416
about like this (draws a curve). And once you're above that
then your stock is going to decline. F-MAX comes from a
yield-per-recruit model which is something like that [draws
another curve]. A.nd F-MAX is the fishing mortality. But
the behaviour of the stock, this is only catch. This 1s
yield. The behaviour of the stock depends on recruitment.
So 1f you're above F-MA.X and got good recruitment, the stock
is going to increase. But you're not going to get as much
weight aut of that recruitment as you would if you were
fishing at F-MAX.
Q: But surely managing at F-MAX is much more sensitive to
variations in recruitment which is essentially
unpredictable.
A: What fishing above F-MAX means 1s that you're catching
the fish a little bit too rapidly. You're not leaving them
enough time to grow. So if you were fishing them a little
bit less, for the same number of fish, you'd get more
weight. A.nd we're not getting that now.
Q: A.nother ....
A.: But that's a wrong perception. That the stock has
decreased. The stock has decreased from about 1983-'84 to
about 1987-'88. Since that time, it's been quite stable.
And at best ....The stock 19 not in danger. The stock is not
in jeopardy. Cod stocks are extremely resilient.
unbelievably resilient. A.nd there's 900d year-classes
coming in. If anything, if we fish the same in 1991 as we
did fish in 1990, catches are likely to increase a little
bit and stock size to increase a little bit.
Q: There are at least two good year-classes in the pipeline.
A: Yes.
Q: What would you say to a critic who says, "Give me the
reason why 1 should believe what you say now when two years
ago..•
A.: You were wrong.
Q: ••• you were so horribly wrong." Why?
A.: Well, ·you do what you want, but this is the best advice
we can give you now. We're going to qualify it. We're
giving a range of options now. This is the best assessment
we have. But in the past, what we were telling you ... l 'd
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say f1.ve years in the past ... we were tell1.ng you that FO.l
is the only way to go.
So if I were doing today what we were doing five years
ago I would be telling you you've got to cut down the
catches to 100,000 metr.ic tonnes. But I think .1n
recognizing whera we were in terms of exploitation rate. in
terms of stock status. recogn1.zing where we were, we
recognized as well that the stocks. soma of the s1:ocks, were
more resilient than we thought. And it may not be required,
.11: may not be necessary to go 1.mmediately to FO.l. Or even
go to FO.I at all.
It depends on what you want to achieve. And for
northern cod today, depending on what you want to ach.ieve,
.if you want to achieve growth, if you want the cod stock to
grow, then you shOuld decrease the catches. The mora you
decrease them, the more the stock is going to increase. If
you're happy with the size of the cod stock the way it is
now. then you can keep the catches about where they are. If
you want to got to FO.l, you've got to go to about 100. If
you want to go to F MAX, you've got to go to 160, 170. If
you want to go half way from where you are today to where
you want to go, which is FO.I, the you should go about 145,
150.
So I think, relating this back to what you were saying
at the beginning, is, by providing those numbers, we're
trying to be more usefuL to the fishing industry, to the
f.1sher1.es managers and to the over-a11 system. At the same
time, we're achieving what we though"t was our job all along
which was protecting the resource. But by protecting the
resource, you don't need to create so much disturbance in
the socio-economic fabric of the system. You may want, by
recognizing ourseJ.ves tha"t there is some variabi1ity around
our estimates, we're saying don't make rushed, hasty
decisions. The cod's not going to d.1s11ppear. We've got
"time. So let's look again. (pause]
I'll say something while you're think.1ng. You've got a
system, a very structured system, for the provis.1on of
biolog.1ca1 advice. Now if you want to manage the fisheries
properly, because really you're not mansging fish. you're
managing people, and communities and plants and stuff l1.ke
that, 1.t wouJ.d seem to me that it would be useful to have
some sociological 1.nput, some economical .1nput. These
inputs may exist. I know that from the economical side they
do exist. But whether they are peer-reviewed, like the
b.101ogy is, I don't think so. I know it's not a structured
peer review and the information is not pub1ic. So I'm
raising a red flag there. You're basing your dec.1sion on
very structured and peer-reviewed biOlogical advice but you
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must take in to account economic and social information as
well. How do you get it? Where do you get it from?
0: There's been a lot of agitation for the need to include
so-celled indigenous knowledge, fishermen's knowledge, in
the assessment process. This has a lot Of political and
cultural currency at the moment. It seems that there's some
resistance within science to this idea. That's
understandable bec3use the language of science is
mathematics. Even if there were a Willingness on the part
of science to incorporate this knowledge, it would be very
difficult. It's like speaking Mandarin Chinese and Engl.1.sh.
They're two d.ifferent systems of knowing. Different
evaluative traditions that seem almost mutually eXclusive.
0: It depends hoW you perceive yourself ... we perceive
ourselves. I think for a very 10ng t.ime we percei.ved
ourselves as holding the true picture. You, the inshore
fi.sherman, have got your perception. You. the offshore
fi.sherman, have got your percept.ion. We see the big
picture. You see only part of the picture. And. because we
thought we saw the big picture, we thought we didn't have to
explain too much to you what you were seeing. Or to
reconci~e wha"t we were seeing and what you were saying. We
thought it was good enough to be somewhere .in the middle of
you two. And that we didn' t have to explain.
But if you change your position, or your point of v.1.ew
or your perceived role, and if your role now is one of
counsellor, of advisor, a useful counsellor and advisor, if
you're an inshore fisherman and you tell me that you observe
this, the cod not coming inshore, whatever, my first
reaction ls going to be we11, I'm going to dream up an
explanation. "Dream up" not hav.ing a negative connotation,
but I'm going to try to think what the reasons are and to
Offer you that explanation. And I'm going to hope that
you're going to be satisfied with that.
But we've got to do more than that. And the difference
of language shouldn't be that much. The onus is on us to be
understood. It's more difficult for us to be understood.
Because it's easier to talk about "RV" instead of research
vessel surveys. It's easier to talk about "CPUEs" instead
of catch-per-unit-of-effort. "Non-linear least square
mi.nimization" and stuff like that. Instead of verbalizing
and expl.aining what they are.
I think the question is not so much introducing
anecdotal and local knowledge and stuff like that. The
objective is to understand what's going on and to try to
explain what's going on. Is to relate. Is to go out there
and say. "What do you see? What's your exp1anation of
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what's going on1 We'll go and check it out." lI.nd we must
go and check it out.
0: But so many of the people that I've talked to, younger
scientists ae well as Older, are either implicitly or
explicit1y dismissive of this knOWledge. I've hed people
say "How much can you learn from a bunch of stupid,
illiterate fishermen? That the dogberries are heavy this
year? what good is that!?.. And J: suppose now that Mac
[Mercar] is no longer there I can say this. When I first
met Mac and was talking with him he went in to a long,
seeming digression of this business of scientists falling in
to the trap of spending too much time with fishermen# They
lose their perspective. They lose their edge. 'l'hey lose
their ...
A: Objectivity.
0: They loose their objectivity and ineVitably come to a bad
end. And I think he was probably speaking of Henry Lear,
among others. At least that's what I've been told. But the
message seemed to be directed, not simp1.y at me but at the
other people who were in the room that day who, in this
case, were Jake and Peter Shelton. And, in my limited
experience, this attitude is more common than not.
ParticuJ.arly because of the evaluative and reward .••
A: •.. structural appraisal system. You're totally right.
To me, that's not eas:ily solvable. Very difficult to solve.
But I agree with the perception that if you're too close to
the fishermen you start to see things their own way. And
you losa .•..
What it boils down to right now is that we've got
clients and we're producing stuff that's totally useless to
them. We've got no links to the cltents. If we want to
continue to do that, that's fine, But we're going to be out
of business. If we want to stay :in bus::lness we better get
closer to the clients. It's str.aight free-market, or
whatever, economical forces.
If l' m close to the inshore f.1shermen and you're close
to the offshore fishermen, we're going to argue and we're
going to reconcile our perceptions some way. And what's
going to come out of it is going to :reflect a little hit of
both. So J: don't see a big problem with that.
0: That's :in principle. But in practice there's not a
fishing wharf in Newfoundland where 8 DFO scientist could go
and not be laughed off.
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A: Yes. Because 'What 'We see, what we're describing, the
status of the stock, does not jibe w.1th what people are
seeing. So we must go .... 1 want to cOllIe back, as well, to
the appraisal.
But, frOlI marine biology perspective, 1 have, and I
th.1nk I'm not the only one, l.ooked at the system as being
too big to have structure. Chaos. Things happen but you
can't predict them. They don't have structure. It happens
this way th1.s yaar and next year it· s going to happen
differently.
And thi.s may not be the case. There may be IIlOre
structure than we think. And we may benefit from looking at
this bay or this small wharf where things are happening
differently frOll the others. We must look a little more at
the parts instead of only the big picture. "gain. that's
not only between offshore end inshore but elso
geographically. So that's one thing. 1 think 'What we've
got to do..•.
Until now most of the things we've done is say, "Look I
This is the assessment and we know 1.t. Okay? Thie is it.
You may not like it but this is it. to And now I think we've
got to change that. We've got to go and say "This is our
best estimate of what's out there. What do you think?" And
we're trying to do that now. Forma11y.
You may have heard or seen that we're making an
advertisement to go and be invited by groupe to go and
discuss the assessments. All the assessments. Groundfish.
All the groundfish assessments. "nd we're going to go end
Bay, "This i.s our perception. This is our best eetimate.
What do you think?" 'l'hey're going to tell. us "Well, that
may be so but va.' ve observed that seals have increased. We
think that your perception of the inshOre is wrong. Because
more of the gillnetters and longlinera are now fishing
further offshore, SO or 7S miles offshore on the Virgin
Rocks. You're sti.ll including them .in the inshore so your
perception of the inshore is wrong. How much of the inshore
is that?"
We're going to get these questi.ons. And what we muet
do is go back next year, or in the meantime, and say. "We
presented you with what we thought the stock va9 doing and
you had questions. These are our response to your
questions. Those that we could answer. The others we can't
but we're working on them." Or we're not working on them.
But there must be a clear, continuous exchange.
0: But even thst, elthough that would be a tremendous ....
A: We're doing that. We are doing that w.ith people who are
directly !~,volved with the assessments. I 'VB done it for
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several groups on northern cod. The ma1.n players on
northern cod, we've met with them. Ind:ividua1~y. We
haven't met with, FPI, National Sea, tUFA, inshore, and
Fishermen, Food and A~lied Workers, all. of them in the same
group. Because then they can't tal.k with total honesty with
us because there might be something else at stake. When we
meet with them :individually, they have been very frank,
informative and useful meet:ings.
0: Isn't there still a kind of resi.dual assumption of
epistemological super:iority here? That they have the
questions but you have the answers?
A: No. WeJ..l, they have observations that they want us to
verify, I think.. But it's not done in a spirit of
superiority. You can' t feel that superior to these people
who make their living out of it and know more about :it than
you do. You Illay think that you've got the big picture but
there' e all. kinds of information that they have that we
don't. They have information about misreporting, about
discarding. about all kinds of practices that we don't take
into account. They don't ex.1st because we haven't
quantified them_ So they're going to rai.se those po1.nts.
0: How are you going to deal with the resistance of research
scientists or other people to spending their t:ime in ways
that there are no poin'ts for within the :internal structure
of DFO?
A: You need to f:ind pointe. Simple. It's as simple as
that. I don't know how to do it and it's very diffiCUlt.
Extremely difficult to do it and I have no idea. We went to
reward who communicate and exchange and do stuff like that.
We say that out of one side of the mouth and then when
it comes time to look at promotions, we say, "This one's got
15 primary pub11cations this year. You've got one. Forget
it boy. You've met with fishermen. You've met with
broadcast people. radio peOple, un1.versity people. You've
met with 81.1 of these people. But what do you have to show
for it? Nadal You're out."
We've got to change tha't and I: don't know how to do it.
I don't have a clue. But it must be recognized. I'll give
you an example. George Rose, when he came back from his
oruise, had an interview on the fishermen's broadcast
talking about the large aggregation of cod that he's seen
out there. And that interv1ew was a beautifUl interview.
Very nice description. George told avery, very nice story
of what he had seen and that would give credibility on what
we were do.:l.ng.
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Now his doing that •.. and George is a180 relatively
close to the inshore fishermen ... his doing that, which is
one thing we want him to do, resulted in a lot of problems
for us. Becaus() then you've got to react. The perception
that there's more cod than we thought there was. That the
assessment 1s wrong because he's seen that many cod the
assessment must be wrong and so on. The reaction coul.d have
been. was not but could have been, "Why the hell didn' t you
shut your mouth? II Which is not the objective. The
objective is that he's going to go out there. He's going to
talk about h1s research and h1s results. And it's go1.ng to
create flak. And we'll need to react to 1t. It's not going
to be an easy job. Gone are the days when you stay 1.n your
office and tommorrow's going to be like today and yesterday.
We need to react 8. little bit more.
0: To movs to Cl s11ghtly different topic, it seems to me
that 1n the last two or three years, the atmosphere of
criticism and turmoil, both 1nternally and externally •... a
lot c:l:: the research scientists and managers, field managers
or line managers, who have had opportunities to go elsewhere
have taken them. Some people I've spoken to say that they
don't feel that they're going to get the support from ottawa
that they need to do their job. They feel that if it· s
polit1cally exped1ent they're going to be hung out to dry.
That they can't trust their superiors to stand up for them.
If they're doing their best job, they still feel insecure
abOut the amount of support they can expect from the upper
levels of the structure. And consequently. are leaving for
less sensit1v9 positions in DFO. For instance. I gather
that 1n the Science Branch (1.n the Atlant1c region] all the
directors' positions except one are now acting. There's
been a lot of turnover. And as one person who is leaving
told me, ~There's a lot of openings for research
scientists." And I asked, knowing what the situation is
now, what competent, qualified scientist with other options
would jump 1nto this precariol..s situation.
A: A masoch1stic one.
Q: And this person's answer was, "Well, there are always new
Ph.DS and then there are the Russians." It was tossed off
as a joke but those are people with no other options. So,
if this is the case, the criticisms, the accusations of
incompetence, there's the possibility of them becoming 8
self-fulfilling prophecy if aJ.I the beet people don't feol
they're gett1ng the aupport they deserve for doing their
best possib1e work and they're bailing out for less
sensitive areas, the vacancies ere going to be filled with
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less than first-rat:e people. Or there's certainly that
likelihood. From your position is this anything to worry
about? Ie this, in fact, happening?
A: The assessments themselves, we've got a peer review
system. Which has one main advantage and one main
disadvantage. Let's talk about: the main disadvantage now.
The main disRdvantage is "that it's going to take you
longer to get your good idea through because you need to
convince your peers first: that you're right. So that's
going t:o be longer. The system is going to be cumbersome,
somewhat conservative. Inertia.
The rnsin advantage is that your assessment, if it's
wrong, is going to be seen to be wrong. It's going to be
correct:ed. It may take a while but it's going to be
detected. The assessment side 1s not bad.
But your question is not really related to that. Your
questions is really about the people t:hat are here. And I
think it's unfair t:o .... Well, t:here are seversl t:hings. For
those people involved wit:h northern cod for the last two or
three years has not been an easy job. It's not been a
rewarding job either. So, of course, you don't expect that
people will be attracted to it. But there are research
positions ..•. For the research scientist..•• There are no
questions that: there wi~l be good research scientists.
There are extremely good recruits comi.ng in. John
Hoenig who is with the CODE. All the people in the CODE,
they are very, ver.y good. So the recruitment, if you take
the time to recruit:, you're going to find good people. And
there's enough good, qualified, English-speaking Ph.Ds in
North America that we're not going to have a shortage.
Whether they' re going to stay for long or not depends on how
well we chose them. we select them.
That's a different story. They may be very good but
you shouldn't select them only for good. You should select
them to ma.ke sure that they're going to stay for a while.
It takes more of the personal suitability side than the
knOWledge or abilities.
But also. to describe the management now, well, Mac has
retired so he's being replaced on an acting basis by Larry.
Larry's been involved wi th northern cod all along and has
been Mac's ri.ght hand for ae long as I can remember. Which
is probably close to ten years. Jake hao gone to tho west
coast and, as a research scientist and as a father of two
girls, you don't have a choice if you want to keep your
personal fam:!.1y life and your producti.ve scientific career,
which in my opinion, Jake was best at.
And Jake had two ha t8 as you know. One for the
codfsther and one for the program head. The division chief.
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So 'the section head is being filled with Claude Bishop who
is very competent enl1 has 1.0ts of experience and knowledge
as a scientist. And the division chief by Bruce, Bruce
A.tkinson who has a lot of experience in the assessment and
is a very organi.zed person. A. good manager.
Q: Which of these two is going to be administe:r.ing the
special northern cod reoearch effort?
A: ,Jim Carscadden but Jim is real1.y on an acting basis. He
doesn't want to do it on the 10ng-'terlD. The selection
process is under way to find someone on a permanent basis.
Q: On this special $42.8 mil.lion over five years ...
A: I don't have a clue how much money it is.
0: It's a lot of money and :1:t eSBential1.y doubles the
science branch budget for five years. Some of the people
I've talked to are wondering how it can be spent. The
physical plant. the facility of the White HH1s is already
strained to the l.imit. There's little or no roam for more
bodies or equipment there. Certainly you can buy more .'1ea
time and the hydroacoustic development effort can use a icc
of that money. But, what I' m interested in is the risk that
ottawa and industry are gOing to want something for their
nearly $50 mill:1.on dollars. they're going to want mora fish
and bigger quotas. Now. that'e not rational. It'g
impossible to know what the state of the stock is going to
be five years from now. But surely you must .•..
A: :I never percei.ved .:1.t that way.
a: No?
A: No. I never perceived it as buying fish. I thought we
were trying to bUy knowledge. But you may be right. You
may ba right. There's something.••.
Q: They're going to have to answer to the pub11c. Ottawa.:i.s
go:1.ng to have to answer to the industry and to the general
publiC for the way they spent ....
A: But sci.ence is not the only thing in there. You're
ta1.king overall plose to $600 lIIil~ion do~ ~ar6. Pive yaars.
The management. the CEIe. the empl.oyment. ell thet stuff.
So science is on1y a small part of it. But the way I would
do :1.t is •••.
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The basis of it is the Harris report. There were
sev,,;.ral recommendations in the Harris report. So I would
make a link between what we're doing and the Harris report.
Say, "Harris said, improve your knowledge on this. And this
is what we've done. This 1s the result." And that's the
link th~t I would make. I think that's accountability that
we hav~ to show.
0: In the same way that you already have the annual program
reviews1
A: They're two things. The theory, the face of it, on paper
this region had the best program review that you can dream
of. It was regUlar. It was structured. It was organized.
But it didn't yield the results that were expected. A.nd I
think tha1:'s because the meat was taken out. The process
was there but the intention may not have been. The process
was there but the intention was not to get the clients'
input and to 8"t on the clients' input. That's a
hypothesis.
0: As wo say in the United States "11.11 show and no g01"
[discussion of J.J. 's schedUle and the time remaining for
the interview]
0: On the basis of my questions and the general tone of the
conversat10n you might have some observations or comments
that you w1sh to add. About the current state of stock
assessment science and where you see it 901ng in the future.
A: Where I soe it going is increased communication of the
uncertainties in the assessment. Part of the reason for the
shi t we got was that people thought we were precise 100 per
cent. So when they realized that there was a plus or minus
25, at best, they think you're full of it. Really, you're
not being very useful. So communicate the uncertainties.
Be useful.
Instead of being theological about what shoUld. be done,
prov1de advice on what's feasible. You still have your
reference but provide useful advice on what's feasible,
what's achievable in the coming one, two, three years.
Recognize and make it known that some of the var1abili ty in
the assessments and the catch forecasts is essentially based
on variability in the system. They're no1: real reflections
of changes in stock size. They're essentially reflect10ns
of variability 1n the data.
The difference between last year's assessment and this
years' assessment is a very good example of that. Stock
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status is exactly the Same between 1989 and 1990. Exactly
the same. Except that we've done the assessllent sl.ightl.y
differentl.y. Which resul.ted in a difference of about 25 per
cent. So instead of using the catch rates on their own and
the survey on their own and combiiling. we combined at the
beginning of the program. So instead of doing two
assessment",. and taking the average of the two, we did one
assessment and that resul.ted in a difference of 25 per cent.
0: This is curious. You say that the stock status is the
same but the assessment is different. But isn't the
assessment how you determine stock status? And how can the
two pieces of knowl.edge ex1.st l.ndependentl.y?
A: Okay. Last year when we did the assessment we said that
the stock has been doing this, peaking at about like this
{draws a curve}. So we said, this is 1988.
Q: Okay. The line is lower but it's the same curve.
A: We do it this year and we find that it's Hke this [draws
another curve}. So stock status is the sams between 1988
and '89 but it's different between the two assessments.
Q: So the status is stable but it's stable at a lower level.
A: At a lower level than we estimated last year.
The other thing we've got to work on is the appraisal
system. We've got to make it possible, we've got to find
rewards for people who are working on things that are
relevant to the management questions. We've got to find a
system... I'm not just talking about this region. This
applies to a~l the regions of DFO in Atlantic Canada.
Science was several years ago, many years ago, maybe
responding a little bit Rlore. But we didn't have good
management system. We didn't have transparent management
where you have the work planning procAss and reporting on
what you had done and stuff like that. Not very structured.
Now we have that very structured. But one of the
pitfe.lls of that or the negative side is that you do your
work plans between about December and January. Over those
two months. And my problem.... If I don't perceive and
communicate my question to you during that time period, then
I've missed a slot and it's going to be the following year.
So we've got to change that. It's not poaeible. All the
questions and problems do not surface between December 1 and
January 31.
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Q: Certainly, the issue of reevaluating contributions to the
OFO process .... Under the current climate, the people who are
doing the most valuable work for DFO are those who are
working to restore the credibility of science with the
client groups.
A.: Yes.
Q: Yet there still is ... you gave the example of George
Rose there are certainly people who felt that he shouldn't
have Internally, his work caused more trouble for them.
A.: .Some people did have that perception. But we've got to
recognize that we've got to live with this. Live with these
perturbations. The other thing that we've got to work on is
getting a lower profile for biology. Biology taking its
appropriate place in the system. Which is when information
and advice .... One part. One element. The fac'tors that must
be taken in to account when you make a decision. The others
being social impact and economical impact. And probably for
POlitical impact as well. When you are making decisions you
must take into account pOliticSl impaot.
Q: Is it possible that you might be considering staff
positions within DFO for economists and social scientists7
A: There are. There are economists now but most of them are
in ottawa. The only time .•.. DFO is a very decentralized
department. And most of the action is teking place in 'the
regions. Except for the economis'ts who ere mostly in
Ottawa. The larger contingent is in Ottewa. But it is by
no means comparable to the biology side of it. Sociology I
think we would hire. Hired guns. To start With. I'm not
sure but I think that their contribution would be to say.
"Don't even think of this regulation. It'e not going to
work ...
0: The regulation makes technical sen'3e but it's socially
impossib~e to implement.
Jr.: Right.
0: Or they might work in the other direction. Sociologists
familiar with both realities; the scientific reality and the
social t.:eal1ty of fishermen and fishing communities might
even become proactive and introduce suggestions that could
then be evaluated ecientificelly for their 'technical
feasibili'ty.
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A: Yes. But it's just that for the practicality of it
you've got about a couple of hundred biOlogists thinking of
possible ways of management regulations and maybe three or
four sociOlogists. So they would be swamped and then would
have to react. But in the long-term it's total.ly possible.
Maybe there will be a jOb for you.
429
APPENDIX K
Interview with Henry Lear
Conducted in Ottawa, Ontario
,January, 1991
Note: This interview took place in Henry's office in ottawa
the day after the Gulf War started. I was quite distraught
over this ominous turn of events and, as a result, this
interview is not as wide-ranging or incisive as I might have
wished.
0: I'd like to begin with a little bit about your
background--I know you're from Port de Grave--your family's
background and how you came to be a fisheries scientist.
A: I grew up in a fishing community. My family'S been
fishing in Newfoundland, we've traced it back almost 300
years. We have a long history in the fishery.
I got my grade 11 and went teaching for a year. I saw
a notice in the Post Office for a job at the Fisheries
Research Board so I applied for it and got it--ss 8
technician. I stayed there a couple of years Bnd then went
to university. At that time there was a scholarship on the
go--the Fisheries Research Board had a scholarship. They
offered rna that one the first yesr. I wouldn' t take it the
first ysar. Newfoundland independence and all that stuff.
I went through and got a BSc. At the time they had a fairly
strong program in marine fisheries, population dynamics,
oceanography--there were four courses--post-graduate
courses, so I went on and did a Masters on Greenland halibut
and I went to work in '67 as a biologist working on
Greenland halibut. After a couple of year.s we had a shift
in staff and that was phased out so I went to work on salmon
for eight years. In' 78 I came back to work on groundfish
8g8in--oo northern cod.
0: When you were working in Newfoundland, what was the
actual work you did?
A: I was involved in the basic biology at first with the
Greenland halibut--the turbot. We surveyed the bays to get
the stock composition and age distributions before the
fishery--the really intense fishery in Trinity Bay, Notre
Dame Bay and Bonavista Bay and White Bay.
With salmon I had mostly to do with the Greenland
problem. We were trying to sort out the American and
European components which we did with the use of scales,
electrophoresis, blood types. We did a fair amount of
tagging. I was also responsible for the marine fishery in
Newfoundland; migrations and following trends in the stocks.
With northern cod, one of the questions at that time
with the offshore fishery was, "To which areas did these
stocks contribute'?" At that time we weren't sure if there
were actually different components of the stock or whether
they were all intermingled, pretty well continuous along the
continental shelf. So I suppose I was the first one really
to tag successfuU.y on the offshore concentrations. We
started in '78 on the Belle Isle Bank. And after tagging
for two or three years and watching the reSUlts it seemed to
be pretty obvious that these components were contributing to
various inshore fisheries.
'I'hey'd be over a wide geographic area and there's a
fair degree of overlap but by and large you could say that
the Belle Isle Bank was contributing mainly to Labrador and
the Great Northern Peninsula. When you get down to the Funk
Island Bank it's mainly the northeast coast of Newfoundland,
some Labrador and down to the Avalon PeninSUla. When you
get to the northern Grand Banks, it's mainly a southern
component moving down over the top of the Bank and into the
Avalon Peninsula.
We also tagged in inshore areas snd, again, we pretty
well bore out what Templeman found 1n some of his tagging.
If you tag in an inshore area like La Scie the fish come
back to the same general area in successive years. So tt,ere
was a certain degree of homing. Not to the same degree it
is in salmon bu-t there sQemed to b'l a trend.
One of the other things that came out •... I started
tagging in bays, with the juvenile cod. I grew up with the
ided, from fishermen, that soma of these bays had local
stocks. Even though Concep·tion Bay was a shallow bay, we
knew that fish had over-wintered there because my
grandfather and his people had fished up in March some
years. And fish showed up again in May and June so these
fish didn't just go out and come in to the bay that quickly.
And I tagged. Again, where we could find a few fish, the
fish did stay around in that same bay that summer.
One of the most striking examples--one of the biggest
surprises 1 got was the summer 1 tagged at Cape St. Marys.
In September of '86 1 think it was. And the fish, instead
of moving offshore, actually moved up into the bottom of the
bay where they were subjected to a winter fishery and then
they moved out to Cape St. Marys in the summertime.
So we had a local inshore stock that was exploited
almost year-'round. And it was a fairly substantial
exploitation rate. We're talking up to fifty per cent.
We're not talking FO.l, FO.2, twenty per cent. So this was
mainly exploitation by the local inshore fishermen.
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And back in the 'sixties, before I had gone to
university or during the process in the summertime, we had
worked on projects where we did g11lnettiog in the Bays.
Bonavista Bay, Trinity Bay and Placentia Bay. Back in those
days we were getting fish ten years old, ten pounds, in
April and May. Right when they were spawning. These
weren't offshore stocks. These were local inshore stocks.
And these were essentially fished out by g1llnets. I
suppose the draggers sometimes came in off Cape Bonavista
too and put the nets to them but mainly it was the inshore
gillnet fishery that knocked them down. In concert with the
turbot fishing at the time. These were local stocks and
that was part of the equation at that time.
We've always had variations in inshore catch in
Newfoundland. That' s the story of the fishery. It's Why my
grandfather and great-grandfather spent almost half their
lives up off the Labrador. Because there was no fish in
Conception Bay in certain years. And there were no offshore
draggers back in those days. These are the things that you
have to place in the balance when you are looking at all
these things.
The point I want to make is that back in those years,
you had a certain cushion. When you had these local stocks.
If the fish didn't coma up into the traps, you could always
get your line trawls and set them out in the deep water and
get something. It wasn't a complete washout. But once we
knocked down these stocks, then you were totally at the
mercy of migrants from offshore which had a high degree of
variability.
And this really was what exacerbated the problem when
the stocks declined. And probably changing climate
conditions, why the cod didn't come in, At the time when
the stock was greatest, we had one of the worst years in
'81, when the stock was at a peak coming up from '74. So
even when the stock was increasing we had these dips.
There were a couple of years when you could explain it
by temperature. Temperatures were -1 to -1.7 in the cold
intermediate layer off Cape Bonavista. The cod just weren't
going to make a break through that. There might have been
eddy systems or breaks that they could get in through. Back
in '85, '86 we did acoustic surveys off the east coast, Cape
Bonavista mainly, and from the sounder records, you could
see the cod coming in towards the coast from the bottom up
to sometimes 200 metres above the bottom. They're semi-
pelagic once they stop spawning so they're e1ther pelagic or
semi-pelagic. And you could see them bunching up against
the cold intermediate layer. [draws a schematic]
Here was the bottom, and here was the cold intermediate
layer. You could actually see large concentrations just
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bunching up under this cold intermediate layer and you
wouldn't see anything up in this once you got colder than -
0.5. They'd make a few incursions up into it. And all the
time caplin were migrating back and forth even down among
these codfish and back up again in the night. The cod just
wouldn't fallow these caplin up into that cold water.
But that doesn't explain away the decreases in catches
and doesn't explain why there were over-estimates made on
biomass and underestimates made on mortali ty.
But the fact remains that it was unfortunate that the
stock declined at this time because it clouded this issue.
It discounted that type of information. Because the fishing
mortality was underestimated and the stock wasn't as great
as it should be, it masked what I considered to be a very
important piece of information and that was the j,mportance
of the environment 1n the migration of the codfish. The
baby got thrown away with the bath water.
Because the stock did increase something like 350,000
tonnes from about '75 to, you know, it was up to a million
and a quarter tonnea in '84-' 85 when we ran into the
problems with the inshore fishery. There were several good
years of recruitment. One of the problems was that it just
levelled off. Not so much the older fish but the
recruitment. We just had a couple of bad year-classes.
It's ironic, looking at the northeast Atlantic. Here
1n Canada there's been panic because we're fishing at 0.45.
They're fishing at 0.8. Even Iceland 1s up at 0.8. That's
probably 55-60 per cent of the stock. 0.45 is probably 35-
40 per cent of the stock. So they're fishing about double.
They're trying to get back to F-max. We're trying to get
back to Fa.!.
0: The assumption is that there's a linear relationship
between spawning stock size (and then there's all the
variables that affect the mortality of pre-recruits) but
there's a clear assumption that there's a neer-linear
relation between spawning stock size and fecundity. That
you get more fish and you get more eggs.
Pt.: Well, that 1 s probably as far as you can take it 1 would
say.
0: But wasn't it about 1966 that Art May did some work that
showed a non-linear relationship between spawning stock size
and fecundity?
A: You're looking at two things. If you're looking at
spawning biomass and total number of eggs, [draws a curve)
you probably have something like that. The more cod you've
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got the more eggs you're going to have. I think that what
Art May was doing was the length of a cod versus the
fecundity. And that was a log relationship. It was
exponential. The larger the cod, the more eggs.
Q: But some of the things I've read seem to suggest that
there's also a density-dependence in this. The more fish
there are, the fewer eggs each individual fish produces.
A: Oh yes! That's prOViding that the food supply is
limited. You have a certain amount of energy available. If
food supply is the limiting factor then your growth rate
declines. The amount of food going into egg production
declines so therefore you have fewer eggs and probably
smaller eggs. And probably fewer viable eggs.
Because, even in the Pacific for salmon, they've shown,
for example, the larger eggs have the greatest chance of
success. Of course growth rate comes in there too. You
could have twice as many fish but only half the weight.
This is a Io\. of what happened in the northern cod. It
all gets sort of fu:z:zy because back in the 'seventies you
had a fantastic growth rate in the northern cod when the
popUlation was down, naturally. As the population increased
it seems that the growth rate declined very steeply. So
that even though your population was increasing, your
biomass wasn't increasing at the same rate that it should
have. Which is what threw our projections off. Now,
granted, our projections were out because we were using an
average recruitment that had occurred before. What else can
you use7
Q: But also you were using weight and length at age data
from the 'seventies when the stock was really depressed.
When growth was not food-limited. I understand that this
was the key to the reassessment .•.
A: That was it, yes. One of the things.
0: That using new data, current weight and length at age
data, to do the calculations. But what I've been told from
several sources is that ...well the interesting question is
why you wore using weight and length at age data that was
ten years or more old for so 10ng7
A: 1 can't answer that one because I wasn' t 1n on the
assessment. The samples were taken every year so I thought
that they were using current ... When the projections were
made was back 1n the 'seventies and early 'eighties.
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Q: Projections, yes, but the yearly assessments up until
'86, '87 were, as it turns out, overly optimistic. And it
wasn't until the '88 assessment was it?
11.: The one in '89 was the one that dropped the bombshell.
But I was under the impression •.• if you go look at the
matrices, they were using the average weights, the current
ones. According to last year anyway. But I'm not familiar
with it because I was sort of on the outside. I wa9 doing
migrations and that kind of thing. Jake would know about
that and Claude Bishop. And Dick Wells was in on all of the
assessments but of course Dick is dead now.
Q: I' va heard some interesting stories about conflicts
between Dick and some of the younger scientists about access
to data.
A: [long pause] Well, all scientists have conflicts over
data.
Q: I've got both sides of the story. I talked to, on Dick
Wells' side, to Sandy Sandeman and on the other side Ram
Myers, who was on9 of the people who complained bitterly
that Dick Wells wouldn't give him access to the data that he
needed to do the reassessment and it wasn't until Alverson
came in and blew the doors off Dick Wells' 8afe that he
got ...
A: I'm not sure that it wa9 that way. I think it was a two-
way street. It's easy to place all the blame on Dick Wells
now that he's gone. He's a convenient scapl:5goat. But, put
it another way, I suppose, if you spend 20 years collect1ng
data and, all of a sudden, somebody stands on your doorstep
and demands 1t all, what do you do? Do you give it away?
There are such things as negotiation and compromise.
Balancing .it out. And the proper balance just wasn't
struck, I gue9s.
Q: That's exactly what Sandy pointed out. That because the
promotional and reward structure at DFO is 90 heavily
weighted in favour of publishing, that you see data as your
investment and your life's work.
A: That's all you have. It's not a level playing field.
This is the problem. I suffered from the same thing.
Because you're so tied up in doing your job that you just
don't have time to publish. You just can't concentrate and
focus on getting the publications. You're the one, if
ther~'s a brush fire, you get called out. You're the one
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who' 9 got the experience and you've always been there and
it's so easy, right?
And you hire someone, it isn't just Ram, 1t could be
anybody. They're brilliant and they come in and you've got
this wealth of data you haven't published and they say,
"Well, this is not right. This demands publication." So
you hand it over and they get half a dozen papers and next
thing you know they I re two levels ahead of you. And you
say, "What am I doing? I'm only a slave I "
And this is where the problem lies. People who are
working very, very hard, working overtime without getting
any payor anything else. Were not getting any type of
reward. Not even promotion. Whereas somebody' d come in who
was quite free to come in and take the data, you were giving
them a free ride. It was sort of creaming off in a way from
someone else's life. This is the crunch. That is the
problem.
0: So the structure does not encourage cooperation.
A: \'ou can call it the structure. But 1 think the reward
system for research scientists doesn't allow that. You get
penalized.
I spent a lot of time talking to fishermen for example.
It was interesting. I came from fishermen and 1 could
easily talk to them and I enjoyed that. Carrying them
information and discussing things with them but in the end
it didn't do anything for me. People were just passing me
by.
So that's just one example. Now we've come to a crunch
where we've got to have people talking to fishermen,
interacting and liaising and all that stuff. When I was
doing it, it was nothing I
0: J.J. Maguire is quite concerned about this. Although
there's a lot of talk about increasing the communication
with the clients, there are still no points for it, no
institutional rewards, When I talk to other people about
this problem, your name often comes up as an example of
someone who has suffered because of this.
A: Well, I have no one to blame, only myself. I knew what
the rules were and because I cared, I suppose, I suffered.
I'm not blaming the system. I'm not blaming anything. I
knew the rules and because I felt a certain way, a certain
dedication, whatever, that's what I did. Dick Wells did the
same thing.
0: What happened to you?
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A: Well, I just never got the publications to get upgraded,
pure and simple. No one caused me to suffer. The rules
were there on the page in the book. You had to have a
certain number of publications, which I didn't have and
there was no way I was goi.ng to get them in doing the type
of job 1 was doing. So it was a vicious cycle and I was
party to the cycle because 1 enjoyed what I was doing. This
was the difficult part.
I thought at the tilae, and I still believe, that I was
doing a good job. But because I did a good job. and enjoyed
doing it, and kept doing it, which only ground me a little
farther down, it was counterproductive to my own career
interests.
Q: There's a lot of talk now about trying to incorporate
fishermen's knowledge in to the scientific assessment
process. The inshore logbook program is one exampls of the
attempt to do this. But whsn I speak to scientists
privately. there is a wide range of opinion about whether
this is A. possible and B. a good thing. What are your
opinions?
A: Back in '86 I think it was, we looked at the situation in
a little technical report we did for the Director General.
And one of the first recommendations, we said it was of
paralllount importance to include catch and effort data frOIll
inshore fisheries into the assessment process. And really
that's what counts. Vou have to have some measure of your
catch rates in the inshore fishery to know what you're
dealing with. Just looking at pure catch is not enough.
And you don't have to give every fisherman a logbook.
You take ha~f a dozen in La Scie and half a dozen in st.
Anthony and a sample from other major fishery centres.
That'll pretty well give you a fix. That'll tell you what's
going on.
The one about the local knowledge. the anecdotal
information and the historical, I don't know what you CISII
it. The fo~k memory if you like. I think this is valuable,
extremely valuable. But the problem, and I've thought about
it a lot, is how in the name of God do you quantify it?
Because of our training, our Western thought I suppose if
you like, everything has to be analytical, structured,
logical, clear. We don't have the scope for intuition that
the Eastern philosophies would allow.
This is the problem I've seen with this type of
information. And ~here's a gold mine there I Or there waB
at one time. A lot of it has been lost. I remembor making
an observation, it wss 8 good 20 years ago wtlen people were
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leaving, going to Toronto and then coming back. For three
or four hundred years, we learned from one another. It was
an oral tradition that was passed down. And all fishing
methods were orally transmitted. It was a continuous chain.
But I think the chein was broken in the 'fifties end
'sixties. People went away. And then some of them came
back but the information flow was sort of truncated. And
they went and set gillnets in a place where you wouldn't set
gillnets. Or they'd set gear in a place where only one
fisherman could fish, or only four or half a dozen fishermen
could fish because there were certain unwritten rules that
said you set your gear parallel on the slope. And another
guy coming behind you sets in a certain way.
It was the sociological side of fishing I guess. It
allowed for the maximization of a piece of ground. Rather
than just one person going in just dog in the manger end
keeping his gillnets on that piece of ground and probably
not haUling them for three or four days.
Because you can take the best piece of ground in
Conception Bay, take five gillnets, and you can ruin it for
everybody and you won't catch fish enough for brewis for
yourself. For the simple reason that they're not set right.
You look at you catch/effort and you say I've got five
gillnets out there and I only caught ten fish. His
grandfather would have taken those same five gillnets and
set them and probably have got twice as many fish. Because
he knew the way that the fish moved around that piece of
ground in response to the way the wind was the day before.
I grew up setting line trawls around Bell Island and
Kelly's Island and you didn't always set the trawls the same
way every day because you knew that the fish were deeper or
shallower depending on the way the wind was the day before.
So intrinsically we were using temperature.
We couldn't detect the temperature but we knew that the
water moved back and forth and around the ground. We knew
we hed to go deeper if there wes a northeast wind. Because
you had an influx of water coming in that forced the warm
water down and your cod went down another five, six, ten
fathoms probably. And when the wind went southwest you'd go
shalloW again because your warm water on the surface got
swept back out again and your bottom water up-welled and the
fish came up the slope. And how do you work that in to a
catch-per-unit-effort?
We talk about the technology change with the offshore
draggers, that thsy became so efficient that we coUldn't
account for it any more. The catch rates were going up and
up and up and yet the stock was staying level. But then you
come to the inshore and you have to look at the sociology as
a technology.
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0: So you're suggesting that the opposite has taken place in
the inshore? That knowledge has !:,~en eroded?
A: It could be in some cases. No, I think it's balanced
out. I have to qualify that one. I think it's balanced out
now. Where most people have Bounders so they can actually
go along the slope and see where the fish are. Or they can
look at a trap before they haUl it. And the fish are just
not there any more.
But I have heard a lot of fishermen complainirtg. When
I talk to fishermen. I've heard them compleining that you
get some fishermen going out who don't know what they're
doing and putting gear on the ground and ruining it for
anybody else. Because you just can't just set your line
traWls, your gillnets, across the ground.
There' 9 one other thing I think we've missed. When I
was growing up in the 'fifties, everybody had a trap boat
and was their own boss. But gradually, in Port de Grave,
they got away from that and got into lon'jliners and instead
of waiting for the fish to come in, they went out after the
fish. So that's a whole new development there.
But it's really not new. Except that they go to the
Virgin Rocks now. My father and grandfather and great-
great-grandfather went up to the Labrador. Or they went to
Cape St. Marys. It's not really different. They're
returning to a oycle that was there for many decades.
0: Do you have any idea why the inshore fishery was so good
this year, on the east side of the Avalon anyway?
A: It was pretty well south of Cape Bonavista. It seems to
me that what happened. I don't really know a lot about it,
the cod seemed to be distributed farther south in the winter
and the spring concentration. And these fish moved en masse
into the southern Brea. And if something chBnges, that
concentration might spread farther north and you get a more
eve::l distribution along the coast in another year. Or you
could get in some years, there was a bigger concentration in
'82, for example, up north. And that was the year we had
the record catch when we had good distribution along the
coast.
It depends to a certain degree where the fieh end up
after spawning. If we have a really cold year and the cod
are forced south like '85 snd '86 when they were on the Nose
of the Grand BAnk and the Germans caught them. Then you're
into a situation where you're probably going to get most of
your inshore fishery in the southern area..
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Q: About this issue of dragging on the spawning grounds.
I've talked to both Jake, who was the official department
spokesman, and Cabot so I've has both sides of the argument.
What's your opinion?
A: Well, it depends on what you mean by ~spawning grounds. ~
The cod aren't spawning on the bottom for one thing.
they're up semi-peJ.agic, above the bottom. So I can't see
that it's going to affect eggs, for example. Because the
eggs float, they don't go back on the bottom. If you're
talking herring, where the eggs attach themselves to the
kelp and the rock and the substrate or whatever, then you're
probably talking damage. But with the cod up in the water
column, swimming, I can't see it. Again, anything is
possibJ.e, but I can't really see it.
0: Jake's point was interesting. That if there is a ban or
a moratorium on dragging during the spawning season, what's
probably going to happen is to effectively push the fishing
back onto the pre-spawning concentrations where you'll be
catching them before any of them have had a chancs to spawn.
And probably the net results would be deleterious to the
stock.
A: I'm not sure that it would have that much affect.
Because Whether you catch them in January or the next
December, the quota allows for a certain volume of fish to
be taken out of that stock. Whether you take them before or
after spawning might not make that much difference. It's a
circle you're looking at. :::f you're looking at just one
year then maybe you could say yes, but you're looking at a
cycle.
0: In the same conversation Jake said something else that I
thought was quite striking. The average cod produces around
2 million eggs and the difference between a good year-class
and a bad year-class is the difference between six or eight
of those 2 million eggs or only two of those 2 million eggs
surviving to recruit to the stock. You're talking about
astonishingly smaJ.l statistical variations, between two in
two million and eight in two million. That's a seemingly
insignificant difference and yet it makes all the difference
in the world. When you start to think about these numbera,
it's astonishing that there's any stability in the stock at
all.
A: It's remurkable, really, that it dc~s hold. If you look
at the number of survivors who make it to four years old
it's probably point one percent or something. I don't know
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what it is. (between .0001 per cent and .0004 per cent] But
it's very very small.
Q: And there's so many potentially lethal situatlons that
per-recruits can encounter. Sudden temperature shifts,
predation...
A: Winds and currents. They could be just swept out over
the top of the Bank you know. It's endless. Food for
example. If they dan; t get the right food when the yolk sac
is absorbed they're gone.
Q: The idea of managing the stock an a yearly basis,
counting the fish eaoh year, much less making projections
seems almost impossible.
A; It's very, very difficult.
Q: Even Gulland said that the very best he thought
assessments could do was plus or minus 25 per cent and he
was doing his work in the North Sea which may well be a more
stable ecosystem than the northwest Atlantic. So this means
that if the stock is really a million tones, the assessment
could vary from 750,000 tonnes to 1,250,000 tonnes. And 1f
you're trying to manage through quotas at the FO.l level,
then the quota could vary from 150,000 tonnes to 250, 000
tonnes just through unavoidable variance in the assessment.
Ram told me that he ran some of the zonal survey data
through normal measures of variation and, at the 95 per cent
confidence level, the lower end of the answer included zero.
1\: It's very uncertain, yes. So I think you're starting to
appreciate the enormity of the task we were faced with back
In '77, '78.
Q: But it seems that back then a lot of people thought it
could be done. Once you kicked the foreigners out and
competent, dedicated Canadian scientists got in there and
took control, ...
1\: I don't think the scientists ever thought that. I
didn't. I think we realized that the problems were atl11
the same. We thought we'd get a better handle on
catch/effort through surveillance and enforcement but the
natural variance was still there.
Q: It seems that in this atmosphere of large areoe of
uncertainty and variability, that given that an answer had
to be given to the minister, that the answer invariably came
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out at the high end, the most optimistic possib~e
interpretation of the data. And until the '89 assessment
the numbers never went down. They always went up. Which
means that they thought that the real answer was at the high
end of the uncertainty. And this is what I'm trying to
figure out.
A: The answer probably lies in the catch rates. The
offshore catch rates were going up anCl that was one of the
things that they were using to tune it.
Q: But the catch rates were gong up because of more
efficient technology and increased skipper competence.
A: And the research vessel survey results were just yo-yoing
back and forth and were very difficult to tune your
assessment from.
Q: And most scientists prefer order and stability in their
data so they perhaps gave undue weight to the commercial
CPUE data because its was orderly and showed stabil1ty and
growth.
A: It was good, hard scientific data and we're conditioned
to think that if something is good, hard and concrete, it's
true.
Q: And of course the increased commercial catch rates
corresponded to expectations and projections. They expected
that once Canada got control of the stock in '77, then they
could rebuild it to its historical IElvels. And there were
some fairly firm and public commitments made to this goal.
A: But when the scientists made these projections, they also
attached several pages of caveats. Which got torn off and
put into the waste basket and all that got looked at was the
one page of projections. A lot of people tend to forget
that one. Everything was there, that it was based on
average recruitment and certain growth rates. If the
recrui tment doesn't come through, this was wrong. And the
recrui tment didn't come through.
0: But, the reader was left to believe that all this would
hold true over time. You might be off by a year or two.
The caveats were there, yes, but the tone was that, "we are
being good, cautious scientists, but what we really think's
going to happen is this. We'll be off a little but not uy
very much." And a s it turns out, it appears now that they
were off by a whole lot. And even Al Pinhorn did some
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projections which he probably fi-nds real embarrasgi.ng now.
And I was told that there were projecti.ons run up especially
for the Kirby Report •..
A: Well. projections were done every year. Five-year
projections, whatever. But when we took over jurisdiction
in '77-' 7B, we never had a survey of northern cod, not
really, not on in divisions 2J and 3K. Not until the fall
of '77. That's the first one we had. So that was the data
base we were working with. It was impossible. But you had
to do the best you could with what you had. And I suppose,
in retrospect. we didn't do that bad. You'll get a lot of
opinions that we did a terrible job. But when you cons1.der
what we were working with, we were extremely successful. It
depends on which yardstick you use. If the Europeans had a
mortality rate of 0.45 on cod in the North Sea they'd be
dancing. Or the Norwegians with their mortalities from 0.6
up to 1.
0: I don't know about the Norwegians but the North Saa
seems to be a very different ecosystem than the Grand Banks.
It seems to have a highsr rate of energy cycling because it
is relatively shallow, relativaly warm. So perhaps if the
biological turnover is higher, if the biological energy rate
is higher, you can hit the stocks harder than here.
A: You can only take so much fish ...
Q: But if the growth rates are higher .•.
A: But their biomass is declining and that's the te1ling
thing. If you had a stable biomass in spite of those
fishin')' mortalitias, then you could say, well, the bottom
line is they can do it. If you look at any of ICES reports,
their stock. is going down and their spawning biomass is
going down.
Q: I was talking to a couple of Visiting Norwegians last
year and they said that thinys are so bad over there that
the government is s1.mply taking a third of the fleet out of
the water and closing a third of the processing eector. Or
maybe it was two-thirds. It was an astonishing number.
Maybe it was two-thirds. It was just brutal. Htmg it up.
Get out of the fishery. Apparently they'~e in big trouble.
A: They are in big trouble. You're looking at a stock that
produced a million tons in some years. 800,000 tonnes. Now
they're down to something like a hundred thousnnd tonnaa.
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Q: Was that primarily because of f:1shing on the stock i taelf
or a~BO on their food? Are they a caplin-eating stock?
A: Yes. And then they decimated the caplin. But they had
bad recruitment too.
Q: And that can happen for any number of reasons that no one
has a clue about. I was reading a paper by an economist
down at the university of Maine named .Jim Wilson who's
gotten in to modelling fisheries dynamics using economic
information in the models. But he' s also finding that if
you run multi-species, multi-variate computer simulations
with a cap on total biomass or total energy in the system,
you get stronglY non-liner responses. And unpredictable,
chaotic responses to very small changes in initial
conditions when you start to run the model. I I ve been
reading about Chaos 'I'heory lately. Have you read anything
about this?
A: Not mUCh. A bit. Sissenwine dealt with some of this with
the uncertainties in scientific advice.
0: It seems to me that up 'U.ll now, scientists have assumed
that the fundamental dynamic in the marine bio-system is
easentially linear. A linear system tending towards
equilibrium states. And that it will respond in a fairly
linear way to inputs and extractions of energy. In a
pred1.ctable way. And this assumption seems to underlie the
current concept of management.
A: The whole concept of it was stability. We could take out
some of the peaks and valleys and stabilize ... everything
could be stabilized and that may not be so. It's subject to
natural fluctuations which, at times, defy our explanation.
Certainly our projections.
0: So if, in fact, the system is strongly nonlinear, or
components of it are, not only do projections go out the
window but it may not be that our f:1shing pressure is the
most important variable.
A: There are a number of people who have made that
observation. Fishing, sure, l.s a factor in everything. But
it may not have the effect that we like to believe that it
has.
If you look at the herring popUlation in the GUlf of
St. Lawrence, the herring population was al.most wipsd out by
a disease, ichthosporidean and the two biggest year-classes
that they ever produced came from that spawning stock, the
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'59-' 60 year-classes. One of the better year-classes that
ever came out of northern cod was the '73 year-class when
the stock was very, very low.
I suppose you have to have a good spawning stock there.
It's a basic building block. You have to have a minimum
spawning stock. If you keep a huge spawning stock, there's
no guarantee that you're going to get good year-classes.
But sooner or later you're g01ng to get some. Unless things
change drastically from what they were in the past. Unless
it's trUly and utterly chaotic. But if there is such a
thing as orderly chaos, random1zed chaos, if you like,
sooner or later you're going to pull a good year-class out
of that spawning stock.
Q: Chaos theory 1s sort of mis-named because one of its main
points is that there is a strange k1.nd of order in
apparently random events. 11. snowflake is a perfect example.
It's a product of random forces and events and no two are
exactly alike, their exact shape is unpredictable and yet
they are orderly. They are all basically hexagonal (check).
You can ba successful depending on your level of prediction.
You can never predict the detailed shape of the next
snowflake but you know it's go:1.ng to be hexagonal. People
like Wilson are saying that the only level on wh.1ch there
seems to be equilibrium :1.n the system is on a total energy
level. So he's running his models with f1ve different
species. He uses the known biological parameters for cod,
haddock, redfish. flounder. And then he introduces a
pret~nd species, Bomething he calls "bloom." Th.1s is ahort-
lived but tremendously fecund and opportunistic. He said it
corresponds in the systom to species like sand lance. So
when he runs his models, there are often weird, chaotic
responses for each indiv1dual species but the total biomaes,
the total energy level, remains relatively constant. And
what I find interesting is, what are the implications for
management? The way it's been done up 'till now hasn't been
terribly successful. It hasn't made anybody happy. And I
suspect it's because the msnagement is based on a flswed
assumption. Now if in fact it's more realistic to think of
the ocean in terms of nonlinear dynamics, how would that
change the scientists' relationship with it? How would you
construct a management strategy? Have you given this any
thought?
11.: Well, I've thought about it but I don't have an answer.
If you look at an assessment, for example, you're really
only hindcasting, in a sense. Your only estimate is your
recruitment that you plug in. Which you get from your
research vessel surveys. You're making the assumption that
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your growth rate is going to remain the same and that your
recrui. tment will be at a certain level. And on that basis
you do the assessment.
But in the l.ong-terrn, you're still basically looking at
the conce~t of stability. Equilibrium is always there in
the back of your mind as the basis. If you're looking at
the uncertain, the chaotic situation, you could still do
your assessments but how they would relate to the type of
management that takes that 1n1:0 account, 1 don't know. 'lou
certainly couldn't plan your fishery in the way you plan it
now.
You'd have to have a mUlti-year plan or whatever.
You're pretty well left to take what you can get out of it
which J.esves the door wide open, dangerously. Because you
then revert back to fishing as hard as you can. You're
right back to the old free-far-all system agein. A race for
the fish. So I guess the whole basis for the management was
to try to put a cap on the amount of effort that was there
so that the people who were there could make a living.
0: How about letting the effort vary among available
species? Let the fishermen make up their own mind what
species they were going after. So that as one specias
increased in abundance or market vaJ.ue, that wouJ.d get
fished unti1 something eJ.se showed up.
A: Then you're back to pulse fishing again. The problem
there is .. . essentially this is what the Europeans practised
in the 'eixties. For example, they moved to cod, haddock,
pollack, ailver hake, herring, you name it. By the time
they were finished there was very 11tt1e of anything left.
This is the danger you run into on that one.
0: But there wes no cap on the effort in that 8ituation.
A: \IIe11, if you can cap your effort you might be able to get
it to work. But you would take the stability out of the
industry.
0: If you capped effort at a reJ.atively low level, and then
let the effort distribute itseJ.f in whatever way it saw as
rational, ..• ?
A: Again, I think you could get caught. Say, for example,
that the price of cod keeps going up and up and up. The
fiehermen keep fishing and fishing and fishing until your
stock is pretty we1.l decimated. There's your cod stock
gone. If the price of cod remained the same, then that
might work. They'd switch to something else because the
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catch rata on cod was going down. But if, for example like
in 'S7, thtl prictl of your cod went up and up and up, they'd
fish them to extinction. Probably not biological extinction
but certainly commercial t1xtinction. So you always have to
have these caps on the individual. species too.
Q: But if we go back to the idea that the system is stable
only at the total energy level, then the only level at which
you can manage is in the amount of energy that you take out,
which is the same thing as effort _ Effort is an energy
extraction equation.
A: What you're saying would work very very well with the
trawler companies. So they wipe out the stock one placs,
they move and fish somewhere else. But if you're an inshore
fisherman on the coast of Labrador, what do you do when
you've fished you're pulse of cod stock? There is no other
species.
0: This brings up another touchy issue which J: think is
something that's going to have to be talkad about pretty
soon. And that's, at what cOl3t is the inshore fishery
mai.ntained? A.s peopl.e. I think. :1.t' s clsar that the
Mulronsy government, at Isast, would just as soon do away
with the inshore fishery. I think that's clearly the intent
behind the ind.ividual transferrable quotas, ITCs, that are
moving eastward. That went in to the Gulf this year. And
what's 90:l.ng to happen when 'the public property, the fish,
gets convertad to private property is .••• You look. at moat
pri.vate property situations, yOU ~oolc at agriculture. It
becomes largely concentrated in the hands of capital-
intensive organizations. The dragger companies will but up,
within a fairly short period of t:1.me, all of the inshore
fishermen's ITCs, and they'll be gone out of there.
A: J: don't Icnow if that's happened anywhere. Tell me
somewhere it's happened.
Q: How long have there been ITCs1 They first came in on
What, herring?
A: Herring, yes.
0: How long have they been .in effect.
A: :r can' t answer that question.
Q: But they haven't been there very long.
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A: NO. They haver,'t been there very long. Several years.
But to me the idea of ITQs brings in a certain measure of
atabil1ty for the fisherman too. They can take the quota
whenever they like. At the:1r leisure if you like. They're
not out there in a race for 'the fish. .Jeopardising their
own safety in a lot of cases.
So you know that on Janusry the first, the fisherman
down in wherever he is, Bonavista. he's got a thousand
tonnes of cod, he can tailor his fishing season to catch it
when it's moat convenient and economical. I think that was
the basic premise behind a lot of this. Because it seems to
me that most of the fishermen liked them. Granted there are
some people who wouldn't like them. If you were a top dog
fisherman. Bu't if you were the average fieherman .... That
way you're not penalized if your engine breaks down and your
out of it for a month. You've lost your fishing season.
But if you have your ITO you get your engine fixed end you
go fishing. So you have a safety nat if you like. Granted,
there's always the danger that you're talking about but
there's always a danger in everything.
Q: But couple that with what the federal government has been
try:1ng to do, Changing the unemployment rules and
regUlations. And all this talk about "rationalizing" and
·professionalising· the fishery. Particularly the inshore
fishery. And it eeems to me that these are code words for
ahutting :1.t down. All this talk about too many fishermen
and too few fish.
A: That's coming from the fishermen themselves in a lot of
csses. You talk to the fishermen and they're the first ones
to Bay that there are just too many fishermen. NoW' whether
that's true or not is certainly a matter of perception.
0: How did that come to be? There was a period there where
the number of fishermen fell quite dramatically.
A: Yes it did. Back in the •seventies. The fish stocks
were down I guess. And as the fish stocks started to
rebuild and things looked promising. they came back in
agein. And in Newfoundland you have the problem of what
else are you going to do? There are no alternative forms of
employment. One time you could go to Toronto or Alberta but
you can't du that any more. It's just too expensive in
Toronto and the~e are no jobs in Alberta.
[short digression--the talk turns to global warming)
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a: You throw the possibilities of what might happen if
global warming is real and it's enough to drive you crazy.
A: Well, there's no one knows what's going to happen. If
the temperatures fluctuate and the currents change, you
could get anything from a fantastic year-class to nothing.
0: And on the Grand Banks it would ~ikely increase the chaos
rather than decrease it becauSe you've got huge amounts of
cold water coming down off the melting ice cape, I can't see
it doing anything but increasing the volatility of the
weather patterns.
A: Well, it's already volatile on the Grand Bank anyway. on
the southern edge. For example, the haddock. It just
zoomed up in the 'fifties. You had a couple of big year-
classes and then it just dropped off again. There was no
recruitment. They're at the northern end of the range. We
got cooling.
But it's interesting that the niche wee taken over by
the yellow tail floundor. I remember in 'the 'sixties, going
out and we'd get a yellow tail flounder, we'd bring it in.
It was a rare specimen. And when the haddock went they took
off because they were eating basically the same bottom fauna
that the haddock were eating. But they were also at the
northern end of their range. So you had the two of these
species at the northern cnd of their range interacting with
each other.
Now the yellow tail recruitment is declining, 1t will
be interesting to see what happens to the haddock. There
are indications that there are a couple of fairly good year-
classes ahead. It I S on the periphery that you see theSe
types of changes 'that gi.ve you indications of what' B
probably happening 1n the whole system. And if it's
happening there, you go to northern Labrador where the cod
are on the northern end of their range and you get a few
cold years, that has to affect it.
a: That's another point that I wonder sbout. The 2J3KL
stock is assessed as a unit. But 1£, as you said from your
tagging studies, that they tend to be regionaL •..
At At spawning time they seem to congregate. But the
problem is that there's such an intermixture, in the
summertime, that sorting it all out .1s a n.1ghtmare. Because
1.t' s not always the same from year to year.
a: But wouldn't the growth rates be different in different
parts of the range. And is this regional variability in
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length and weight at age incorporated in the model? I don' t
think it is.
A: It's fed in by division. How it's treated
afterwards •... I'm not sure. I've been away frOll it for a
while.
Q: What is it that you're doing now.
A: I '. a research assistant for Scott (Parsons] for a book
he's writing.
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APPENDIX L
Q: what I find most striking about the current fisheries
crisis is .... It mayor may not be a biological crisis. No
ana really knows at this point. The crisis seems to be
about what is and is not an acceptable lavel of uncertainty.
What counts as valid knowledge and what doesn't. Within tho
scientific frame of roference, the traditional academic
evaluative traditions, probability and uncertainty are
simply interesting problems. From a management perspective,
I suspect that when DFO stock assessment science was set up,
the expectation was for a much greater degree of certainty
from science's input to management than has turned out to be
possible. Similarly from the corporate sector's
perspective. So the first question would be, how the
revealed uncertainties of stoc;~ assessment, even on the
current state of the stock, much less predictions, affect
your ability to manage the stocks?
A: I heard three questions in there, Chris. Is the crisis
real in biological terms? Secondly, are ex:pectations of
certainty unfulfillable? And thirdly. how does uncertainty
affect the day-to-day management business?
Speaking of northern cod, the only predictor of the
future that 1: know of that's reasonably useful is the past.
Empirically, within those circumstances at 1east, you know
that it did happen and consequently, it could happen again.
If you look at the data givoan in the Harris report, Harris
shows us that northern cod has supported a catch of
somewhere between 200 million [sicI tonnes and 300 million
[sic] tonnes. There have been fluctuations outside of those
bands but they're rare.
If you accept that as a reasonab1e expectation of what
the future could give us then, biologically between 200
thousand tonnes and 300 thousand tonnes, to me, seems a
reasonable expectat10"l. Assuming that the world doesn't
change from what it was [inau~ible word or two]. That in my
mind is biological real!t:y.
If we ask ourselves, do we have a crisis of
expectation, as dist1nct from a crisis in a biological
sense, then we may have had unrealistic expectations. What
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seems to have happened in all of the North A.tlanti.c from
about the second world war on, is that catching capacity of
fish exceeded nature's ability to provide it. Bigger
vessels, echo sounders, batter gear, more experience at
catching fish. And the catches went up very sign.ificantly
on both sides of the Atlantic after the war. Here they went
from the historic 200 to 200 thousand tonnes to about 800
thousand tonnes.
Again, looking at h.istory, what had happened,
speculating on the whye, obviously 800 thousand tonnes
wasn't sustainable. The stock crashed at that time. We
know that two to three hundred thousand tonnes is
sustainable. We know that 800 thousand tonnes isn't
sustainable. What are the reasons? We can only speculate.
One possi.bility is that something has changed in the
environment in the North Atlant.ic. Productive capacity
seellls to have gone down about 30 percent on both sides of
the Atlantic. So you've got environmental change. It could
be temperature, salinity, I really don' t know. Is it simplY
a reflection that, with greater catching capacity after the
war, we simply went in to a stock that hadn't been subjected
to that fishing pressure, took out a lot of the capital, if
you wish, instead of just harvesting the interest? And once
that cap.1tal was gone it was gone. We hsd a depleted stock
and have had to work since '77 to build it up.
So .1f I could sum all that up, wha I: history tells me is
200 to 300 thousand tonnes is realistic. E1.ght hundred
thousand tonnea we've seen is not Busta.1nable. And for me,
looking toward the future, what I would have said is two to
three hundred thousand tonnes is what I would hope to get
out of that fishery. If I got less I would be a l:1.ttle
disappo.1nted and if I got more I would be pleased. I thi.nk
we have had expectat.1ons that exceeded nature's proven
h.1storic track record to provide.
The second quest:1.on .is expectations of certainty for
management. I would say, "Yes." There are expectations
that sc.1ence produce scientific predictions for the future
of stock assessments. I see this not just in this
department but in other departments where you deal with
numbers. If, for example, we were to say that the total
allowable catch for, let's say, 250 thousand tonnes is
possible in a g.1ven year, 250 thousand tonnes is a hard
number. It's quite d.1fferent from 251,000 tonnes or 249.
Because you say a number it has a prec.i.s.1on that covers the
uncertainty on which it's basad.
I really haven' t found a good way :in thi.s department or
in another department where I was inVolved in residues in
food to say seven parts per mill.1on. Well, there you're
drawing a firm line w.1th a very unsteady hand. It could
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easi1y be point six or point eight. Point seven implies
that 1t's that number and no other. It couldn't vary.
My other comment on uncertainty, part.:lcularly in this
department, is that people's lives are affected by the
number that's given for the TAC. And because people's
payments on their gear and their boats are fixed, and are
dealt with with great certainty by the bank, they are under
pressure to have a catch and a cash-flow that has equal
certainty. In consequence, for them look.:lng into the
future, they are frustrated by not having consistent
predictions of catch. In other words, 250,000 tonnes every
year into the future. And because they are frustrated they
become angry and when they become angry they direct their
anger at whoever seems to be frustrating them.
In the fisheries, we have not privatized the fishery in
the sense that we have privatized the Western land in this
country. Everybody got a hundred acres when the Hest was
opened up. We've only had the offshore fishery for 13
years. So really it is the new west. The new frontier.
And 1t has 1argely been held as a common resource property.
Rather like some countries have held ell the land as the
property of t;he state and a110wed you to farm a little
piece. In that context we have positioned ourselvea between
nature and the fishermen.
I grew up in a fishing family. we had a trawler. We
had a lobster boat. And there was a department of fisheries
but this was thirty years ego. Like God. :1. t; was something
you heard about but never saw. It really had very little
impact; on our lives. In some years we got a good catch end
in some years we got a very bad catch. It was an act of
God. And we didn't go about blaming God. It simply
happened.
What's happened in recent years is that fi.sheries has
stepped in between the act of God and the receipt of that
act by man. And have become the focus of anger for the bad
years. We went out and fished without the department of
fisheries and in the bad years there was no one to blame.
It just happened. So I would say, "Yes. ~ There is an
expectation for certainty. And we have become the focus for
frustration and unhappiness when we can't provide certainty.
The big question was how does uncertainty affect tho
day-to-day management? I'll take the lead-off from the last
question. Because there's a perfect1y understandable desire
on the part of the fishing community and the fish processing
community to have some certainty in the stock they can get,
those they can take, that translates into pressure on tl:l1s
department to produce A) certain numbers and B) consistent
numbers over a period of time to avoid fluctuations and C)
to provide increasing numbers because decreasing numbers are
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punishing. Punishment to them translates to punishment for
us. If we don't produce those ever-increasing numbers. So
yes, I would say that uncertainty has made it more
difficult. And the fact that the State owns the property
has made it more difficult.
Q: I'm going to roughly quote one of my previous sources who
said that, in hindsight, it seems that DFO has been setting
the TACs in response to variability in the data rather than,
necessarily, in relation to any change in reality to the
northern cod stock. That in fact, the widely-shared
guestimate of the levels of uncertainty in the current state
of stock assessment is somewhere on the order of 25 to 30
per cent. This seems to be generally accepted among the
scientific community as the best that they can do. And,
given the uncertainty in other variables, predictions--
useful resource projections of more than a year are coming
to be understood as perhaps impossible. So that's again two
questions. One, the opinion expressed to me that TACs have
been set in response to ... reflected variability in the
assessment data rather than reflections of biological
real!ty. And the question about the possibil1ty of useful
predictions.
A: I'll make two comments on that Chris. One is that both
those statements are absolute statements. One says that
TACS have been set based on variability in the data rather
than variability in the stock. That's'an absolute statement
and, as such, I WOUldn't accept it. The one thing we know
in the fisheries is that it's based on probability and
variation year to year. Certainty and absolutes tend to be
untenable.
What I would have said is that the comment about the
confidenco interval for a given prediction around a given
stock being plus or minus 25 per cent, that basic figure is
in Gulland's text book. One of the basic text books on the
fishery ... speaking of European fisheries. So if I accept
Gulland's text book as being correct, that's the standard
uncertainty in the European fishery. That they haven't been
able to improve on.
Let's'take it for a moment that it's a standard in this
business and about as good as you can get. To go fron that
conclusion to say that TACs are set in response to
variations in the data rather than variations in the stOCk,
presentlY I think is quite untrue, What that number tells
you is, let's assume that we said the TAC for next year is
250,000 tonnes. And that was based on confidence intervals
on each aide of it of 25 per cent. We have a very high
degree of confidence that the number, the correct number, is
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250,000 tonnes plus or minus 25 per cent. Plus or minus
50,000.
So the truth in a given year could lie between 200 and
300 thousand tonnes. That's a standard behaviour in any
statistical sampling whether it's an opinion pallor whether
it's a market surveyor whether it's a survey of the number
of fish. What's quite important is that the confidence that
the correct number is 250,000 tonnes is very high. The
confidence that .it is 200,000 or 300,000, wh.ile those are
possible, it tends to be one year out of 19 or one year out
of 20 that it will be one of those extreme cases. So you're
getting closer and closer to the truth. Closer and closer
to a high degree of confidence as you move closer and closer
to the 250,000 tonnea.
The other comment on it is, because you're not taking a
stock assessment in one given year as one given picture of
the stock, you are not dependent on one sampling. You, in
fact, have a ser.ies of years. So that if your series of
years gave you a trend around 250,000 you have a higher
degree of confidence that the truth is close to that range.
That gives you a second check.
A third level of check is the suggeb"ion in the Harris
Report th.at because any sampling plan, for instance an
opinion poll to see if George Bush will be elected president
where th.ey use a high leval of sampling, say 1,200 samples,
you always see as a codicil to the prediction that they
survey said that Mr. Bush would get 45 per cent of the .....ote
plus or minus 5 per cent and this .is right 19 times out of
20. You're seeing the same sort of conclusion in doing a
fish stock. That's because of the 19 times out of 20. One
time you can get a completely wrong number. Not even within
the plus or minus five. And the best way that I know of to
protect yourself against that is to have two or three
separate indicators. So if one of them gave you quite a
wrong number you have two or three others to put you back on
the righ.t track.
And that' g one of the things that Harris recommended in
cod. He said if, for example, you are using the research
vessel survey as one indicator, that's fine. But it could
be wrong, quite wrong, in certain years. There's nothing
wrong with the people involved. It's simply a matter of not
counting every fish that you're sampling. He said try to
have a separate indicator. The commercial vessel sampling
is a separate indicator. So that if one is off the other
might correct you. And he said two indicators are good but
that three indicators are better than two so try to have
hydro-acoustics as a third, completely separate
indicator.
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And in some stocks we do, for examp10, a winter and
summer survey. So they give you two samples. In effect two
checJt.s. To say that because there is variation in the data
that you cannot use the data is to throw out all statistical
methods and all sampling plans. I think that would be
unwise.
0: Just to go back to the indicators that have been used.
It appears that up until the cdtical reevaluation that the
final assessment was tuned with heavier weightings given to
the commercial catch data than to the RV data. And
it ..•. From an outside perspective one can construct a
hypothesis that the reason for this is that the commercial
catch data showed a reassuring stability and, in fact,
optimistic figures whereas the RV data, gathered randomly.
showed d1sturbing var1abi11ty. And, therefore, when one is
dea11ng w1th assumptions of a linear dynamical system, the
unexplained or unexplainable variation is undesirable. One
tends to look for stabil1ty and consistency in data if
you're assuming that the system's natural tendency is to
seek equilibrium states rather than reacting nonlinearly and
chaotically. Now, of course, since the reevaluation there
are different weightings and different tunings and different
basic assumptions in the model. But, in your opinion, is
there any basis to this hypothesis of mine?
A: Let me try to answer, Chris, and if I haven't quite
understood the qU6stion stop me and put me back on treck.
In trying to assess any fishery in terms of what stack
is out there. in terms of your capital invested, what
harvest can reasonably be taken out in terms of you interest
payments, you're looking for a way of sampling the stock
that is out there in a way that 1s as unbiased and
consistent as possible.
The research vessel is the least biased way that I know
of. The basis for a statistical experiment is that you hold
all of the variables constant except one. In this case the
one that fluctuates is the stock going up and down. And to
hOld all the other variables constant it means consistency
in the vessel thet you use, the gear you use, the manner in
which you select the trawl sites, the stratification of the
areas that you I re going to sample in and depths that you're
going to work in. So that, insofar as possible, the only
thing that changes is the amount of stock. Then if you get
a different number for the amount of stock, you can
reasonably conclude that the stock caused this change Bnd
nat something else. That's the advantage of the research
vessel.
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The disadvantage is that it's very costly. You cen
only do a relatively small amount of sampling. So it has a
pro and it hes a can.
The commercial fleet, on the other hand, has very large
amounts of sampling. They fish a lot and every time they
fish they ar13 taking a sample of the fish population. The
other big advantage of the commercial data is that it's low
cost. Somebody else is paying the fixed costs of taking the
sample. The can side is that the commercial fleet is in the
business of changing the way in which it does business
constantly to improve its profit position. In other words,
to get maximum outputs for minimum inputs. That leaves you
with the difficulty in interpreting their data of, is the
stock assessment they give you, the variation they give you
caused by the number of fish in the sea or does it reflect a
variation in the ability of the vessel to catch them?
That's the conundrum.
What usually happens is that you try insofar as is
possible with the commercial vessel 1s to make as much ".Jse
of it as you can because it's a huge sample and it's cheap,
But if you can find, to use your term, a linear relationship
in the trend of their improved ability to fish, then you can
calculate in a correction for their improved ability to
fish.
If, on the other hand, their ability to catch fish is
changed by one-off type changes where a new piece of gear
hes suddenly coltle in that we haven I t got experience with in
the past, or a new rule hag been imposed that changes
fishing patterns, you don't have a trend to base it on. It
means you may end up debasing your numbers.
That doesn't say that one research vessel is better
than the commercial vessels. It is if you had unlimited
money to do lots of them. But you don't so you're in to a
trade-off. The big advantage of using the two indicators is
that if you get a bad number, it could be one year in 20 you
get a bad number or one year in 10 depending on the kind of
sampling you're doing. If you have a trend that's saying
your stock is growing and suddenly you get a number that's
way off the scale the other indicator, whether it's
commercial, research vessel or hydro-acoustics, can put you
back on track.
What seems to have happened with the research vessel
in, I believe it was the '86 figure, is that it gave a
fiqure that waa out of the previous trend. Quite a ways
out. And the jUdgement call was, was the atock a lot better
than we had thought or was this an artifact? Without being
able to look into the future and get future data it really
was quite diffiCUlt to make the call. The commercial
indicator at the sama time was showing, as you've said,
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larger numbers of fish out there than the research vessel
was. And this is leaving the one odd year out. In
consequence, it would have been nice at that stage to have
had a third indicator that might have told you which one of
these two might be indicating the true trend.
Harris's comment was, in cases of uncertainty, try and
pick the least uncertain. And Harris's suggestion was that
because the research vessel is so consistent year over year,
give increased weighting to the research vessel. At least
you know what its strengths and weaknesses are. You oan get
an off year but given that, you should be fairly oonsistent
over time. In commercial vessels, because of the
imponderables, 1t really 1s hard to be sure hem to interpret
that data that you're getting. So Harris said, err on the
side of safety. Give weighting to the research vessel.
What has happened subsequent to the Harris
recommendation, for example, this year we first of all
looked at the research vessel and the commercial vessels as
two separate indicators. To see, are they giving us
consistent signals which support each other or are they
giving us different. signals. The second thing we've done is
to examine the data given by both of them to see,
particularly in the commercial vessel area, where have we
got consistent data? In other words, where things haven't
changed and we're relatively comfo:o:table that we're being
given consistency over time. The interpretation there was
that, for the middle ages groups, the data was quite good.
For the second step, first of all we compared them
independently. We combined the data to give us larger
sample size and shorter confidence intervals. And what that
did for us is that it reduced the gap between the purely
research vessel estimate of how big the stock was and the
commercial vessel indicator to about, speaking off the top
of my head but about, half of what that gap had been before.
So that., in my mind, was a useful step. Anything we can do
to get the best possible information out of those two data
sets really is useful.
If we could get hydro-acoustics to work, that would
give us a third indicator. The more information you have
the shorter you make the gap between the decision you've got
to make and the data you've got to make it on.
0: The time is about up but I'd like to ask one last
question about the possibility of useful predictions. Of
resource projections. When one looks at the resource
projections for past years it's quite striking. You have
year zero here. And on the left there I a lot of variation,
actual catches and TACs. And on the right there's this
gorgeous st.air-step projection. Always increasing. Always
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nearly linear. And this tells me something. Why should the
future be any less variable, and always in a rising trend,
than the past? I think that the current situation in the
fisheries can be traced, especially the overcapacity
problem, can be traced to the Kirby Report. And the wildly
optimistic resource projections that were contained there.
'I'hey were projecting TACs in 1989 and 1990 on the order of
450,000 to 500,000 metric tonnes. That's more than one
order of magnitude off from reality. And yet there's
tremendous demand for projections. From the commercial
sector particularly. The financial sector of the fishery
needs to make five and ten year business plans. Will it
ever be possible to make usefUl resource projections? More
than one year class away?
l\: I think the answer depends on what degree of certainty
you're willing to accept as useful. I find it helpful to go
to extremes. Because extreme cases by their nature make
certain things obvious.
If, for example, we were to say that since resource
projections, or predictions of anything for that matter,
what the weather's going to be tomorrow, are by their nature
not absolute, and if we were to take the extreme case and
say that because by their nature predictions are not perfect
perhaps we shouldn't do them at all. If you follow that
line of logic we make no predictions. We put no controls on
a common resource fishery.
What history tells us, going back to the middle ages,
is the tragedy of the commons. Where the kings, with the
best intentions, set aside some common land for their
subjects to use. You had a race to use that land because if
I didn't get my share this year you took it and there was
nothing left for me. Fishing capacity is so great now that
if something were not done to predict what can be harvested
with reasonable confidence in what shOUld be left there, we
likely would damage the fishery in a very short period of
time. 'I'hat' s an assumption but it's my assumption at this
point in time.
If, on the other hand, we were to say, to take another
extreme.... people like to have certainty because they have
to make ten year business plans and guarantee payments
consistently over ten years. Then let' $ make ten year plans
of what you can harvest from the stock. That really is the
debate which took place in the 'sixties and 'seventies
around Max.imum Sustainable Yield.
What seems to have been concluded at that time is that,
in a naturally varying stock, in order to have maximum
sustainable, in other words, every year the same amount, you
would have to take a very low and conservative amount. So
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you're holding yield and allowing the stock to fluctuate but
you're not taking the peaks or valleys.
I don't th1nk e1 ther of those extremes would be
helpful. If we took a sustainable yield in a way that we
were quite certain would be sustainable, it would likely be
a very small yield and in certain years we would leave a lot
of fish in the ocean. My instinct tells me that the most
useful solution, if we could become reasonable people and
accept that there is uncertainty in this business and nobody
is able to predict the future perfectly, I think that for
those stocks that lend themselves to it a mUlti-year TAC
would be usefUl.
I'll tell you why given -the uncertainties. There are
some stocks which grow and decline over a period of years.
And if, for example, we are reasonably sure that the
spawning biomass, the mother stock, is relatively low it
shoul.d be given some time to buil.d. Let's assume for a
moment that it's going to take a few years to build that
s-tock. A.nd in every area equivalent which is cyclical, that
I'm aware of. ups and downs in the economy or ups and downs
in the [unclear word] cycle, it is very difficult for people
1n a business sense or in a human sense to accept right
angle -turns. In other words large TAC this year, small TAC
next year.
If we know that we shOUld rebuild a stock, let's say
that -there's a stock which we have been harvesting
historically at 50,000 tonnes a year and we feel -that 1t
shOUld go to 40. 000 tonnes a year to allow that stock to
rebuild. We could go to 40,000 tonnQs immediately and
rebuild it quickly or we could go t~j 40,000 tonnes in three
or four lock steps. Say 50,000 this year. 47 next year.
45 and 40. Let's assume that a110ws the stock to rebuild in
a safe biological way. The price you're paying for a
smoother change over a longer period is that the recovery
will be over a longer period also.
If you 100k at human behaviour, people seem to accept
difficult dE/cis ions if they're not surprises and if they're
phased in a 11ttle in the fu-ture with a little forewarning.
For example, if you look at the unions negotiating salary
increases, if the union's offered 15 per cent over three
years it often gets broken down as package of, le-t's say, 7
per cent, 5 per cent and 3 per cent. The 7 per cent is
quite acceptable now. The decision to take a 5 per cent is
a year away. A decision, psychologists tell us, only
becomes frightening as the decision point is approached.
You have a year to accommodate yourself to it and the 3 per
cent you have a further year.
So I would sayan those stocks where we know the stock
needs rebuilding and where there's no 1::10logical reason to
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prevent us from doing it over time, assuming that the
community we serve were willing to live with that time
frame, I think that mUlti-year plans in some stocks could
serve a useful purpose. It would avoid the abrupt right
angle changes that are so hard to live with.
Q: And I assume that northern cod would be one of these
stocks. That mUlti-year plans would be most appropriate to
long-lived, slow recruiting stocks.
A: Yes.
Q: That they're less sensitive to variations. Large
numbers, high density, long-lived stocks.
A: Yes. Take again, for example, and extreme case. Assume
that you had a species of fish that recruited to the fishery
this year and died at the end of this year.
0: Shrimp for instance? Aren't there some shrimp fisheries
like that?
A: Let's take a hypothetical one. It's safer. Let's say it
recrui ted and died in the same year. That means that you
could not have a mUlti-year plan because you do not have a
mUlti-year stock. You're forced to a one-year plan. But
for those that ere a little more sp:f·':Iad out and which lend
themselves to it, I think it could I.ave value. The codicil
that you would have to put in there is that if for any
reason the data on which the assessment were made was
superseded by better data or different data a new decision
would have to be made. But that's the uncertainty that you
live with day to day in the fishery in any event.
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APPENDIX H
Interview with Ram Myers, Resource Assessment Modeller
Conducted in St. John's. Newfoundland
August 2e. 1990
{Discussing the process by which things went wrong]
A: There was a group of people who did not want others to
hava a close look at the data. It was very subjective.
Virtually nothing was published.
Q: Who were these people?
A: '/ou want names? Dick Wells. He's dead now. They were
convinced that the stock was going up. Honestly, completely
convinced. There were other people ... 1 wes outside of the
assessment process. People who were not within a small
group were very much discouraged from examining the data.
There's a long history of that.
Q: So stock assessment was run as an exclusive club?
A: No. It was through CAFSAC. But if I wanted to model the
distribution of fish in relationship to temperature, this
was fought very hard.
Q: Why?
A: Paranoia.
Q: But if they were convinced they were right, who were they
scared of?
A: I don't know. But what went wrong with the process, why
the mistakes were made, was this exclusive attitude to
examining the data. That and some sociological reasons.
The group dynamics of the process.
It's very unscientific. Not in terms of the
mathematics. Well, it's unscientific from my point of view.
There's a group of people that gets together and they meet
continuOUSly. And in order to make progress at these
meetings, you have to accept certain things as common.
Otherwise you'd be arguing about every point. This is
simply the way the process worked. It almost has to because
these are human beings. It's one thing to talk about
perfect people but they aren't.
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And there are certain things that are inherent in the
process of having a group of people examining things, like a
small society. And within that group there are people who
are very much opposed to something in the stock assessments.
But since it is consensus, anyone in the group who .... within
CAFSAC. There' s a local group none of whom have Ph. Ds.
0: These were people who had been hired under Sandy's
directorship?
A: Yeah. Some even before.
0: Under Wilf Templeman. Going back that far?
A: Oh yeah. One of the fundamental things to realiz.e is
that the Canadian system works by putting a group of
scientists at different levels, some active researchers but
mostly people who are trained on the job. And traditionally
they've come from a standard biology background. You put
them in. Your try to shelter them from outside interest
groups. And they try to come up with an independent
decision.
This process probably works better than any other
process I can think of. Not that mistakes aren't made. The
only interest is in people who've said something and they
want what they've said to be true. As opposed to inshore
fishermen saying the quotas should be lowered or the
offshore fishermen saying the quotas should be raised. It· s
a decision-making process without advocates, in the
traditional sense.
0: But certainly it generates advocates internally?
A: Yes. But when the quotas were generated pre-CAFSAC, when
it was the old ICNAF system, there'd be different national
groups arguing for different things, advocacy groups. As
opposed to that, you've got a group as much as possible
shielded from the outside forces.
0: I seem to recall a note of warning in the '82 or '83
CAFSAC report ...
A: George Winters?
Q: And then that voice disappeared until the '87 assessment.
A: No. That's not true. It didn't disappear. It
simply ••. Remember, it's a consensus process. Unless you're
willing to go to meetings and just slug it out ...The
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meetings aren't over until they've come to 8 consensus. A
decision has to be made. There's no such thing as saying, I
don't know. This is a process where saying, there isn't
enough information, is not acceptable. Decisions always
have to be made. And consistently abundance was
overestimated and fishing mortality was underestimated for
years and years and years.
0: Why? What were the contributing factors?
A: I can't speak for the period before '83 or so because
before then I knew nothing about the process. But even then
it was beginning to become clear. I think that after that,
a group of Canadian scientists were forced to make a
prediction about how many fish there were going to be and
they made a prediction.
0= Was this for the Kirby Report?
A: Yes. They were asked what would happen if you put in a
200 mile limit and cut back on fishing. [NOTE: this must
have been before '77 then, not for the Kirby Report which
was published in Dec. 'B2] They weren't really keen, as I
understand it, I wasn't there, and they produced something
with confidence limits. Okay, so they said that the stock
was going to go booming ahead. And therefore their
reputations ... and they wanted to force reality to be what
they'd predicted. I think that was 'the key 'thing. There
were technical problems. But there were sources of
information that made it abundantly clear that that wasn't
true. There was data that wasn't consistent with that.
That was consistently ignored.
Q: By the core ,group within DYO?
A: By the core group and the whole CAYSAC process allowed it
to be ignored. This data consisted of, for example, by
calculating mortalities from the research surveys. Research
surveys are very variable. Nevertheless, you can calculate
average mortalities. And these were much higher than what
was Claimed by the asseDsment. It was completely
inconsistent.
c: Natural mortality or fishing mortality?
A: Fishing mortality. Actually, you compute total mortality
and then subtract out •.. but this evidence was ignored.
0: Was this virtual population... ?
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A: No. This was much simpler. Just how many age five do we
havoa this year versus how many age six next year. And there
is a lot of error in this but you can calculate roughly.
0: And yet this data was discounted in favour of commercial
catch data?
A: There are several issues that are confusing you. What
you're referring to is that up until the '86 research
survey, that is, the '87 assessment, the VPAs had been tuned
against the commercial catch per unit effort. The reason
that the commercial CPUE was going up is that they were
learning how to fish. Introducing new gear. Commercial
CPUE data is not very reliable.
Q: But until very recently it was weighted more heavily than
the RV data.
A: That was up until ... Now the research survey data is more
variable.
Q: So it's scarier?
A: It's scarier. It's a very big ocean out there to survey
with limited resources and they spend a lot of money on it.
If the surveys had been SUfficiently accurate then there
wouldn't have been this problem but that would have cost il
lot more money than was available. It's an inherently very
expensive thing to do.
Q: And commercial data is free, its more stable and there's
a lot more of it.
A: But it contains trends and bias.
0: Yes, but I'm trying to understand why it was consistently
weighted more heavily than ...
A: The key thing to understand is that it conformed to what
people, some people wanted to believe. It's a little more
complicated than that but I don't feel it's a lot more
complicated than that. Then in '86 ther.:". was a huge
increase in the abundance in the research surveys. So they
quit tuning against the commercial surveys and tuned against
that and got a tremendous number.
At that point was when the inshore fishermen yelled and
screamed. And the Alverson Commission was called. I had
nothing to do with this until that time because I was
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completely outside. So this was '87 and I was asked by
someone on the Alverson Commission to examine the data
because I had developed new mechanisms for evaluating
research survey data. It had to be done quickly. I
concluded, in about four days, given access to the data,
that their claim that there was an increasa, from tha
research surveys, was simply false. For various reasons.
0: Could you be more specific?
A: There had been changes in the timing of the surveys, over
time, which had effected the estimates of abundance. Also
they were just very variable. The symmetric confidence
limits for the 31< popUlation, they're not symmetric but you
assume thay're symmetric, the 95 per cent confidence limits
included zero for that year. So simply, there were a few
big catches. It was a little more complicated than that but
3L did not show an increase in '86. 31< did but there was
almost no informetiC"n. And 2J did. But it wae very
variable and the timing had changed. Once you start
inClUding these factors, their conclusions were not very
robust. I concluded based on ...not even reading the
assessment document ..• I did an independent analysis of the
data, that the stock simply was not incraasing at that time?
0: So at that point you were not working for DFO?
A: I was working for DFO. But simply because you work for
DFO doesn't mean you're allowed to examine data.
Q i So it took Alverson coming ••. ?
A: This was Mac Merc9r's major fault is that he allowed the
power blocs .•. I was asked by someone on Alverson' B
commission, the one person who knew what he was doing, John
Pope ..•
0; So it took Alverson cOIO!:!.ng in from outside to force them
to let you see the data. To crack the safe for you?
A: That's right. And this was just to do my job. And it
has creatad an enormous number of probleme for me. There
are people who just hate me for doing that. In retrospect,
with a lot more data now, it's abundantly clear that it was
true. After the Alverson report things were restructured
and they realized that fishing mortality was basically twice
what they thought.
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0: So instead Of catching 20 per cent of the fishable stock
they were catching about 40 per cent?
A: Roughly. So the Harris group was largely unnecessary.
0: That's an interesting statement because I've been told by
everyone else thet the Alverson report basically confirmed
the DFO science was doing a good. job, confirmed your results
that said the stock had grown by five-fold.
A: The basic problems were corrected by the Alverson
Commission. At least as far as the mortality rate.
Q: As far as the assessment process itself went.
A: Yes. That's right.
0: So the word went out internally. The problem was
recognized internally but there wasn't a public
acknowledgement that the problem had existed and that it had
been corrected?
A: The earlier reports of the Alverson commission inclut1ing
an analysis by John Gulland and John Pope. You know who
these people are?
Q: I've read Gulland's FAO text on stock assessment.
A: He died just recently. John Pope and I are friends. I
see him around. I think they went easier than they should
have. But the report was modified.
0: So it had a greater affect internally than it did
externally?
A: It did change things. Even though the people internally
were saying the Alverson report vindicated us, it was clear
at that point that large mistakes had been made.
0: But it took the Harris report to articulate tho problems,
errors and solutions to the larger community. to the
consumers of scientific knowledge.
A: From Alverson it was clear that fishing mortality had
been grossly underestimated. When that was rectified ... It
was an interesting process ...which meant that fishing
mortali ties had to come down and quotas had to be cut.
There was a huge hue and cry and another commission was
called. This was 8 process. The Alverson commission shook
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things up. Thera waS! rocognition that fishing mortalitic8
had been underestimated. When that took effect and new
quotas were recommended, there was enough uncertainty
created by tho Alverson commission that those weren't
believetl.
The Harr1.s commission had nothing new to say other than
a lot more money could be spent. The person who did the
reanalysis, John Pope, said the assessment iY basically OK.
John Pope actually recommem3ed sOllie fairly drastic changes
which Harris wasn't willing to take. For ~)[ample,
eliminating the trap fishery.
Q: Eliminating it entirely?
1\: Yes. They catch baby fish! They dol They catch really
small fish! It's a stupid fishery! Just in terms of yield
from a fish in the ocean, it's a very stupid fishery. And I
was in the room ... I was asked to do some more analyRis
informally for the Harris commission, 1 was in [1placename?)
with Harris and John Pope and Alverson, Jake Rice came over
as well. I was there independently. And 1 was there when
John Pope suggested the trap fishery be eliminated
completely. It' a not something where you can change things
gradually. You have too ...
0: I take it he's not a Newfoundlander?
A: No. [Jut in a senae the best-regulatod fishery may be
something like the Falkland Islands' squid fishery which is
operated entirely by foreigners and It;'s operated as a
business as opposed to a welfare system.
Harris was not going to say anything that would in any
way be unacceptablo to his perceivod...Whether you agree
with the point or not, whether you believe we should
eliminate the trap fishery or not, you don't not eliminate
it because people will diSlike you porsonallyl
[general discussion about the new !Roney for northern cod
research and the difficulty of replacing the rocent
departures from science branch)
A: Scott [Aikenhead) would have left anyway. And Mac
Mercer ... 1 don't know why he left. One reason was probably
because of the criticism. And the only part of the
criticism that I think was deserved was that he allowed the
~ower blocs .... He didn't allow the data to be accessed
freely. And that was a very serious mistake.
Let me explain one simple consequence of that. When
the Kirby Commission made their report, they projected an
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increase in cod based on their remaining at the same weight
per cod as when the 200 mile limit was imposerl. It turns
out that cod growth is strongly related to density. The
more cod there are, the smaller they are. This was, in
fact, noticed several years before that. But the person who
worked it up, the access to the data was denied him even
after it was done. It was never reported. So this 1s one
of the effects of not allowing ....And this was when Sandy
Sandeman was .... That was allowed to happen. It was
forb1ddcn for thet pe:r;-son to pUblish anyth1ng. That person
was Scot Aikenhead.
Q: So the knowledge was there but it was suppressed?
A: Yes. And for no good reason.
Q: By wh.,?
A: In that (,:;"8e, Dick Wells. And Sandy Sandeman was
director and allowed it to happen. Mac Mercer, to his
cred1t. tried to change things but didn't try hard er,:mgh.
That happened, number one, because he prObably wanted to
publish the data himself later but never got around to it.
Or maybe there was some deeper psychological reason. But
that wasn't the only cese. Derek Ross was here and he was
forb1dden access to data. Jake Rice was, for years,
forbidden access to the data he was hired to work with.
This was before he became monagement level. There ware all
kinds of examples of that.
c: Would you characterize it as a case of the old guard
versus the young turk-s?
A: 'leah. And Jake Rice became an old turk [sic] just like
that [snaps fingers]. It was an amazing transition.
Q: After he became management?
A: Yeah. We're basically a tribal society and once you
bp,,:ome a member of a tribe, the tribe is all-important. In
this case the cod assessment biologists were the tribe and
they wel'e certainly protected which was pretty foreign to
me. Through all of this I remained an outsider.
Q: Tell me a little more specifically what it is that you do
in DFO. Resource assessment modelling?
1\: Yes.
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0: So j'ou work for John Hoenig's CODE group?
A: Yes. John Hoenig is nnt willing to stick his neck out.
Not willing to go in there and Slug it out. Do you know
what I mean? Some times you have to go in there, and this
is an important issue. People's livelihoods are at stake.
And you have to be willing to go in there and slug it out.
During the Alverson Commission I sat around a table
when I was giving my reanalysis. And there was the director
of the lab, directors from Ottawa. Everyone involved in the
process. And I was presenting this report to John Pope and
John Poole. And basically I said the cod population hadn't
changed in the last sjx years and that the fishing mortality
was at least double of what they were claiming.
All my co-workers were there and everyone of the,
without exception, violently disagreed with my analysis.
Without exception. It bAgan with Dick Wells saying, "Well,
you really can't expect us '\;0 say anything different. We've
gone through the process and this is the CAFSAC document and
this is what we've concluded. Therefore, you can't expect
us to say anything different." Which is an incredibly anti-
scientific approach to the topic.
A lot of the things that you're talking about are not
science in any traditional sense. The process is not
science. You're talking about something that has more to do
with tribal societies ....But all science might be like that.
But with this in particular, the process is ver'f different
than scientific research.
Q: But don't most other scientific debates get resolved in a
consensual way? They are debated in the journals and at
meetings and the eventual resolution is a matter of
consensus.
A: Not necessarily. YOIl can have issues where a consensus
has not been reached for fifty years!
Q: Ah yes. There doesn't have to be an answer tomorrow.
A: Yes. That's the big difference. For instance,
interpretations of quantum mechanics. No one d:>ubts the
basic formulations but there is not really a consensus in
terms of the int~!'t:n:etation. (At CAFSAC] A declsion has to
be made. A number has to be put forward. "I don't know,"
isn't an answer. And the person who waits longest. The
person who believes strongest and is willing to stay out of
town in a hotel the longest is the one .... So it's not even a
(" ::msensus, it's •...
470
0: A war of attrition?
A: Almost. And most people are not willing to stand up and
have a lot of people telling them that: they are wrony. They
won't do that. I don't usually go to these assessment
meetings because I don't like them. I don't like the
process because I get incredibly aggressive.
0: They are probably just as happy if you don't go.
A: That's truel
0: [statement that the key to understanding this "crisis" is
as a conflict of evidential contexts; scientific, political,
social and corporate-capitalist]
A: It may not bE.' knowledge. If you are a corporate entity
and you are bo~rowing money at 14 per cent interest rate and
you have a fish stock that is growing at 10 per cent. your
optimal thing to do is to take it all, eell the boats and do
something else. That has nothing to do with knOWledge.
C: Let's try it this way. Within the internal evaluative
traditions of ecience, you can be doing a pretty good job
b~t that might not be good enough to be useful to the
corporate or political in-cerests. And from what I've heard
so far you are doing a good job but you're in an early stage
of development of a new science ....
A: No. I don't think this is a new science. I th1.nk they
were fucked up. There was enormous ... There was a lo't j{
information that was "true" because people believed that it
was. So there was something wrong with the process at that
point. But 1 think that was largely corrected before the
Harris Commission.
'J: But one of the things that the Harris Report did was to
publicly communicate the large degrees of uncertainty that
you are dealing w1.th. So I think that in 8 way, the
consumers of scientific knowledge, the corporate and
political sectors, were more comfortable when you were wrong
with apparent precision rather than when you are correct but
with large confidence intervals.
A: No confidence intervals were ever communicated. The
problem was that there was a persistent bias. Fishing
mortali ties were underestimated tremendously. That was the
problem.
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0: Let me ask you a specific question. What sort of
confidence intervals are you dealing with now when you make
an assessment with the new, revised procedures?
A: The key thing to get right is the fishing mortality. And
I would imagine that our fiahing mortalities for a given
quota would be within .05 of what we expect them to be. If
we think that mortality is .4 the confidence bands are .35
to .45.
0: So what percentage of overall error are we talking about?
A: It depends on what quantities you're talking about. If
you're talking about what are the errors in a certain survey
in anyone year, that's going to be larger than the error in
the estimate of the biomass in anyone year because
information from a number of them are taken into account.
The problems that we've had have been structural problems
that have allowed large biases in.
0: Aren't there still some large gaps in your knowledge
about fishing mortality. For instance the middle distance
fleet is very poorly monitored and has tremendous incentives
to under-report and discard. One hears stories about
midnight landings at small plants and huge slicks of
discarded, undersized cad.
A: There are those problems. There are also the problems
of, if there are inshore stocks, their fishing mortality
would be much greater. So there are those problems. The
fishing mortality of the inshore is really large on ceratin
portions of the stock. That's true.
Q: And that's mostly pre-reproductive stock.
A: Yes. Small fish.
c: So that would have B greater effect on the future
popUlation. Greater than catching the same numbers or
weight of mature fish.
A: Yes. The trap fishery is not a great way to catch fish.
They are getting quite small fish.
Q: SO beforo people started dragging offshoro in the
'fifties and ' sixties, the trap fishery was viable because
there were so many ...
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A: Now wait a minuta. There were long lings. There were
other ways of catching .•.other kinds of gear. Whole
communi ties migrated up to the Labrador. They don't do that
now because there's a subsidy that allows them to fill
Conception Bay with traps and bottom gill nets. So I think
that the structure of the fishing gG~;: has changed
drastically as has where the fishing takes place.
Q: The t:o:ap is a fairly recent development?
A: Yes. AS is the bottom gill net. The fishing mortality
now is much higher than it has been in the past.
Q: I'd like to get back to the point that I think is the
source of the frustration and criticism from the groups
outside of science and that's that you haven't been able to
supply reliable, precise knowlec:lge for the commercial sector
to base their five and ten year plans on and for politicians
to maintain nice, stable quotas and build nice, stable
processing sectors. The volatility is at best an
embarrassment and at worst a disaster for a lot of the
consumers of scientific knOWledge.
A: What you're saying is that a lot of these sectors would
trade off the mean yield for a lower variance. And in order
to have that, you have to allow the stock to rebuild. Which
means allowing ... rec:lucing fishing mortality. And you want
to change the quotas gradually.
0: But they had to be revised drastically downward.
A: But in a sense, you can make five and ten year
projections. But you have to make assumptions about the
behaviour of the fishery. And you have to make assumptions
about the variation in recruitment. You can't do anything
about the variation 1n recruitment. You can have a sequence
of poor year-classes. That's simply true.
0: So it's conceivable that even with :z:ero fishing morta::'ity
you could have the stock drop just from a couple of
disastrous year-classes.
A: That's right. That baing said, the variation in
recruitment for northern cod is not very high as fish go.
[shows me a publication on the historical variations in
recruitment for 100 North Atlantic fish stocksl The errors
made in the past were largely preventable. The process
broke down, I think it was largely repaired by the Alverson
Rcpm::t. Not completely. The flow of information is still
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not completely open. Some of the problems are still there.
I'm not going to fight it. I'd just as soon do other
things.
0: So you just sit ;,.n the CODE group and wait for people to
come to ~ou with Questions?
A: No.1 generally feel that 1 can recognize problems before
other people do. The analysis that 1 did for the Alverson
report was stuff that 1 wasn't asked to work on but that 1
fel": needed to be worked on. There was resistance in terms
of getting the data but there was never rosistance from Mac
Mercer in terms of doing the work. Is any of this helping
you?
Q: Yes. But it's not what I'd expected to be talking about.
1 had expected to be talking about these issues at a more
removed level. Building a new science under conditions of
extreme uncertainty and considerable criticism and
hostility.
A: 1 think this notion of building a new scisnce is ... l mean
a lot of the issues that we're talking about are not
very ... Plotting a growth rate against numbers of fish is not
very complicated. It's not a new science. That wasn't done
because oi ther there were people who wanted to do it
themselves and didn't get around to it or fOI" whatever
reaso;"l kept it from being done. It warm't really hard to
do. It was obvious in the data. It was not done. That has
nothing to do with science.
Q: SO in your opinion, a lot of this talk about the
difficul ties of building a new science is a cover up or a
way of explaining ths failures of the past?
A: Well, I think thet e lot of the £allurebl of the past werc
tribal in nature. That has nothing to do with science.
Except scientists are human like everyone else. These
people generally do not publish in the peer-reviewed
journals. Thsro waa almost nothing from this group of
people doing the work that was published in open literature.
0: And yet these were the people who decided what was done
by who and wher... -:-
A: Yes. More than they shOUld have. The Director W68
reluctant to exercise his full authority.
'7'
Q: And their relative authority was perhaps a function of
their long tenure and institutional inertia?
A: Yes.
Q: May I speculate that these people were by-and~large
Newfoundlanders and younger. more academically credentialed
people were by-and-large come-from-aways?
A: Yes.
Q: So there was resentment to all these college educated
mainlanders who were coming Sn and trying to tell them how
to run their fishery?
A: I think it was much more personal than that. To be fair,
there were Newfoundlanders who fought long and hard. There
was George Winters who wrote that paper sayin£ northern cod
asse'lsment was not worth a rat's asshole . So I don't think
it's fair ... there's a bit of that but that's not the whole
story.
0; I'm trying to see as many paople on different sides of
this issue as possible. I'm going to be seeing Sandy {Ted
Sandeman] 1n a week or so.
A: Ask him why data was not allowed to be analyzed when he
was director. And give him the example of the growth
rate/population study that Dick Walls kept the data out of.
[break: discussion about the sociology of science]
There's B big question about how science differs from
the normal ways in which things are done. In some ways this
stock assessment] is more like engineering. And before
engineers had solid rules about bui] ding bridges, br,idges
fell down a lot. Bridges don't fall down much any more.
[break: discussion about the Falkland's squid fishery]
Do you know who Colin Clark [Clarke?] is? You should.
He wrote a book called "Mathematical Bio-economics." He
made the quite serious recommendation that you' d be better
off dropping DFO, dropping all the inc:ome supplements, all
the government programs and just let people do what they
want to the fishery. He said, "Of course you wouldn't have
any fish then." But it wouldn't be this tremendous drain on
the economy. You have to ask the question, "Is the fishery
as it is presentlY run a net benefit to the economy?" At no
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point in tho Harris Report did they look at the cost/benefit
for any of the recommendations. Nowhere was there an
analysis of what would be worth knowing as opposed to what
would be nice to know. I think that is a big problem with
tha t report.
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APPENDIX N
Interview with Jim Roache, Director ('pf Conununieations
Conducted in 51:. John's. Newfoundland
July 24. 1990
Q: Let's begin with a brief recap of your professional
background and experience.
A: 1 'm Director of Communication,:; for the DFO Newfoundland
Region. Prior to that, I had a long and broad background
starting in private sector broadcasting with VOCM in st.
John's and other smaller stations and then with the CSC for
16 years, most of that in television as a journalist and
manager.
I've worked in the DFO Department of Communications in
Ottawa for two years and when the current crisis began to
develop in the fishing industry they felt that they needed
someone here who had a fairly broad communications
background. but who also had a fairly intimate knowledge of
the res.i.on and of the fishing industry and of the Department
of Fisheries and Oceans. And by definition. the kind of
person required fit my resume to a "T".
So they approached me and said, "We've got a set of
problems down here and we need somebody to go in and define
more succinctly where the barriers to communication are. why
the message isn't getting out. How can the department
respond more effectively?" Go in as a conSUltant
essentially. Davise a set of communications plans
appropriate to what you discover.
Q: And you 'va been here how long now?
A.: Since March which is five months.
Q: And what are the problems that you've found here?
A: Well the big problem.•. One of the first things I did was
a media analysis. Basically sat in my hotel room for a week
with the press clippings for the preceding six months and
discovered that Fisheries and Oceans was either not
mentioned or mentioned in a negative way in almost 100 per
cent of the stories in the local papers including, more
disturbingly I suppose, the specialed sections of the
papers. Those shOUld have had a more balanced and
insightful interpretation of events.
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The expression on the street when I arrived and up
until two or three weeks ago was that "The arse is out of
her." There's a crisis in the fishery. The bottom's
fallen out. The stocks have collapsed. Which was 8
terrible overstatement of the case. Not because it made DFO
look bad or DFO science look bad, but because the general
public and people who work in or who are closely related to
the fishing industry are done a disservice. A spectre is
held up ... the bogeyman. They are left to worry about things
that: aren't true.
Which is not to say that there aren t t problems in the
fishing industry. 'rhere are. The fishing industry has to
be rationalized. It's overcapitalized. It has been used as
the employer of last resort. It has been used for political
purposes in the past. All of those things are true. But to
move from there, those facts, to a perception that "the
arse is out of her" is to sensationalize. So I saw r,ly job
as being, in some way, to bring real:l. ty and perception
closer together.
Q: Why and how did the reporting on the fishery come to be
so one-sided?
A: That begins, I suppose, on a philosophical level. When I
left eBC after 16 years, I left because I was concerned
about a growing tendency in my discipline, which was
journalism, to be sensational. A tendency to try to sell
papers, try to get tho ratings, try to get the by-line.
There was a move away from the old journalistic ethic of
objectivity, balance and fairness. And the move was towards
sensationalism or a willingness to use only part of the
truth to make a "better story".
The emphasis in the so-called new journalism ia towards
the "better story" and unfortunately the "better story" is
what we sometimes used to call yellow journalism. The
carefUl shading or elimination of some of the facts so that
you're left with a "better story." It serves a couple of
purposes. You get that "better story" day one :Jnd you also
allow the corrections, clarifications and amplifications
that ensue to spread that story over a longor period of timo
and maintain public interest over a longer period of time.
So you can sell more papers or get more ratings or get more
by-lines over that longer period.
There is now, unfortunately, a journalistic preference,
investment in, bias towards the sensational as opposed to
the old objectivity, balance and fairness--which does nobody
any good in the long-run. 1 t m afraid that the journalist
has become part of the story, part of the issue, in all too
many instances now. There are worse offenders in some
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si tuations and in some organizations and in some media than
in others and I can't generalize to say this is true of all
journalists, but too much of the time it's true.
And I found in my own experience with the Corporation
that I was often working with young people who ch.'lilenged me
as being a dinosaur, naive. idealistic and who tried to
encourage me to opt into their ethic and go for the gusto,
go for the headline.
0: Are you seying that the current perception of a crisis in
the fishery is an artifact of the media?
A: Not entirely. What I am saying is that the media has
made a less-than-ideal set of circumstances into a crisis.
l'm not trying to say that thare isn't a problem in the
fishery. Whet we heve is 8 si'!:uation where the stock hasn't
increases as quickly as everybody had anticipated. We have
a crisis of expectation.
When we went to a 200 mile limit people in general, and
I think industry as well, felt that our ship had come in.
that the time was at hand when we could catch as many fish
in as many different ways, throw in as much technology and
as much capital as we liked, making it as labour-intensive
and as capital-intensive as we wanted, pUlling out all the
stops in marketing the product. It was a gOld rush kind of
mentality. It was going to be a boom as opposed to the
historic bust.
We haven't had the boom, but we haven't had the bust
either. What we've got is something in between. And the
something in between is that big fish companies have good
balance sheets and good atock market performance and had
high levels of employment and operated at about 60 per cent
capacity for a goodly number of years, say the last five
years before "the bottom fell out." And we should never
cease to acknowledge that fact. That's the good news. The
good news is that there was a recovery. We were able to
harvest that resource in a way in which, with the 12 mile
limit, we weren't able to.
0: What share of the responsibility for the creation of
thoso false expectations belongs to DFO?
A: I think we're all guilty of creating that kind of
mentality. Which is to say that DFO made a contribution as
did other departments of government. as did the large fish
companies, 8S did fishermen, as did the small and medium-
sized processors. Everybody was on the bandwagon.
Right now, there's a temptat.1on on everybody's part to
try to scapegoat somebody else for how this situation
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developed. The fact of the matter is that the situation
'that has developed is not a catastrophic one. We have the
healthiest cod stock in the world. It simply hasn't
increased at the predictod rate.
Q: In that case the fishermen and the man on the street want
to know why the quotas are going down if the stock is
increasing.
A: The quotas are going down in keeping with the fact that
the biomass hasn't increased to the extent that everybody
had predicted. It's going down in a move to ratiollalize the
industry. It's going down to put things in a proper balance
so that a smaller effort by fully professional fishermen and
processors can produce a better living for participants than
historically anybody's been able t!:J do from that resource.
0: Ar9 you saying that the reduction in quotas is not so
much to prot9ct the stocks but a strategy for rationalizing
the fishery?
A: It's both. It's first and foremoat a move to preserve
the stocks. To alloW the stocks 'to grow at some optimal
level whereby they will allow a reasonable number of people
and organizations to exploit that resourcr> in a rational
way. ouotas give us targets beyond which we're over-
exploiting 'the resource, beyond which we're t~lng to get
more out of the resource in terms of employlllent and return
to stockholders and political benefits than that resource
can sustain over tims. So to that extent it's a
rationalization.
0: Do you see science being used as a tool or scapegoat of
this aocio-politicsl prograJI of rationalization?
A: That's too cynical an interpretation to put on it. What
I do see science ss having done is haVing failed, over the
last ten to twenty years, to elaborate to the public in a
language that they could understand what 'they could expect
from science, and to elaborate the job that was being dOTle
by science at the time it was being done, with a clear
explanation of what should be a reasonable expectation on
the baeis of the resources that were available to do the
work. In other words, it should have been clear up front,
communicated consistently throughout, that here is the job
that we ecientiets are trying to do, here are the resources
that we I re allowed to do that job, here is the short-fall in
those resources, here is the probability of accuracy, and
therefore, every number and every option that we give the
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mangers is given with the caveat that within these
conditions and limits, our best guess Is.
It really wasn't made clear that the scientific work
that was being dona wasn't foolproof. It wasn't really
clear that the recommendations given to the managers weren't
really recommendations as you and 1 understand the word, but
were sets of options or rang~:; of numbers which had certain
likely outcomes attached. Now scientists understand that to
be the case and take it for granted that everybody else
understands, but people don't.
Had people been properly attuned to what was reasonable
to expect, had they been attuned to the fact that there was
a certain element of risk or uncertainty associated with the
recommendations that the scientists were producing, had it
been explained by the other parties, the managers and the
politicians, that there were other variables--that the
scientific output was only one of the inputs for the
fisheries manager or the politician to \l.·eigh in determining
the TAC, and those other consider:;,tions are equally
.important from othar perspectives, there would not be a
problem.
The scientist would say, the number or range with the
statistical probability of certainty attached, is the
important thing, whereas a sociologist might say that social
considerations are more important. We have a tradition of
people being able to live off the fishery.
We have a tradition of it being the industry of last
resort. The economist, on the other hand, particularly if
he was from the rationalist schOOl, would say bigger is
better. We've got to take care of the offshore. We've got
to take care of the big plants, the big fleets. We've got
to get the industry structured into a few large, manageable
un!ts. So where you stano depenrls on where you sit.
There wasn't enough of a caution issued by the
scientists in the first instslLce and the managers in the
second and the pol1tlcians in the third. We all rode the
wave of our own expectations. And we're now in the middle
of a crisis of those expectations, not a crisis in the state
of the stocks.
Q: Isn't that perhaps a bit of wishful thinking given the
levels of uncertainty that we're still dealing with? My
understanding of fisheries stock assessment science is that
it is a very new science and it is at that early stage in
itl:l development where a great deal of its activity is
directed toward uncovering, documenting and attempting to
mitigate sources of error and uncertainty. So it is in the
peCUliar position whers the sources of error, the known
ones, have actually increased in recent years. From the
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point of view of science, this is an inevitable end
essential pa::-t of the process of creating knowledge. Until
you know what the number and m.agnitude of error sources 6.re,
you can't work to Alinimize thelll. And the news that got out
about science was, yes they've been seriously
underestimating mortality, the models didn't work very well,
data sources such as CPUE were discovered to be sources of
as much uncertainty as data, research design, sampling
techniques, all of these sources or raw data for the
assessment models have been recently been shown to be more
or less inaccurate and billed as mistakl:ls and incompetence
in the press. But from the scientist's perspective, this is
normal science. However, these things have all led to a
reduction in the estimate of the stock biomass of about half
over the last few years.
A: You're probably more conversant with the specifics of the
situation. My knowledge of the techniquas and the tools is
less than yours. What I understand, though, is that two
major studies have more or less ~vindicated~ scientific
effort in terma of the methodologies that were used.
Q: That's science's interpretation of the reports. That's
not shared by the gonoral public or the pOlitical management
and the eommercJ.al sector.
A: No. And thare' saIl· kinds of reasons for that other than
\lndt the scientists were doing and how they were doing it.
l'm not really in a pos1t!on to jUdge the extent to which,
or whether at all, the werle that DFO scientists wsre doing
is flawed. So it would be unfair of lIle to comment.
C: Let me quote from a presentation given by Leslie Harris
at the Grad House last January. He said "this fancy method
of counting we had was wrong. Garbage in, garbage out is an
age-old fOrTllula." So clearly, his personal opinion is that
the current state of stacie assessment science is at best
u:79less and at worst mislead1ng. And he was the chair of
the commission that you say vindicated scienctl.
JII: Well 1 hope he's either wrong or he's undUly pessimistic.
None of the information that 1 have been able to uncover in
my six months of investigation would allow me to conclude
that anything other than what I've told you is t~e case.
You hear reports offshore from the trawler captains and
they're sailing over schools of fish that sometimes run
twenty or thirty miles. We just had a research vessel come
back that tracked an extremuly large school of cod on its
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way from the offshore tv the inshore, feeding all the way,
feeding on caplin, growing and getting fatter and fatter.
In the last two or three weeks you may have noticed
that ttlore' s a hush in tho media about the -crisis- 1.n the
fishing indus'i.:ry. People are catching fish inshore. There
are a few isolated communities where they're not catching
anything, but in most COllUllunities, oven as we speak, poople
are doing very. very well. The trap fishery has picked up
illlllloasurably from a very slow start.
I' ve been observing the middle-distance fleet that
docks on this side of the harbour and for just about the
whole period I've been here, those otter trawlers are filled
to the waterline every tillle they come in. At first--March,
1990--the cod were very small and that disturbed l1Ie, but
that was only for the first two or three weeks and since
then the cod are what I'd call medium. They look fat.
Every boat is full and the turn around time on those boats
1s as fast as they can get in, off-load, get ice and get
back out. It's just non-stop.
There are people catching fish in the industry,
offshore, middle-distance and now inshore. Which certainly
doeRn't support the hypothesis that the stock is in
collapse. 'rhere are people who wl11 say that therlll's a
bigger problelll than there really is. There is some
anecdotal evidence to suggest that some communities are not
getting what they might, but I'm not sure that thlly ever
were.
When you were in my offi-ce recently I showl3d you a
paper from 1887 that detailed the same types of problems at
that tillS that we havs today. I'm not simply trying to make
OFO "look good. - My job, as I see it. is to get out
complete, timely and accurate infonnation. rather than to
necessarily make DFO -look good. - My job isn't to make the
OFO scientists "look good.-
But to suggest that a scientist or group of scientists
can accuratoly, 100 per cent of the t'.ms, predict the amount
of fish in the ocean or the number of northern cod that
exist in the Atlantic, is an absurdity by definition. The
best that you can ever reasonably 8ccomplish is 8 good
guessti.ate. backed up by whatever good, concrete data you
can collect over time.
There's no question that our scientific method has
evolved over time, changes, modifications, improvements,
more resources have been thrown at it. And that process is
going to be continued end be escalated under the Atlantic
Fisheries Adjustment Package. But to suggest that OFO never
made a mistake seems to me to be equally inaccuratE! as
suggesting that tho stock is in total collapse. Naither
scenario is correct.
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In fact, DFO scientists and other poople with
environmental concerns have been monitoring those stocks
with the best resources available to them and with all the
good will in t:he world for the past 20-25 ylllars. In
fairness to them, they've done as good a job as humanly
possible under al-ost illpossible circumstances at times.
You just: have to look at the weather conditions under which
they have to work, the physical constraints and the shear
impossibility of the job to begin with. It's a Iliracle that
they weren't totally wrong. In fact, they were only off the
mark a little bit.
They can't perform tho miracles of the loaves and
fishes w1thout the loaves. I think that's the real
knock ... that we can't have perpetual boom. But we don't
have perpetual bust either, and that's the message that I
feel a responsibility to try to get out. And thp. way we
have to do that, or ono of the ways, is to popularize the
scientific messege. To get the scientists talking to the
industry and the general public as much end as well as they
talk to other scientists. And that involves not only
talking but that they talk in a language that can be
understood.
0: Now that you've done your assessment and found that DFO
science has failed to communioate its position accurately or
effectively, how do you plan to remedy the situation?
A: I think th'lt there' 8 the ideal approach that one would
take; in that kind of 8 situation and then there's the
approach that one is constrained to take because of the
nature of the s'ystem because of the resources and the
manpower that's available under these circu.stances. It's
always harder to get th~ horse back into the corral rather
than to keep it in the corral in the first place.
We're now in a situation where we have to reeducate
people. It would have been easier to educate them in the
first place rather than re-eduoate them out of a perception
that we have allowed to form for some time. So I don't want
to begin to suggost that this is an easy task at all. I'm
not sure that it's immediately "doable." 1 th1nk it's a
long-term proj ect.
Under the AFAP program [the Atlantio Fisheries
Adjustment Packagel. one person-year and some thousands of
dollar!'! have been allocated for a communication/education
initiative of some sort to do two things: to cl.arify a lot
of the miaperception and misinformation, the inaccurate and
incomplete information that's out there already about the
state of the stock. How the TAC, how the rango of options.
is established by the scientific commun1ty. Hon the
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managers and politicians move from there to establ.1sh the
formal TAC. What the role of CAFSAC is. How to encourage
grea-t:.er participation by the industry, inshore fishermen as
well. as trawlermen, so "that anecdotal information is
incorporate in some way into the model to better or more
fully assess the state of the stock.
There's a whole list or projects that they're abou"t to
implement. So we have to correct old information and
implement the range of new projects with expanded resources.
And then we have to communicate the progress and the reSUlts
of those initiatives in SOil'.e way that can be understood by
the layman, by the fisherman, by the processor, by the
person who works in the plant.
Q: Is it fair to say that, at present, the industry, the
general publ.ic and "the political eector, for various
reasons, feel that DFO has failed to do its job?
A: No.1 think who the scapegoat is depends on whom you talk
to. There are some people who will blame the foreigners for
overfishing on the Nose and Ta11. There are some people \<,'1'10
will blame the foreigners for encroaching wi"thin "the 200
mile limit and overfishing. There are some people who will
say that we're giving away too much to the foreigners where
they are not fishing illegally with over-the-side sales of
allowing them to come in and fish underutilized species.
There are some people who accuse us of being lax 1n
enforcement, allowing too many discards or allowing over-
fishing of the TACS because we dian' t have the manpower.
There's no shortage of scapegoats for the problem
"that's occurred. I'm not trying to suggest for a minute,
I'm not trying to be an apOlogist for DFO science and the
position in which we find ourselves. DFO has a certain
amount of responsibility to bear but the fishermen knew and
know what the state of the stocks were and are.
The media and the general public were the ones who
didn't know and don't know. They get their information
through a fj.lter. They get it second-hand. We talked about
the tendency of the media to sensationalize the down-side
rather than the up-side. The general public is in"terested
and concerned but they don't qu1te believe that the "arse is
out clf her" quite yet.
You see too many fishermen in Newfoundland living a
quality lifestyle. Which is not to say that there aren't
fishermen who aren'"t. God knows, it's not "the ideal
circumstance. But there are a lot of trawlermen making 8
good living. A lot of people who work enough time 1n the
plants to have a nice home, a nice standard of living and a
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nice qual! ty of l.if8. A lot of inshore fishermen are in the
same boat.
There was a period of time when the Rationalist School
of econOlllics had convinced us that the family farm had to go
and the inshore fisherman was operating with a question lIIark
over his head. Time has proved that if you solve one set of
perceived problems you create others. I think you're seeing
the same thing in the fishing industry.
We went through 8 period where there was 8 deftni te
shift in orientation toward the rational economic and away
from the social, for better or for worse. And we're all
going to have to grapple with this issue of diversification.
If you take capital and you take property, plants, equ.ipment
and peoplCl out of the fishing .industry, whether it's the
offshore sector or the :lnshore sector, and move them to
someth.ing else, somebody has to answer the question, "What
else?"
And that's also part of this progrem. The Atlantic
Fisheries Adjustment Program, through Cenada Employment and
Immigration and ACOA, and I know the provincial government
.is looking at it through the Doug House Economic Recovery
movement and so on, people like the Chamber of Commerce and
the rural development associations. Any number of
institutions snd groups, governmental, quasi-governmental
and private, run into the [lrob1elll of "diversify into what'"
There' 9 too much scapegoating going on. It's too easy
for DFO Newfoundland Reg.ion to scapegoat OFO ottawa. It's
too easy for the federal bureaucracy to scapegoat the
scientists. It's too easy for the scient.ists to scapegoat
the mangers. It's too easy for the province to scapegoat
the feds. Its too easy for the offshore to blame the
inshore and vice verss. And everybody blames the lIIiddle-
distance guys. And on and on. The foreigners are high on
the list as well. It's madness!
The fact is that all of us helped create a problam
that's not nearly 8S serious as it's il6rceived to be in the
public mind. We have a situation with a healthy cod stock
that hasn't increased as quick1.y as our fondest hopes and
aspirations would have had it do and we have to adjust.
That could be painful.
Q: Let me pose 8 hypothetical queet.ion that you are go.1og to
have to deal. with sooner or later. Okay. You're te11.iog me
that the stock has, in fact, increased. That they're
healthy. But just two years ago, one year ago, the Harris
report said and CAFSAC said that there should be huge
reductions .in the quota.
A: You' ro confusing the quota and the biomass,
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Q: The Har-cie report, which was close to the CAFSAC numbers,
said that the biomass had been overestimated by abOut the
same percentage as the quotas should be reduced.
A: That's not true. The biomas... has not been overest:1rnated
proportionately to the reduction in the TAC. The increase
in the biomass has been overestimated. The TAe has been
drastically reduced downward towards some optimal level of
exploi tatioo.
Q: If you read the appendices in the Harris report, i£ we
now aseume or believe that we were not f1.shing at the F..O.2
level. but at something around or in excess of F_O.4. then
that would lead us to believe that the estimate of the
available biomass should be drastically reduced. The report
presented a range of possibilities saying if this F value is
true then this is the state. If this F value is true then
this is the case. All of them represented significant
reductions in the biomass estimate. Put the point is that
we st1.ll don't know. Thera are still huge sources of
uncertainty in these estimates. So how would you respond,
when you'd just said that the stocks were healthy and
grow1.ng, to someone who'd done their homework and asked you
to prove it?
A: Number one. I won't respond. I don't have to respond
because th1.s question would get passed on to some scientist
who has the expertise to respond. What J: have seen when
Larry Coady and J.J. MagUire are confronted like that, they
have the answers, they hava the numbers tha~ show where the
Harris logic is flawed. They can address those issue more
authoritatively that I can. And that's why they're the
designated spokesmen when it comAS to the specifics of a
situation.
What :I'm trying to communicate is the more general
perception. Dr. Harris is a historian. In all fairness and
with all due respect, even though he did sit through those
hearings, he would need the judgement of Solomon to say tha't.
the scient:1fic data was wrong or that there was another aasy
way to have done it and, therefore, we're back to square
one.
:t don' t think we're back to square one. I don't think
we're in a situation where we have no knOWledge whatsoever
of the state of the stocks. In fact, every piece of
concrete evidence seems to suggest an increase, not as great
an increase as we had thought, and an over-investment, an
overcapitalization in the industry which we now have to
address through rational.izat1on.
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I think that we could have continued to fish at a
higher level but that would have been irresponsible. Short-
term gain for long-term pain. Take the cut now.
Rati..onalize the industry. Professionalize the industry.
Increase the scientific effort and increase the accuracy and
Qua1ity of the output of the scientific effort. And then we
can optimize our utilization of the resource. That's what
this whole effort is all about. You can't do that without a
certain amount of pain and you can't do that with a 100 per
cent guarantee no matter how many scientists you put out
there, no matter how many boats, no matter what kind of
techniques they use.
Even after putting the anecdotal information that's
going to come from the offshore and inshore into the
mathematical models that the scientists use, there's still
going to be an element of uncertainty. There are still
forces at work that we cannot fully control and do not fUlly
understand. The environmental forces. Water temperature,
tidal conditions, what happens in the food chain.
Dr. Harris says we shou1.d do an ecological assessment.
Fine. But the magnitUde, the shear difficulty of doing an
environmental assessment so that you could be 100 per cent
sure of a rational exploitation of a resource of the size of
northern cod in an environment the size of the North
Atlantic. You can't get there from here!
And that's the message I want to get out. We're doing
the best we can under very difflcult circumstances. We are
trying to be good stewards of the ocean, good stewards of
the industry because if there's no industry there's no DFO.
So there's 0",1 enlightened sel.f-interest on the part of the
DFO scientist and the DFO manager and the DFO communicator.
We're trying to do what we see as best for the industry end
best for the country and that means conserving the resource
whil.e allowing optimum exploitation.
And yes, I think it' 8 f air to admi t that we overshot
the mark a little bit for, say, a ten year period. But "it
still. ain't 1:111 that bad." There are still a lot of people
mak:1.ng a very good liVing from the fishing induatry and
there's still some groundS for optimism.
But we're going to have to address that very difficult
and dangerous issue of rationalization and that means
certain communities are going to suffer. Certain
individuals are going to Suffer. And maybe the bottom line
of some of the big processing companies are going to Buffer
during the period of adjustment.
Meantimo, while we are moving in that direction in
incremental steps, we hope to God that the business experts,
the economists can come up with something into which we can
diversify effectively to become a modern, technological
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society. We have to find a place in the country other than
fish.
0: So you eee the current crisis as a socia-economic crisis.
Not a biological crisis?
A: Both. There's a biological crisis to the extent that the
resource hasn't increased as much as we'd hoped.
0: But you maintain that the resource is not: in trouble.
That in fact is quite healthy_ So how can that be
characterized as a biological crisis?
A: Because, while the ate.ck has been growing, the amount of
capitalization, the amount of property, plants, equipment
and the number of people trying to sJtploit that resource and
the technology to exploit that resource has been growing at
a higher rate. We 1 ve been trying "to get too much out of too
little. ThfJ.t's the problem we have to address and that's a
social, pOlitical and economic issue rather than a
biological issue.
And that' s eomething that's really not wi thin the
purview of the scientists. The scientist can carryon with
his research and continue to expand some of the tools and
techniques he uses to get P. better fix on what the biomass
is doing. Then it's up to the manager to determine at what
level the TAC will be set to exploit that biomass so .. u can
optimize the number of people who live off it and tl. rowth
that you' d like to project for it over time. It's a
difficult balancing act.
It's a social and economic and political management job
that lies before us. It's not a disaster area. It's not
unsolvable. It's something to which, if we devote the right
people and the right eneX'gy, we can resolve. We can find
alternatives for people in the Newfoundland fishing
industry. We can educate our people and find them other
kinds of work to do in a modern society that will allow the
people who remain in the fishing industry to do better.
I'm overcompensating. I'm being a bit of a POllyanna,
but I'm doing that to balance your honest, but very
negative, perception of the current state of affairs,
because your's reflects, very accurately, the perceptions
I'm seeing in the media and amongst the public at large.
The more knOWledgeable people in the industry don't
talk the way you talk. But they're not the ones you will
see interviewed on "Here and Now." You'll see the inshore
fisherman saying that there' s no fish because none have
struck inshore at his dot on the map. Or you'll Bes
interviewed the head of a labour union at a plant that
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doesn't have quite enough fish because, again, the fish
haven'~ struck inshore at that dot on the map. Those are
the realities that we have to grapple with.
What I am suggesting is that if you took every dragger
off the Grand Banks and out of the North Atlantic and tied
them up, there still might be no cod at that dot on the map
and that fish plant still might not be feasible in a free
enterprise economy.
Q: What I've been doing in this interview is being
unnaturally aggressive to simulate the kinds of questions
that you're going to get to the kinds of answers that you
would give to hostile critics.
1\: But when push comes to shove, I won't be the one who's in
the hot seat. The primary spokesman is the minister. In
this case Valcourt. Other than that, it is a designated
spokesperson appointed by the department in their respective
areas of expertise.
I tend to be a broker of information and line up the
media person or the academic such as yourself with the
person in the department who has the specific information to
deal with the query. Anything at the policy level, of
course, has to be referred to the minister's office. I am
the communications officer for the bureaucracy. But I'm
still an information broker. I can only connect up the
dots. I can, to a certain extent, translate the technical
jargon, the scientific jargon or the bureaucratic jargon
into "everyday language."
My function is as a conduit in and out. I monitor the
environment, feed information back into the organi%ation,
the bureaucratic side and the political side, and then 1
help program the output of what ever strategic decisions are
made. And my role in programming that output is to
articulate to the public and the people 1n the industry the
things that are g01ng to help them 1n making the decisions
that are going to help them produce a better l1.fe.
And that, in the current crisis, means trying to
mitigate the spectres that have been created by the media.
Saying that the sky is not falling, the world 1s not coming
to an end, that we have a viable resource. All we've got to
do is do a better job of stewarding it. And we've got to do
a better job of aligning our resources so as to exploit them
at an optimal level.
By no means does that constitute a crisis. It
constitutes a re-ordering of priorities. And that's my
role. To manage the expectation so that the strategy can
fall in behind that expectation 50 we can all more
effectively exploit the resource, so that we can humanely
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redirect out of the industry those organizations and
communities and individuals who have to be rec1irecte~ out of
it.
Epilogue:
Speaking to Jim on the telephone Aug. 27, 1990 we
disc'Jssed how his work was going. He said that Saga
Communications (as mentioned by Jake Rice) had just
completed an evaluation of DFO communications/public
relations for the Ilinister's office in Ottawa. Jim is not
permitted to see the report, but has the distinct impression
that it is highly critical.
In further discussion of how DFO science got itself
into this mess visa vis its public and industry credibility,
he said, "We weru wrong because we didn't have enough data,
which wou1.d have been OK, 1£ we'd admitted it at the time.
!!:Jt at the time we were wrapping ourselves in the
'sc1entific mantle' and mak1ng pronouncements."
As a result, the newly announced scientist/fisherman
communications initiative is problematic. "They lnight just
be laughed out of town in certain inatances because
scientific credibility has tali.1n such a beating already."
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APPENDIX 0
:In1:erview wi1:h
faBer Direc"t:ar of
Conduc"t:ed
Q: [Opening request to tape the interview]
A: I'm always suspicious when interviewed by the press
because they always tend to take you out of context. But
when you tape the whole thing, then "t:hat' s a different
matter. Furthermore, the press also extracte only what it
wants to use, and in doing eo usua11y selects only those
part of the interview which are controversial and to which
people will react. But if you have the whole record then
there should be no prob~em.
Q: It· s my i.mpression from reading the chronology of DFO
science, the history beginning with the Iittlo station et
st. Andrews up 'till now, it's my impression that you were
the director during a particularly crucial phase in the
transi.tion of scientific activity, the paradigms under which
it was conducted.
A: That might be so. 1 don't see it quite like that because
I think the really crucial change actually took place back
in the 'fifties with advent of landmark books by Beverton
and Holt [1957] and Ricker (1948];
:It was during this period that the focus of fisheries
science changed to a mathematical approach and the modern
science of fisheries population dynamics really took off.
This was really quite a difficult time for those in
fisheries science because they were neither trained or even
had an aptitude for this new discipline.
Fisheries ecientists of that era were trained to
taxonomy and the microscope, and it was 8 diffiCUlt
challenge to change from biology to mathematic9. In their
university training persons who tended to be non-
mathematica~ly inclined turned toward something like
biology. They chose something that didn't require a
mathematical background and now found that the calculator
had to displace the microscope which previously was their
major tool. That was a major challenge at the time and ono
which has continued to influence the relationships between
scient1sts even to this day.
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When I: joined the station in 1953, a major priority was
on exploratory fishing, defining where the fish were, and
trying to understand their basic biology. Because you can
only apply mathematical techniques once you know the
population characteristics ..• the growth rates, the mortality
rates and that sort of thing. The fishery was in an
expansion phase and the expansion was outstripping the
science. Because there was no shortage of fish. There was
no need for conservation. At le.!lst that is the way that the
Canadian fishing industry saw it.
In the early days of N1I.FO, what they tried to
do .•• ICNAF .in those days ...was to bring in mesh regulations.
It was called ~saving gear." You were saving the young
fish. And that was really the only effort that the
international community exerted on behalf of conservation.
It was put on a mathematical basis, yea, but it was very
simple and naive approach to the problem.
The push didn't really develop until 1970 when most of
the ICNAF community started to realize that there were
problems. That gl.OSS over-fishing was taking place. That
there was just too much effort no matter what mesh size you
used. And I guess rea~ly that's when our scientists were
forced to become much more mathematically oriented, and to
use the too~s of population dynamics. As we ventured into
the realms of population dynamics it became evident that we
had to gat people on staff who were trained in more than
biology. Preferably a combination of bio1ogy, mathematics,
physi.cs and computer science.
Yes particularly computers. We required people who were
versed in computers and who were prepared to use tham rather
than shy away from them as many of the older ~biologists"
were prone to do. Who were .•• well, the modern fisheries
biologist as opposed to the one who was trained onlJ to
classical biology a·:jd to the microscope. A mul ti-
disciplinary approach was the order of the times.
0: During this transition was there any resistance from, for
lack of a better word, the old guard, the old microscope
biOlogists, to the introduction of these new techniques?
11.: It wasn't the techniques. The problem was data. You had
guys who had worked for 15 years on a given Rpacies; had
worked hard, spending many days at sea or in the field, to
assemble a data set, which they were looking forward to
working up and publishing papers which would not only
enhance their ecientiH.c reputations. but because of the
reward syster.. that was in place wi thin the service, would
also likely lead to promotions and financial rewards.
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As well, I. think it is ilaportant to rea1.ise that these
people who were now 1.n the middle management category, elsa
had adlllinistratJ.ve responsibilities which ate into the time
that they had available for their research function, and
with the new emphasis on "consultation" within the
department, lIOre and more of their tillQ was being devoted to
at1:ending meetings. Meetings wit~ f1sher1len and industry as
well as the continual round of depart.ental and
international meetings such as those of ICNAF or later those
of NAFO and CAFSAC.
This gave rise to a 91. tuation where l'Illny of the older
sc1.entists, the ones who had worked hard to assemble useful
databases that they had all. sorts of plane to use, got more
end more involved in meetings and leS9 and less time was
9vailable to do the research, analysis and wr.1ting up that
they wanted to do.
At the Game time, you now had the newer generation of
fisheries scientists who were entering the field who were
anxious to apply thoir newly learned techniques and indeed
had been hired because of their capabil1. ty in this respect.
It was the task of the Director and his management team to
try to encourage harmonious working relationships between
the old and the new so that joint papers became the accepted
norm, and the new techniques were blended with painstakingly
gathered data toward the publication of joint papers.
In this there were many success stories, but also there
were several fa1.lures. Clearly good coopera1:ive ventures
are .ore a function of the personality of the scientists
concerned than 1.nstitutional regu~ations. and personality
d1.shan:lOny occurred more frequent~y than one would wish.
My impression is that thesa conflicts were .ere
frequent when the new scientist was a recant PhD. graduate
who still. considored that; he or she knew everything, rather
than the case of the more mature scientist who could
appreciate that experience played an important place in
really reaching an undGrsta.ndiog of biOlogical phenomenon.
So we reach a 91. tuation where on the one hand we have
thOse who have worked hard for several years designing
experilllon1:s and assembling extensivq data bases to test
their hy~otheses and on the other the sci~ntist8 have not
exerted theMselves in the tedium of data collection and the
planning of field programs. but who by the nature of their
training, have skills and techniques wh1.ch applied with
understanding w1.l1 l1.kely lead to significant advances.
They [young scientists) are starved for data. wanting
the data. And yet unprepared to ses the other aide of the
etory an:l not prepared to take the trouble, I gusss, to
accept the fact that expuiencs usually hss something to
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offer and that cooperation in this sort of situation is
almost always superior to an antagonistic approach.
Yes there was a clash for data. There probably still
is, and there probebly always will be. The guy who's
invested 15 years of his life knows that his advancement is
dependent on publishing and he' 5 got this data that he wants
to publish. He doesn't want to release it to someone else.
Okay, usually he'll do B joint paper if it's applying new
techniques and they're working on the same data and they've
got a nice team going. Yes. But if they can't get that
team going then. you've got friction.
And that friction is likely to be relatively common
when you have situations when recruitment to the service
occurs in spurts with relatively long pauses in between.
This is not only a problem of the laboratory 10' St. John's
but it is everywhere.
When I was acting as Director at the Lab in st. Andrews
N.B. I saw the same thing there and in fact I remember one
young fellow in one of the labs in the Maritimes who wrote
something, I think, like 18 papers in his first one or two
years. He mined the data that had been collected by others,
ignoring any plans that they may have had to use it and what
was achieved? A series of rather superficial papers which
lacked real understanding and which applied a variety of
techniques in such a manner as not to achieve any real
advancement in knowledge as well as a group of disgruntled
older scientists who felt betrayed in that they were denied
the final fruits of planning and field work that they had
slaved at for soveral years. superficial. If sense had
prevailed and he'd spent another year or so working with the
experienced scientists and had understood the data better,
the joint papers that would have been produced would have
left everyone happier and he could have made a much more
solid contribution to science. That was the sort of problem
which was there.
0: 1 ask this question because I have had sources from the
younger scientists' side...
A: You'll always get ·that.
0: ... telling me that they had data withheld from them, that
they were denied access to ...
A: Oh, they Will!
0: And some of them have tended to paint it in terms of
scientific irresponsibility and outright malicious
Withholding of ...
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A: It's possible that there is some malicious withholding
but I think you have to SGe both sides of it. Our
promotional system is totally dependent on two things;
published papers and international recognition. If you
become chairman of an international commission or chairman
of B large scientific body or something like that, you gat
cradit for that. But you get most credit for papers
published.
0: And probably papers published are among the criteria for
the selection of chairpersons of these bodies.
A: Well, to some extent that's also true. In fact, that is
the main criteria 1 guess. You've got to be well up in the
field before they select you. So, you know, these guys have
an investment of time in it. The young guys don't realize
that, I don't think, in most caSBS. Number one, they don't
look at their promotional problems. They aren't worried
about promotion. The world is theirs! The fact that in our
promotional system... and it's worth your studying it because
it's 8 very important part of a research scientist's
thinking. There are certain levels .•.. Do you know the
system?
Q: Only very roughly.
A: Well, I think you should know the system because it
really gives an insight into why you get these problems.
The system has some extremely good features about it. The
main feature that I think is good is that you can get a
scientist who's on his own, He has no empire under hi:n or
anything like that and he' 9 earning as much money as the
Assistant Deputy Minister. If he's a top-notch scientist
he's working on his own at the bench. Maybe with one
technician. And publishing. And publishing first-clasa
stuff. The system allows that and is tailored to allow
that. So it means that you don't have to spend your time in
administration and build up a pyramid so that the more
people you get under you the more promotions you get which
is the standard civil service way. That is a big strength.
I think that if there is a weakness, the weakness is
that there I a not enough brownie points, for lack of B better
word, given to contributions made to the organization. '{ou
get a fellow like Jake Rice who .•..You know him. You've
talked to him so I can use his name as a type example. A
guy who is a program head. Who is chairman of this and
chairman of that. He's a super chairman. He's got a broad
spectrum of interests. So he's doing all sorts of things of
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value to the organization and maybe not publishing as many
papers as he would like.
So that, I think, is a weakness. You do get an
imbalance. The guy who's giving himself to the organization
and his papers are sl.1ffering.
Now the way it works 1s that there are basically four
levels. The RES 1 level, which is the Research Scientist
One level, is the recruitment level. A young Ph.D. You
have to have a Ph.D or the equivalent to get into the RES
Bcale. So the young Ph.D coming in would normally be an RES
1. And if he's publishing reasonably during the first two
or three years it's almost automatic, three or four years,
that he moves up into the RES 2 scale.
hnd the RES 2 scale .... Most young scientists don't
recognize this. They don't think about it. But the RES 2
scale is figured as the scale that most .•. the average
scientist will reach the top of. And not everyone will go
on to the three or the four ~cales. Approximately 60 per
cent of the population of research scientists are in RES 1
and 2. (You should get a copy of the regulations because I
cannot remember the precise figures.
In order to get up to the RES 3 scale, which is the
next level up, you've got to have a very good publication
record. It's only 32 per cent of the total population of
research scientists in Canada can achieve that scale. So
you know there's competition to get there. A.nd tho
competition is extremely vigorousl It is! So that you have
to have, number one, a good publ.ication record and, number
two, usually you have to have something else like
chairmanship of something or you're really top of your field
in something, in order to get into that scale.
And then the fourth scale, which is only five per cent
of the research scientists' population in Canada, is the top
scale. And that is reserved, really, for people who are the
bet:Jt. The Rickers and people like that become RES 49. In
Newfoundland we have, I think, one. In Nova Scotia there
are possibly two or three.
Q: Who' s the one here in Newfoundlend?
A: Al. Pinhorn. He made a tremendous contribution to the
ICNAF scene. He has a big publication record but that was
his big contribution. He was sort of one of the
major ... major players, I suppose in the ICNAF and the
formation of NAFO ... the final years of ICNAF and the
formation of NAFO. He was chairman of the research
committee and etc., etc .• etc. So he's the only one. And
that was after 25 years of publishing and doing things ..•.So
that's the system.
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Now the average Research Scientist I who comes in
doesn't think of the system. Doesn't think that some of
these guys who are at the top of RES 2, their only way of
getting further is to get some of these papers out that
they've been collecting the data for for years! That
they've tried to write up and they just don't get a chance!
So there is a conflict there. But my advice to any
young person who's coming in that has got ideas is to do
joint papers I I mean anyone ....And Ram Myers is a good
example. Almost every paper that he's done is a joint paper
with someone! He applies his techniques and uses someone
else's data and assembles a jOint paper. And both people
get the credit for it then. Maybe not as much as the first
person who is usually RAm. But his publication record is
superlative!
0: And yet there are still, from what I understand, echoee
of hostility bouncing around the walls of DFO as a result of
his contributions to the A.Lverson Commiasion.
A: There may be hostility. I don't know. But I expect some
hostility. Some of it's plain jealousyl
0: Because he's the one who did the reanalysis of plotting
growth rates to population density. Or did Scott Aikenhead
do that with him?
A.: I don't know. I've been gone for three years and I'm not
right up to date.
0: But this was back in '86.
A: Well, I left just before the Alverson group came on, 1
guess. And I don't know who did the work but I expect some
jealousy.
0: From what I understand, this paper was the first
suggestion that the data •..or the extrapolations and the
conclusions reached from the data about abundance and growth
rates .•• were seriously flawed. That, in fact, growth, in
terms of total biomass, had not been as great as hoped for
and predicted. And that very simple things such as the fact
that cod in large numbers grow more slowly than cod in small
numbers .... That they had been projecting growth rates based
upon growth rates observed during the depleted years of the
early and mid-'seventies. And as the stock rebuilt, growth
rates tailed off as the population density increased and
this led to a serious revision in the estimation of the
total spawning biomass. Are you familiar with thia?
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A: No. I'm not familiar with that. I haven't made a point
of keeping up with the 2J3KL stuff which is what this was.
But it doesn't surprise me that there was a little bit of
enmi ty there or rub' ~ the wrong way.
We had a scient..i.l;.''': who came on staff while I was
director ...what was his name now ...who made it almost his
sole work in the lab to crit1.cise the work that was being
done. And that wasn't popular. Because it was destruct1.ve
crit1.cism. It wasn't construct1.ve. Nevertheless, it
fulfilled 8 function. CE>rtainly I took exception to one or
two of the papers that he published. But 1 would never stop
him publishing. There was one of them which never should
have left his desk and I am sure he is now sorry that we did
not stop it. But in science you've got to have both si"-es.
If someone feels they're being overly criticised, it's up to
them to use the scientific media to correct it.
0: I think that this may be one of the reasons that DFO
science has come in for such 8 public 91agging recently, is
that the general public and the consumers of OFO scientific
output, the corporate sector and the political sector, don't
understand how science works. It does proceed by disproof.
It is a probabilistic .•.
A.: I think you're quite right. That's one of the things.
The other thing is that they don' t understand the basic
facta of Bcience. They don't understand how an assessment
is done. They don't understand that in doing an assessment
there are all kind of assumptions which are there. They
don't think about all these things. And when our scientists
are asked to make a prediction, they make a prediction with
all kinds of caveats and "if" statements surrounding them.
Probability statements. If this happens and this happens
then something can be expected. But if something or other
happens ... and so on. And ~.'hen this comes out in anything
but a scientific journal, it comes out as a bare prediction.
That this will happen 1 Never mind if, if, if, if, if I And,
unfortunately, most of the trade and most of the non-
scientific people, all they read is the final shortened
version which says that this will happen. And it doesn't.
0: In all you've talked abo",,,:: so far, there's ...•You've
talked about stock assessment science in relation to values
and norms, evaluative traditions that are internal to
science. But DFO science exists to some extent .•. at least
in the minds of the bureaucratic and political structure and
the corporate sector ... as a service industry. That's the
public justification for the rather large amounts of public
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mon£ly that are expended on it. Then the question arises, if
science can't provide us with knowledge of the degree of
certainty we need.... From the corporate point of view, they
need to make five and ten year plans to construct and
amortize plants and trawlers over a considerable period of
time based upon the projections of what their allowed
catches are going to be for that peri~d. The political
sector has to make management decisions based ...They expect
to be able to use science as the legitimizing or justifying
ground for their decisions. And if it's unreliable or
unpredictable then they are in trouble. Is there any
recognition of this within the scientific community and, if
so. how do the soientists feel about it?
A: There is certainly very strong recognition of the basic
fact that we're a service, amongst the administrative side
of it beoause we are continually having to justify this,
that and the other thing in order to get funding. As far as
the scientists are concerned ... You've talked to Larry Coady
and Mac so you've gone through our review system, right?
Our review system try to bring our scientists ....Well,
one of the things it does, it brings scientists into contact
with the fact that we are a service o:r.ganization. That
we've got certain things that we've got to do.
And my own guideline, as a director and as a research
manager, was always that we try to spend approximately 80
per cent of our time on the service function. Research
towards service. And there's a group of 20 per cent ... and
this figure varies .... I mean there' E' some scientists you'd
let them go much higher than 20 per cent. But on an
average, 20 per cent of the time is devoted to things that
are "may payoffs." Real research. They're not the things
that we have to do every day to provide our assessments. To
provide our projectiollS. Nor are they things which are
keyed to just improving our techniques. They are research
lines which are interesting. Which may payoff or may not.
We don't know. I think much of the work that Ram's doing is
of this type. Not all of it. I think he spends 70 per cent
of his time in straight service work. Service to others.
But a good scientist shoUld be able to spend at least 20 per
cent of his time on long-term work which mayor may not pay
off. In addition to the service.
So I think a director has to recognize that. You won't
need scientists just to do the service work. Scientists
have to have more than just the service. Especially when,
if you are a stock assessment scientist who hes to produce
his stock assessment twice a year ...• I mean, it' 8 a
relatively mundane job. Reading your otoliths. Getting
your age distributions. Ge'tting your weight/length curves
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and all the things you need for the stock assessment.
You've got to have that extra 20 per cent to follow up lines
that look interesting and to do the other things.
Nevertheless, I think that the service side of it .... I
think that everybody in St. John's recognizes the service
side of it because of the review system that we have that
forces that.
0: Isn' t there a potential conflict here between the
political masters and the corporate consumers of scientific
knowledge and the evaluative traditions that you've outlined
that lead to promotion?
A: We have the evaluation which is a scientific evaluation
for promotion which is a separate exercise to the annual
review process. The annual review process is one which the
industry is invited to. Other scientists are invited to
from the other regions. The senior people in the people in
the department are invited to. The conSUltants who are in
different, allied fields are invited to. And the academic
crowd are invited to who care to come. And this is an
attempt to show these various people that what we are doing
is, in fact, aimed at helping them.
And always a big part of that session, especially the
one with industry, a big part of it is, "Why aren't you
doing this which would help us?" And you can say, usually,
that you are doing some of that but you I re not doing maybe
as much as they would like. And you then ask the question,
"Well, what part of the work that we are doing should we
stop doing in order to transfer our efforts to do this job?"
And that they can never answer because all they want is
more and more and more and more. And we have to put
priorities on it and they just realize then that we can't do
everything. I think there's an attempt there to do what
industry wants.
I think where we fall down, and where we've always
fallen down, is in tranSlating science to industrial terms.
We'll never get that right. Partly because the way we say
things 1s not what industry wants because we always have
these conditional clauses that surround everything that we
say. Industry doesn't like that. Industry, however, blames
us for not providing the stuff, the predictions that they
would like to have to allow them to expand their fleets or
to do other things. Because our science is full of
uncertainty.
Nevertheless, I think that the economic uncertainties
of life are far, far greater than the science uncertainties!
The uncertainties that surrounded the fishing industry when
the fuel price went up, the last fual crisis, the last round
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of trouble in the gUlf, was a far bigger impact than
8i'.ything to do with stocks. And that's still part of their
problem now. The economic side of it as opposed to the
actual stock size.
0: There have been two major crisis in the 'eighties. The
first, in the early 'eighties was the one that spawned the
Kirby commission. That crisis was essentially an economic
crisis rather than a stock crisis. Or at least it was
perceived that way.
A: There were stock o'lertones to that as well. In actual
fact, there's been more crises. Every six years there's a
crisis in the fishery, is the accepted period that you hear
time and time again. This is another sixth-year crisis sort
of thing. In the 'seventies there was a stock crisis. Under
the NAFO or ICNAF regime all the stocks were extremely
depressed. There's no doubt about it. There was a stock
crisis and Canada was really worried about it and that's
what brought in their position at Law of the Sea and gave us
control as a costal state.
Once we got control as a coastal State, I think there
were two main things that happened. One is that our
aspirations were far too high. I mean what people did in
thinking and planning, what the industry did, was say we've
had X number of large stern trawlers fishing on the Grand
Banks for the past few years; we can take that over now. Of
course, forgetting that the large number had whacked the
stocks down to practically nothing. So they failed to put
the thing in perspective inasmuch as we had to rebuild.
And, you know, I think they just got too big of an
expectations. So that was one thing.
And the other thing was the economic crisis that came
in about '75, '76 which was oil mainly.
Q: But in the Kirby report, presumsbly based on scientific
projections, they were projecting TACs by now of 450,000 ....
A: 450,000 tonnes for 2J'3KL, right.
0: And based on these projections, industry geared up for
larger catches; more plants, more boats ....
A: They didn't build more plants. They were about 200 per
cent over~capacity then and now I think they're about the
same.
0= But certainly you understand the drift. These
projections created what turned out to be Wildly unrealistic
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expectations. Because it appears now, with the reassessment
in '87 I think it was, that the 2J3KL stocks have not grown
nearly as fast as predicted back then. In fact there are
some, including Jake now, who feel. that the growth rate over
the last two or three years has been flat and possibly even
slightly negative. And I think that this realiz.ation, this
reevaluation, precipitated the current crisis. But you say
you haven't kept up on ....
A: No, 1 haven't kept up that much on 2J3KL 1 must admit.
But I think it probably has precipitated the current crisis.
The forecasts were not good. There's no doubt about it.
They weren't good.
0: Do you think there's any possibility of doing good
forecasts given the ....
A: Not in the long 'term. I don't think there is in the long
term. To me, the key thing is recruitment. And recruitment
is variable. We can't predict recruitment I Until we can
predict r.ecruitment, and I rather suspect that we will never
be able to predict recruitment, our predictions are always
going to be relatively crude. The predictions are probably
the best we can do in terms of at least not allowing
fisheries to slide down hill. But we're not going to
squeez.e MSYs out of them I Ever I And I think it's kidding
ourselves and industry is kidding itself if they ever think
that we will.
The whole management system has to be tailored 'to
whatever recruitment there is. Biological systems are not
static, change is a fundamental fact of life, and one of the
necessary arts of fisheries science is to recognise such
changes in a timely manner, to try to understand them and to
build tham into the models that we use. There are,however,
changes which we cannot understand.
When I £1rst joined the station, this is one of the
sort of anecdotal things, everybody but everybody when they
started reading agss was given Labrador cod--2J3I<L otoliths
to read. Because the were so regular, so clear. It was
just 0 tremendous introduction. You could count the rings
and know the age and it was all very clear, There were odd
occasions when there was a check or something and you could
see the check in everyone of them because everything was so
clear. And it was a great learning tool.
You look at 2J3I<L otoliths now and they're totally
diffe:r:ent! They're not clear like thatl There's been some
sort of ecological changel I mean it's nC'thing to do with
£1ohing. It's just... they're dif~tlrent! There's no
regularity to it. something changed. I don't know that
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anyone's looked at it. But that's the sort of thing
that .... Life is different!
0: The bureaucratic structure of DFO waa established in
light of post-'77 expectations. That with Canadian control
and good scientific management that the stocks could be
rationally managed. That forecasts could be made.
A: Not necessarily. It depends on what you mean by
forecasts. Forecasts can be made ....
Q: That stability could be brought to the industry.
A: No! No one has evsr, ever said that stability can be
brought to the industryl I don't believs that.
0: Not from the scientific point of view. But perhaps
from ....
1\: Where you've got variable recruitment you can't have
stability!
0: Rightl But I believe from my readings and research that
this was the expectation from the corporate and political
sectors••..
A: 1 think that's probably true, yes.
0: And a lot of the criticism that's coming from these to
sectors now against sciencE:' is a result of them being
disabused of this notion. HaVing to face facts. And
they're saying, we've spent tllillions and tlillions and
millions of dollars on science which is of no apparent
practical use for our needs. Our pel! tical needs or our
corpel'ate planning needs.
A: That, of course is the question. Because if you look at
the stocks compared to '72 when this started, they're all
way upl They've been built upl They're not continuing to
be built up perhaps as well as we'd hoped ..••
Q: And yet these lads have just had thoir quotas slashed
drastically as a result of what looks to them like
scientific error I Screw ups ~ So they're not fishing for
450,000 metric tonnea this year, (as predicted by DFO in tho
1983J they're fishing for 196,000 with the scientific advice
saying that we got it so wrong that we think that you reelly
should b~ fishing for only 125,000 metric tonnea this year.
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This is a shock to them. And it causes them to say,
"If you boys can't get it any bet.ter than that, why should.
we keep forking over tens and hundreds of millions of
dollars to you?" This is their perspectivs, not mine.
A: I can Bee their perspective, I must admit. I can see
their perspective and it's a hard on9 to answer becBuBo they
don't appreciate the fact that it.' s not an exact science.
That there are errors. But it's just as exact as any of
their other economic forecasts.
0: I see a danger that this external criticism of science
has tho potential of becoming a self-fUlfilling prophecy.
That good scientists like Jake who don't care to deal any
more with this level of hostility, operate in this kind of
environment, are bailing out.
A: No doubt about it. That's the truth.
0: So, in fact, whereas in the late 'seventies and early to
mid-' eighties you were assemb1.ing an internationally
respected top-notch team of scientists there, now the onos
who are any good, who have any options are bai1.ing out and
heatUng somewhere else that's less fractious, 1.ess
unrequited.
A: Well, 1 know you'rs right and I don't know what you can
do about it. The fact is that no scientist want.s to be
continually in the front line BS far BS the press is
concerned. It's not what science wants. And, in a way, I
think it's wrong that our scientists are being put in that
position. It shOUld be the directors and the administrators
who are doing that job.
0: Which is exactly why some of the scientists are leaving.
Because they don't feel that they are being ... that the
bureaucratic structure above them is not willing to support
and pro-tect them.
A: I think that might well be true. I think that's one of
the key things of a director's position is that you have to
~rotect your scientists. Now many of the scientists don't
like it. They want to get involved in other things. They
want to get involved with fishermen's groups. But you know
damn we1.1. that as soon as they do, number one, they'll do
less science. Because they don't want to appear at a group
without being well prepared. So, not only do you have your
meeting but you have probably the week before in preparation
for it. It could be minor stuff. It could be major stuff.
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It could be research which is useful. I don't know. But
usually there's some that is unproductive" just getting
ready to meet the fishermen.
So there's that side of it. And the other side of it
is the press. I don' think any scientist should have to
face the press! That's just not part of their jobl And.
again, I know a director can get 1n trouble with his
scientists by not allowing his scientists to face the press.
Some love to do that! But you've got to recogni ze the
people who want to do it and who can do it productively
without interfering with their research. It's a key thing
of a director's job. Protect your scientists from the press
and other influences which are likely to have a negative
impact on them and their science.
0: But if there's no support up through the ADM and into the
Minister's office for a director doing that, which it
appear$ that there's not now, the director will fall into a
defensive posture as well. There's reason to speculate that
Mac either jumped or was pushed. In either case, he
probably left unwillingly. Somebody had to take the
fall ..• be seen to take the fall for the criticism in the
Harris report. And a month or two latter, there goes Mac.
You can draw your own conclusions.
A: Yeah. It was an unfortunate similarity of timing. I
don't'know what the conclusions are because one person did
take it in Ottawa and that was Bill Doubleday. 1 maan. he
was the one who was the fall guy. It didn't need to come
down any further. Ha was ADM Science...Acting ADM
Science... and he got relieved of that job.
0: But that didn't get the play, the preas play, here in
Newfoundland, and Newfoundland is the focus of the criticism
from the larger population..•.
A: It's not. you know! The criticism in Nova Scotia is just
as much, if not way higher. Because they .•. there are many
more vocal fishermen involved. It' 8 not just the big
companies. Many more of them own their own boats.
Q: SO there's a lager percentage of independent operators in
Nova Scotia?
A: That's right. Not plants but boat operators. And
they're very vocal. They're well-educated. And they're
prepared to shout. So it's not just Newfoundland. But
that's beside the point. I take your point.
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It is unfortunate if that really was the case but we
have to recognise that it is the way that government works,
and indeed is what the public demands. The approach of
Ottawa, OFO, Ottawa, to anything to do with the press always
seems to have been ... unless it's a ministerial statement ...
Bay nothing and it will be forgotten in a few dayB time.
That's always been the:1r approach. And the whole businoss
of the controversial 2J3KL assessments ....
Our scientists were right up in arms a year or two ago
when the Al.verson report basically exonerated them and the
methodology that they usod but the press and the comments of
the general publ.ic focused almost entirely on the more
negative aspects in the report. The silence that emanated
from Ottawa was deafening.
0: So their feelings that, in times of controversy, they are
abandoned by Ottawa are justif:10d?
A: I think it's justified, yes! In the saml;l way, we have
seen that, as soon as any question comes u~ which has
unpleasant consequences, say down-sizing of a quota, the
decision makers (who are not the scientists) usually take
overy opportunity to "protect" themselves using such
statements as, "Well, that's what the scientists tell us."
However, if the quota is to be raised, somehow the message
seems to come through that it is by their (the managers)
diligence that this is happening.
Ouota decisions are not scientific decisions. They are
socio-economic-political in na-ture. Tho scientists give
their advice and this is bl'lnded through an involved
consul tat ion process with other advice from the industry and
from the socio and political arena before a decision is
made. A.nd yet, when the news is bad the answer always seems
to be, "Oh, that's what the scientists tell usl" It's just
not true I But that's the easy way out and we've always kept
quiet about it.
Q: The system, as it's structured, not only doesn't
encourage but doesn't permit Bub-sets of the department, in
this case the sciontific units, from speaking independently
in the public arena. There's a heavy disincentive for
Canadian civil servants ....
A: That's true. I don't know how you can get over that.
It's not just Canadian civil servants. Any civil servant
cannot criticise the government in power at least in matters
concerning their own departments. If you start criticising
the policy of your own department, the whole structure of
government system falls apart. You've got to have that, and
507
not only in government, for it applies in industry as well.
Re who pays the piper must call the tune.
We are usually accountable to our employers and it is
really only in the she1tered cloisters of academia that
scientists or others have the freedom to say what they like.
Of course, with this freedom there is an unwritten
understanding that the academics will not abuse their
posi tion of knowledge and trust with irresponsible
statements. With the increasing power of the mass media,
this abuse is unfortunately more prevalent and more and more
academics seem to be prone to pontificate on matters about
which they know little and are not qualified to speak.
Thus, while the government scientists are to some
extent muzzled relative to matters of Government pOliCY,
they are not restricted in matters of scientific fact,
8:1tCept that they are accountable for what they say and this
may be held against them at some future time. The academic
on the other hand can quite easily abuse his or her position
of public trust, and utter nonsense with impunity knowing
that fow will criticise it and 1n any case it wl11 be
forgotten in no time at all.
0: I'm reminded of an incident last year, I think it was
last fall, where a group of Canadian lobster biologists were
prevented from going to a meeting in the states, an academic
meeting, because the conflict between Canadian and American
minimum size regUlations was under negotiation at the
poli tical level, and they were order not to attend.
1\: I don't know the circumstances of that. 'I'hat mayor may
not be the real reason. The fact is that, when it comes to
meetings, our scientific staff, any scientific staff, have
problems because of questions in the House. "Why was it
necessary that 15 people went t.o Britain or to Denmark to
the ICES meeting? Fifteen! Ftfteen people! ~ You know, the
political approach. And yet the ICES meeting is probably
one of the three or four meetings which are valuable to
people in fisheries. There's maybe five altogether. And
you've got a staff of 200. Fifteen is nothing.
But we're always faced with that sort of question. And
there are always restrictions on the number of people
attending meetings just because of political questions in
the House. Why was it necessary? How much money are we
spending on people flying around to meetings?
The public perception is that when scientists go to
meetings, it's the same as the Lions Club going to lli Lions
convontion. 'I'hat it's a big wing-ding. And it's very hard
to live that perception down.
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So there are reasons given. Sometimes it's because of
questions in the Hauss. Sometimes it's because of a big
push to save money. Some political reason or other. All
conferences are cut out unless they're absolutely essential.
there are many reasons like that.
Be that as it may it is also quite possible that the
real reason was that negotiations were at a particulary
sensitive stage, and the last thing the government wanted
was to have to take a defensive posture or even change their
approach because of a statement made by one of their own
government scientists.
The fact is that negotiations usually involve a certain
amount of choosing and even slanting the facts to suit a
particular line of argument, argument, and they are
particularity sensitive to counter arguments or even an
pmphasis on different facts by persons who can be considered
to have knowledge or opinions which can be attributed to
representing one or other side in the negotiation. NOW
which was the true reason in this example I don't know, but
I would guess it was a combination of circumstances that
gave rise the decision.
0: It seems to me that another thing that happened, at a
very unfortunate period of time, was that, as the science of
fisheries stock assessment advanced from a fairly young
science, it entered a phase in the 'eighties where you began
to understand what the sources of error were, what the
levels of uncertainty were that you were dealing with.
Beginning to quantify, for the first time, how much you
didn't know. HI)W big the job really was. It became
apparent that this wasn't a simple job. As they made the
transi tion from single-species r;,odels to mul ti-species
models. From simple production models to more sophisticated
models. That is when it became Obvious that there were huge
unknowns. Hugely variable inputs to the stock size. That
this was a much,much bigger job than anyone had ever
guessed. Much more difficult. You'd got pretty good at
retrospective population analysis but as far as what's out
there now, the best guess seems to be that you arA desling
wi th levels of uncertainty with the final asseosment number
of 20 to 30 per cent one way or the other. And as far as
forecasting goes, that may be, as we've (hscussed, nigh on
impossible.
A: I think all that was recognized. 1 think it may not have
been reco\luized by the bureaucrats and thst· s always one of
the problems. They didn't realize how big and complex a
problem it was. 1 think the scientists realized how big a
~roblem it was because we were talkin2 about the problems of
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multi.-speci.es and about the problems of si.ngle-species as
well. single species just bringing in certain
interrelationships. The food and feeding relationsh1.ps
rather than bringing in the whole complex of lnu~ti-species
management. But just thinking of cod in relation to caplin
for i.nstance. These are the sorts of things we were
addressing in the late 'seventies, middle 'saventias.
think we realized how involved the subject was.
You have to realize too, that until 1982... no, until
1978 ...all we had was one vessel that was capable of off ..
shore research in the whole of the Canadian North Atlantic!
The A.T Cameron. That vessel was shared between the
mainland and ourselves. But until we got the Gadus
Atlantica, which was in 1978, that's all we had to cover the
offshore area from the Arctic to the GUlf of Ma1.na. There
were two small inshore vessels as well which were usefUl
work on inshore problems such as work on herring and caplin
and tagging of groundf.ish in the inshore area. But
basically, the key vessel was that one vessel. And i.t
wasn't until the extension of jurisdiction that wa got that
second vessel. And after that we got a replacement for the
Cameron, the Wilfred Templeman. And in addition, the Alfred
Needler for the mainland. Lack of research vessels and an
offshore capability was a fundamental constraint on the
development of fisheries research in Newfoundland.
Q: Thet brings up a point that Larry raised which I thought
was very interesting. He says fisheries science is the only
natural resource science that he knows of that was theory-
driven rather than data-driven. His point being that things
like forestry and mining science were based uprn an
accumulated fund of data. That they made a trunsition from
old foresters and prospectors date but that fisheries
science was theoretically well-developed in advance of much
of the data and that the theory was largely deri.ved from
eoonomic models.
A: I don't agree with that sentiment. I think that there is
some truth in the statement i.n the North American context.
But much of the theory was developed on the history of the
European .fisheries in the North Sea for instance, where
concern about overfishing was being voiced in the 19208 end
where a tradition for the keeping useful international
statistics and maintaining coordinated fisheries research
was in place in the 19th century and wae put on a formal
basis with the founding of ICES in 1904 or thereabouts. It
was only really after the war that the Northwest Atlantic
fisheries started to expand, and in recogniticn of the
lessons learned in the prewar fisheries of europe and the
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North Sea, Canada pushed very herd to establish an
internet:\.onal forum for monitoring the expanded fisheries in
the area and instituting a means avoiding the overfishing
that had occurred in Europe. Thus it wes that ICNAF came to
be.
0: I think Larry was talking about the northwest Atlantic •..
A: In the Northwest Atlantic, the theory was there in '53 ...
0: That the theory was there but that it took a long time
for the theory to be modified in light of accumulated data.
A: In our area there's no doubt about it. In the 'fifties
all we were doing was exploratory fishing. That's basically
what we were doing. Exploratory fishing and trying to
understand the basic biology and distribution. Why they
were where they were. Where they spawned. Their growth
rates. What they fed on. All these things. That only
started in 1950, really. There was a little bit of work
done in the 'thirties. There was a little done in the
'forties. Only on inshore species. And then when we got
the Investigator in 1946, that's when modern fisheries
research really started in Newfoundland. It was very late!
0: Let's go back a bit to the discussion we were having
about the demands form the consumers of scientific knowledge
to participate. Especially from the inshore, there's a
litany of criticism. That science doesn't listen to our
knowledge. That they don't value our knowledge. The
inshore crowd feels pretty ignored. And then let's couple
this with your observation that the scientists who attempt
to address these issues, these concerns and attempt to
participate more fully with the fishermen, become less than
optimally productive as scientists. I'd be interested in
you thoughts on this general sUbject.
A: Well. you've got several questions there, though they
are all related. There is a fundamental reason why, to a
large extent, we ignored the inshore cod fishery. The
reason being that it was an extremely difficult to study.
We did not ignore the more locally distributed species
such es lobsters (there has been continuing research on this
species since the 1930s) or even herring but in the case of
cod which was a migratory species, the fishery around the
coast varied according to the type of shoreline. the
bathometry of the inshore area, the geographical position on
the coast the local practices of the fishery on top of the
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numerous variables which can control the varying production
in the stocks and their migratory patterns.
In effect the additional variability was such. that for
meaningful estimates of stock abundance you had to study the
whole coast of Newfoundland. That's a very large area.
Whereas if you leave it until the fall/winter period Bnd you
do the work offshore, with the vessels that we now have, you
can at least get you estimates of abundance within some sort
of error bars that are at least acceptable. But to do that
within the inshore area is an impossible task!
So we tended t.o downplay the inshore area. It was just
t.oo big an area to cover with the people that we had. When
the fish went offshore into concentrations, we could much
better devote our time on those concentrations. So you're
qui te right. We did ignore that inshore area to a large
extent.
Now, the other part of it is the potential knowledge to
be gained from inshore fishermen. We continually get
blamed, for not using this fund of knOWledge. I hav.c:l some
very definite views on this which are not necessarily
supported by my colleagues and which I am sure differ from
those who pursue an anthropology or sociological bent.
I think the inshore fisherman has very little to
contribute to the solution of the fundamental problems of.
stock assessment and science in support of fisheries
management. There are a few exceptions. There are a few
fishermen who think, and see beyond the bounds of their
local intereats, but the comments of the vast majority are
self serving <:lnd extremely restricted in geographical range.
If one is studying the distribution and movements of
the fish in a local area then one would be wise to use their
local knowledge, but at scale of a fish stock, so much work
is required to separate the hay from the chaff that it is
probably better to take a more objective approach from the
very start.
For the most part the majority of them have a litany of
mumbo jumbo which they bring forth each time you telk to
them. About where the fish are and why they'ro 1I0t here.
they relate it to things like the berries on the trees.
Sometimes observations of that sort have some value such as
.. when the wind is such and such a way you get catches".
That's acceptable.
When I was going around trying to understand a bit more
about Newfoundland and the fishery, I just got completely
turned off by inshore fishermE\n and their views. Because
they were totally unscientific! And you'd try to gat them
to approach it from a scientific viewpoint and they would
say, yes, they'd be happy to help. But in many cases they
couldn't write, in the old ~~ays, they can now, so they
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coUldn 1 t keep a log book for you. You'd pick the one or two
better ones and they might keep a log book for so long and
then they'd say, "B'ye it's just too much troublel I just
can't help you any more. Sorry." It was just banging your
head on a brick wall. so;r tended to downplay inshore
fishermen as being useful to the scientific process.
There are some who are different. I worked on shrl:'lps
for a time which tends to be inshore fishermen in bigger
boats. Most of these guys are the best inshore fishermen.
Because they're the ones who have the gumption to get th:J
boats somehow. Thsy're not content just to go out to set
the trap the same place his father set it before and if the
fish don't come, complain. And I certainly got on very well
with most of these guys. They were prepared to think a bit.
They still didn't read and write, many of them. And
that made it difficult to communicate by writing. Writing
is so important. Very little of what we do is spoken. It's
a11 writing. But on the whole they were they best and I
could get on with them and ;r could work with them and I
found it valuable. And they helped me a lot. But "the
everage .1.nshore fisherman, no b'ye, 1 just don't think so.
And I think they're being exploited right now by people
like Cabot Martin. He' s on~y go"t one real reason for it.
He's going into the political arena before very long. And
tha"t's his way of getting there. And he's drumming up all
sorts of haohah one way and the other. He's a~ways been a
difficult person to get along with. If he had his way, he'd
have our management system the same as in the States. A
thought which absolutely appals me because I think their
management system stinks. Ours has got its faults but
the.1rs stinks "to high heaven.
0: What are the differences?
A: Well, the differences are that: all the decisions are made
by the fishermen. A.nd the fishermen make decisions for
today, not for five year's time. So every stock in the
States is right down at the very bottom that it could be.
0: You're referring to the regional management system?
A: Yes, the regional management groups.
0: With more or less perpetual reassessment with input from
all interest groups but which tends to be dominated by the
fishing industry.
A: By the fishing industry and they make the decisions. I
mean look at the groundfish in the States l It's abysmal!
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The Georges Bank groundfish. There are a few success
stories. There are some. Where you get a part.1.culary
dominant person coming out who can lead the meeting and, by
political savvy or whatever, gets his own way. And h.1.s own
way might be a five year or ten year future.
But a fisherman never, never, never, in sp.1. te of what
conventional wisdom might say, thinks in any more than
todayl I say that dogmatically because I'm convinced of it.
They will always raise the point that th.is is their
existence. "Of course we are interested .in conservation.
It's our future!" But you give them the choice of the big
catch today or the possibility of higher catches tomorrow or
the future. they'll always take today. And I' va seen that
time and time again. And they'll l.ie in order to get today
rather than tomorrow.
So I'm one of these peopl.e who, though I accept that we
can gain a lot by using fishermen in the right mode, think
that we have to be careful and selective in the types of
things that we use them for, And, again, I think you've got
to look at their leaders and the motives behind their
leaders.
Q: Of course, I've talked to Cabot. I'm talking to everyone
from all sides of this issue because I'm trying to bo
reasonably scientific...or at least, objective in my work.
I'm trying to talk to as many voices on as many sides of the
debate as possible.
A: Well, that's the right way to do it. No doubt about it.
You'],.l get some outlandish views like some of mine and .. ,.
Q: There's an interesting debate between Cabot and Jake Rice
on the issue of traWling on the spawning grounds. And it
does seem to me from my assessment of the evidence that
Cabot is exploiting an anthropomorphized emotional response.
That Jake's evidence is far more reasonable. That, in fact,
what's going to happen if there's a legal or bureaucratic
response to this pressure is simply to move the fishery up
into the pre-reproductive phase of the concentrations.
Which will result in less fecundity, less spawning success
because yOU'll be fishing directly on the pre·spawning
concentrations. Fishing on the spawning concentrations,
some of them are going to reproduce.
A: Many of them have already reproduced.
(digression on the Jake/Cabot debate]
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A: They're talking about capl.in now. NIFA is thinking about
going •.. axtending 1 t toward caplin. And I would have
thought that anyone who ... if they ever were on shaky
ground .... The whole caplin fishery is on a spawning fishery.
They're catching spawning females for the eggs. That's what
they're catching. Cabot MartinI I've never seen eye-to-eye
with him and I've had many argumen.ts with him through the
years.
0: He can be quite strident.
A: If he's got an audience he will be. But he can sit down
and be quite sensible if he's on his own. There's no doubt
about it. He has a different approach when he doesn't have
the audience.
0: Perhaps to another issue.... As a scientist, you may not
want to comment on this .•. but the issue of transferring
COlnmon fish stocks from the status of common property to
private property. First of all, there's .•..The first step
was the enterprise allocation quotas which transferred it
into quasi-private property. This all devolves from the
theory of the tragedy of the commons.
A: Right.
Q: Now, with the sale of the fish plants at Burgeo and
Canso, where everyone involved in the transaction denies
that the stocks or quotas ara being sold. But why would
anyone pay S12 million for a 52 million plant unless the
quota went with it and was valued, right? What are your
opinions on this and, further, what are the impl ications for
the future of effective stock mar-agement? You needn't
comment if .•..
1\: No, I've got opinions on it. I'm not speaking as a
scientist. I'm speaking as an individual. And I spent some
time in my career working for various groups 1n ottawa
looking at common property resources and the way to manage
and all these things.
I like the idea of privati:dng the resource, so to
speak. Giving people quotas that are a saleable item. That
can be auctioned. They can realize the value for it. And
they have to pay a tax to government on it as well. It's
the people who ca1:ch tha fish should be paying for the
rasearch and the other things. Not the general purse. So
that if a fish plant is going to anter the field, it should
have licenses. It should encourage private individuals who
have licenses to provide fish to this particular plant.
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Work out cooperative systems so that they have a fleet,
either their own fleet or a private individual fleet is
90.1ng to provide the fish. So that they get their fish on
an enterprise allocation or some sort of system whereby
private individuals or companies own the fish ... the rights
to fish. And rights to certain amounts of fish, on a
sliding scale, depending on the stock size, etcetera.
No, I think that's rightl The one thing I'd add to it
is that there's a tax on it. That they should be able to
auction .it freely in the open market. But the government
should receive an annual tax on the quota.
Q: But .isn't thoro a possibility •... At first gloss, it
sounds quite good. That fisheries science service is user-
funded through taxes.
A.: Right. But they'd never be able to afford it.
Q: Now... Yes, thero' s that question. But on an more
theoretical level, if a service is user-funded, doesn't that
open the possibility of bias in the service in favour of the
funding agency. One knows what the user wants. The user
wants to hear that you can catch more fish. Or certainly,
not less. And therefore, open a bigger hole for user
pressure in the political process.
A: I think there's a posaibi1ity of that. But under our
system, which is a benavolent dictatorship, as I describe
it, with the Minister as the dictator, I think the
possibility is far less than with many of the other systems
of fisheries management that are in the world.
Q: But you have a concentrated corporate fishery which can
marshall rather form.idable economic resources. One can
clearly see the possibility of ..••Well , it's already
happening. We've got people like Jim Roche being parachuted
in from Ottawa to take over the cOl1\lllunications end. A.nd he
ta:"ks the classical Thatcherite litany which is the nead to
"rationalize" and "professionalize" the fishery. Which
essentia~ means to .•••That' s a code phrase for killing the
inshore and turning .:1 t allover to ....
A: No, no! Not necessarilyl I don't think ....
Q: And when Newfoundlanders talk about the fishery they mean
the inshore fishery.
A: Yes.
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Q: The cUltural identity of this place is so .•.. It may be
economically ~irrational~ granted. And it's a very small
percentage of the GNP of Newfoundland now and it's shrinking
every year. But it .•..Newfoundlanders' strongest shared
cuI tural identity is with the outports and the fishing
stages and the flaltes, the trap skiffs. And you take that
away from them, what else do they have? There's no
"rational" reason that there shOUld be anybody living on
this rock in the first placel
A: But isn't that where the politics comes in1 That stops
the power groups and the lobbying groups etcetera, is the
fact that -the votes are in the outports? That's the balance
I think.
0: Yes. But that's exactly what .introduces the ••. That's
exactly the source of the most "irrational" of the criticism
of DFO science and of fisheries management as it now exists.
The "Cabot Martin factor" if you will, What Cabot's talking
about ....He isn't Bpeaking "rationally." He knows that.
He's speaking emotionally. His logic is based in CUlture
and tradition.
A: I don't know exactly what you mean when you say Cabot
Martin is speaking that way. A decision has been made,
right or wrong, that the outports of Newfoundland are
important to those who live there. And no matter what
happens in terms of licensing in the offshore. those
communities are going to be allowed to continue to exist
and, hopefUlly, to maybe do better than they are. And
that's why, in our management system, we have allowances for
the inshore and quotas for the offshore. So there is
flexibility there. And I think part of the flexibility is
that if, in fact, in any given year the allowances to the
inshore aren' t used because the fis~1 never came in, which is
one of the problems of the inshore fishery, the
reallocations can be made to the offshore fishery or other
inshore fisheries. So I think that while that is there,
its' a principal of fisheries m"3nagement.
It was certainly announced as one of the principalS of
the management system. If it's changed, then there's a
pol! tical upheaval and all sorts of hoohah in the press by
the inshore fishermen. And rightly so. They have problems.
Sometimes because the fish don't come in. Sometimes because
the stocks are low. Many other things. But they're always
going to have problems in some area of Newfoundland in the
inehore fishery. Historically there've always been areas
where the fish don't come in. So there's always going to be
one group of fishermen in trouble.
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The problem in the press comes up where you have a
spokesman like Martin that always takes the one place or the
dozen places it's bad and blows it up out of proportion.
Whereas this year, the fishermen in Torbay have never,
never, never done as well as they have this year!
0: But on the eas1: side of the Avalon, in Bauline and
Portugal Cove, it was a bad year.
A: Yes, a bad year. So Cabot Martin will. be spaaking, -The
stocks are down! The poor fishermen of Bauline!· So, you
know, ....
0: But one of my sources made an interesting point. He said
that up until the growth of the offshore trawler industry in
the 'sixties and 'seventies, that the inshore fishermen knew
that there would be good years and bad years. There'd always
been good years and bad years. They didn't know why but
they knew that the fish would come back. They always had.
They knew this too. It was an act of nature, an act of God.
whatever. But this person's analysis was that. for the
first time in the history of the inshore fishery, that in
the early 'eighties it began to dawn on 1:hem that there was
another, new factor at play here. And that was the
offshore. That we had the potential. to fish the stocks down
so hard that they might never come back. That it was no
longer an act of God or an act of nature whether they came
in or not. That it had a lot to do with how heavy the
Offshore, the draggers fished. And this realization was the
point at which the inshore becams radicalized and activist.
Before that they'd said, "Yes, they come and go. But
they'll always come back." Now they realized that they
could go and nsver come back.
A.: Well, I think some of that was political leadership of
course. Some of that was the Smallwood policy of get tha
fishermen ou1: of tha boats. A. lot of them did get out of
the boats and the number of fishermen dropped quite
dramatically. It went down to something liks 11,000 I
think. I don't remember the year now but I guess it was
'round tha 'seventies, sometime in the 'seventies. It's now
up around 35,000 again or some figure like that. So it'g a
three-fold increase.
Now that three-fold increase is not ths old timers.
That is mostly young people who can' t get a job anywhere
else. Because of this they no longer have any corporate
memory. There are few old timers left in this new induatry
and the "fa..;;ts· of years gone-by and the historical record
handed down through the years of the way the fishery was has
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been lost. You becallle a fishermen at ten and you listened
to the old timers talking until you became an old timer
yourself. The l.ore was passed on. And that's some of what
I was talking about earlier. Some of the lore was nonsense,
but years of success and failure ware remembered and the
fact that there were good years and bad years was one of the
things that the old timers all recognized.
1 think when you got this big expansion, three-fold
expansion, most of which were young peopl.e coming in who had
no historical reference to look at, they started to think
about other things. What is the cause?
And the poi-nt 1 always make about
recruitment ....Recruitment is the one thing we can't predict
in any way at all. It's vastly variable. People can
understand that the dogberries are good one year but the
next year they're terribh:. They understand that because
they can sea it. But somehow we've never been able to get
through to fishermen and others that recruitment of fish is
the same! There are good years and there are terrible
years.
Now, another thing that I think's helped that is the
squid. Squid used to have their ups and downs but they
never were longer than three years. Three years without the
squid was a very rare event historically. Now. we I ve
reached six years. Five or six years. J: 'm not sure of the
exact time. And that, again, is part of the lore saying
well, the squid seem to have gone. Maybe our fish will go
too. And, when there's B quota, if you can blame someone
else and get their section of a quota, that's good politics.
And that's what Cabot is doing to some extant. So you try
to push the things that will help you.
0: But isn't it a fact now that, if you have a particularly
tragic congruence of serious scientific errors, bad
management j udgemonts and factor in the fishing power of the
offshore fleet, in a year of two it 1s possible to fish the
stock down ... ,
A: Fish the stock down but not to extinction I
0: Not to bi.ological extinction but to a point where, given
the growth rates of cod ... three to five years to
recruitment, five to seven years to sexual. maturity.•• there
could be eight, ten years or more of real famine.
A: There could be. But there could be at any time even if
there's no fishery I And there was 1n historical times I It
always comes back to recruitment. You look at the
historical data and you can see failures for ten years. The
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thing just going down, down, down. There wa. no new
recru:1.tment for a ten year per.1od and of course the stocks
went way down without that. But they buil.t up again. ...nd
we've had per.iods .1n recent h.1story where there' a been
failures of f:1.ve years.
Q: The difference :I.e, yes. these events happened due to
fluctuations .in ocean climate conditions or whatever. But
that was with a very different gear technol.ogy. Up unt11
very recently we had hook and 1in. technology and no
electronics .• "•..
1\: That Illay be so but you can look at other stocks like the
North SeD stock. They've been dragg:l.ng it and dragging it
and dragging .it and they take the Ush that big! [holds
hands about a foot apart] And yet it i8 still one of the
most productive stocke there 1st recruitment happons to
have been good all the time. And the stock has never
collapsed, so to speak. The North Sea one. The Arcto-
Norweg:l.an stock io way down but the North Sea one has been
fished and fished and Ushed and it .is still prOViding a
large catch every year. Mind you, they're tiny fish.
Recru.itmant is what it comes down to!
Q: Recruitment and •...That's a relatively benign sea as I
understand. It's very shallow. It gets a lot of solar
energy. It's a r1.ch environment.
A: It's a very productive sea. There's no doubt about it.
e: But the northwest Atlantic, particularly off Labrador in
the 2J3KL area is certainly much less productive.
A: No doubt about it. But it still C0lD88 down to
recrui-tmentl No recruitment, no fish. We can try and
manage and we can try and do things the best we can but if
we don't get recrui1:111ent. we're screwedl
Q: So that argues for very, very conservative management.
1\: It doesn't necessarily.
0: No?
A: No. Herring is being managed ....
0: I am speaking of cod, not herring which are relatively
more fecund and shorter-lived. They have shorter cycles.
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A: Shorter cycles but not 811 that shorter. Relative to
2J3KL cod I guess they are but relative to 3NO coo. south
coast herring or Gulf herring ....We:U.• it'e clearly
something 1:hat more work needs done on. But that' B another
of the big gaps is the whole business 0 understanding
survival from the egg stage to when they settle on the
bottom. We know nothing! Absolute1y nothingl
0: As Jake put it. the average fema1e cod might expel, over
the course of the breeding season in several events, two
million to three mi1110n eggs. And the d.1fference between a
bust year and a boom year is two of those eggs recru.1. ting to
the fishery or eight. And you think sbout that in terms of
odds. One.1n a million versus four in a million. The
difference is so slight. You think about this statistically
and it seems hopeless for us to be able to understand, much
leS9 predict the influence of the variables or manage them.
A: We can'1: do anything about it and we'].l never be able to
predict it :r don't think. But 1 suppose that there are
things that we can do. We can do a bit more on •.. and Jake
has firm opinions on the fact that we're not affecting the
spawning stock by fishing it.
But certainly, 1 think that one of the things that
Cabot does have in his favour is that we should have done
some work on it. We should know something abOut it. We
shouldn't be relying entirely on other people's work. We
shouldn't be relying entirely on the historical side of it.
There are some direct things we could do and we shOUld have
done. We didn't do them, partly, because we didn't have
vessels. I think we identified them as problems.
People were worried about this back :Ln the 'fift:Les
because back in the 'f:1.fties was when the first winter
fishing started. The questions came up. With one vessel
what could we do? We did plan one program. 1 think it was
back in the 'sixties. trying to do some sort of ecologicsl
survey of survival of eggs and larva and drift rates and
things like that. But it was just a drop in the bucket.
And that's a big, complicated SUbject.
0: And yat absolutely critical. But it doesn't mattQr how
crit1.cal; it is if it's not doable given available
resources.
A: That's r:1.ght. We don't have the resources. We've got to
put our eggs where we can get answers. That's got to be one
of the criteria of the work that's to be done is, is it
reasonable to expect an answer form i t1 Is the work worth
doing to get an answer?
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0: [making polite noises to wind up the i.ntervi.ew and
SOli.citing recommendations as to other people I shOUld talk
tol
A: [re: Art May] He'd be well worth listening to. He has
the spectrum from the science to the Deputy Mi.nister. He'd
be one of the most valuable people you could talk to). And
he wae involved in the Kirby task force as well..
[a f ow words abou t Templeman]
It would have been nice if you could have talked to Dick
Well.s before he di.ed. He was one of the custodians of data
that overybody complai.nod about. 1. think you might get a
different perspective by talking to him. Tom Pitt retired
about four years ago and he was another of the custodians of
data. He worked with flatfi.sh. Wrote 8 lot of papers but
he was more the Old style. And certainly he was one of the
ones that people cOJlplained about hOlding all the data.
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